{"id":29522,"date":"2025-05-20T05:00:06","date_gmt":"2025-05-20T02:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=29522"},"modified":"2026-04-05T12:39:24","modified_gmt":"2026-04-05T09:39:24","slug":"majbutnye-nato","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/majbutnye-nato\/","title":{"rendered":"The End of the Globalization Era and the Future of NATO"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: justify;\">The End of the Globalization Era and the Future of NATO: The Donald Trump Factor<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Since the introduction of China\u2019s reform and opening-up policy [1] and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the world economy has become increasingly interconnected. International supply chains have helped many Africans escape life-threatening poverty and contributed to the growth of the global middle class.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">However, progress stalled after the 2008 financial crisis, which showed how fragile global economic ties can be. During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020\u20132021, supply chains were further disrupted, forcing governments to focus on strengthening domestic resilience.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">As a result, countries have shifted to a neo-mercantilist approach, prioritizing exports and protecting their own industries to strengthen national economic power. China\u2019s dual circulation strategy, introduced in 2020 to combine domestic self-sufficiency with global trade, is one example of this approach [2]. Another example is the European Union\u2019s large-scale industrial policy known as the European Green Deal [3]. US President Donald Trump\u2019s concern about the trade deficit reflects a broader trend signaling the decline of economic globalization.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato2.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-29530\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato2.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato2-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>It seems that it is the new owner of the White House that has to play a role of an additional catalyst for this process. On April 2, 2025, Donald Trump announced the introduction of new mirror tariffs on imported goods, calling this day \u201cLiberation Day\u201d. According to him, friends and enemies of the United States had been plundering the American economy for decades, but now it was over. This event marked the beginning of a global trade war and caused a sharp decline in stock markets.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">However, Donald Trump would not be himself if he stopped reconsidering his previous decisions. Already at the end of April 2025, it was announced that the United States had selected 15 countries to conduct trade negotiations in a preferential format to find a quick solution to the problem of customs tariffs. In early May, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a new trade agreement that provides for the introduction of updated tariffs to stimulate the development of bilateral economic relations and promote trade growth. At the same time, the United States and China agreed to ease mutual tariffs for 90 days and create a mechanism to continue discussing economic and trade relations. However, this is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on the current situation in the global economy.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato3-1.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft wp-image-29543 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato3-1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato3-1.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato3-1-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>At the same time, is collapsing the system of international relations formed after World War II and built on common institutions, integrated economies, and a global security architecture with centers of influence: The United States in the West and the Soviet Union in the East. After the end of this order in the early 1990s, the United States remained its guarantor. However, the rise of China has called the USA\u2019s dominance into question.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Whether this arrangement was based on established rules is questionable. Rather, it can be characterized as a channel of systemic competition through international organizations. The United Nations was in fact a platform for confrontation between the USA and the USSR.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato4.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29532 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato4.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato4.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato4-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Today, the United States and China compete within international organizations. And over the past decade, this rivalry has expanded to other spheres, such as trade, the military, technology, and the information space. Both global powers often disregard the rules of multilateral organizations. A striking example of this is their minimal contributions to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, in February 2025, Donald Trump took an unprecedented step: he signed an executive order imposing sanctions against the International Criminal Court, accusing it of \u201cillegitimate and groundless actions against the United States and its close ally, Israel\u201d [4].<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">According to some Western think tanks, the decline of globalism is not only due to President Donald Trump\u2019s giving it up; this process has been going on for a long time. Due to its institutional structure, China\u2019s \u201cOne Belt \u2013 One Road\u201d Initiative offers a game model alternative to the Western one. The European Union, striving for a world governed by regulation and democratic principles, is challenging any order formed within the UN. The USA\u2019s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization, as well as the suspension of funding for many UN agencies, are further steps towards the decline of globalism.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">The Return of Isolationism<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato5-1.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29533 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato5-1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato5-1.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato5-1-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>From a European point of view \u2013 geographical rather than political \u2013 the new drive towards American isolationism is especially worrying.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">American isolationism is a US foreign policy approach that gained popularity in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It was characterized by an unwillingness to engage in international conflicts or form alliances, especially in Europe and Asia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Isolationism has its roots in President George Washington\u2019s farewell address in September 1796, in which he called on the nation to \u201cavoid permanent alliances with any part of the outside world\u201d and to prevent \u201cthe intermingling of our destiny with that of any part of Europe\u201d, which could draw the United States into \u201cEuropean ambitions, rivalries, interests, moods, or whims\u201d that would threaten the USA\u2019s peace and well-being.