{"id":29966,"date":"2025-06-10T08:00:29","date_gmt":"2025-06-10T05:00:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=29966"},"modified":"2026-04-05T12:38:48","modified_gmt":"2026-04-05T09:38:48","slug":"29966","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/29966\/","title":{"rendered":"Serbia As Russia\u2019s Bridgehead in South-Eastern Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"

Serbia As Russia\u2019s Bridgehead in South-Eastern Europe<\/h1>\n

This summer, the fourth Ukraine-Southeast Europe summit is to take place in Odesa [1]. The previous summit was attended by President of Serbia Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 [2]. However, after his demonstrative visit to Moscow to participate in the Victory Day celebrations and meet with Vladimir Putin, which drew sharp criticism from the West, it is unlikely that the Serbian leader will visit Ukraine [3].<\/p>\n

It should be noted that Serbia occupies a rather peculiar position among the countries of Southeast Europe. When on March 1, 2012, it received the status of an EU candidate, it seemed that the country had finally taken a course to the West. Thirteen years later, the balance looks different: Belgrade is a place where Russian intelligence services feel at ease, oligarchs can circumvent sanctions, and the Kremlin propaganda has launched a full-fledged TV channel. This evolution \u2013 from official candidate to Moscow\u2019s foothold \u2013 was the result of a chain of events in which each successive link strengthened Russia\u2019s influence.<\/p>\n

According to Serbian political scientist Aleksandar Djokic, the current myth of brotherhood between the two nations is a \u201cretrograde construct\u201d invented by politicians after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. The Serbs and Russia have never been so close as the media constantly claim. The alliance between Serbian President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 and Vladimir Putin has become increasingly visible in recent years, reinforced by the cultural and historical symbolism of the monument to Tsar Nicholas II in Belgrade. It was a gift from Moscow to commemorate the centennial of the outbreak of World War I, and the statue bears an inscription with the words of Nicholas II: \u201cRussia will never remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia\u201d.<\/p>\n

The pro-government \u201cBlue Europe\u201d portal points out  that Serbia and Russia have ties that date back to at least the 12th<\/sup>  century and are based on a common Slavic and Orthodox heritage. On this foundation, Moscow has been consistently building a message of a \u201cfraternal community\u201d while simultaneously fueling distrust of NATO. Russia presents NATO\u2019s air raids on Belgrade in 1999 as a manifestation of the West\u2019s aggression, the Russian Patriarch  repeats the narrative of the \u201cRussian world\u201d,  while  Serbian Patriarch Porfirije emphasizes that the so-called \u201cSerbian world\u201d belongs to the Russian religious orbit. After Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, many Russians moved to Serbia. With their higher purchasing power, they contribute to economic growth. Russia also imposes the image of a \u201cbig sister\u201d and loyal ally on Serbia.<\/p>\n

Granting Citizenship to Russians<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a>The first milestone was the decision of the government in Belgrade to apply Article 19 of the Law on Citizenship and issue passports \u201cin the interests of the Republic\u201d without the need to renounce current citizenship or permanent residence. According to investigative journalists (as of April 2025), 204 Russians have received Serbian passports since the invasion of Ukraine, including FSB officers, managers of the \u201cRostekh\u201d holding, close associates of Ramzan Kadyrov, billionaires such as Sergei Lomakin, and representatives of the so-called \u201csport soft power\u201d.<\/p>\n

None of those individuals is  currently on international sanctions lists, so  they can travel freely with Serbian passports, as they provide visa-free access to the Schengen area and, more importantly, allow them to create companies in the EU and bypass the \u201cbeneficial owner\u201d entry in sanctions registers.<\/p>\n

Cooperation in the Military, Intelligence and Political spheres<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a>According to the UK Foreign Policy Center, security cooperation between Russia and Serbia began to develop in 2012, when the Serbian Progressive Party took over the power from its more openly Western-oriented predecessor, the Democratic Party. This was manifested in the signing of a bilateral agreement on military cooperation in 2013, which provides for the exchange of information and experience, cooperation in military education, cartography, topography, and peacekeeping. In 2014, an agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed, which granted Serbia the status of a client of the Russian military-industrial complex, as well as other agreements on cooperation in the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism.<\/p>\n

