{"id":31234,"date":"2025-08-26T00:04:27","date_gmt":"2025-08-25T21:04:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=31234"},"modified":"2025-08-26T20:19:16","modified_gmt":"2025-08-26T17:19:16","slug":"garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni\/","title":{"rendered":"Security Guarantees for Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">Security Guarantees for Ukraine.&nbsp;What Should We Expect from Our Partners?<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><em>In accordance with the decisions taken at the meeting of the leaders of the United States, Ukraine and Europe on August 18 in Washington, consultations are ongoing on security guarantees for our country. Several options are being considered, ranging from further military and technical assistance to Ukraine to the deployment of an international military mission on its territory. However, Ukraine\u2019s membership in NATO is not foreseen. In any case, foreign guarantees, as they say, will not be 100%. Therefore, the Ukrainian Defense Forces will still remain the main guarantor of our country\u2019s security.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Sadly, hopes for a quick end to Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine have proved to be too optimistic.<\/strong> The meetings between D. Trump and Putin, as well as the leaders of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe in August of this year, have not yet yielded the desired results. Putin has again begun to delay the negotiations and refuses to fulfill the agreements reached in talks with D. Trump.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">However, he cannot do this forever. In the near future, Russia will not be able to continue the war at the current level of intensity due to the critical worsening of problems in its economy. And later, it will face the prospect of either agreeing to peace on terms acceptable to Ukraine or finding itself in a deep crisis with unpredictable consequences.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Nor will the Russian dictator\u2019s hopes for achieving decisive success at the front in the time he still has left come true. There is no hope for this anymore, as shown by the course of the war since the beginning of this year. Russian troops have not been able to capture a single significant settlement, and since the spring of 2025, there has been a decrease in the number of people willing to volunteer for contract service.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Putin understands what is happening and agrees to real concessions, which are disguised by Russian propaganda as a \u201cvictory\u201d. &nbsp;The Russian president is still putting forward various demands to Ukraine, including unacceptable ones. However, he has conceded the main point, namely, he has given up the entire territory of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, which were included in the Russian Constitution, and now claims only the entire Donbas.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">This means that Putin can be forced to change his position even on issues of principle, and this will be done in the future. Therefore, the war will end, although the ceasefire and peace agreement will not guarantee that Russia will not attack Ukraine again. This is what determines the urgency of the problem of providing reliable security guarantees for Ukraine, which should be clearly worded now.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">As you know, during the talks in Washington on August 18, it was decided to prepare possible options for security guarantees for Ukraine within 7-10 days, which should be discussed by the parties concerned. At present, they are already being published in the media with relevant comments. I would like to give my own assessment of the situation around this issue in the context of which option can be adopted.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The nature of security guarantees is of fundamental importance for both Ukraine and Europe. Therefore, another assessment will not be one too many.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Ukraine should not repeat the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which failed to prevent either Russia\u2019s first attack on our country in 2014 or Moscow\u2019s launching the full-scale war in 2022. As is well known, according to the Memorandum, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom committed themselves to guaranteeing Ukraine\u2019s security in exchange for its abandonment of nuclear weapons. But this was never done.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">However, this was not the first time in history that the guarantor countries did not fulfill their promises, which led to extremely serious consequences not only for those to whom the guarantees were promised, but also for the guarantors themselves. In particular, in 1839, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, and the Netherlands guaranteed Belgium\u2019s independence and neutrality, and enshrined this in a treaty (the London Agreement of 1839). But in practice, nothing was ever implemented. None of those countries backed up the guarantees of Belgium\u2019s security with troops on its territory or at least on its borders.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Moreover, hoping that Germany would respect Belgium\u2019s neutrality, the leadership of France neither deployed its troops on the Belgian direction and nor built powerful defensive fortifications there. They were mainly deployed and created on the border between France and Germany. All of this was fully used by Berlin at the beginning of World War I, which sent its troops not to break through the French defense at its strongest point, but to bypass it through Belgium.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">As a result, in a few weeks the Germans won the border battle and approached Paris. And only the \u201cmiracle of the Marne\u201d (a successful battle for the French near the River Marne) saved France from a quick defeat. Interestingly, France had a mutual military assistance treaty with Great Britain, but there were no British troops on French territory before the war began. This also contributed to Germany\u2019s success in the initial period of hostilities.