{"id":30008,"date":"2025-06-11T00:10:14","date_gmt":"2025-06-10T21:10:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=30008"},"modified":"2025-06-09T15:21:30","modified_gmt":"2025-06-09T12:21:30","slug":"vijna-rosi%d1%97-pershoprichini-strategichni-proraxunki-globalni-naslidki","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/vijna-rosi%d1%97-pershoprichini-strategichni-proraxunki-globalni-naslidki\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s War: Root Causes, Strategic Miscalculations, and Global Consequences"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">Russia\u2019s War: Root Causes, Strategic Miscalculations, and Global Consequences<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong><em>Since the mid-16<sup>th<\/sup> century, Muscovy-Russia has been involved in 75 devastating wars, conflicts, and military operations (an average of one war every 7-8 years). More than 70 % of those wars were started by Russia. In each of them, the goals were aggressive and partially successful: the empire managed to increase the original territory of Muscovy by a total of 10 times.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><em>Over the past 30 years, Russia started 7 wars. It failed to increase its territory, but it managed to maintain its influence in whole or in part. Each time, the same narrative was used to justify the aggression: the country comes to the \u201crescue\u201d of those it is \u201cforced\u201d to protect. For decades, the world shyly ignored this.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><em>In 2014, the situation repeated itself in Ukraine. This made the events of February 2022 possible. Only the resistance of the Ukrainian people and the heroism of our military made the world understand that this was not a \u201crescuing\u201d but a war of aggression by a sub-empire against the civilized world, and that even a small country can resist Goliath.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><em>Today, at every turn, the \u201croot causes\u201d of this war are mentioned, and their elimination, according to the enemy\u2019s narrative, \u201copens the way to a lasting peace\u201d. Let\u2019s try to understand this logic in order to realize the real possibilities and ways to achieve peace, to assess strategic miscalculations and their possible consequences for Ukraine and the world.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<div class=\"sp-wrap sp-wrap-yellow\">\n<div class=\"sp-head\" title=\"Expand\">\nPolitical Context\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"sp-body folded\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The search for an answer to the question of the true root causes of the war takes us back to the 16<sup>th<\/sup> century. But without going into a deep retrospective, let\u2019s start with the present. Let us recall Putin\u2019s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007. It is considered to be a message to the West that contained the main message: rejecting Russia\u2019s role as a minor power in world politics. Putin then emphasized his determination to defend the interests of the state and to take an active part in shaping the global order \u2013 a true imperial narrative. The main aspects of the speech were the rejection of the unipolar (American) model of the world order, the inadmissibility of NATO\u2019s eastward expansion, disarmament, and the Iranian nuclear program. Subsequently, on October 24, 2014, Putin delivered a similarly focused Valdai speech, which was considered a continuation of the Munich speech and the ideological basis for a great war.<\/p>\n<p>Many experts saw Putin\u2019s statements as early signs of Russia\u2019s imperial reversal. They were right: the Munich speech was a clear, undisguised warning from Putin about the inadmissibility of US hegemony, Russia\u2019s staying among the world\u2019s leading powers, and its influence in the post-Soviet space.<\/p>\n<p>And the warnings were not just verbal: by that time, Russia was already holding Transnistria, having formed the unrecognized TMR (1992-1993), having provoked a war in Abkhazia and having separated it from Georgia (1992-1993), having conducted the first military campaign in Chechnya (1994-1996), and being in the midst of the second Russian-Chechen war (1999-2009), which ended with the establishment of a pro-Russian Chechen government.<\/p>\n<p>All of Putin\u2019s wars, \u201cfrozen\u201d conflicts, the formation of quasi-republics, and the use of Russian military contingents and private military companies such as \u201cWagner\u201d abroad are targeted tools with a single goal: to keep countries under control, to prevent them from moving away from Russia and drifting toward the West and NATO.<\/p>\n<p>The collective West, especially the United States, largely ignored these signals. As a result, in 2008, Putin launched the Russian-Georgian war, which resulted in South Ossetia becoming an unrecognized republic under Russia\u2019s control. This was followed by the invasion of Syria (2015-2022) and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war (2014\u20132022 \u2013 to date). This logical series is extremely telling.