Russia’s War with NATO: Fantasy or Reality in the Near Future?
The end of last year gave rise to many optimistic scenarios for the development of the situation in Europe, linked to peace talks on ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, the analysts’ optimism proved groundless, as it became clear that Russia was not backing down from its ultimatums and that the USA was unable (or unwilling?) to force the Kremlin to compromise.
If we are not to fall into complete pessimism, the question remains as to what extent Vladimir Putin or his successors are prepared to accept a long-term “peace” with the West.
At the same time, most Western experts are currently discussing not the possibility of a potential Russian attack on one or more NATO member states, but are trying to predict the timeframe for such an attack.
In early February 2026, the Munich Security Conference released a report stating that the Russian Federation is ready to start a war with NATO six months after the ceasefire in Ukraine. The document points out that despite huge losses on the battlefield, devastating sanctions, Ukraine’s intensified strikes on Russian infrastructure, and growing international pressure to negotiate, the Kremlin shows no signs of giving up its maximalist goals.
Earlier, Bundeswehr Inspector General Carsten Breuer suggested that Russia could be militarily ready to attack a NATO member state by around 2029. Germany’s Armed Forces are expected to be sufficiently combat-ready by that time [1].
A similar view is shared by many NATO intelligence agencies and experts, who estimate Russia’s potential readiness to attack the Alliance in the range of 2027–2032. Similarly, most military-political analyses point to 2028–2029 as the period when Russia may be capable of expanding the war in Europe. For its part, NATO leadership assumes that by that time, the Organization will be fully prepared for such a development.
Speaking in December 2024 at an expanded meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense, its head, Andrei Belousov, declared “full readiness for any developments in the medium term. This includes a possible military conflict with NATO in Europe in the coming decade”. In other words, both the West and Moscow assume the possibility of war breaking out within the next ten years.
It is important to remember that open analytical materials on Russia’s plans and capabilities are also available to the Russian side. This means that local analysts and strategists may advise the military and political leadership to use the element of surprise even before reaching a critical point in the field of armaments.
This is particularly relevant given that the greatest threat to NATO is the current lack of transparency in Russia’s decision-making processes. Besides, caution should be exercised with regard to processes at the highest echelons of Russia’s political and military elite. Not to mention how emotionally stable the individuals responsible for these decisions are.
It is also necessary to take into account the weakening influence and positions of some of them, primarily due to the incompetent conduct of armed aggression against Ukraine after 2022. The history of wars has repeatedly shown that military conflicts do not always begin according to the plans of the aggressor state, which has reached the limits of its capabilities in terms of indicators such as production capacity, troop strength, supplies, and logistical reserves. Therefore, the specific dates currently proposed by analysts and the military serve as benchmarks and perform a dual function. First, they demonstrate the ability to observe a potential adversary and signal to them that NATO is making changes in the areas of deterrence and defense. Second, they serve as an internal signal within the framework of strategic communication with societies. In the latter case, it is important to remember that this type of military threat requires long-term investments that cannot be made solely on the basis of strong, extreme emotions such as fear. Rather, it is about developing a strategic base that allows even extreme scenarios to be accepted, provided that the necessary preparations are in place. It is worth noting that similar assessments of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region (primarily regarding the possibility of armed conflict over Taiwan) have existed for many years.
Some Western analysts believe that specific main directions of a potential Russian attack on NATO can be identified, including the Baltic Sea, NATO’s northern flank, and, for example, the Arctic.
The Baltic Sea and the Northern Flank – the Alliance’s Weak Spot
Based on numerous official Western declarations and scenarios of future conflict with Russia, an invasion of the Baltic states by 2030 is identified as the most likely theater of war, often involving the use of an increasing number of drones. Experts note a specific build-up of Russian military forces on the Finnish border – the appearance of new garrisons in Lupche-Savino and Sapernoye, the planned creation of a new army corps in Karelia, and the prospect of increasing the number of troops in the Leningrad Military District from approximately 30,000 to 100,000, including several hundred tanks.
