In recent years, we have increasingly seen the phenomenon of states disclosing classified intelligence information to the public or to specific groups of recipients (allies, international organizations). The aim of such actions is not only to deter potential adversaries from aggression, but also to influence the awareness and mood of the international community. On the one hand, this can help build coalitions against actions that are perceived as hostile or destabilizing, but on the other hand, it raises serious questions about the politicization of intelligence, source protection, and the long-term consequences of disclosing state secrets.<\/p>\n
This phenomenon has been discussed, in particular, by Joakim Brattvoll, an expert at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies who specializes in Russian foreign and security policy, and Ben Scott, Senior Advisor at the National Security College [1]. In their publications, they presented the evolution of the phenomenon of strategic intelligence disclosure and discussed its main goals, risks, and future consequences. Their analyses point to the growing role played by the public use of intelligence in international relations.<\/p>\n
Traditionally, intelligence information has remained hidden from the public. Intelligence services (especially in democracies) were responsible for supporting political decision makers with analyses, forecasts and conclusions that would enable them to make the right security decisions. The disclosure of this information was considered an exception, usually occurring only after many years (e.g., retroactively declassified documents).<\/p>\n
During the Cold War, there were cases of selective disclosure of intelligence, such as the confrontation between the USA and the USSR in 1962 over the Cuban Missile Crisis [2], or the presentation of satellite images that were supposed to prove the enemy\u2019s military intentions. However, the prevailing belief was that intelligence should be seen as the \u201clast line\u201d of defense for the state, and that only fragments of information or evidence should be disclosed in order to protect own sources.<\/p>\n
Since the end of the Cold War, the security architecture has changed, which, combined with the development of modern technology, has led to a redefinition of the role of intelligence services. They are increasingly faced with the challenge of responding quickly to hybrid threats, cyberattacks, and social media propaganda. In such a situation, the release of key intelligence data can help to gain an advantage in information wars or rally allies.<\/p>\n
According to Joakim Brattvoll\u2019s conclusions published in NATO Review-2024, the events related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were a turning point for the current policy of classified information disclosure. On December 3, 2021, the Washington Post published confidential intelligence reports showing that Russia was preparing for a large-scale military offensive against Ukraine with up to 175,000 troops. That publication, as noted by The Time magazine, was the beginning of an unprecedented information campaign by the United Kingdom and the United States aimed at publicly disclosing classified information to counter Russian propaganda and warn the world about Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s aggressive intentions.<\/p>\n
By February 23, 2022, according to BBC News, the US and UK intelligence services had released eight sets of information exposing Russia\u2019s plans to invade Ukraine. That activity was unprecedented in its scale, frequency, and strategic use of classified data. Until then, intelligence agencies had rarely dared to provide such extensive information to public opinion, as the basic principle of intelligence services is to keep their sources and methods of work secret.<\/p>\n
The use of this new approach to intelligence sharing had clearly defined strategic goals. The initial goal was to deter Russia from invading by removing the element of surprise, but after that effort failed, the focus shifted to building unity among NATO allies. Public disclosure of information allowed the international community to react more quickly and NATO countries to coordinate diplomatic and military actions more easily.<\/p>\n
Then US and British intelligence agencies began to release additional details, including satellite data and analysis, that confirmed Russia\u2019s readiness to attack. However, as Ben Scott describes in his article published in Lawfare Media-2024, public communications by US officials based on intelligence led to rapid mobilization of allies in NATO and the European Union, speeding up, among other things, the coordination of sanctions and planning for military aid to Ukraine. Although the disclosure did not stop the invasion itself, it undoubtedly helped to consolidate Western support and create a common front.<\/p>\n
According to Joakim Brattvoll, the strategy of public intelligence sharing is not limited to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In recent years, information has also been made public, for example, on China\u2019s military potential in the Taiwan Strait and Iran\u2019s activities in the Middle East. The goal may be to quickly counteract the spread of hostile propaganda or to deter potential aggressors by demonstrating that their movements are being closely monitored.<\/p>\n
