{"id":29474,"date":"2025-05-12T05:00:07","date_gmt":"2025-05-12T02:00:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=29474"},"modified":"2025-05-12T09:04:05","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T06:04:05","slug":"vijna-chi-mir-gluxij-kut-dlya-rosi%d1%97","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/vijna-chi-mir-gluxij-kut-dlya-rosi%d1%97\/","title":{"rendered":"War or Peace: a Dead End for Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"

War or Peace: a Dead End for Russia<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Russia is faced with a dilemma: should it end the war or continue it to a \u201cvictorious end\u201d? In both cases, it will have extremely negative consequences for itself. Under any circumstances, these consequences will be an aggravation of the socio-economic and political situation in the country, which could lead to massive unrest among the population. The threat of a crisis in the country will force Moscow to take harsh measures, such as restrictions on civil liberties, repression, and increased state control over the country\u2019s economy. As a result, Russia will resemble something like the USSR of the 1930s or modern North Korea. This will determine the nature of future relations between Russia and Ukraine.<\/em><\/p>\n

One way or another, however, Putin will be forced to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. He simply will have no choice because of the rapid deterioration of the Russian economy since the beginning of this year. I have already raised this topic, as have some well-known experts with whom I fully agree. But with regard to the economic situation in Russia, it has deteriorated even more significantly in recent years. In particular, according to a number of estimates, in April of this year, economic growth decreased from about 5% to zero, and according to some reports, it has begun to fall uncontrollably. This is also true of those industries that, with their steady positive dynamics, used to meet the country\u2019s military needs.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the country\u2019s state budget deficit has increased significantly, forcing the government to adjust its figures from $12 billion to $42 billion. And there is nothing to cover the lack of funds, because Russia cannot influence the decline in its revenues, as it is a consequence of the decline in world oil prices, and it has virtually no gold and foreign exchange reserves. As a result, Moscow is both rapidly losing its ability to continue the war and is facing the threat of a deep economic crisis in the country similar to the 1990s. This is bound to happen with catastrophic consequences for Russia if Putin does not agree to a just peace. Moreover, US President D. Trump and Europe are ready and intend to impose new sanctions on the Russian Federation if the Kremlin does not change its position. The United States and the EU leadership have already announced and are preparing new economic restrictions on Russia. They are well known and relate to its oil industry and banking sector. This state of affairs will, one way or another, force Putin to give in and at least agree to a genuine truce, and later to sign a peace agreement that takes Ukraine\u2019s interests into account. However, this will hardly help him, as Russia\u2019s acute internal problems are becoming irreversible. Even if the war ends, Russia will still have problems. Let us analyze this issue in more detail as it relates to our country.<\/p>\n

Let’s start with the truce. What will happen if it is adopted? In general, it will lead to a decrease in tension on the front line. And with that, the deterrents that help the Russian military command maintain order in the troops will disappear. And without them, the decline in the troops will begin, which usually happens in the Russian army in all eras and forms of its existence. There is no need to look far for examples. Suffice it to recall what happened to the Red Army at the front after the victory over Nazi Germany in May 1945. Recently, the 80th<\/sup> anniversary of this event was loudly celebrated in Russia, but without mentioning what really happened then. Russian propaganda carefully conceals this, but there are many memoirs of veterans who managed to tell the truth, and the declassified documents of the time demonstrated its scale.<\/p>\n

As expected, soldiers, officers and generals began to celebrate the victory. And there would be nothing wrong with that, if it did not escalate into massive drinking in the military environment and outrages against civilians. The command lost control of the situation because it was also involved in that. And only the tough measures of those who had not yet lost their minds and began to take action, up to and including the execution of the villains on the spot, helped save the army.<\/p>\n

The same thing happened after the end of the active phases of the USSR\u2019s \u201cspecial military operations\u201d in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as in Afghanistan in 1989 and Chechnya in 1996 and the 2000s. However, the current Russian army is much worse. Neither the Red Army, nor the Soviet Army, nor the Russian army until 2022 mobilized citizens with mental disorders or criminals. There were criminals in the Red Army, but only in penal battalions and under strict command control. In today\u2019s Russian army, such trash dominates almost everywhere. So what else can we expect from them?<\/p>\n

After the peace agreement is signed and the troops are demobilized, they will all return home to Russia. However, it is unlikely that they will be able to integrate into a peaceful life, which few of them know today. Some of them will plunge back into criminal activity, while others will go on a rampage in Russian settlements. This is plausible, given the subsequent behavior of those former prisoners who are discharged from the army as a result of injury and other reasons. Most likely, most of the relatively normal citizens who were mobilized or who voluntarily joined the army for one reason or another will not be able to find themselves in civilian life. The experience shows that participation in war cripples the human psyche, especially in the Russian armed forces with their brutal orders.<\/p>\n

Besides, while in the developed parts of the country citizens returning from the war will still be able to somehow arrange their lives, in depressed regions this will not be the case. Because people will again find themselves in poverty after a considerable financial support in the army. We are talking about those who managed to survive the war.<\/p>\n

All of these categories of citizens will degrade, adding to the lumpenized part of the Russian population. And this is, if I may say so, at best. Those who do not completely decay will join the criminal environment, which will become widespread. And the authorities will not be able to prevent this development, and will do nothing, as is usually the case in Russia.<\/p>\n