This means that Russia is capable of simultaneously waging war in Ukraine and strengthening its capabilities on NATO’s northern flank. A series of incidents in the Baltic Sea is cause for concern: Russian-linked ships “Orel S” and “Vezhen” “accidentally” damaged undersea cables connecting Finland with Estonia and Sweden with Latvia [2], while a Russian Su-35 violated Estonian airspace. This is a deliberate test of the resilience of NATO member states and their preparedness for larger-scale provocations, which may include actions against infrastructure, cyberattacks, and the use of “little green men” in cooperation with local Kremlin supporters. Thus, Bundeswehr Inspector General Carsten Breuer considers the Suwalki Corridor to be the most “sensitive” area, which could become the site of a Russian attack on a Baltic state, potentially leading to a larger war with the USA [3].
With NATO’s expansion to include Finland and Sweden, the strategic position of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has improved. However, at present, the Baltic Sea and this region cannot be treated lightly as a so-called “NATO lakes”. First of all, the military resources of the Baltic states and the contingents of other NATO countries are still insufficient compared to the capabilities of Russian forces (potentially supported by Belarus) located across the border. Besides, Finland has a border with Russia that stretches for over a thousand kilometers, which could be vulnerable to all kinds of sabotage and other types of hostile activity. Today, the capabilities of other NATO countries to conduct operations in cooperation with Finland in this complex area are only beginning to strengthen [4].
Military experts emphasize that from Norway to Lithuania (and to a lesser extent Poland), the most challenging scenarios may not be full-scale invasions, but operations below the threshold of war. That is why all training exercises that involve, for example, the recapture of airports/ports, seaports (including ferry crossings), and urban combat (especially those that are crucial due to their border location and as places where national or regional decision-making processes are concentrated). For Russia, the most important task would be to call into question the significance of the response of NATO member states, commonly referred to as actions under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Even a few square kilometers occupied/seized by pro-Russian forces (similar to the aggression against Ukraine in 2014-2015) could have enormous implications for the future of NATO. Most importantly, Russia still has the ability to use its nuclear deterrent as leverage and negotiate from that position. Therefore, we cannot relax our perception of the threat in the Baltic Sea. The situation in the Black Sea is currently stabilized by Türkiye, but Russia perceives it differently than the Baltic states. This may further encourage Moscow’s desire to test its strength in this area.
The Arctic and Northwest Russia
After Finland and Sweden joined NATO and the Nordic countries signed defense cooperation agreements with the USA, the Americans gained access to nearly 50 bases in the region, including the Finnish village of Ivalo, located about 40 km from the Russian border and less than 200 km from Murmansk. This allows for the rapid deployment of short-range missiles (such as ATACMS/PrSM), which could threaten Northern Fleet bases and strategic submarines on the Kola Peninsula. According to some military analysts, the deployment of such systems could lead to a crisis comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, this time in the Arctic, and increase the risk of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia.
Indeed, the Arctic should not be forgotten today because of the events unfolding in Ukraine. First of all, because NATO and the USA are becoming increasingly assertive in their actions in the region. Russia understands that it can no longer impose its principles based on intimidation and militarization of the region. Moreover, changes in US military capabilities in the Arctic, for example, are too noticeable and change the rules of the game between superpowers [5].
Therefore, it is possible that Russia’s weakened position will prompt it to take preventive action due to its advantages and the need for surprise. In addition, the Arctic is important to the Americans, British, Northern European countries, and many other NATO members. There are also questions about China’s role in this region. The possibility of staging a new “Caribbean missile crisis” in the Arctic could be a tempting opportunity for the Kremlin, allowing it to strengthen its position (if not dominate, then at least limit the number of other players and their influence) and implement at least part of its regional agenda (especially with regard to the USA, but also China).
At this stage, it is worth considering (in a somewhat abbreviated and simplified form) how Russia could fight NATO. The potential aggressor currently has access to a fairly wide range of options, even taking into account the limitations resulting from the losses suffered in Ukraine.