<\/p>\n<p>It is wrong to say that the West\u2019s passivity was complete: there was a dialogue between Moscow and Washington at the unofficial level (recall the regular visits of special envoys, contacts through intelligence services, and the use of mediation missions). However, the democratic world still showed weakness and indecision. It was this uncertainty that made it possible to reach a \u201cpoint of no return\u201d, which on the Ukrainian track was J. Biden\u2019s meeting with V. Putin in Geneva in 2021. That meeting, according to some experts, paved the way for a full-scale war in 2022. And it is far from certain that, if agreements had been reached in Geneva, the compromise would have been in favor of Ukraine, as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Europe as a whole. So, we have what we have.<\/p>\n<p>In this sense, D. Trump\u2019s statements such as \u201cthis is not my war\u201d, \u201chad I been president, there would not have been this war\u201d take on a certain positive, yet controversial color for us: suppose he had managed, as an imaginary American leader, to meet Putin halfway on Ukraine in exchange for the Kremlin\u2019s financial and economic \u201ccarrots\u201d\u2013 what would our state look like today? Would it exist at all?<\/p>\n<p>It becomes clear why Trump\u2019s America is trying its best to disassociate itself from the Russian-Ukrainian war: for it, this is a dead-end political puzzle that leaves the current president no room for loud victory statements. The US administration has realized that a compromise cannot be reached, so they are shifting the problem to Europe \u2013 this war has become a \u201cEuropean\u201d war.<\/p>\n<p>Trump seeks to build a \u201cGreat America\u201d using his well-known Big Deal business strategy, which has paid some dividends in the past. However, this approach, as well as the attempt to \u201cturn the tables\u201d on Europe, has become his strategic mistake. The truth is that America will not become great by quarreling with everyone. The \u201cdiplomacy\u201d of division, conflict, and shifting the blame for failures to others will only speed up this process.<\/p>\n<p>Washington&#8217;s policy is increasingly adapting to Putin\u2019s demands: just look at the speech of US Vice President J.D. Vance on February 14, 2025, at the 61<sup>st<\/sup> Munich Security Conference and read the statements of Keith Kellogg \u2013 the United States recognizes the validity of Russia\u2019s demands for NATO\u2019s non-expansion to the east and is ready to discuss this issue as part of a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine. Thus, the United States de facto agrees that it is losing its geopolitical \u201chegemony\u201d and is ready to give Russia control over the territories that the Kremlin considers its \u201czones of interest and traditional influence\u201d. They are engaged in a dialogue with Putin, seeking compromises in the Big Deal format, and reaching agreements.<\/p>\n<p>Trump is confidently moving toward his own catastrophe and bringing the country closer to it, and these signs are already visible in the White House and the establishment. Sooner or later, Trump\u2019s America will end, and we will witness many unexpected turns in that country. Today, Putin is skillfully taking advantage of Trump\u2019s unprofessionalism, even gullibility, turning him into an accomplice to his own crimes.<\/p>\n<p>Is everything that bad? No, Ukraine has more reliable partners in Europe. We are united by an understanding of a common threat. Europe is waking up, realizing that tomorrow Putin could be standing near Warsaw or Berlin if he is not stopped in Ukraine. At the same time, America just shrugs its shoulders. Trouble always unites those who find themselves in it: a burning house on the edge of the village must be put out together, because tomorrow the whole village will burn.<\/p>\n<div class=\"spdiv\">[collapse]<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<div class=\"sp-wrap sp-wrap-yellow\">\n<div class=\"sp-head\" title=\"Expand\">\nRoot Causes of the War\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"sp-body folded\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>It is easy to see that all the political and diplomatic \u201cdancing to tambourines\u201d is taking place around one key issue: \u201caddressing the root causes of war\u201d. It is important to realize what these root causes are, and what and where the key to peace is.<\/p>\n<p>Moscow has repeatedly spoken about the need to \u201celiminate the root causes of war\u201d in various formats. These words were heard in the rhetoric of not only Moscow, but also Washington, Beijing, and others. The \u201croot causes\u201d thesis,created by the Kremlin regime, is not accidental \u2013 it is based on the idea of returning the world to a multipolar one, as well as Russia\u2019s resumption of its role as a world power, membership in the G7 club, and \u201cruler of destinies\u201d of other countries. Moscow persistently seeks influence and control over the territory of the \u201cex-USSR\u201d \u2013 this is the angle from which Russia\u2019s occupation of Transnistria (1992), the war in Georgia (2008), and eventually Ukraine should be viewed. Zbigniew Brzezinski warned us about this in his \u201cGrand Chessboard\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cstarting point\u201d for Russia in Ukraine was the victory of the Orange Revolution in 2004. The revolution was perceived \u201cbehind the fence\u201d as a challenge to its own interests in foreign policy, primarily because of Ukraine\u2019s desire to move away from Russia and toward the West. In fact, this movement posed a real threat to the stability of the regime in Russia. Many experts point out that it was the Orange Revolution that laid the groundwork for Russia\u2019s aggression. The northern neighbour\u2019s hope to regain the status quo was finally dashed at the turn of 2013-2014 with the Euromaidan. The course chosen by the Ukrainian people to determine their own European future and their unwillingness to identify and combine it with the Soviet past meant the possibility of losing Ukraine for good, and thus losing Russia\u2019s power, \u2013 this became the second \u201croot cause\u201d of the war.