{"id":30434,"date":"2025-07-09T00:05:15","date_gmt":"2025-07-08T21:05:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=30434"},"modified":"2025-07-13T07:08:35","modified_gmt":"2025-07-13T04:08:35","slug":"pivdennij-front-dlya-rosi%d1%97","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/pivdennij-front-dlya-rosi%d1%97\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00a0The \u201cSouthern Front\u201d for Russia and How it Affects Its War Against Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"

Moscow is steadily losing allies and partners in the Caucasus, who are gradually turning into its enemies<\/span><\/h1>\n

This weakens Russia\u2019s position in the region and negatively affects the realization of its interests. As a result, T\u00fcrkiye has the opportunity to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions. Besides, yesterday\u2019s allies of Russia are eagerly switching sides. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s political and economic measures to achieve its goals are accompanied by a revival of its military activity, which opens a new front for Russia, forcing it to divert its combat resources from Ukraine. New challenges and threats reduce Russia\u2019s ability to continue the war, which is in Ukraine\u2019s interests. However, Moscow\u2019s motivation to keep Crimea and the South of Ukraine under control is increasing.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Moscow\u2019s further losing partners and allies is a consequence of its imperial policy and arrogant attitude to them<\/span><\/strong>. As a result, some of its former close allies are switching sides to its rivals. Consequently, Russia\u2019s international position is weakening, and there is a prospect of new hotbeds of military confrontation between it and its neighbors. <\/span>One example is the deterioration of relations with Azerbaijan<\/span><\/strong>, which has become particularly important for Russia since the start of the war. According to some respected experts, Azerbaijan acts as a logistical channel through which Russia circumvents Western sanctions, including by obtaining dual-use goods. T\u00fcrkiye, which has close economic ties with the EU but does not support its sanctions against the Russian Federation, also serves as such a channel. In addition, the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline runs through the territory of Azerbaijan and Russia, designed to transport oil from the Caspian to the Black Sea region with further access to the world market. This allows Moscow to pass off its oil as Azerbaijani or Kazakhstan\u2019s and thus circumvent Western restrictions on its oil exports.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, even before the war, Russia had been pursuing its interests in the Caucasus with the help of Azerbaijan. In particular, on February 22, 2022, on the eve of Putin\u2019s full-scale attack on Ukraine, the Moscow Declaration on Allied Cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation was signed. The main provisions of the document are: refraining from any actions that harm the strategic partnership between the two countries; providing military assistance to each other in case of need; deepening cooperation between the parties in the oil and gas sector.<\/span><\/p>\n

Western experts believe that this was the basis for Azerbaijan\u2019s covert assistance to Russia in resolving issues with American and European sanctions. For its part, Moscow simplified access for Azerbaijani goods to the Russian market and did not interfere with Baku\u2019s efforts to regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, in order to use Azerbaijan for its own purposes, Russia sacrificed Armenia, which is its ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This is precisely why Armenian-Russian relations have deteriorated, leading to a decline in Moscow\u2019s influence in the Caucasus.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>However, not everything is going well for Moscow in its relations with Azerbaijan, and this further undermes its position in the region<\/span><\/strong>. As is well known, the reason for this was the Russian air defense forces\u2019 shooting down an Azerbaijani Airlines passenger plane flying from Baku to Grozny on December 25, 2024. Due to the damage caused by the Russians, the plane made a hard landing not at Russian airports, but on the territory of Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Moscow acknowledged its involvement in the incident but refused to publicly apologize to Azerbaijan and pay compensation to the victims or their relatives.<\/span><\/p>\n

At that time, the incident had no visible consequences, except for Baku\u2019s loud indignation at Russia\u2019s position. However, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev refused to participate in the Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 this year, although he sent an Azerbaijani military unit to it. It is also possible that Azerbaijan will not help Russia circumvent the known sanctions. It also continues to cooperate with Ukraine, providing it with humanitarian and economic assistance. Azerbaijan\u2019s strategic partnership with T\u00fcrkiye, which is Russia\u2019s main rival and, in fact, its military opponent in the Caucasus, the Black Sea region, and the Middle East, is not in Russia\u2019s interests either.<\/span><\/p>\n

Analysts believe that because of all this, Moscow may try to \u201cpunish\u201d Azerbaijan, including through its diaspora in Russia. This diaspora numbers more than one million people. People from Azerbaijan \u201chold\u201d a number of powerful business structures in their hands and even control certain sectors of the Russian economy. Unlike many other post-Soviet countries, Azerbaijan does not depend on remittances from its workers in Russia. Nevertheless, Azerbaijanis perceive the diaspora abroad as part of their community.<\/span><\/p>\n

