The Change of Government in Hungary and Its Implications for Europe, Ukraine, and Russia
The change in Hungary’s government following the parliamentary elections may influence future Hungarian policy, particularly regarding the abandonment of pro-Russian, anti-European, and anti-Ukrainian stances;
This is important for our country, as it will remove obstacles to European support for Ukraine, thereby strengthening its ability to counter Russia;
This topic should be considered in light of existing assessments and forecasts. Although they take on new significance when viewed in a comprehensive manner;
Precisely because of the topic’s relevance, the analysis is presented in two parts. The first part addresses the characteristics of Viktor Orbán’s personality, peculiarities of his rule, and the 2026 parliamentary elections, while the second part focuses on Hungary’s future policy.
Part I. Background. Viktor Orbán’s 16 Years in Power and His Loss of Control
From Europe and Democracy to Russia and a “Mafia State”
Viktor Orbán’s role as the chief advocate of Russia’s interests in Europe is everybody’s knowledge. However, he was not always this way, as he began his political career as a supporter of Hungary’s European and democratic development and of freeing the country from Moscow’s long-standing control.
For example, in 1988, Viktor Orbán was one of the founders of the Alliance of Young Democrats, which brought together young people with anti-communist and anti-Soviet views. The Alliance later evolved into the Fidesz party – the Hungarian Civic Alliance (in Hungarian, Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség).
Viktor Orbán’s political popularity began to rise significantly after he spoke at the reburial ceremony for Imre Nagy and other Hungarian political figures executed in 1958 following the suppression of the 1956 anti-communist uprising in Hungary. In that speech, he called for free elections in the country and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. As leader of the Fidesz party, Orbán opposed nationalism, defended civil society, and countered the church’s influence on politics. In this way, he gradually strengthened his political position and bolstered the party’s political role in Hungary. In 1990, in the first free parliamentary elections in post-Soviet history held in Hungary, the Fidesz party received about 9% of the vote and formed its own parliamentary faction.
At the same time, due to his peculiar behavior – in particular, his attempts to enrich himself without any moral scruples – V. Orbán fell under the influence of the Hungarian, and later the Soviet, mafia, which was linked to the KGB of the USSR and tasked with recruiting foreign politicians. This is precisely how V. Orbán became the champion of Soviet, and later Russian, interests in Hungary and Europe.
In 1997–1998, following numerous media investigations, it became known how the FSB of the Russian Federation, which had replaced the KGB, actively facilitated V. Orbán’s rise to power. This was done by financing the election campaign of the Fidesz party. The funds were transferred through the head of the Russian mafia, S. Mogilevich, and his subordinate I. Korol, one of the leaders of organized criminal groups in Hungary.
The then-chief of police in the Hungarian capital, S. Pinter, was also financially supported by the mafia and, at its behest, halted important investigations. After V. Orbán for the first time became Prime Minister of Hungary, this police officer was appointed Minister of the Interior. Thus, with V. Orbán’s assistance, local and Russian criminal organizations gained complete freedom of action in Hungary. V. Orbán himself and his government began implementing corrupt schemes with Russia regarding the supply of its oil and gas to Hungary.
At the same time, at that point, Viktor Orbán was still actively pursuing a course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration for the country. At the time, Russia was not yet able to exert significant influence over him and did not stand in the way of Hungary’s course, since democratic forces were still in power in Moscow. Moreover, Russia’s economy was still in crisis, so it was interested in maintaining constructive relations with Europe and the USA, which were providing it with loans. Therefore, under V. Orbán’s leadership, Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and was preparing to join the EU.
However, Moscow did not forget about Viktor Orbán and provided him with financial support, particularly during the 2002 parliamentary elections in Hungary. The bet was placed “on the long term”. But Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party suffered a defeat.