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The same thing happened at the beginning of World War II, but with regard to Poland. Thus, France and Great Britain provided security guarantees in case of Germany\u2019s attack on Poland. That is, according to the relevant treaty, Paris and London pledged to declare war on Berlin. Formally, they fulfilled their promise, but did not start actual hostilities. This position of the \u201cguarantors\u201d of Polish security allowed Germany to capture most of Poland and two-thirds of France itself, to reach the approaches to Great Britain, which was saved only by the English Channel, to occupy Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the Balkans, and to attack the USSR.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">After the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West, the United States initiated the creation of NATO as a transatlantic security system that provided for the protection of its members. At this, the Washington Collective Defense Treaty includes clear commitments of the Alliance members to jointly repulse external attacks. Since the founding of the North Atlantic Alliance, they have been backed up by the NATO Allied Forces and US troops in Europe.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Currently, NATO is the most powerful collective security system in the world, capable of actually fulfilling its tasks, which is especially important in the context of Russia\u2019s aggressive foreign policy and military expansion. This is confirmed by the actions of Moscow, which attacked Ukraine but does not dare to attack Poland, the Baltic States and Finland, although it constantly threatens them. And the claim that leading NATO members will be afraid to stand up for them because of the threat of a direct military clash with Russia is just a fantasy.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Whatever one may say, the North Atlantic Alliance is actually preparing for a possible war with Russia. First and foremost, it is strengthening the defense of its front lines in the Black Sea and Baltic regions and in the Arctic. Rapid reaction and deployment forces are being deployed there, and the main groupings of troops are being strengthened. At the same time, military exercises are being intensified and expanded to practice repulsing Russia\u2019s armed invasion. By the way, while earlier NATO\u2019s strategic concepts allowed for the possibility of a temporary withdrawal from the front lines with the subsequent regaining of control over the lost territories, after Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine, the Alliance\u2019s leadership gave up that option. The current plan is to defend the Alliance\u2019s borders and prevent the Russian Armed Forces\u2019 breakthrough. The reason for this was the mass atrocities and crimes committed by the Russian military in the occupied territories of Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>That is why joining the Alliance is a strategic goal for Ukraine. This is the only way to guarantee Ukraine\u2019s security and prevent Russia\u2019s another attack.<\/strong> Most NATO member states are interested in Ukraine joining the Alliance. This would, among other things, strengthen the Alliance and further distance its eastern borders. Moreover, Ukraine already has a fairly powerful army in Europe and experience and motivation to counter Russia militarily. It also has a defense industry adapted to war.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Thus, NATO sees Ukraine as a key component of the European security system and one of the main forces in deterring Russia&#8217;s military expansion in the European direction. Based on this vision of Ukraine, NATO and the European Union provide military, technical, financial and economic assistance to Ukraine at the level of their members.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">This is already an important part of Ukraine\u2019s security guarantees and helps it to counter Russia. However, without Ukraine\u2019s membership in NATO, such assistance is not enough to prevent a possible new Russian attack. For a number of reasons, which will be discussed below, Ukraine\u2019s accession to the Alliance is not currently on the agenda. Therefore, other options are envisaged to guarantee security for our country.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Among them, the closest to Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO is the option of deploying an international military mission on its territory consisting of units of the armed forces of Western and other countries that are supportive of us. It would also be important to provide them with air support and logistics from the territory of Ukraine\u2019s European neighbors.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A reasonable addition to this is the proposal to extend Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to Ukraine, which defines the principles of collective defense, but without granting Ukraine NATO membership. According to this approach, in case of a Russian attack on Ukraine, NATO member states would have to decide within 24 hours how they would help Ukraine. It is also proposed to extend Article 42.7 of the European Union Treaty to Ukraine with similar content. This option is considered to be even better than the previous one, as Ukraine may still become an EU member in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Another approach acceptable to Ukraine could be the United States\u2019 decision to grant Ukraine the status of a non-NATO ally of America with appropriate security guarantees in the form of deployment of American troops on Ukrainian territory. This approach is currently being implemented by the United States in relation to South Korea and Japan, and to some extent Australia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Implementation of the ideas discussed above could indeed play a decisive role in ensuring Ukraine\u2019s security. At the same time, in practice, this is complicated by a number of problems, some of which are extremely acute.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">For example, Moscow is categorically against Ukraine\u2019s possible membership in the Alliance. In this way, Russia is trying to preserve the possibility of continuing the war against Ukraine until it is eliminated as an independent state, and not to ensure its own security, as Moscow claims. Despite their interest in Ukraine, the United States and other leading NATO countries are trying to avoid an excessive aggravation of relations with Russia or even a direct military clash with it. As a result, the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance refuses to grant Ukraine membership, although it does not stop active cooperation with Ukraine. Russia\u2019s supporters in the Alliance (Hungary and Slovakia) also create obstacles to Ukraine\u2019s Euro-Atlantic security.