A Short but Powerful Strike and a “Fait Accompli” [6]
One scenario involves Russia launching a limited ground strike against a NATO “weak spot” (e.g., the Baltic states) while simultaneously:
- Launching deep missile strikes and drone strikes on NATO logistics bases and critical infrastructure;
- Conducting an intensive information campaign;
- Using the threat of nuclear escalation to force the West to quickly agree to a ceasefire on Moscow’s terms.
The prerequisite for such a plan is a short, high-intensity campaign in which Russia seeks to impose an accomplished fact and prevent NATO from regaining the initiative. A possible attack on the Baltic states could take place without a single tank, relying instead on communication disruptions, drone attacks on infrastructure, and the appearance of unmarked armed units, so that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania “could wake up as part of Russia”.
Indeed, a limited strike could be a challenge for both NATO and individual member states if the Alliance does not have access to many indicators of readiness for action, or if they are disguised as routine military training.
That is why every Russian (Russian-Belarusian) military exercise is always closely monitored by intelligence services, and tools such as NATO’s own military maneuvers and combat readiness checks are increasingly being used. This model of action against the Baltic states takes into account their limited territorial space and, for example, the concentration of a number of decision-making processes in one or two key cities. Another problem is the relatively small population of these countries, which means that Russia has the ability to send troops capable not only of defeating local defense forces, but also of conducting “mopping-up” operations in the occupied territories. As a result, the Baltic countries lack the ability to maneuver or quickly transfer part of their resources and replenish them elsewhere. This was and remains one of the most important advantages of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the war with Russia.
This type of model is very dangerous for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (and to a lesser extent for Finland). However, Director General of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service Kaupo Rosin has stressed that there are currently no signs that Russia intends to attack any of the Baltic countries or, more broadly, NATO. At the same time, he added that his country must ensure that the situation does not change.
Missile and Drone Warfare and the Lessons of Ukraine
According to estimates by the US Institute for the Study of War, Russia plans to significantly increase production of T-90M/M2 tanks and modernize its large fleet of T-72 tanks by 2028, while limiting the use of tanks on the front lines and expanding the use of lighter formations and drones [7]. The Russian Federation seeks to conduct operations without massive armored formations and without complete air superiority, replacing these advantages with the massive use of missiles, drones, and electronic warfare capabilities to strike deep into the enemy’s rear. However, as some military experts point out, in a future conflict with NATO, Russia is unlikely to wage a classic conventional war, but will combine limited ground operations, UAV attacks, and hybrid operations against critical infrastructure.
After four years of combat operations in Ukraine, the Russians have realized their operational and tactical weaknesses. The armed conflict they are planning with larger conventional forces should take into account the lessons learnt there. Of course, there may be doubts about the quality of the implementation of the lessons learnt, the quality of training based on them, and the quality of human resources. One thing is certain: Russia’s readiness will be much less “optimistic” than it was before 2022. Therefore, we should expect the Russian Federation to look for weaknesses in the defense capabilities of NATO countries, rather than attempting to impose its own rules of engagement in accordance with outdated combat regulations. There is a clear desire to exploit the advantages of new unmanned systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and reconnaissance and sabotage groups.
This is particularly relevant given that the West continues to emphasize its shortcomings in its ability to deploy troops on a large scale and counter attacks by UAVs or missile systems on its own cities. The ability of citizens to withstand such campaigns, which would paralyze their normal existence if critical infrastructure were hit, remains an open question. There is also ongoing debate in Europe about how acceptable losses in its own armed forces are (the statement by French General Fabien Mandon [8] was widely commented on). In this conflict, Russia could seek to inflict losses that are unacceptable to the West from the point of view of certain political and social values, rather than a classic defeat in one or more decisive battles.
Hybrid “War of Never Ending Preparation”
Russia’s hybrid warfare, including disinformation, cyberattacks, sabotage, and provocations below the threshold of war, is not an episode but a permanent element of the Kremlin’s strategy, rooted in the tradition of “active measures”. Russia uses hybrid operations, particularly against the Baltic states and Poland: from cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns to incidents involving UAVs, sabotage of railway and energy infrastructure, and “mysterious” damage to underwater infrastructure. Such operations (from “strange” infrastructure failures to “unexplained” behavior of ships and vehicles) are designed to gather information about the vulnerabilities, response times, and crisis procedures of NATO countries, which can then be used in a large-scale operation during a crisis. In this sense, Russia is already waging a kind of “pre-war” with NATO, testing the Alliance’s resilience and cohesion.