Given this position of Azerbaijan\u2019s people, Moscow deliberately dealt a painful blow to their dignity. This is how Azerbaijan perceives the fact that Russian law enforcement agencies detained at least 50 ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg on June 27 this year for their alleged involvement in a criminal group more than 20 years ago. Two people were brutally killed during the detention.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>It should be pointed out that Baku did not accept Moscow\u2019s actions and took harsh measures in response. Russian Deputy Prime Minister O. Overchuk\u2019s visit to Azerbaijan was canceled, as were all Russian cultural events in the country. Azerbaijan\u2019s leadership officially accused Russia of torturing and killing Azerbaijanis, comparing it to Nazi Germany. At the same time, Azerbaijani police searched the office of the Russian propaganda agency Sputnik-Azerbaijan and detained two of its employees on charges of working for Russian special services. Later, eight more Russians were detained on charges of drug trafficking.<\/span><\/p>\n

Baku\u2019s reaction came as a surprise to Moscow, which called it an anti-Russian move. Russian Z-propagandists and bloggers went even further, calling on the Kremlin to launch large-scale repression against the Azerbaijani diaspora, close the Russian market to Azerbaijani goods, and even declare war on Azerbaijan.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, Moscow did not do so, as it is interested in relations with Azerbaijan. It is trying to resolve the situation diplomatically. At the same time, it seeks to force Azerbaijan to show loyalty and act exclusively in line with Russia\u2019s policy. But this, as always, will serve as a basis for discord in their bilateral activities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Especially as T\u00fcrkiye is backing Azerbaijan, pursuing an active course to strengthen its position as a leader in neighboring regions, particularly Turkic-speaking ones.<\/span><\/strong> As part of these activities, Ankara uses Baku to promote its interests in the Caucasus.<\/span><\/p>\n

Back in 1992, T\u00fcrkiye and Azerbaijan signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement. And in 2010, the parties signed a strategic partnership and mutual assistance agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of T\u00fcrkiye. According to those agreements, Ankara has provided and will continue to provide comprehensive assistance to Azerbaijan, including in strengthening its armed forces.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Currently, the armies of the two countries are closely integrated and have joint operational plans in the Caucasus. At the same time, T\u00fcrkiye has become one of Azerbaijan\u2019s main trade and economic partners and facilitates the export of its energy resources to foreign markets. In fact, T\u00fcrkiye is also Azerbaijan\u2019s mainstay in its disputes with Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s assistance enabled Azerbaijan to win the second war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020-2023 and restore its territorial integrity. In this way, T\u00fcrkiye strengthened its influence on Azerbaijan and consolidated its position in the Caucasus. The deterioration of relations between Armenia and Russia has led to a rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite the existing problems in relations between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and T\u00fcrkiye, a certain alliance is currently forming between them based on their shared interests in relations with Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and T\u00fcrkiye have signed an agreement on the Zangezur corridor, which is important for all parties. The corridor connects Azerbaijan with its province of Nakhchivan through the territory of Armenia, and T\u00fcrkiye acts as the guarantor of this agreement. A peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia is also being prepared.<\/span><\/p>\n

A certain obstacle to Ankara\u2019s final consolidation of its positions in the Caucasus is the pro-Russian course of Georgia\u2019s current leadership. However, Ankara can strengthen its influence on Tbilisi by deepening bilateral economic ties. T\u00fcrkiye is one of Georgia\u2019s main trading partners and investors in its economy. In July 2023, at the height of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, Ankara and Tbilisi signed a cooperation agreement on security.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ankara is also using its successes in the South Caucasus to strengthen its positions in the North Caucasus (NC) and the Black Sea region (BSR).<\/span><\/strong> At this, Ankara is relying on a number of factors that are favorable to it, including: Moscow\u2019s distraction from the war with Ukraine; a significant weakening of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which suffered serious losses during the hostilities; the aggravation of socio-economic problems in Russia, which destabilizes the situation in the NC; and the lack of a powerful military advantage over T\u00fcrkiye in the aforementioned regions.<\/span><\/p>\n

In line with its policy towards the North Caucasus and the Black Sea Region, T\u00fcrkiye is constantly stepping up its military activity in those areas in various formats. The main ones are: training national armed forces and participating in NATO joint exercises; increasing T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s military presence; further assisting Azerbaijan in strengthening its army and navy; supporting anti-Russian forces in the North Caucasus and, according to some estimates, their armed formations.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>Thus, the 3<\/span>rd<\/span><\/sup> Field Army(consisting of two army corps \u2014 a total of eleven mechanized brigades) of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Armed Forces has been deployed on the Caucasus-Russian direction. This allows to contain Russia in the Caucasus, especially in mountainous areas. The Black Sea straits and the northwestern part of T\u00fcrkiye are protected by the 1<\/span>st<\/span><\/sup> Field Army, consisting of three corps \u2014 a total of fourteen mechanized brigades.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Navyof T\u00fcrkiye dominated Russia\u2019s Black Sea Fleet even in the latter\u2019s best pre-war days. Now it has lost almost a third of its combat potential, and Russia cannot replenish it due to Ankara\u2019s closure of the Black Sea straits.<\/span><\/p>\n