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, the foreign policy aspect. Let\u2019s recall Russian narratives about US global expansion, NATO\u2019s eastward advance and the approach of danger to Russia\u2019s borders, \u201ccolor revolutions\u201d financed by Western intelligence services, as a result of which Ukraine began to \u201cdrift\u201d in a western direction, to come under \u201cUS control\u201d, and so on. Thus, another root cause may be the alleged \u201cprevention of Ukraine\u2019s falling under the control of America and its allies\u201d and the \u201cabsorption\u201d of our country by the collective West and NATO.<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s draw a conclusion: each of these root causes is ideological, and none of them can be eliminated. Ukraine looks to the future, while the Kremlin is hopelessly stuck in the past, in the imperatives of \u201cRussian greatness\u201d. The world has changed, and Russia is a colossus on clay legs in it. This is reminiscent of the situation in the USSR in the late 1980s. The war and economic isolation finally threw the \u201cstate-civilization\u201d into the past and destroyed its future. Such a morbid Putin\u2019s \u201cidea-fix\u201d has no chance of being realized.<\/p>\n<p>Yes, Putin is right: to end the war, its \u201croot causes\u201d must be eliminated. But those root causes are Putin\u2019s fundamentally sick Russia, where a fascist oligarchic regime imbued with hatred, imperial superiority, revanchism, and waging wars of aggression as a means to achieve the Kremlin\u2019s goals, has flourished under the forgiving gaze of Western democracies.<\/p>\n<p>Today\u2019s Putin regime is not only a global problem. It is also an opportunity to reboot Russia and stop it from returning to the past.<\/p>\n<div class=\"spdiv\">[collapse]<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<div class=\"sp-wrap sp-wrap-yellow\">\n<div class=\"sp-head\" title=\"Expand\">\nMiscalculations\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"sp-body folded\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>In the prehistory of the war, many mistakes and miscalculations were made. They were made by leaders of different states and at different times. Let\u2019s try to record the main ones.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ukraine.<\/strong> In choosing its Euro-Atlantic future, Ukraine counted on a safe path, the unwavering support of the United States and its major Western partners. This imaginary \u201cshield\u201d, as well as the \u201csecurity guarantees\u201d enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum, gave hope for steady progress toward such a future. We made a mistake: the guarantees did not work, and the support was not that unwavering. This miscalculation cost us dearly, and we are still paying for it today with heavy losses.<\/p>\n<p>The state, unfortunately, neglected possible dangerous scenarios, did not fully invest in the development of the Armed Forces, missile programs, defense industry, and did not strengthen the border. The war caught the country unprepared. The result is widely known.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The collective West.<\/strong> It miscalculated in many aspects: assessing the national spirit of Ukrainians, heroism, readiness for resistance, realism of planning and conducting combat operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It also underestimated the true intentions of the Kremlin leadership and Russia\u2019s real capabilities.<\/p>\n<p>The main mistake that led to the war was the US leaders\u2019 unwillingness to reach agreements on geopolitical issues and to consider the conditions put forward by Putin in 2007-2021. His political isolation pushed him to decide to get closer to China, North Korea, and other allies and to start a war in Ukraine against the West to preserve his power. This worsened Ukraine\u2019s already weak starting point at the beginning of the war.<\/p>\n<p>Western Europe made systemic mistakes when its politicians flirted with Russia and allowed it to create financial and oil and gas dependencies. Cheap gas and oil turned into Russia&#8217;s insidious weapon. Europe was unprepared for diversification alternatives and faltered. Moscow had managed to create systemic long-term dependencies, and as a result, to influence capitals and politicians. Now, European countries are urgently strengthening their defense, activating all the capabilities of the military-industrial complex, introducing military training programs, reanimating underground bomb shelters, etc.