{"id":30231,"date":"2025-06-24T00:04:41","date_gmt":"2025-06-23T21:04:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=30231"},"modified":"2026-04-05T12:37:59","modified_gmt":"2026-04-05T09:37:59","slug":"operaciya-levovij-narod","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/operaciya-levovij-narod\/","title":{"rendered":"Operation \u201cRising Lion\u201d: Mossad Returns to the Top League"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">Operation \u201cRising Lion\u201d [1]: Mossad Returns to the Top League<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">After the Palestinian militant group Hamas\u2019 sudden attack &nbsp;on Israel on October 7, 2023, Mossad was accused of \u201cmissing\u201d the terrorists\u2019 preparations for the bloody massacre [2]. It was also reminded of previous failures, in particular the destruction of the Mossad\u2019s agent network in T\u00fcrkiye in 2021 [3]. However, it should be noted that the list of successful operations by the \u201cIntelligence and Special Operations Agency\u201d (full name \u201cMossad\u201d) is much longer. Besides, part of the blame for the lack of preparedness for the HAMAS\u2019 attack lies with the political leadership of the State of Israel. In November 2024, the Civil Investigation Committee, created by the families of the victims and civil society organizations, pointed out &nbsp;in its report that the mass murder committed by HAMAS was made possible by the arrogant groupthink under the leadership of Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu. Repeated early warnings from senior commanders were not considered in detail by the head of government, and no reasonable response was given to the possibility of error in the adopted concept.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The unprecedented Operation Rising Lion, organized and carried out by Mossad, during which Israel launched a coordinated preemptive strike against Iran\u2019s nuclear program, can to some extent be considered revenge for the humiliation inflicted by HAMAS [4]. On the night of June 12-13, 2025, the first explosions were heard at the Iranian nuclear facility named after Shahid Ahmad Roshan [5] in Natanz, preceded by a series of carefully planned operational measures.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Preparation for the Operation<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">According to <em>The Times of Israel<\/em>, since 2020, Mossad has been collecting intelligence, satellite data, and conducting thorough analytical work to circumvent the physical and counterintelligence protection of Iran\u2019s critical facilities. Weapons and necessary equipment were secretly transported to Iran several months before the operation began. Mossad established secret operational bases in the country, deploying kamikaze drones and high-precision short-range missiles hidden in ordinary vehicles. These pre-prepared assets were intended to paralyze Iran\u2019s air defenses at the very moment the Israeli strike began.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Mossad agents and the Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) in Iran, as well as its 8200 electronic intelligence unit, monitored the movements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Command. The locations of the S-300 systems were detected using reconnaissance drones and Ofek-16 satellites [6].<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Some of the equipment \u2014 kamikaze drones and Spike-NLOS launchers \u2014 was shipped in containers to ports in the Gulf of Oman, and from there by rail from Azerbaijan in trucks carrying construction materials or modular houses. The electronic devices were disassembled and placed in suitcases, which allowed a special group to enter Iran from Armenia in October 2024. All of this equipment was then stored in the Markazi province under the guise of components for cement production lines.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A secret underground \u201cWarehouse 727\u201d was established in the Alborz province (less than 40 km from Tehran). It housed 48 kamikaze drones with 17-kilogram warheads, as well as satellite communication stations compatible with Ofek-16. Several dozen Spike-NLOS launchers were hidden 60\u2013120 km from the city of Natanz. The use of low-emission synthetic fuel was intended to make it more difficult to detect drones and launchers with thermal imaging.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Besides, Israeli commandos special forces placed powerful explosive devices near the positions of Iranian anti-aircraft missile batteries. When the \u201czero hour\u201d came, the saboteurs detonated the charges, destroying or disabling the radar systems and launchers that were supposed to protect Iran\u2019s airspace. This asymmetric neutralization of air defense systems \u2014 using ground-based rather than air-based operations \u2014 created a window of opportunity for an effective strike. At the same time, Israeli secret services infiltrated Iranian telecommunications networks.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">The Culmination of the Attack<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">On the night of June 13, 2025, Spike-NLOS systems opened fire, and a few seconds later, kamikaze drones were launched from an underground warehouse in Alborz, attacking Russian-made Nebo-M radars and IRGC communications nodes. This allowed a large group of Israeli aircrafts to fly over Iran unhindered.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In the first three minutes of the operation, key radars were suppressed, enabling the air force to use Spice guided bombs from a distance of about 75 km, avoiding the S-300\u2019s kill zones. The attack was carried out in three parallel directions: drones launched from the Alborz base; Spike-NLOS launchers deployed from cover; 216 aircrafts that dropped 334 bombs in 27 minutes (including 16 BLU-113 bunker-buster bombs).