The concept of hybrid operations is very problematic in itself. On the one hand, even if Russia agrees to some form of “peace” agreement with Ukraine, it will in no way stop using them against other countries. Especially those that are key to NATO’s northeastern flank, including Poland. Moreover, the end of full-scale aggression against Ukraine could actually increase the number of Russian operations (or operations under a foreign flag) in the cyber, information, and cognitive domains, not to mention the scale of sabotage activities. The goal is to emphasize Russia’s dominance and punish its biggest opponents. However, on the other hand, there is an internal problem with defining concepts that contain the term “hybrid”.
Terms such as “hybrid warfare” and “hybrid operations” are regularly used in public and media debates. As a result, the formula itself has become very vague, simplified, and applied to almost everything. The Russian approach (in this case) involves maneuvering in the gray areas of security and defense, and the excess of “hybrid warfare” in the West may further facilitate this task. However, this does not change the fact that the Russians will act below the threshold of war, regardless of whether they ultimately seek escalation (intentional or accidental) to conflict or open war. In any case, one should assume a high level of espionage activity by the Russian Federation, its ability to conduct various covert operations, and its attempts to seek tools to undermine the sense of security of individual countries. It should be noted that Russia has achieved significant success in this regard, provoking an artificial migration crisis since 2021 and currently forcing Poland, for example, to conduct large-scale checks on railway lines. It is also important to note the problems associated with the threat to airspace posed by UAVs and, more recently, balloons [10].
The Nuclear Dimension – the Risk of Escalation
Despite NATO’s superiority in conventional weapons, it is precisely this superiority that creates the risk of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons if a series of defeats threatens it with complete defeat. As noted above, some military analysts believe that the potential deployment of US missile systems in northern Norway or Finland, which would enable a rapid strike against Russian strategic submarines, could be perceived by Moscow as a threat of a “disarming strike” and provoke a response similar to the Caribbean missile crisis.
There are also other expert opinions that for Russia, actions related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (including tactical nuclear weapons) are primarily aimed at psychological effect. This is particularly relevant given that, in case of the use of nuclear weapons, Russia would have to face not only the USA, the UK, and France, but also other states that possess such weapons (China, India, and even Pakistan). Russia’s use of WMD could weaken the nuclear deterrence potential of those states. Of course, during the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, Russia’s nuclear threats were more reminiscent of those made by North Korea, but international politics is still an arena where intimidation or nuclear shielding takes place. It must be acknowledged that it is quite difficult to give a definitive answer to the question of the degree of preparedness and readiness of Russian forces using WMD. In any case, Russia’s efforts to focus on nuclear weapons are already well understood by other countries and are increasingly failing to elicit the response that the Kremlin expects from other players, particularly in Europe. It is worth noting that only recently, the mere announcement of any actions related to the use of WMD caused panic and fear, reminiscent, for example, of the intimidation of NATO’s eastern flank states by the transfer of nuclear warheads and carriers to Belarus or Kaliningrad region.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
Notes:
[1] In November 2025, 200 experts prepared a report for the Bundeswehr, according to which it became clear that Germany (in particular, the country’s healthcare system) was not yet ready for a possible war. The armed forces remain understaffed and technically backward. They are short of about 80,000 military personnel out of the planned 260,000, which they plan to recruit over the next decade.
[2] At the same time, NATO member states do not have a unified position on Russia’s actions. During a parliamentary hearing on this issue, Director of Bulgaria’s State Agency for National Security Plamen Tonchev stated that he had no information that the Bulgarian crew members of the “Vezhen”, detained in Sweden, included foreign intelligence agents or individuals who had committed criminal acts. He clarified that his country’s partner intelligence services had no information that the incident with the damaged fiber optic cable was an act of sabotage. Plamen Tonchev added that, apart from the cable used by Latvia, a cable belonging to a country unfriendly to NATO had also been damaged in the same area.