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">At the same time, Russia rejects the possibility of deploying Western military contingents on the territory of Ukraine, even calling them legitimate targets for strikes if they are deployed there without its consent. The reasons for this position are the same as for Moscow\u2019s objections to Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO. Moscow agrees only to the deployment of international forces in Ukraine, consisting of military units from China, Brazil, India, and other Russian partners, whom it can persuade to leave Ukrainian territory or not to interfere in its actions if it decides to continue its aggression. However, even without Moscow\u2019s opposition, it would be difficult to find 30-40 thousand NATO troops for such a task, which is the minimum level to ensure Ukraine\u2019s security. Out of the Coalition of the Willing, which unites Ukraine\u2019s partners and includes about 30 countries, no more than ten of them agree to send their troops to our country. These include France, the United Kingdom, T\u00fcrkiye, Estonia, and Latvia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">A number of other countries agree to participate in air cover and the maritime component. The United States is also considering this possibility. All this is obviously not enough.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">China can send the necessary number of its military personnel to Ukraine. It has already expressed its readiness to do so. But because China is a partner of Russia and assists it in the war, such a decision is unacceptable to Ukraine. However, only Chinese troops could really guarantee that the fighting would not resume, as Russia will not dare to attack them.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">It is unclear how a similar Article 5 of the Washington Treaty would work without Ukraine\u2019s membership in NATO. How and what decisions would be made and through what mechanisms would they be implemented? The same applies to Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">It is also hard to hope that the United States will agree to grant Ukraine the status of its non-NATO partner. This could be done by a really strong US President like G. Washington, A. Lincoln, F. Roosevelt, D. Eisenhower, and R. Reagan. The US Presidents of the last 35 years, including D. Trump, are incapable of taking decisive steps. It is enough to see how D. Trump does not dare to impose sanctions on Russia.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>In such a situation, Ukraine will hardly receive truly powerful security guarantees from partners like those of &nbsp;full NATO members.<\/strong> Most likely, the guarantees will include a certain strengthening of the measures already being implemented by the United States, NATO, and the EU.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">For example, Ukraine\u2019s partners will continue to provide military, technical, financial, and economic aid to Ukraine, which is agreed upon by all parties. Such support for Ukraine may even increase.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">It is also possible that a certain military presence of NATO in Ukraine will be launched or, more precisely, restored in the form of training missions that will participate in the training of Ukrainian military personnel. Their task will be to train our military in the operation, maintenance, and repair of Western equipment, since we already know how to fight better than they do.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">But then, the United States may press Russia to agree to deployment of more significant NATO units in Ukraine, including air defense and monitoring of the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian demarcation line. Besides, the possibility of NATO aviation participating in air cover of Ukrainian territory is not ruled out. NATO rapid reaction and deployment forces could also be deployed on Ukrain\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Thus, our Defense Forces will remain the main guarantor of Ukraine\u2019s security.<\/strong> In view of this, Ukraine should and will not accept Moscow\u2019s demands to reduce them. On the contrary, they will continue to be strengthened. At the moment, the Joint Forces have actually received a strategic component in the form of Flamingo cruise missiles with a range of three thousand kilometers. The accumulation of a sufficient number of such missiles will allow to paralyze the Russian economy in case Moscow decides to attack Ukraine again after the war is over. We have already demonstrated how this can be done by destroying 15 % of Russia\u2019s oil refining without using our cruise missiles.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Thus, despite the fact that Russia continues its war against Ukraine, the issue of determining security guarantees for our country for the post-war period is becoming more and more relevant. It is currently the subject of rather complicated consultations between Ukraine and its partners. However, we should expect that Ukraine will be provided with some form of security guarantees.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>However, they will not provide for Ukraine\u2019s membership in NATO and will not guarantee its security by 100 %. Anyway, they will be a deterrent to Russia. However, in any case, the main guarantor of Ukraine\u2019s security will remain its Defense Forces. This is what determines the need for their further strengthening and development.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Yurii Mykhailenko,<br \/>\n<\/strong>Institute of Global Politics<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n<p>In accordance with the decisions taken at the meeting of the leaders of the United States, Ukraine and Europe on August 18 in Washington, consultations are ongoing on security guarantees for our country<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31235,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-31234","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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