Lessons were learned. In 2009–2010, Russia, in addition to funding his election campaign, assisted in organizing campaign events. His campaign was based on promises to address the country’s economic problems, which were a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. And as early as 2010, the Fidesz party won the elections again, and V. Orbán returned to the post of Prime Minister of Hungary. Since then, he had managed to remain in power for 16 years…
All this time, Moscow had V. Orbán firmly in its grip, using compromising information against him regarding his ties to organized crime. However, V. Orbán himself was interested in Russia’s support and in obtaining cheap oil and gas from it. As before, the joint corrupt activities of V. Orbán, his government, and the Russian leadership were based on trade in energy resources. That is precisely why V. Orbán refused to diversify energy carriers, which contradicted the EU’s policy of reducing Europe’s energy dependence on Russia. And to conceal his true interests on this matter, he claimed that oil and gas prices in Europe were higher than those offered by Moscow. He also pointed out Hungary’s lack of access to maritime terminals. Although, in reality, this could have been done via Poland and Romania, which was what had been proposed to Budapest.
According to a number of experts, it was then that V. Orbán began building a “mafia state” in Hungary, where all power effectively belonged to a group linked to the Fidesz party and to him personally. And Hungary became the most corrupt country in Europe. All these factors enabled Moscow to make Viktor Orbán a champion of its interests within the European Union and NATO. However, in the early stages, his work on behalf of Russia was not particularly pronounced. For the most part, he merely created obstacles to Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration under the pretext of alleged violations of the rights of ethnic Hungarians living on its territory. And in order to strengthen his position within Hungary, counter the opposition, and conceal his criminal activities, V. Orbán began rolling back democracy in the country. Specifically, this involves the suppression of the media: the transfer of various private media assets to the newly created KESNA, which reports directly to the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, and the establishment of the MTVA Foundation, which consolidated four state-owned media companies and acquired the exclusive right to produce news content for public broadcasting. This also concerned violations of the independence of the judicial system, the redrawing of electoral districts in the interests of Viktor Orbán’s clear supporters so that a specific candidate would gain an advantage in single-member district elections, and so on. Furthermore, he began imposing a chauvinistic ideology on Hungarian society by promoting the idea of reviving “Greater Hungary, comprising all the territories it has lost”. This also referred to Ukraine’s Zakarpatska region, where efforts began to stir up separatist sentiments among ethnic Hungarians within the local population.
In response to Viktor Orbán’s violations of European norms and principles, EU leaders froze EUR 19 billion in loans to Hungary.
Following Russia’s first attack on Ukraine in February 2014, Viktor Orbán shifted his policy toward a more pro-Russian stance, a move that was clearly made at Moscow’s insistence. He opposed the European Union’s imposition of sanctions against Putin’s regime for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and provocation of the conflict in the Donbas.
At the same time, Viktor Orbán still did not dare to defy Europe, as Hungary was heavily dependent on the EU. Therefore, he did not recognize the “Russian” status of Crimea and the self-proclaimed “republics” in the Donbas, and was also forced to vote in favor of anti-Russian sanctions and other EU decisions regarding Russia.
Viktor Orbán’s policy became openly pro-Russian only with the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022. Thus, he began consistently blocking all EU and NATO decisions related to putting pressure on Russia, providing aid to Ukraine, and strengthening European defense.
He tried to argue that the sanctions imposed on Russia were harming the European Union itself, and that aid to Ukraine was only prolonging the war. At this, he implied that Ukraine itself was to blame for the war because it had attacked the Donbas. Orbán also insisted on the need to restore relations with Russia, claiming that Russia posed no military threat to Europe and that, therefore, there was no need to increase military spending.
He has also stepped up his efforts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine’s Zakarpatska region, with the aim of diverting our country’s attention and resources away from the front lines and disrupting military conscription in that region. To this end, Hungary intensified its information campaign, attempting to turn ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine against the Ukrainian authorities and incite them to refuse military service.
Viktor Orbán also accused Ukraine of deliberately obstructing oil supplies to Hungary via the “Druzhba” pipeline. However, any interruptions in the pipeline’s operation were exclusively the result of Russia’s military actions.
He held the same negative attitude to EU leadership. V. Orbán accused the EU of restricting Hungary’s freedom of action, interfering in its internal affairs, and forcing it to abandon Russian energy carriers, which could undermine the country’s economy. He often spoke of excessive spending of European funds to aid Ukraine, funds that would be better directed toward solving the European Union’s own problems.