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">After the First World War, isolationism gained popularity again, focusing on domestic issues and seeking to minimize external military and political commitments. It reached its peak in the interwar period, but began to decline after the United States entered World War II, marking the beginning of the era of interventionism and global leadership.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Today, as this role of the United States seems to be diminishing, Europe faces the challenge of navigating an increasingly fragmented security landscape without the support of its main ally.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">NATO is a product of an era of the USA\u2019s global leadership. After World War II, the United States led the creation of the Alliance to counter the communist threat. This alliance provided European countries with a reliable guarantee of security. Even after the collapse of communism, NATO survived, gradually transforming into a global force that has, albeit reluctantly, carried out peacekeeping missions in regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Gulf of Aden.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Despite the some Eastern European countries\u2019 aspiration to join the Alliance, NATO is largely focused on the USA\u2019s interests. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe has become increasingly aware of its own vulnerability. Meanwhile, the United States has demonstrated limited political will to defend Europe and use the Alliance \u2013 which it largely funds and controls \u2013 to maintain the global order. Statements by US leaders, including President Donald Trump\u2019s criticism of NATO member states\u2019 defense spending, underscore this shift and raise questions about the Alliance\u2019s future.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Possibility of the USA\u2019s Withdrawal from NATO<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato9.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29538 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato9.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato9.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato9-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>A formal or actual USA\u2019s withdrawal from NATO would be a critical step in the revival of global isolationism. The United States plays a key role in strengthening the Alliance\u2019s strategic capabilities, particularly in spheres such as nuclear deterrence, airlift, collecting intelligence, logistics, and rapid response. Without this support, NATO will remain an empty structure, and Europe will be forced to face the need to ensure collective defense in a fundamentally new environment.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Western experts are already discussing which country or group of countries could take on a leading defense role on the European continent, and are also predicting possible scenarios.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>France<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">France has the most powerful military capabilities among the EU countries, including a nuclear arsenal and a global expeditionary force. It has demonstrated the ability to deploy and support overseas operations, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. However, despite these capabilities, France lacks the scale necessary to replace the United States in NATO. Limited human resources, fiscal constraints, and a political environment that is not conducive to large-scale militarization prevent France from providing a full continental defense, especially in high-risk areas such as Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Turkey<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato7.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29540 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato7.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato7.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato7-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Turkey has the second-largest army in NATO, significant ground forces, a growing defense industry, and extensive regional operational experience. However, Ankara\u2019s strategic priorities are not related to the defense of continental Europe. The main focus is on the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and adjacent regions.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Given Turkey\u2019s complicated and sometimes hostile relations with other NATO members, such as Greece and France, and its transactional approach to diplomacy, it is unlikely that Ankara will take a leadership role in European defense or make a significant contribution to deterring threats on the Alliance\u2019s northeastern flank.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Eastern Europe<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The USA\u2019s withdrawal from NATO would cause a serious security shock for Eastern European countries, especially Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland. Those states have long relied on American guarantees to deter Russia\u2019s aggression. Without such assurances, they would most likely intensify rearmament efforts, deepen bilateral ties with other military powers (including the United Kingdom and France), and potentially form new regional defense alliances.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In particular, Poland has already demonstrated its readiness to play a leading military role having launched the ambitious defense procurement programs and having increased defense spending to more than 4 % of GDP. Although speculative, the prospect of Poland developing its own nuclear program did not seem unlikely until a certain point, given the growing threats. However, on May 9, 2025, France and Poland signed the Treaty of Enhanced Cooperation and Friendship, which culminated in political rapprochement in the new geopolitical reality. France promised to deploy its troops in Poland in case of danger. Moreover, it promised to deploy its \u201cnuclear umbrella\u201d over the country.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Germany<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Although Germany is an economically powerful country, its army remains underdeveloped. Despite recent changes in rhetoric and promises to increase defense spending after Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the Bundeswehr continues to face structural inefficiencies, low readiness, and political instability. Germany cannot fill the leadership vacuum left by the United States, and its internal contradictions, coupled with its deeply rooted pacifist traditions, complicate the country\u2019s attempts to take a more assertive defense posture.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Possible scenarios<\/h2>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Likeliest: The United States significantly reduces its engagement with NATO<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato8.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29537 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato8.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato8.