Deterrence:<\/strong> In many cases, the main motivation is to prevent armed conflict by showing that the enemy\u2019s intentions are known and that the element of surprise cannot be achieved.<\/p>\n Uniting Allies:<\/strong> Public disclosure of intelligence can persuade partners and the public of the reality of the threat, strengthening coalition cohesion and facilitating coordinated actions.<\/p>\n Fighting Disinformation:<\/strong> In the era of the Internet and social media, the rapid release of facts (e.g., about a false flag operation [3]) can demoralize the enemy and deprive him of a propaganda tool.<\/p>\n Creating an Image of Trust:<\/strong> as Ben Scott points out, a state that decides to declassify some data can show that it \u201chas reliable information and is willing to stand up for the truth\u201d.<\/p>\n Politicization of Intelligence.<\/strong> Both Brattvoll and Scott, as well as former CIA officials David Gio [4] and Michael Morell [5], who have commented on this topic, warn of the danger that disclosure can quickly become a political tool. Public decision makers may choose only the information that reinforces their propaganda message, leaving out other key elements. As a result, the public receives a distorted image that jeopardizes the reputation of intelligence services as neutral analysts.<\/p>\n Protection of Sources and Methods.<\/strong> Any declassification carries the risk of revealing how the data were obtained. This can lead to the disclosure of sources of intelligence (HUMINT), losses in technological infrastructure (SIGINT, satellites), or disclosure of intelligence analysis methods. As a result, the adversary may change its behavior and make it more difficult for intelligence services to collect further information.<\/p>\n Disinformation and Information Warfare.<\/strong> While the disclosure of information can be effective in disrupting the enemy\u2019s narrative, reckless or excessive use of this tool risks causing confusion in the public space. As emphasized by Brattvoll, the ever-increasing amount of data, massive leaks (e.g., the case of Edward Snowden [6]), and the use of artificial intelligence to generate fake news and bots complicate the information situation. The public may end up believing that every news story is propaganda, even if it is backed by verified intelligence.<\/p>\n Maintaining Professionalism and Objectivity.<\/strong> Ben Scott emphasizes the need for institutional safeguards to ensure that intelligence services can operate outside of short-sighted party policy. Care should be taken to ensure that decisions to disclose information are not made haphazardly, but are based on an analysis of the implications for sources and methods and a full understanding of the impact on allies.<\/p>\n Formalization of Declassification Procedures<\/strong>. As Joakim Brattvoll points out, the growing number of requests for \u201clowering the level\u201d of secrecy should encourage state authorities to create clear procedures in which security and legal experts play a key role. This is to prevent situations where information is disclosed for purely political or personal reasons.<\/p>\n Strengthening Cooperation Of Allies<\/strong>. Since the main aim of disclosure is to unite partners, states should seek to strengthen intelligence cooperation at the multilateral level (NATO, the EU). This can ensure greater confidence in the data provided and increase public trust in it.<\/p>\n Response to the Information War.<\/strong> In the face of disinformation, diplomacy and online manipulation, rapid and transparent counteraction is crucial. However, the mere release of intelligence will not be enough if it is not accompanied by explanations and training of the public on how to recognize false content.<\/p>\n Mass Digitization and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT).<\/strong> In an era when huge amounts of data are publicly available (e.g., satellite imagery from private companies), the role of classical intelligence is evolving. According to Ben Scott, intelligence agencies will increasingly combine open sources with classified data to create a full picture of the situation. But the question arises: will \u201csecret\u201d information continue to have the same value in such a situation?<\/p>\n Development of Artificial Intelligence.<\/strong> Generative language models, automatic image analysis systems are tools that can support the intelligence community, but also potentially deceive it (for example, by creating convincing fake evidence). The growing scale of information threats may prompt more countries to resort to even greater disclosure to discredit the enemy\u2019s narratives.<\/p>\n A Blueprint for a New \u201cInformation Order\u201d.<\/strong> As pointed out by Joakim Brattvoll, if the practice of information disclosure continues and spreads, a certain informal \u201cconsensus\u201d may emerge in international relations, in which some key intelligence is automatically made public to jointly counter aggression or propaganda. However, this requires mutual trust and better risk control mechanisms.<\/p>\n Disclosure of strategic intelligence information has become an important tool of foreign and security policy. These actions, which have been intensively used by, among others, the United States and the United Kingdom in response to Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine, confirm that sharing some classified information can<\/p>\n