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Trump is wrong that \u201cthis is not his war\u201d. When a bloody massacre is taking place in the center of Europe, the fault for which lies partly with the United States, it is his war as well. Moreover, a 30-million-strong state that has no nuclear weapons, no significant military arsenals, and is fighting for its survival against a 140-million-strong nuclear triad has to invent and apply non-standard, cutting-edge warfare technologies. War is not only about losses, but also about an incredible surge of scientific and technological progress to destroy the enemy. Progress eliminates the possibility of the enemy using nuclear weapons, as it allows us to disable the means of its delivery. Everyone is studying this experience. And it is far from certain that the latest methods will not be used by other organizations and small countries against the United States.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Trump\u2019s America is mistaken in believing that it is still possible to negotiate with Putin: time is lost. He not only knows, but has tested the weaknesses and unprofessionalism of the American team, and skillfully exploits them to achieve his own goals. Please, be reminded how during his last phone conversation with the Kremlin leader, the latter set conditions in a harsh, far from diplomatic manner, and D. Trump asked in response to provide \u201cat least the proposals that would not be rejected immediately\u201d \u2013 this fact is quite revealing.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Russia.<\/strong> Putin, inspired by his hawkish environment, made the main strategic mistake of his presidency when he threatened the West in 2007 in Munich, and then unleashed wars against Georgia and Ukraine. The Russian president hoped to regain control of the countries he considered \u201ca historical part of Russia\u201d by force. He decided to punish \u201cdisobedient nations\u201d but miscalculated.<\/p>\n<p>He was persuaded that the Ukrainian people overwhelmingly wanted to live under Russia\u2019s protectorate, and that the revolutions of 2004 and 2013 were not natural, but \u201cartificial, colour\u201d, organized and financed by the US intelligence services and the collective West to weaken Russia. Despite all the efforts to \u201creturn\u201d Ukraine by force, it has moved even further away from Russia. Putin\u2019s war has made our country stronger, more resilient, more confident, and more pro-European. The Armed Forces, special services, and intelligence agencies of Ukraine are making history by destroying the \u201cworld\u2019s second\u201d army.<\/p>\n<p>Putin, without even realizing it, has created what he sought to avoid. His strategic mistakes, caused by false ideologies, are doomed to failure. He wasted time and the opportunity to avoid a catastrophe.<\/p>\n<p>This is not the only key mistake. Putin chose the path of systemic destruction of European unity, and he fully supported the rise to power in the United States of D. Trump, whom he knew well and believed to be under his control. Putin counted on one and only thing: the US President had to stop supporting Ukraine and force our country and Europe to accept Putin\u2019s terms of \u201cpeace\u201d. As a result, D. Trump, faced with unsolvable problems, began to withdraw from peace negotiations and pass this heavy \u201cflag\u201d to European states.<\/p>\n<p>No matter how eager Moscow is to negotiate with the \u201cdecision-making center\u201d (the US President), it now has to admit that Washington is losing influence and control over the situation. It should look for agreements with European leaders, i.e., with those whom it threatens with a \u201cgreat war\u201d, which is a completely different political configuration with unpredictable consequences.<\/p>\n<p>Another of Putin\u2019s visionary miscalculations is that he has declared Russia a \u201cstate- civilization\u201d whose place is in Asia. In fact, he turned away from the pro-European course and chose a strategic partnership with China and other authoritarian regimes in the region. This strategic mistake will cost Russia its absorption by China in the future. Such processes are already underway. Beijing definitely does not do anything for nothing, it invests in the future only when it is sure of the result. China needs Russia\u2019s resources and territory, it is gradually getting them now, and after the war in Ukraine is over, the process will become avalanche-like.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, this is not a complete list of the problems that have led to the current state of affairs, but the above is enough to realize the depth and systemic nature of the crisis.<\/p>\n<div class=\"spdiv\">[collapse]<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<div class=\"sp-wrap sp-wrap-yellow\">\n<div class=\"sp-head\" title=\"Expand\">\nConsequences\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"sp-body folded\">\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>It is unlikely that today there is a responsible expert or politician who can clearly answer the question of how long the war will last and what its consequences will be. But there are some things that already have a definite answer.<\/p>\n<p><em>Firstly<\/em>, we can confidently state that the world will never be the same as it was before February 24, 2022. A new world is being formed, and the war is a manifestation of this process. It will continue and end in a certain status quo, but for sure Ukraine will survive as an independent state (perhaps on a smaller territory) and build its European future. It is very likely that other post-Soviet states will follow Ukraine in getting rid of Russia\u2019s influence. Under such circumstances, as Zbigniew Brzezinski warned, Russia will lose its empire status.