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato8-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Under this first and most likely scenario, the United States does not formally withdraw from NATO, but drastically reduces its participation. Under the pretext of strategic reorientation, Washington shifts its military focus to the Indo-Pacific region, reduces the number of troops in Europe, and limits participation in joint exercises and decision-making processes in the Alliance. Public rhetoric emphasizes that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own defense, accompanied by a reduction in US funding for European operations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The immediate effect is strategic ambiguity. Although Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty formally remains in force, confidence in its implementation is weakening. European allies, especially those on the eastern flank of the Alliance, may begin to doubt the reliability of US security guarantees. In response, France is likely to intensify calls for European strategic autonomy, and Eastern European countries will look for alternative security guarantees.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Under this cooling scenario, NATO will formally survive, but will enter a vague phase of existence, gradually losing its real capacity. The Alliance\u2019s deterrence capability will decline, which may prompt adversaries \u2013 in particular Russia \u2013 to test its resilience through hybrid threats or pressure campaigns.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Somewhat Likely: The United States functionally withdraws from NATO<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato10.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29536 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato10.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato10.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato10-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Under the second scenario, the United States could actually withdraw from NATO without invoking Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to this provision, a member state can leave the Alliance by sending an official notification, after which the withdrawal takes effect one year later. In this case, the United States closes key military bases in Europe, withdraws nuclear weapons deployed there, ceases to participate in NATO\u2019s integrated command structure, and announces that it will no longer participate in the planning and conduct of collective defense operations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Although the Alliance will formally continue to exist, its functional core, the United States, will disappear, leaving Europe to try to fill the gap. The main European members of NATO, limited in their capabilities and divided by divergent priorities, will try to compensate for the loss of American leadership. As a result, NATO will lose its operational importance. It will be impossible to fill this void quickly and coherently, which will only increase the fragmentation of the security system and the risk of strategic miscalculations.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><em>Least Likely: The United States officially leaves NATO<\/em><\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato12.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29535 alignright\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato12.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato12.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato12-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Under the third and most dramatic scenario, the United States would formally withdraw from NATO, using the provision of Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Washington would announce its withdrawal from the Alliance, stating that it no longer considers itself obliged to comply with mutual defense commitments. A one-year withdrawal period would begin, during which US troops and nuclear assets would be withdrawn from Europe, and the USA\u2019s participation in NATO command structures would be terminated.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The consequences of such a step would be immediate and profound. NATO as an institution would effectively disintegrate, even if it legally continued to exist. France would likely become a major strategic player in Europe, positioning its nuclear deterrent as the cornerstone of a renewed European defense strategy. However, its ambitions would be limited by available resources and political divisions within the EU.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato13.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-v4KvoGIQ\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-29534 alignleft\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato13.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato13.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/nato13-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>In the absence of a coherent European response, smaller regional alliances would begin to emerge. A Nordic-Baltic-Polish bloc may form around common security challenges, while the Franco-German core would try to preserve the remnants of Europe\u2019s collective defense. Turkey would formally remain in NATO, but would increasingly pursue an independent course. Some Central European states may lean toward neutrality or even seek closer relations with Russia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Such a formal break would mean the final end of the postwar transatlantic security order. Although Europe would eventually be able to build a new defense architecture, it would face years of strategic disorientation, growing vulnerability, and increased geopolitical risk.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Volodymyr Palyvoda,<br \/>\n<\/strong>expert in international relations<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><strong>Notes:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">[1] The program of socio-economic reforms in China was aimed at creating socialism with Chinese characteristics, or a socialist market economy, and at opening up to the external economic market and the world. The reforms began in 1978 on the initiative of the pragmatist wing of the Communist Party of China, led by the then de facto leader of the country, Deng Xiaoping, and continue to this day.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">[2] The dual circulation strategy is a key component of China\u2019s 14<sup>th<\/sup> Five-Year Economic Development Plan, which outlines the country\u2019s economic goals and provides a medium-term forecast until 2035. This new strategy focuses primarily on growth through exports and investment. Its main goal is to expand the local market while strengthening China\u2019s integration into global markets.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">[3] The European Green Deal is a set of policy initiatives put forward by the European Commission with the overall goal of making the European continent climate neutral by 2050. It also presents an impact assessment plan that will increase the EU\u2019s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 % and up to 55 % by 2030 compared to the year 1990\u2019s levels. The plan envisages a review of every existing law with a view to its climate benefits, as well as the introduction of new legislation in circular economy, building renovation, biodiversity conservation, agriculture and innovation.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">[4] Despite his claims of being a \u201cclose ally\u201d, Donald Trump did not cancel the 17 percent tariffs he imposed on Israeli goods in May 2025 and reminded that Israel receives $4 billion in aid annually.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n<p>Although Europe would eventually be able to build a new defense architecture, it would face years of strategic disorientation, growing vulnerability, and increased geopolitical risk<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":29529,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-29522","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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