{"id":29816,"date":"2025-06-02T00:02:01","date_gmt":"2025-06-01T21:02:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=29816"},"modified":"2025-06-02T17:22:17","modified_gmt":"2025-06-02T14:22:17","slug":"strategichne-partnerstvo-mizh-ukra%d1%97noyu-ta-turechchinoyu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/strategichne-partnerstvo-mizh-ukra%d1%97noyu-ta-turechchinoyu\/","title":{"rendered":"Strategic Partnership Between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">Strategic Partnership Between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye as a Factor of Security and Stability in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian Region<\/h1>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px; text-align: left;\"><em>The strategic partnership between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye provides them with great opportunities to realize common and national interests. At the same time, the military, economic, and political potential of Ukraine and Turkey allow them to take a leading position and become a factor of security and stability in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region. All of this is very important for Ukraine in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as it is a factor that helps to strengthen and improve our country\u2019s capabilities in confronting the aggressor. All of these circumstances demonstrate the need not only to strengthen the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey, but also to bring it to a qualitatively new level.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>The development of relations between Ukraine and Turkey is an example of positive interaction between the two countries. Their interaction is in the interests of each and has a positive impact on their neighboring regions.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">First of all, this means the unification of Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye in the form of a bilateral strategic partnership as one of the poles of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian Community, which includes the Baltic States, Central and Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Caspian regions. Despite the different states of the countries, they have a number of common interests that can consolidate efforts to realize them. I mean the geographical location of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region on the border with Russia, which directly poses a threat to those countries. For eone, Moscow does not hide its intentions to restore the sphere of influence of the former USSR, including the above-mentioned countries and regions. At the same time, it is ready to implement its plans militarily. Suffice it to recall the Russian attacks on Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and especially the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war launched by Moscow in 2022.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">It is now quite possible that Russia will attack other countries in the Baltic-Black Sea region, which are at the forefront of its expansion on the European direction. Moreover, it is already preparing for this as part of military exercises in the European theater of operations. The largest of these should be the strategic command and staff exercise of the armed forces of Russia and Belarus \u201cZapad-2025\u201d in the autumn of this year. After all, the Russian Federation has resumed them, despite the most Russian troops\u2019 participation in the war against Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The exercise scenario involves rehearsing one of the options for a full-scale war between Russia and the United States\/NATO in the European theater of operations. According to this scenario, the main areas of military confrontation between the parties are the Baltic and Black Sea regions. It is there that key operations are planned, as defined in the operational plans of the Russian Armed Forces.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">This approach is fully consistent with the current military and political situation in the world and Europe, which is characterized by an escalation of confrontation between Russia and the West to the level of the former Cold War. And the Baltic-Black Sea region is located between them. Given this military-strategic position, it may become the main arena of hostilities. And they have been taking place in Ukraine for years.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">There are Military threats from Moscow to the countries of the Caspian region too. For example, Russia has territorial claims to Kazakhstan, which have been repeatedly voiced by Russian politicians, allowing for the possibility of implementing such plans with the help of troops.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Russia could also use its Armed Forces to take control of Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. As already mentioned, in 2008 Moscow did this in relation to Georgia. And one of the goals of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine is to reach Transnistria and then invade Moldova. So far, Moscow has refrained from implementing its military plans for Azerbaijan. It has not even interfered with Baku\u2019s efforts to regain control of Nagorno-Karabakh. But this is only temporarily and due to its lack of the necessary potential. Under such circumstances, Russia is Ukraine\u2019s direct enemy and aggressor. For the Baltic States, Central and Southeastern Europe, and the Black Sea region, it is a potential adversary.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">For certain political and economic reasons, T\u00fcrkiye does not define Russia as an enemy, and does not break ties with it. However, this does not change the essence of the matter. Moreover, Moscow recognizes T\u00fcrkiye as its enemy, preparing for war with it as well. Moldova and Georgia with their current governments and Azerbaijan also refrain from openly recognizing Russia as their enemy. As in the case of T\u00fcrkiye, this has political and economic reasons, but does not reduce the level of Russian threats to their security.