That is why T\u00fcrkiye ignores Russia and pursues a pragmatic policy based solely on its own interests. At the same time, through various military exercises, it demonstrates that it can implement those interests by force. The exercises include: T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Armed Forces\u2019 naval exercises \u201cMavi Vatan-2025\u201d (\u201cBlue Motherland-2025\u201d) and land exercises \u201cK\u0131\u015f-2025\u201d (\u201cWinter-2025\u201d). Officially, these events were not directed against other countries. At the same time, their nature and locations give reason to conclude that elements of scenarios for possible armed conflicts and wars between T\u00fcrkiye and Russia are being mastered.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ankara, considering its interests in the aforementioned regions, also takes into account the interests of its ally Ukraine<\/span><\/strong>, which is defending its independence. That is why T\u00fcrkiye provides the necessary military and technical aid to Ukraine and is trying to strengthen its participation in the process of ending the Russian-Ukrainian war.<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides, T\u00fcrkiye is objectively interested in deploying its military contingent on the territory of Ukraine as part of the international peacekeeping forces, as this will contribute to strengthening T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s influence in the Black Sea Region. And in case of an armed conflict between T\u00fcrkiye and Russia, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s troops will effectively have a foothold in the Northern Black Sea region. The presence of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Armed Forces units in the South of Ukraine will also provide Ankara with additional opportunities for conducting reconnaissance against Russia. However, Ankara also has a certain interest in continuing the war, as this weakens Russia and preserves all the above-mentioned factors that are beneficial to T\u00fcrkiye.<\/span><\/p>\n

If this happens, Russia will have to deal with a second \u2013 \u201csouthern front\u201d, which will force it to adequately respond in a military way<\/span><\/strong>. Even though it really needs military resources to keep fighting Ukraine, Russia\u2019s leaders will have to take some of them away to keep T\u00fcrkiye in check in the Caucasus and Black Sea Regions. First and foremost, this concerns Russia\u2019s Southern Military District and Black Sea Fleet, which are allocating personnel to cover the border with Azerbaijan, the Black Sea coast, and the Crimean Peninsula, as well as strengthening Russia\u2019s military presence at the military base in Gyumri, Armenia, and in the self-proclaimed republics in Georgia. However, Russia\u2019s ability to take adequate steps in response to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s actions is currently significantly limited.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>At the same time, intensification of challenges and threats from T\u00fcrkiye increases the role and significance of Crimea and other territories occupied by Russia in the South of Ukraine.<\/span><\/strong> The Crimean Peninsula is the Russian Federation\u2019s main foothold in the Black Sea region, while the temporarily occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are a connecting link to it, as an alternative to the Kerch Bridge and maritime communications, which can be relatively easily damaged. In this case, Moscow will not only try to keep them for itself at all costs, but also expand the captured coastal regions of Ukraine. In fact, this is one of the main reasons for the intensification of the Russian Armed Forces\u2019 offensive actions in the South of our state, as well as Russia\u2019s demand to transfer the entire territory of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions to it. The same applies to Moscow\u2019s plans to capture Mykolaiv and Odesa regions of Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

The trends discussed have mixed consequences for Ukraine, both positive and negative.<\/span><\/strong> For example, the need to respond to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s actions and changes in the situation in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region distracts Russia\u2019s attention and military resources from the war against our country. At the same time, maintaining control over Crimea and the occupied territories of the South of Ukraine is of vital importance to Moscow, which means that it will not give them up under any circumstances and will try to expand them.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, at this stage, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s plans for the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region are in line with Ukraine\u2019s interests, as they contribute to weakening Russia and reducing its ability to continue hostilities.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, since Russia seeks to use other countries for its own purposes, while violating their interests, its partners ultimately refuse to cooperate with it. Currently, this refers to the deterioration of its relations with Azerbaijan as a result of Moscow\u2019s attempts to exert complete influence over it. Russia\u2019s position in the Caucasus is also weakening due to the deterioration of its relations with Armenia. This, in turn, creates favorable opportunities for T\u00fcrkiye to implement its plans to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus and Black Sea Regions. At this, T\u00fcrkiye is backing up its intentions with military activity in the aforementioned areas, creating a second \u201csouthern front\u201d for Russia. Even without entering an active phase, this front distracts Russia\u2019s attention and military resources from Ukraine.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Yurii Mykhailenko,
\n<\/span><\/strong>Institute of Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n

(Images generated by artificial intelligence)<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n

Moscow is steadily losing allies and partners in the Caucasus, who are gradually turning into its enemies<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":30435,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-30434","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n\u00a0The \u201cSouthern Front\u201d for Russia and How it Affects Its War Against Ukraine - 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