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The most effective was the so-called decapitation strike [7]. A bunker in Tehran, where a meeting of the IRGC staff led by General Hossein Salami was taking place, was destroyed \u2014 all those present were killed on the spot. The strike destroyed General Mohammad Bagheri\u2019s villa, and another missile killed IRGC Air Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh. IAEA inspectors confirmed the complete destruction of the above-ground part of the experimental fuel enrichment facility at the nuclear site in Natanz. According to experts, the damage to 1,700 IR-6 centrifuges will delay the uranium enrichment program by at least two years.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The operation also had a cyber dimension. Unit 8200 of the Israeli Defense Forces inserted fake IP addresses into Iran\u2019s telecommunications network, redirecting 73 % of traffic in a reverse cycle, which paralyzed the capabilities of the IRGC radar at crucial moments.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The Israeli attack was not limited to the use of aircrafts. In parallel with the air strike, Mossad carried out sabotage operations on Iranian territory. Its agents blew up or disabled many elements of the enemy\u2019s strategic network, from surface-to-surface missile launchers to radar stations and communication centers. As a result, when Israeli F-16s and F-35s entered Iranian territory, many anti-aircraft batteries were silent or had already been destroyed.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Iran\u2019s Response and Strategic Consequences<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Israel&#8217;s campaign on the first day was swift and paralyzing \u2014 experts compared it to the concept of \u201cshock and awe\u201d [8], but with the use of modern technology and special methods. Although Iran had been expecting some form of attack for months (the USA and Israel made no secret of their growing determination), it was surprised by the scale and synchronicity of the operation.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Initially, the warning and command communication systems in Tehran were so disrupted that it took the Iranian Command precious minutes to understand the full picture of the attack, and many commanders were already dead or hiding in shelters. This delay led to a limited response from Iran in the early hours \u2014 suffice it to say that Tehran\u2019s immediate reaction was limited to launching about 100 drones without using its full arsenal of ballistic missiles.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The conflict, as <em>Business Insider<\/em> points out, affected the markets. Oil prices rose by 9 %. In two days, the VIX index [9] rose by 24 points, and currencies strengthened against the dollar.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Conclusions for the West<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Of course, a direct comparison with other potential conflicts has its caveats. Experts at the Atlantic Council think tank stress that the Israeli attack took place in a relatively favorable environment \u2014 Iran did not yet have nuclear weapons, and its air defenses had already been weakened (the Israeli Air Force had been neutralizing threats in Syria for years and probably some in Iran as well). It would be difficult to repeat such a scenario, for example, against a nuclear power in full combat readiness without risking nuclear war.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Despite this, Western analysts are thoroughly &nbsp;studying the lessons of Operation Rising Lion, as well as Operation Pavutyna (Spiderweb- Transl.), previously carried out by the SBU. In other words, even against states such as Russia and China, elements of this strategy could theoretically be applied (with the caveat that Russia and China possess nuclear arsenals, which complicates preventive actions).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The most important conclusions concern a new paradigm in offensive and defensive operations. First, the deep integration of intelligence services, special forces, and drones has created a new model of pre-conflict operations. Until recently, it was believed that the advantage at the beginning of a war was primarily ensured by a massive missile or air strike. Now it is clear that a precisely placed \u201chidden blade\u201d on enemy territory can determine the success of a campaign even before it begins. The USA is already considering the development of similar capabilities \u2014 programs such as the Replicator project [10] &nbsp;involve the use of a whole swarm of cheap drones in conjunction with special forces, directly inspired by the successes of Israel and Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Second, states must rethink the concept of deep defense. Traditionally, it was believed that a large territory provides time and space to respond \u2014 but the case of the \u201cPavutyna\u201d showed that geographical distance has become a psychological vulnerability, and rear areas are dangerous if the enemy can penetrate them using drones hidden even in civilian trucks. Analysts at the US Center for Strategic and International Studies believe that modern defense systems must perceive threats from within, so it is necessary to invest in multi-level protection of key facilities: from drones (radars for detecting drones, patrolling using drones) and in agentura detection systems (e.g., analysis of behavior, &nbsp;logistics monitoring, etc.).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">NATO countries have begun to take seriously warnings that the same cheap drones Ukraine used to target bombers could be used by terrorists or hostile states to attack critical infrastructure in the West. The Center for a New American Security called Operation Pavutyna a wake-up call for the Pentagon, pointing out &nbsp;that current US efforts to protect UAVs are far from sufficient.