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">These circumstances frankly require the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian Sea region countries to join forces to deter Russia and repulse possible aggression from the RF. This is already being done within the framework of NATO, whose members are the Baltic States, Central and Southeastern Europe, and T\u00fcrkiye. Ukraine is a partner of the Alliance and receives comprehensive assistance from it. For the same purpose, a new European security system is being formed, which so far remains largely a European component of the Alliance.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Since Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine in 2014, the main content of the operational plans of NATO and the US Armed Forces in Europe has again been the fulfillment of the above-mentioned task. And most of the exercises that take place in the European theater of operations are devoted to their mastering. This year, the main one is the \u201cDefender Europe-25\u201d SCPE, which takes place in May-June in the Baltic-Black Sea region.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">At the same time, with all due respect to our NATO partners, they are currently unable to effectively confront Russia militarily and are doing everything to avoid it. Currently, only Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye are capable of countering Russia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Everything is clear with Ukraine. It has been defending itself and Europe on the battlefield for more than three years. And not only does it deter the \u201csecond army of the world\u201d, but also strikes back. The center of criminal decision-making, which is Moscow, included. Of course, we use the assistance of the United States, Europe and other countries, but the main burden in the fight against Russia is still on Ukraine and its Defense Forces. It is they who are the most powerful Army in Europe, with combat experience and readiness to counter the aggressor.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Despite its restrained attitude to Russia and unwillingness to overly aggravate relations with it, Ankara also fiercely defends its interests, including by using military force. In July 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces shot down a Russian Su-24 aircraft that violated Turkish airspace while conducting strikes against pro-Turkish rebels in Syria. And in 2023\u20132024, T\u00fcrkiye assisted Azerbaijan in regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh, which was occupied by Russia\u2019s ally Armenia. And finally, in 2024, T\u00fcrkiye played a leading role in the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, which was Moscow\u2019s main support in the Middle East.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Therefore, it is Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye that can become the basis of the security system in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region as part of a broader European security system that extends to its neighboring regions.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur4.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-tqST2Jw2\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-29821\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur4.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur4.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur4-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Ukraine is already one of the main forces in deterring Russia\u2019s westward expansion and is seen by Europe as a key element of its security. T\u00fcrkiye, in turn, is a deterrent to Russia\u2019s expansion in the Black Sea region and its spread to the Mediterranean region, as well as the Caucasus and, to some extent, the Caspian region. And together with other allies and partners, they can completely put an end to Russia\u2019s attempts to establish control over the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Along with strengthening their security, the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region have a number of other common interests.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Thus, in the <strong>political<\/strong> sphere, the main ones are to ensure opportunities for sovereign and independent development, as well as to strengthen their positions in the region and in the world. At the same time, the unifying factor for the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian countries is again the encroachment of Russia, which is trying to subjugate them. At present, the only international organizations that can consolidate the political efforts of those countries are the UN and the OSCE, which have common positions on certain issues. However, those organizations have broader goals which cannot fully express their interests. Especially since they include Russia. Therefore, it seems more promising to combine the potentials of various regional organizations, which include the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian countries. Moreover, some of them are members of several such organizations, which allows them to act as intermedia between them. Those associations include the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea Initiative (or simply the Three Seas Initiative).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Among the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian Sea countries, Ukraine is a BSEC member and a partner of the Three Seas Initiative, and T\u00fcrkiye is a member of both BSEC and the OTS, which is a unique position among others. Therefore, they can be an important unifying link.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The common <strong>economic<\/strong> interests of the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region are more specific and pragmatic, in particular, they are concentrating their efforts on implementing infrastructure, energy, and digital projects. Opportunities for this are provided by their location on transport routes between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, as well as by the presence of developed industry and agriculture, scientific and technical potential, wide networks of railway, road, and pipeline infrastructure, and energy reserves. Therefore, the main efforts of such countries are focused on creating a unified transport and logistics system from the Baltic to the Black Sea and Caspian regions by combining their railway, road, sea, air, pipeline, fiber optic and other communications.