And that’s not all. As it later became clear, Orbán and his ministers systematically passed on classified information about the European Union’s plans to Moscow. This allowed Russia to react to them in advance in its own interests. It is evident that this was also done with NATO’s military plans. However, even without that, V. Orbán maintained direct contact with Putin. Since the start of the war in 2022, they have met at least four times.
At the same time, V. Orbán has become a sort of magnet for other pro-Russian politicians in Central and Eastern Europe. One of V. Orbán’s allies is Slovak Prime Minister R. Fico, who has coordinated his pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian activities with him. Close behind them is Czech Prime Minister A. Babiš, although he has so far refrained from taking active measures against Ukraine and from directly supporting Russia. In addition to Moscow, V. Orbán has been supported by US President D. Trump and his administration, who have their own interests regarding him. Indeed, D. Trump used him to weaken Europe by undermining its unity. This was done to prevent Europe from consolidating itself as a separate global power center and competitor to America, as well as to strengthen America’s influence over it. The substance of these actions is outlined in the USA’s National Security Strategy, which was adopted in December 2025.
Russia and the USA’s interests regarding Viktor Orbán in Hungary essentially coincided, so they effectively coordinated their actions. Thus, in October 2025, a meeting between Putin and Trump was announced in Budapest to discuss a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Hungary was chosen specifically to boost Viktor Orbán’s image. However, due to Moscow’s refusal to make concessions, the meeting did not take place.
According to some European experts, another group that supported Viktor Orbán was the owners of major German companies in the oil and gas, chemical, and automotive sectors. They are interested in restoring ties with Russia to further their business interests. Without this, Orbán simply could not have acted at his own discretion in defiance of the EU’s course. However, before the start of the immediate preparations by Hungary’s political forces for the parliamentary elections in April of this year, the EU leadership still managed to influence Orbán and unblock the processes of imposing new sanctions against Russia and providing further aid packages to Ukraine.
The Collapse of Viktor Orbán’s Regime As a Failure of His Ideology
These issues came to the fore during the preparation and conduct of the parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2026. Specifically, they manifested in the election campaigns of the main contenders and the actions of Russia, the United States, and the European Union.
Thus, in their rhetoric, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party criticized Ukraine and the EU leadership, which they allegedly blamed for all of Hungary’s problems. In this context, the aforementioned narratives were repeated, amplified by Viktor Orbán’s explicit promises to support Russia’s policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Ukraine was aggressively demonized as a cautionary example for Hungary. According to many experts, it seemed as though Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was Viktor Orbán’s main opponent in those elections.
The Hungarian leadership’s propaganda campaign was accompanied by actions that were effectively anti-Ukrainian. In particular, Viktor Orbán blocked the EU’s decision to grant Ukraine a EUR 90 billion loan, as well as the adoption of the 20th package of sanctions against Russia. All of this was done on Moscow’s clear instructions with the aim of depriving Ukraine of the ability to resist Russian aggression and to prevent Russia from incurring additional losses due to new European sanctions. However, at the official level, he described this move as a response to Ukraine’s alleged deliberate shutdown of the “Druzhba” oil pipeline. As V. Orbán claimed, Ukraine was attempting to influence the outcome of the Hungarian elections by creating an artificial economic crisis in the country. The oil pipeline was indeed not functioning, but not because of Ukraine, but as a result of a Russian strike on an oil pumping station near the Ukrainian city of Brody.
In response to this Hungarian stance, EU leadership blocked the provision of another EUR 16 billion loan to Hungary. As a result, the total amount of funds that Hungary could have received but did not receive due to V. Orbán’s pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian policies amounted to EUR 35 billion.
Budapest also engaged in direct provocations against Ukraine. For example, on March 5 of this year, the Hungarian National Tax and Customs Administration detained seven cash collectors from Ukraine’s Oschadbank on allegations of money laundering. At the same time, $40 million, EUR 35 million, and 9 kg of gold were seized from them, all of which were being transported entirely legally from Raiffeisen Bank, Austria, to Ukraine. Based on a completely fabricated case, Hungary’s leadership accused Ukraine of interfering in the Hungarian elections by financing the opposition.