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Third, both operations demonstrated the breakdown of traditional deterrence and warning mechanisms. Attacks carried out on enemy territory \u2014 through agents and drones \u2014 make the old \u201cred lines\u201d less clear and less deterrent. When the enemy does not need to cross the border to strike (because it is already inside), classic escalation signals may be detected too late. This reduces the response time for decision-makers and potentially increases the risk of mistakes or hasty decisions.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The world has seen, as noted by the Canadian portal repolitics.com, that Iran failed to prevent the attack because it underestimated Israel\u2019s innovative potential, and Russia experienced its own aviation \u201cPearl Harbor\u201d [11] because it ignored the warnings of its bloggers. Other countries, such as China, are undoubtedly learning from this and may accelerate the development of their own capabilities, both offensive (for example, \u201cWhat if we deploy drones in the USA?\u201d \u2014 such a question appeared in analytical calculations) and defensive (protection against similar sabotage).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Volodymyr Palyvoda,<br \/>\n<\/strong>expert in international relations<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><strong>Notes:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[1] Operation Am Ke-Lavi literally translates as \u201cThe People Like a Lion.\u201d Ukrainian media often refer to it as \u201cThe Rising Lion.\u201d In English-language sources, the operation is referred to as \u201cRising Lion.\u201d The name of the operation is taken from the Torah. The full phrase reads: \u201cBehold, the people rising like a lion, and like a lion it is rising; it will not lie down until it devours its prey and drinks the blood of the slain.\u201d This is an excerpt from the famous prophecy of the seer Balaam (Bilaam).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[2] During a meeting of Israeli intelligence chiefs a week before the so-called \u201cBlack Saturday,\u201d a Mossad representative stated that \u201cHAMAS is exercising caution so as not to get involved in a military confrontation with Israel.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[3] In October 2021, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s &nbsp;media announced the arrest of 15 Mossad agents who had been operating for several years in various regions of T\u00fcrkiye. They were monitoring activists from anti-Israel organizations and students at Turkish universities. Special &nbsp;attention was paid to those who could work in the defense industry in the future.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[4] On October 7, 2023, Rahim Safavi, an adviser to Iran\u2019s supreme leader, congratulated Palestinian militants on the launch of the largest attack on Israel in recent years and said that Tehran would support HAMAS until the complete liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[5] Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan was an Iranian nuclear scientist who was assassinated in 2012, believed to be the result of a Mossad operation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[6] Ofeq 16 (or Horizon-16) is an Israeli high-resolution reconnaissance satellite controlled by Unit 9900 (geospatial intelligence) of the AMAN.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[7] Decapitation strike \u2014 a military term meaning a strategic attack aimed at the political and military leadership of the enemy with the intention of rendering it incapable of further hostile action, or at least significantly limiting its ability to do so.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[8] Shock and Awe is a strategy of using force in which the enemy must be confronted with overwhelming, dominant force and massive, intense firepower from the outset of the conflict in order to achieve superiority over it in the shortest possible time. The demonstration of overwhelming force is intended to paralyze the enemy\u2019s will to fight. The concept was formulated by American strategic analysts Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in 1996 for the Pentagon. It was applied during the 2003 campaign in Iraq.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[9] The Volatility Index is an index of volatility, also known as the fear index. For traders, it is a tool that helps assess the market situation and determine when to buy securities and when it is better to start betting on a decline.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[10] Project &nbsp;Replicator is an ambitious Pentagon program aimed at creating swarms of drones capable of performing complex tasks on the battlefield. The essence of the idea is to reconnoiter enemy positions, attack the enemy, defend one\u2019s own positions, and carry out other missions with the simultaneous involvement of thousands of drones acting as a single organism.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[11] Unfortunately, the result of Operation Pabutyna looks more modest than the result of Japan\u2019s attack on the US Navy base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. At that time, 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,178 were wounded. Almost all 188 aircrafts stationed in Hawaii were destroyed or damaged. Four battleships were sunk, four armored ships, three cruisers, and three destroyers were damaged.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n<p>After the Palestinian militant group Hamas\u2019 sudden attack \u00a0on Israel on October 7, 2023, Mossad was accused of \u201cmissing\u201d the terrorists\u2019 preparations for the bloody massacre<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":30232,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-30231","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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