As a result, the Russian Federation will face a situation reminiscent of the events in the USSR after World War II, when there was a total spread of all types of crime. As then, this will become a political factor undermining the stability of the state.<\/p>\n

Rather ambiguous trends will also be inherent in the Russian economy. On the one hand, the lifting of some of the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the EU, as well as reduction in military spending, will create favorable conditions for improving its economic situation. At the same time, the positive effect will be offset by a number of negative factors that cannot be eliminated even by ending the war. In this regard, we can first of all mention the decline in world oil prices, which is only indirectly related to Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine. The United States could indeed have negotiated with Saudi Arabia to increase its oil production, which would have led to lower prices. This is exactly what they did in the 1980s to undermine the Soviet economy.<\/p>\n

OPEC has effectively lost its regulatory function, and as a result, its members have begun to increase oil production uncontrollably. And they will not reduce it, because even with low oil prices, they make more profits.<\/p>\n

Russia will not be able to restore its position in the European oil and gas market either. The leaderships of leading countries of the European Union continue to pursue a clear course to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. This is exactly what the EU\u2019s strategy to completely stop importing hydrocarbons from Russia by the end of 2027 envisages. Therefore, even Moscow\u2019s \u201cexotic projects\u201d such as selling Gazprom to the United States with the subsequent distribution of revenues from gas exports to Europe are doomed to failure.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the conversion of military production will be an extremely difficult problem. Since the beginning of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, it has been the main driving force behind the development of the Russian economy. Despite the fact that the general difficulties in the Russian economy have now also affected the military component, it remains the leading one. However, the military industry is not a source of revenue for the state budget, but rather consumes its resources. The restoration of peace opens the way to resolve this issue. However, as shown by the experience of the USSR, this cannot be done immediately. Moreover, the conversion requires additional financial resources and at the first stage leads to a general decline in the economy due to the need to reorient or shut down the military and related enterprises. But all of these enterprises employ people who receive relatively high salaries. According to some estimates, their number, together with their relatives, is more than 20 million people. And entire regions are tied to a number of companies that manufacture military products. Therefore, the conversion will be another powerful factor in exacerbating socioeconomic tensions in Russia. Moscow will probably try to eliminate its negative consequences by gradually reducing the military component of the Russian economy, and new weapons will be temporarily delivered to warehouses. But this will only prolong the problem in time.<\/p>\n

Taken together, all of the above-mentioned factors could lead to a social explosion in Russia, including massive riots, shortly after the end of the war. Moreover, there is a catalyst for this, which is the so-called \u201cZ-patriots\u201d who are dissatisfied with the prospects of Moscow\u2019s refusal to completely destroy Ukraine at this stage. And they have support. Both among some of the Russian leadership and oligarchs who are making political and financial capital from the war, and in the Russian military command, for whom ending the war would mean their defeat. Especially when they will bear the main responsibility for the failure of the Kremlin\u2019s military adventure. In addition, we must not forget the aforementioned 20 million citizens who owe their livelihoods to the war. Therefore, the socio-economic crisis in Russia will be complemented by a political one.<\/p>\n

Moscow is obviously aware of the danger of such events, and therefore has already begun to take preventive measures to prevent negative consequences. At the moment, this means preparations for military actions to prevent an anti-Putin rebellion in the ruling elite and the spread of mass protests. In addition, preparations are underway to introduce something resembling a state of economic emergency, which once took place during the Russian Civil War, or was introduced during the war with Nazi Germany and in the early years of the post-Soviet period.<\/p>\n

The signs of such actions by the Kremlin are quite transparent. In particular, they include: the final suppression of citizens\u2019 rights and freedoms, including access to independent sources of information and even restrictions on mobile communications; strengthening Putin\u2019s own security; personnel changes in the security forces and local authorities; and consideration of plans to introduce total state control over the country\u2019s economy. And, of course, Moscow will stick to its aggressive foreign policy in order to divert the population\u2019s attention from internal problems and redirect its negative energy.<\/p>\n

So, Russia will become an analog of the USSR of the 1930s or modern North Korea. And relations between Russia and Ukraine will resemble those between North Korea and South Korea or East Germany and West Germany. This is what Ukraine needs to prepare for. First of all, it needs to further strengthen its armed forces and economy, integrate into the European security system, and strengthen its border, taking into account the experience of South Korea and West Germany.<\/p>\n

We currently have every opportunity to do so, including with the help of our Western partners. The visit of the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs to Ukraine on May 9 is a strong indication of the resolve to continue to provide assistance to Ukraine. I think that no additional conclusions are necessary here. Everything is clear. As for Russia itself, we can recall Putin\u2019s well-known brazen statement about Ukraine just before the war began. Then he tried to joke: \u201cWhether you like it or not, bear with me, my beauty\u201d. I don\u2019t want to sound like him, but now the same can be said about Russia…<\/p>\n

Yuriy Mykhailenko,<\/strong>
\nInstitute for Global Politics<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yuriy Mykhailenko<\/p>\n

Relations between Russia and Ukraine will resemble those between North Korea and South Korea or East Germany and West Germany<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":29478,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-29474","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nWar or Peace: a Dead End for Russia - 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