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">This provides additional opportunities for their economic development and helps to strengthen trade and economic ties between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, Europe\u2019s energy security is improving, and the countries of the Caspian region are getting alternative access to foreign markets. Thanks to these actions, they have already significantly reduced their dependence on Russia, which allows them to pursue a more independent policy. Such opportunities are especially important in the context of the escalating confrontation between Russia and the West over its war against Ukraine. This has significantly increased the role of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian countries in defending Europe\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The main projects mentioned above in the Baltic region and Central and Eastern Europe are improving transport links within several transport corridors, namely Via Baltica, Rail Baltica, and Via Carpathia, which connect them to the rest of the continent. In the Black Sea and Caspian regions, the development of the \u201cMiddle Corridor\u201d communications between them and the \u201cNorth-South\u201d communications with China can be pointed out.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Geographically, Ukraine and <\/strong><strong>T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong> <strong>are located together, in the center of the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region, and their transport and logistics infrastructure is the most developed compared to other countries. Therefore, they can also become a center for the integration of their communications.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Implementation of such plans requires further strengthening of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong>. The basis for this is being created by a number of agreements, namely: Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye of May 4, 1992; Joint Action Plan between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of T\u00fcrkiye on Enhanced Cooperation of April 2, 2004; <strong>Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the High-Level Strategic Council between Ukraine and Turkey, which established a strategic partnership between the two countries of January 25, 2011<\/strong>; Framework Military Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of T\u00fcrkiye of October 16, 2020; Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye of February 3, 2020.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">These documents provided favorable conditions for intensifying cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey in all spheres. Among them, the greatest progress was made in the trade and economic sphere. Thus, before the outbreak of Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine, T\u00fcrkiye ranked third among our country\u2019s partners. In 2021, the trade between the two countries amounted to about USD 8 billion.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">At this, Ukraine mainly supplied Turkey with ferrous metals, grain crops, ore, slag, and ash, while receiving various engineering products, metals, oil, and oil products from T\u00fcrkiye. At the same time, about 30 joint high-tech projects were being implemented in the aerospace and defense industries. More than 700 companies with Turkish capital operated in Ukraine, which contributed to the intensive development of bilateral trade and economic relations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Strategic partnership with T\u00fcrkiye became especially important for Ukraine after Russia\u2019s attack on it in 2014 and especially with the outbreak of a full-scale war in 2022.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur7.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-tqST2Jw2\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-29822\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur7.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur7.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ukr-tur7-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>In fact, the war was a turning point in Ukrainian-Turkish relations. Thus, T\u00fcrkiye condemned Russia\u2019s actions for its invasion of Crimea and annexation of the Peninsula, supported Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity, and refused to recognize the \u201creferendum\u201d on the Crimean Peninsula and its \u201cRussian status\u201d. T\u00fcrkiye did not recognize the self-proclaimed \u201crepublics\u201d in the Donbas either. Subsequently, Ankara participated in various negotiations and dialogues on the topic of Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine. At this, T\u00fcrkiye paid special attention to the protection of Crimean Tatars. Besides, it sent humanitarian aid to victims of the armed conflict in the Donbas.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye has also intensified. In this regard, the main role was played by the supply of Turkish Bayraktar TV 2 strike UAVs and ammunition to Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Ankara reacted even more sharply to Russia\u2019s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Thus, on February 24, 2022, President of T\u00fcrkiye R. Erdogan made an official statement, directly calling Russia\u2019s actions a war against Ukraine. The next day, in a telephone conversation, the Turkish leader tried to convince Putin to end the war. However, the most tangible consequence for Ukraine was Ankara\u2019s decision to close the Black Sea straits to warships, which was done on the basis of the Montreux Convention. As a result, Russia was unable to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet, which began to suffer losses.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Turkish Bayraktar TV 2 UAVs can be considered a real salvation for Ukraine. At the initial stage of the war, they were one of the main and most effective means of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which effectively destroyed armored and other enemy equipment.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A significant contribution to resolving Ukraine\u2019s war-related problems was T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s increase in exports to our country of such goods as petroleum products, power generators, aircrafts, vehicles, metal products, tires, medicines, and food.