The election campaign of his main rival, P. Magyar, leader of the “Tisza” party, was entirely different. He promised that Hungary would return to full participation in the European Union and NATO, and that the suspended aid to Ukraine would be unblocked. At this, he called Russia an adversary of Europe and Hungary.
The election campaign in Hungary was accompanied by massive rallying activity by supporters and opponents of both candidates, who had sharply opposing slogans. At the same time, clashes between them were successfully avoided. Young people, who want change in the country, were the most active. Moreover, some young people promised to leave Hungary if no changes took place.
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s anti-European, anti-Ukrainian, and pro-Russian policies have failed. Overall, Hungarian society has finally come to realize what Russia is all about and the war it has unleashed against Ukraine. Furthermore, Viktor Orbán has discredited himself through his corrupt activities and his inability to address the country’s economic problems, which have only grown worse. Consequently, Viktor Orbán began to lose the support of Hungarian society, while his main political opponent, Péter Magyar, saw his support grow, as demonstrated by the results of opinion polls.
Naturally, Russia could not allow this to happen. In addition to providing V. Orbán with financial assistance for his election campaign, a group of Russian political strategists was also sent to Hungary. This group was led from Moscow by S. Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Russian President’s Administration. He is considered an expert on interfering in elections in other countries. Recently, he has been involved in this regarding the presidential elections in Romania in 2024–2025 (held in two rounds, as the results of the first round were annulled due to fraud) and the parliamentary elections in Moldova in 2025.
Donald Trump also attempted to assist Viktor Orbán. On the eve of the elections, he sent US Vice President J. Vance to Hungary. Vance spoke at a joint press conference with Viktor Orbán and openly supported him. Incidentally, at that time, he also accused Ukraine of interfering in the elections in the USA and Hungary.
However, neither anti-Ukrainian and anti-European rhetoric, nor demonstrations of loyalty to Russia, nor support for Putin and Donald Trump helped Viktor Orbán. The majority of Hungarians did not vote for him. And the population’s desire for change was confirmed by the high voter turnout, which reached 80%. This was one of the most compelling indicators in Hungary’s entire post-Soviet history, confirming the importance of such elections for Hungarian society.
Péter Magyar’s “Tisza” party won, garnering 53.5% of the vote, while Viktor Orbán’s “Fidesz” party received only 39%. In other words, “Tisza” holds a constitutional majority. This guarantees P. Magyar the position of Prime Minister.
Based on his campaign platform, Hungary’s course is set to change, which will be important both for Hungary itself and for Europe and Ukraine. We will examine this issue in more detail in the next section.
Thus, over the course of his political career, Viktor Orbán has gone from being one of the leaders of Hungary’s democratic forces and a supporter of its European course to a champion of Russia’s interests in Europe and the de facto head of the Hungarian mafia. As a result, his loss of power is entirely logical, as Hungarian society did not approve of his leadership.
The parliamentary elections in Hungary marked the end of the Orbán era, which will most likely lead to a shift in the country’s policy, including a return to active participation in NATO and the EU, as well as a departure from a pro-Russian course and an end to the blocking of aid to Ukraine.
As for Russia, it has also lost and seen its influence wane in Hungary, and with it, effectively, throughout all of Central and Eastern Europe. This is a continuation of Moscow’s failed interference in elections in other countries. Please, be reminded that last year, its proxies suffered defeats in Romania and Moldova.
Along with Russia, US President Donald Trump also lost, as he is becoming a toxic figure for Europe. The negative attitude of Hungarians, as part of the European community, to him was confirmed by US Vice President Jeff Vance’s visit to Hungary on the eve of the country’s parliamentary elections. After that, Viktor Orbán’s approval rating dropped even further.
A change in government in Hungary will have positive consequences for Hungary itself, for Europe, and, we hope, for Ukraine. Hungary will strengthen its international standing and economy, Europe will become more united and stronger, and Ukraine will enhance its ability in confrontation with Russia thanks to European assistance.
This turn of events will undoubtedly cement a turning point in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Russian Armed Forces are still actively conducting offensive operations on the front lines, but their effectiveness has declined. The Russian economy’s capacity to sustain the war has also diminished. And now Russia is also losing its ability to politically influence Europe regarding its support for Ukraine.
Yurii Mykhailenko,
Institute for Global Politics