Since 2013, Serbia has been an observer in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and in 2014-2021 participated in joint military exercises led by the Russian Federation (\u201cSlavic Brotherhood\u201d and \u201cBARS\u201d). According to the Washington Examiner<\/em>, cooperation between the Serbian Security and Intelligence Agency (SIA) and its Russian partners has significantly increased. The GRU\u2019s residentura  in Serbia is engaged in spying on NATO forces in neighboring Kosovo. A key role in the development of the SIA was played by Aleksandar Vulin, one of the most influential figures in President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107\u2019s environment. He started out as Minister of Defense, then headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs  and the SIA, and in 2023 was placed on the US sanctions list for corruption, drug trafficking, and ties to Russia. In 2024, after US sanctions were imposed on him, he became Deputy Prime Minister for Cooperation with BRICS. According to the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs (Clingendael Institute<\/em>), in August 2022, during his visit to Moscow, Vulin  allegedly handed over to the then Secretary of the Russian Security Council Patrushev the wiretapped materials of a meeting of the Russian opposition in Belgrade. During a meeting in September 2024 in Vladivostok with Putin, he stated that Serbia under Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107’s leadership would never become a NATO member, would never impose sanctions against Russia, and would never allow any anti-Russian actions to be carried out from its territory.<\/p>\n

When a wave of student protests against corruption began in Serbia in November 2024, Aleksandar Vulin called it a conspiracy by the United States and asked  Russian special services to help identify the organizers. On February 28, 2025, while in Moscow, Vulin met with Director of the RF\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Service Naryshkin and thanked his Russian colleagues \u201cfor their support in the fight against color revolutions\u201d.<\/p>\n

Economic Cooperation Between Serbia and the RF<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a>Despite the EU sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea, Belgrade has not only maintained but even increased trade with Russia. Only the economic downturn in Russia slowed down the trade: from 2022 to 2023, the trade fell by 46.3 %. Serbia mainly imports Russian fossil fuels and chemicals, while exporting food and transportation equipment. The dependence also extends to gas, telecommunications technology, and industrial components. By 2022, Russia accounted for almost 100 % of Serbia\u2019s gas imports. A striking example of Serbia\u2019s dependence on Russian energy was in 2008, when Belgrade sold its national oil company, Naftna Industrija Srbije <\/em>(NIS), to Russia\u2019s Gazprom Neft for modest  EUR 400 million, securing a commitment from the Russians to invest another EUR 500 million at a later stage.<\/p>\n

Gas as a guarantee: The core of the Russian economic presence in Serbia is NIS<\/em>, with Gazprom Neft controlling 56 % of the shares. This has allowed Belgrade to defend itself against the EU\u2019s common energy policy for years and ensured that the country, unlike its neighbors, will not give up Russian gas.<\/p>\n

Weapons from two directions: in January 2025, Commander of the  Armed Forces of Serbia General Milan Mojsilovi\u0107 announced that due to sanctions, Serbia would cancel or postpone contracts for new Russian weapons and purchase 12 French Rafale fighter jets worth EUR 2.7 billion. However, this gesture toward Paris did not prevent the export of Serbian ammunition to Ukraine. On July 8, 2024, the Financial Times<\/em> reported that artillery shells worth EUR 800 million were transferred through Czech and Slovak companies, making Serbia a larger-albeit indirect-supplier than some NATO countries. However, first Russia did not protest. Russian Presidential Spokesperson Peskov said that \u201cthis issue will be discussed with Serbian friends\u201d. The hope was that the strategic importance of the bridgehead would compensate for this unpleasant fact for the Kremlin.<\/p>\n

However, at the end of May 2025, the situation changed. Russia\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Service issued a press release entitled \u201cSerbian Military Industry Is Trying to Shoot Russia in the Back\u201d,  in which it accused Serbia of supporting \u201cthe war unleashed by the West\u201d because its defense companies continue to produce ammunition for Kyiv \u201cdespite Belgrade\u2019s officially declared neutrality\u201d.  For his part, President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 promised to conduct a joint investigation with Russia into how Serbian-made ammunition ended up in Ukraine. Against this background, on May 30, 2025, an explosion occurred at the Kru\u0161ik<\/em> defense ammunition plant in the city of Valjevo. The official version is that the incident occurred during routine pressing of a substance used to equip ammunition and its capsules. However, this strange \u201ccoincidence\u201d immediately reminded of the explosions in 2014 at military warehouses in the Czech Republic, where weapons for Ukraine were stored, as well as at military warehouses in Svatove, Luhansk region, in 2015. In October 2023, the State Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine fully proved the involvement of Russian special services (in particular, the 161st<\/sup>  Special Forces Training Center of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces) in those sabotage attacks.<\/p>\n