[3] The Suwalki Corridor is a geopolitical term used in NATO terminology (in US military terminology, the “SK Corridor”) to refer to the territory around the Polish cities of Suwalki, Augustów, and Sejny, which connects the Baltic countries with Poland and the rest of NATO, and also separates Russia’s Kaliningrad region and Belarus (approximately 65–100 km). According to the US military, the region is one of the most potentially volatile hot spots in Europe. It is considered one of the most vulnerable areas for NATO, as its capture by Russia could lead to the isolation of the Baltic countries from the rest of the Alliance. US representatives point to infrastructural and organizational shortcomings that prevent NATO countries from responding quickly enough in case of a threat in that area, citing intelligence information indicating that Russia and Belarus are interested in the area in case of an escalation of a potential conflict with NATO countries.
[4] The Russian side cynically accuses Finland of strengthening its defenses, “forgetting” that it was the Russian Federation’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine that caused this country to abandon its long-standing neutral status. Thus, Russian Ambassador to Finland Pavel Kuznetsov has stated that “Helsinki’s decision to withdraw from the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction is just one in a long chain of steps towards the accelerated and large-scale militarization of the country. Helsinki has long made no secret of the fact that one of the key elements of the country’s new course is, in fact, preparation for war with Russia”. But it is precisely the Kremlin’s neo-imperial policy that is forcing Finland to increase its military spending to 3% of GDP by 2029 and to 5% by 2035. On January 1, 2026, the government of Finland raised the age of service in the Armed Forces to 65, which will allow the number of reservists to reach one million by 2031. Funding for military training of the population is increasing, and the number of training grounds and shooting ranges in the country is growing. Finland is purchasing new types of weapons, modernizing its naval capabilities, upgrading its fleet of multi-role fighters, and planning a large-scale program to upgrade its land forces.
[5] Back in 2021, the USA published its new strategy for restoring Arctic dominance, which led to a reorganization of its forces and priorities in Alaska. The USA’s military activity includes the use of strategic facilities such as the Pituffik Space Base in Greenland. During the “Arctic Edge-2025” exercise, high-altitude reconnaissance aerostats capable of observing large areas from an altitude of 30 km were tested, which increases situational awareness in extreme conditions. The USA conducts regular joint exercises (e.g., with Canada) to practice combat readiness, relying on cooperation within NATO. The main focus is on controlling the Northern Sea Route and countering the influence of Russia, which is also expanding its infrastructure in the region.
[6] “Fait accompli” (from French, “accomplished fact”) – an event that has already happened and cannot be changed. The term is used to describe actions that are unacceptable from an international legal point of view, aimed at creating, in circumvention of international legal norms, a situation in which one event or another would be accepted as a fait accompli without the possibility of returning the event to its original state, i.e., when the “point of no return” has already been passed.
[7] In December 2024, at an expanded meeting of the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, its head, Andrei Belousov, proposed, in accordance with Vladimir Putin’s instructions, to form a drone force. In November 2025, the creation of this new branch of the armed forces was completed.
[8] A speech by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of France, General Fabien Mandon, in November 2025 on readiness for conflict with Russia sparked heated debate across the country. According to him, Moscow is preparing for military confrontation with the West by 2030. The general stressed that although France has the economic power to win a potential conflict, its society lacks the resilience necessary for proper self-defense. The far-left party La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) accused Fabien Mandon of spreading a bellicose narrative. The far-right National Rally party, for its part, said that Russia does not currently pose a serious threat to France. The country’s Minister of the Armed Forces, Catherine Vautrin, defended the Commander, stressing that he has the right to express his opinion on threats.
[9] Active measures are covert or deceptive actions carried out to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. Their aim was to influence foreign public opinion, as well as the actions of individuals, state and public organizations.
[10] In late January and early February 2026, Poland repeatedly recorded violations of its airspace by balloons moving from Belarus. The Polish military classifies this as an element of hybrid activity and considers it part of Russia and Belarus’ preparations for war with NATO.