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s military supplies to Ukraine have also increased significantly. In the first quarter of 2022 alone, Turkey supplied Ukraine with UAVs, ammunition, military equipment, and supplies worth about $60 million. The next important step was the agreement on the sale of UAVs to Ukraine. The next important step was an agreement to transfer to Ukraine specialized equipment for demining and restoration work. With T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s participation, the problem of resuming Ukraine\u2019s exports of grain and other grains, which had been blocked by Russia, was also resolved. With Ankara\u2019s active assistance, in July 2022, the Initiative for the Security of Grain Transportation from Ukrainian Ports, or the so-called Black Sea Grain Initiative, was signed in Istanbul, with Ukraine, Russia, T\u00fcrkiye, and the UN as participants.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Ukraine is grateful to T\u00fcrkiye for hosting and resettling refugees on its territory. Under the special ASAM program, they are provided with medical, humanitarian and financial assistance. T\u00fcrkiye has also taken in about a thousand orphans from southern regions of Ukraine. The humanitarian aspects of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s work include its role in the exchange of prisoners of war.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A separate aspect of Ankara\u2019s actions was its participation in ending the war. As you know, it mediated the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia that took place on its territory in March 2022. Despite the fact that they ended without results, a precedent was set. Based on this precedent, the dialogue continued in May 2025.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Besides, Ankara supported the Ukrainian peace formula, participated in the Crimean Platform, and voted for Ukrainian resolutions in the UN General Assembly. T\u00fcrkiye is also one of the countries that has expressed its readiness to participate in providing Ukraine with real security guarantees in the form of sending its military contingents to Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">But not everything is as simple as we would like. T\u00fcrkiye has refused to join the US and EU sanctions against Russia; it also continued trade, economic and military-technical cooperation with the RF and kept its skies open to Russian aircrafts. There are both political and economic reasons for this. Thus, T\u00fcrkiye is trying to balance between Russia and the United States and Europe, which allows it to strengthen its position as a regional leader. Besides, Ankara is greatly interested in maintaining access to the Russian food market, which brings it about $25 billion in revenue per year. And Russian tourists bring Turkey $17 billion a year. However, all this is offset by the positive aspects of Ukrainian-Turkish relations.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>These circumstances create favorable opportunities for further strengthening the strategic partnership between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye both during and after the war.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Taking into account the interests of the parties, the situation in the world and the region, as well as the existing experience, their main directions may be:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left; line-height: 15px;\">\n<li>in the <strong>political<\/strong> sphere \u2014 deepening cooperation between the parties in global and regional international organizations; searching for ways to politically resolve security problems in the Black Sea region; exchange of experience in cooperation with the European Union;<\/li>\n<li>In the <strong>economic<\/strong> sphere \u2014 development of trade and economic relations between the parties, including: Ukraine\u2019s increasing grain supplies to T\u00fcrkiye; joint development and production of weapons and military equipment; meeting Ukraine\u2019s energy needs; participation in the work of the Europe\u2013Asia and Europe\u2013Middle East transport corridors; T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s involvement in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine;<\/li>\n<li>in the <strong>security<\/strong> sphere \u2014 continuation of joint activities to end Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine; deterring Moscow and ensuring security in the Black Sea region in the postwar period; cooperation between the parties within NATO.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye may pay special attention to increasing their role and importance in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region based on the above-mentioned prerequisites.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Thus, the development of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and T\u00fcrkiye and joining their efforts will allow them to take the place of leaders in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region, as well as to become a factor of stability and security in its territory.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>This will contribute to the realization of their common and national interests. The countries complement each other, but they also have certain peculiarities. The main ones are: restoration of peace in Ukraine and security in the Black Sea region; preservation of sovereignty and inviolability of state borders of all countries in the region and their unconditional compliance with international law; favorable conditions for mutual economic activity.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Achieving these goals is a difficult task and will require appropriate efforts, but they will be justified by the results obtained.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Yuriy Mykhailenko,<br \/>\n<\/strong>Institute for Global Politics<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yuriy Mykhailenko<\/p>\n<p>The military, economic, and political potential of Ukraine and Turkey allow them to take a leading position and become a factor of security and stability in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":29818,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-29816","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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