Pro-Kremlin Propaganda<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a>After Russia Today<\/em> and Sputnik<\/em> were banned from broadcasting in the EU in March 2022, the Kremlin needed a new platform. In November 2022, the RT Balkan portal was launched in Belgrade with the prospect of turning it into a full-fledged TV channel in 2025. In a report dated October 7, 2024, Reporters Without Borders documented how the editorial staff led by Jelena Milincic and Nikola Vr\u017ei\u0107 adapted Russian narratives to the realities of Serbia and the Balkans, and the materials were massively reprinted by the tabloids Informer<\/em>, Kuri<\/em>, and the Pink<\/em> and Happy<\/em> stations.<\/p>\n

To spread its narrative, Russia uses its freedom of action in Serbia\u2019s media sector: it has established several of its affiliated media outlets in Belgrade: Sputnik<\/em>, TASS news agency, RT Balkan<\/em>, and Russia Beyond the Headlines<\/em>. Russia\u2019s communication strategy is to use those media to create an environment more favorable to it than to the EU. RT<\/em>\u2019s strategy is \u201cinformation laundering\u201d: the portal publishes a fake news story, the tabloids copy it, and then refer to a \u201cSerbian source\u201d to hide its Russian origin. Main topics: \u201cKosovo Is Serbia\u201d,  \u201cNATO Threatens with World War III\u201d,  \u201cEurope Is in a Moral Crisis\u201d,  and in the background, an advertisement for lawsuits against the United States and the United Kingdom by lawyer Srdjan Aleksic over the use of depleted uranium shells during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 (a project supported by Russian diplomacy).<\/p>\n

The Use of \u201cSoft Power\u201d<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a>Orthodox brotherhood: The Serbian Patriarchate regularly hosts delegations from the Russian Orthodox Church, and in the history of  \u201cOrthodox civilization under siege\u201d  Kosovo and the Donbas become part of a single narrative. During a meeting with Putin in Moscow in April 2025, Patriarch Porfirije of the Serbian Orthodox Church openly admitted that he and his church rely exclusively on the Kremlin when it comes to Kosovo, Montenegro, and Republika Srpska. He also stated that his predecessors \u2013Patriarchs of the Serbian Church \u2013 have always been tied to Patriarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, saying, in particular: \u201cWe, the Serbs, need (…)our small boat, sailing on a stormy sea, to always be tied to the big Russian ship\u201d. In response, Putin said that the Serbian Orthodox Church plays a significant role in strengthening relations between our peoples, who traditionally maintain the warmest, closest and most trusting alliances.<\/p>\n

Sport \u201cTrojan horse\u201d: Serbian passports of the head of the International Boxing Association Umar Kremlev and officials associated with him allowed to organize tournaments named after Akhmat Kadyrov in Belgrade. This links Chechen foundations to the local sport elite.<\/p>\n

IT diaspora: Reuters estimates that 100-150 thousand Russian immigrants, mostly from the IT industry, may live in Serbia. A \u201cLittle Russia\u201d has been created in Belgrade\u2019s Dor\u010dol district: \u201cMatryoshka\u201d grocery stores, \u201cSloj\u201d cafes, and coworking spaces. Bloggers spread information about the ease of obtaining a visa at the airport and the \u201cOrthodox atmosphere\u201d.<\/p>\n

How to Counter Russian Expansion in the Balkans?<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/a>In March 2025, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  Kaja Kallas  said that the participation of the candidate countries in the May 9 celebrations in Moscow \u201ccontradicts the European path\u201d. President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 announced that he and Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico would travel to Russia. Brussels condemned these actions, but the EU did not impose any sanctions. This is the best proof of the effectiveness of the Kremlin\u2019s strategy. Belgrade can simultaneously trade with the EU, export weapons to Ukraine, and greet Putin.<\/p>\n

Now, according to Western experts, there are three possible ways the situation could develop.<\/p>\n

First<\/strong>, a scenario of controlled drift, i.e., preservation of the current state of affairs, in which the EU limits itself to verbal remarks, Serbia retains all the privileges of a candidate country, and Russia maintains its position in the region without hindrance.<\/p>\n