<\/p>\n<p><em>Secondly<\/em>, the Kremlin will not be able to force postwar Ukraine to become a \u201cbrotherly\u201d country. The wounds, losses, destruction, abuse, and humiliation inflicted are so deep that they won\u2019t be erased from memory for generations. Russia, in fact, has never been a \u201cbrotherly country\u201d, but now and for many decades to come it will remain our implacable enemy, and for many others it will simply be an enemy, an adversary. Post-war Russia will exist in a hostile environment, and this will determine its military and political system. Ukraine will demand not only an apology from the aggressor, but also that the regime be condemned by an international court and reparations be paid. Communication will be complicated, and there will be no political and social dialog for a long time. A high fence will be erected along the border as a symbol of the ideological disunity of the states. A high level of conflict will persist on all international platforms \u2013 this is an issue for generations.<\/p>\n<p><em>Thirdly<\/em>. Worldview differences and the fundamental impossibility of eliminating the \u201croot causes\u201d of the war pave the way for its continuation. Russia will not be able to maintain its political and economic influence in Ukraine, but the struggle for \u201chistorical territories\u201d will continue until the resource is exhausted. Putin\u2019s regime will have no reason to \u201ccome to the aid of the Russian-speaking population\u201d in Ukraine, but the thesis of \u201celiminating the military threat\u201d at its borders, which will \u201ccome from\u201d a militarized and Western-backed neighboring state, will remain. At some point in the war, exhaustion must set in, the fighting will stop, the situation will go into a frozen state for a while, but the hybrid war will continue. It will continue until there are fundamental changes within Putin\u2019s Russia. Such events are bound to happen, and the Putin regime will be condemned by the new government and the \u201cawakened society\u201d, but we understand that this process will be long. The new post-Putin Russia is only visible in the long term.<\/p>\n<p><em>Fourthly<\/em>, Putin\u2019s and even post-Putin Russia will lose its pretended status as a \u201cglobal player\u201d, \u201creliable partner\u201d, and \u201cstrategic ally\u201d. The state will become weaker and proportionally less interesting to the civilized West, including the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Even China is interested in Russia only as a large territory rich in natural resources. The regime will have no prospects in great global isolation. In today\u2019s world, fixed ideas about a separate \u201cstate-civilization\u201d are doomed. Without external support, integration into world markets, etc., the country will move towards destruction. The common task is to speed up this process.<\/p>\n<p><em>Fifthly<\/em>. Security issues in the new world will obviously come to the fore. This principle will quite predictably become dominant in the formation of new interstate relations, as well as in the formation of more modern and effective defense alliances. The old security architecture will become a thing of the past. Today\u2019s NATO will be called into question. A new regional leadership will be formed, based primarily on the defense and security capabilities of states. And here Ukraine has good chances and prospects.<\/p>\n<div class=\"spdiv\">[collapse]<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Today, it is becoming clear that there are no magicians in the world who will resolve all Ukrainian problems, remove Putin, bomb Moscow, fragment Russia, and return Crimea and the Donbas to us. Moreover, we don\u2019t have many true allies, and even a tandem with the existing ones will not bring us the conventional \u201cKorean scenario\u201d on a plate \u2013 we will have to fight for such an outcome of a full-scale war.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">But we should not despair, nor should we be enamored, nor should we accept wishful thinking. We know that the problem has a solution. Let\u2019s be realistic. We need to confront the Kremlin leader with the fact that he will not be able to achieve his \u201cNapoleonic\u201d plans in Ukraine under any circumstances. He will definitely stop, if he does not \u2013 he will be stopped by others, when the military and economic situation in Russia becomes a stalemate. It is our common task to make it achieve that state.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Yuriy Romaniuk,<br \/>\n<\/strong>Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yuriy Romaniuk<\/p>\n<p>Since the mid-16th century, Muscovy-Russia has been involved in 75 devastating wars, conflicts, and military operations (an average of one war every 7-8 years)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":30012,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[285],"class_list":["post-30008","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-romanyuk","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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