Second<\/strong>, a scenario of difficult accession conditions, in which Brussels will make each subsequent chapter of negotiations dependent on Belgrade\u2019s joining sanctions against Moscow and closing the Balkan RT <\/em>station. This, however, could prompt the Serbian elite to seek support from Beijing,  and Russia  \u2013 to move some of its hybrid operations to Hungary.<\/p>\n

Third<\/strong>, the scenario of Russian escalation, in which the  Kremlin\u2019s possible  victory in Ukraine or a new crisis in Kosovo would create a pretext for the deployment of Russian \u201cinstructors\u201d, to which NATO would respond by reinforcing the KFOR contingent, and the Balkans would again become a front line.<\/p>\n

To minimize these risks, the EU and NATO should consider coordinated actions:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Closely monitor all decisions on issuing passports \u201cin the interests of the Republic\u201d and, if necessary, freeze the entry of newly naturalized \u201cSerbs\u201d into the Schengen area.<\/li>\n
  2. Include Naftna Industrija Srbije<\/em> in the eighth package of sanctions and offer Belgrade soft loans to diversify gas supplies through the interconnector with Greece and the LNG terminal in Alexandroupolis.<\/li>\n
  3. Support the Balkan Media Shield project of Reporters Without Borders, which will limit the share of non-European capital in Serbian national TV channels to 20 %.<\/li>\n
  4. Establish a permanent Europol-SIA-Eurojust working group to counter the transfer of dual-use technologies.<\/li>\n
  5. Launch an Erasmus Western Balkans<\/em> scholarship fund for students from Serbia and Montenegro to counter the influence of pro-Russian narratives among young people.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Today, Serbia has become a kind of multifunctional platform for projecting the Kremlin\u2019s power: a passport bypass of sanctions, a channel for spreading propaganda, a logistics port for covert operations, and at the same time an injection of soft power thanks to hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Russia. Long-standing cultural and religious ties, political support, energy dominance, and information dominance mean that Russia is effectively using soft power to keep Serbia in its orbit, despite the  EU\u2019s expectations. However, Moscow is not alone in the Balkan market of influence \u2013 Beijing is competing with it more and more boldly. Until the EU firmly links the accession process to limiting Russian influence (sanctions, media, finance), Belgrade will remain the cheapest and most effective Russian investment in Europe.<\/p>\n

    Volodymyr Palyvoda,
    \n<\/strong>expert in international relations<\/p>\n

    Notes:<\/strong><\/p>\n

    [1] Southeastern Europe is a geographical subregion of Europe consisting mainly of the Balkan Peninsula region, as well as adjacent regions and archipelagos.<\/p>\n

    [2] The previous summit in this format took place on October 9, 2024 in Dubrovnik (Croatia). In addition to President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it was attended by the heads of state, government and foreign ministries of Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey, Croatia, and Turkey, as well as the Vice President of the European Commission.<\/p>\n

    [3] After a meeting with President of the  European Council Ant\u00f3nio Costa on May 13, 2025, Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 said that Belgrade wants to accelerate its European integration and open new chapters of negotiations with the EU. This statement looked rather strange against the background of the Serbian President\u2019s recent \u201cfraternization\u201d with Vladimir Putin.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n

    Serbia occupies a rather peculiar position among the countries of Southeast Europe: Belgrade is a place where Russian intelligence services feel at ease, oligarchs can circumvent sanctions, and the Kremlin propaganda has launched a full-fledged TV channel<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":29971,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-29966","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nSerbia As Russia\u2019s Bridgehead in South-Eastern Europe - Institute for Global politics<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/29966\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Serbia As Russia\u2019s Bridgehead in South-Eastern Europe - Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/29966\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2025-06-10T05:00:29+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-04-05T09:38:48+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/serbia2.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"16 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/29966\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/29966\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Vladimir\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b\"},\"headline\":\"Serbia As Russia\u2019s Bridgehead in South-Eastern Europe\",\"datePublished\":\"2025-06-10T05:00:29+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-04-05T09:38:48+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/29966\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":10101,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/29966\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2025\\\/06\\\/serbia2.png\",\"keywords\":[\"\u041f\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0430\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Analytics\",\"Publications\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/29966\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/29966\\\/\",\"name\":\"Serbia As Russia\u2019s Bridgehead in South-Eastern Europe - 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