{"id":31474,"date":"2025-09-12T00:04:39","date_gmt":"2025-09-11T21:04:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=31474"},"modified":"2025-09-12T19:17:50","modified_gmt":"2025-09-12T16:17:50","slug":"skshn-zaxid-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/skshn-zaxid-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"SCPE of Russia and Belarus \u201cWest-2025\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

SCPE of Russia and Belarus \u201cWest-2025\u201d. <\/span>Peculiarities and Comparative Analysis<\/span><\/h1>\n

Russia and Belarus have resumed joint strategic exercises such as \u201cWest\u201d(Rus.\u201cZapad\u201d \u2013Transl.), aimed at exerting forceful pressure on Europe and the United States and dispersing Ukraine\u2019s security measures. The exercises rehearse the actions of the Russian Federation and Belarus in a war with both NATO and Ukraine, including the use of nuclear weapons, which is a cause for concern in Europe and the United States. Similar exercises took place on the eve of Russia\u2019s first attack on Ukraine in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of our country in 2022. In general, this creates a direct threat to Ukraine. In order to prevent the risks associated with the SCPE, the leadership of NATO and European countries are taking measures to contain Russia. This confirms their solidarity with Ukraine.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Against the background of the ongoing war against Ukraine, Russia is also resorting to demonstrative military actions that simultaneously exert forceful pressure on Europe and the United States.<\/span><\/strong> This is evidenced by Moscow\u2019s resumption of the practice of conducting strategic exercises of the Russian Armed Forces, which was suspended in 2022 after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

The next such exercise is \u201cWest\u20132025\u201d exercise of the Armed Forces of Russia and Belarus on September 12\u201316. It is related to the CSTO\u2019s <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Interaction\u20132025<\/span>\u201d (Rus. \u201cVzaimodeystvie\u201d)<\/span>, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Search-2025<\/span>\u201d (\u201cPoisk\u201d)<\/span>, and <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Echelon\u20132025<\/span>\u201d (\u201cEshelon\u201d)<\/span> exercises, which took place on September 1-6 on Belarusian territory. The exercise requires special attention, as similar exercises, such as <\/span>\u201cWest<\/span>\u20132013<\/span>\u201d<\/span> and <\/span>\u201c<\/span>West\u20132021<\/span>\u201d<\/span>, were used by Moscow to cover up the preparation of the first attack on Ukraine in 2014 and the beginning of the full-scale war against our country in 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

The topic of the \u201cWest\u20132025\u201d strategic exercise has been repeatedly raised by the media. However, most publications contain only a general description without a thorough analysis, which does not allow us to understand the true essence of the exercise and realize its role in Moscow\u2019s military policy and actions. Therefore, let us consider it in a broader perspective.<\/p>\n

For one, a strategic exercise like <\/span>\u201cZapad\u201d<\/span> is the main element of the activities of the allies of Belarus and Russia in the military-political sphere and the final stage of combat training of the Regional Group of Forces of their armed forces.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The main aim of the strategic exercise is to demonstrate force to the United States and NATO in Europe and to rehearse a scenario of actions during a large-scale war with them in the European theater, with the main efforts focused on Russia\u2019s Northwestern direction (in the Baltic region). At this, the tasks of organizing and conducting offensive and defensive operations are being performed.<\/p>\n

At the initial stage, the \u201cWest\u201d exercise usually took place during peak periods of deterioration of relations between Russia and the United States and NATO, as well as during Moscow\u2019s preparations for various large-scale military operations against its adversaries.<\/p>\n

For example, for the first time, \u201cWest\u20131999\u201d exercise was conducted as Russia\u2019s response to the US and NATO\u2019s military operation \u201cAllied Force\u201d against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (to force the Serbian leadership to stop the genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo). In addition, demonstrating its readiness for a military confrontation with the United States and NATO, Russia warned that they should not interfere in its actions in Chechnya (in 1999, Russia launched the second war in the Caucasus to regain control of the Chechen Republic).<\/p>\n

After some improvement in its relations with the United States and NATO in the early 2000s, Russia temporarily suspended such SCPEs, but did not give them up. The next exercise, \u201cWest\u20132009\u201d, was held at the time when Russian-American and Russian-European relations were once again complicated by Russia\u2019s attack on Georgia in August 2008. This was again a way to make it clear to the United States and NATO that they should not interfere in Russia\u2019s actions in the post-Soviet space.<\/p>\n

Since then, exercises such as \u201cWest\u201d have been held regularly and are part of a four-year cycle of exercises in conjunction with exercises \u201cCaucasus\u201d (\u201cKavkaz\u201d) in the Southwest (Black Sea), \u201cCentre\u201d (\u201cTsentr\u201d) in Central Asia, and \u201cEast\u201d (\u201cVostok\u201d) on the Pacific and Chinese directions. The main events of strategic exercises were organized in the respective military districts of the Russian Armed Forces, namely the Western (now divided into Moscow and Leningrad), Southern, Central and Eastern Military Districts.<\/p>\n

These exercises are practicing tasks specific to the theaters of war where they take place. The tasks of the \u201cWest\u201d exercise were discussed above. As for the \u201cCaucasus\u201d, they are similar in the Black Sea region. For the \u201cCentre\u201d, the tasks include countering the Islamic extremism from Central Asia and strengthening groups of troops on other directions. The task of the \u201cEast\u201d is repulsing a possible attack from the United States, Japan and China in the Far East and Eastern Siberia.<\/p>\n

From the very beginning, the exercise called \u201cWest\u201d was held in Belarus and the Western Military District of Russia. They practiced actions to capture the Baltic states and part of Poland. The main strike was supposed to be carried out along the so-called Suwalki corridor, which stretches from Belarus to Russia\u2019s Kaliningrad region along the border between Poland and Lithuania. Other (passive) sections of Belarus\u2019 and Russia\u2019s borders with NATO countries were covered and defended.<\/p>\n

The following forces were involved in strategic exercises \u201cWest\u201d:<\/p>\n

    \n
  • From Russia \u2013 troops of the Western Military District; units and subunits of other military districts of the country that were deployed to Belarus and the western part of the Russian Federation to strengthen the Armed Forces; forces and means of the Aerospace Forces, the Baltic and Northern Fleets, airborne troops; bodies of the Border Guard Service, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the FSB, the police and specialized civilian agencies;<\/li>\n
  • from Belarus \u2013 its armed forces in full, as well as other law enforcement agencies and designated civilian bodies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    The announced number of participants in the exercises gradually increased from 15-20 thousand military personnel during the first exercise to 200 thousand in the \u201cWest-2021\u201d. The main events took place at several land ranges and designated areas of the airspace of Belarus and Russia, as well as in the waters of the Baltic and Barents Seas. Some of them were in close proximity to the borders of NATO member states, including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Norway.<\/p>\n

    As a rule, within the framework of general plans of strategic offensive and defensive operations, tasks were fulfilled at the tactical level for battalion and brigade tactical groups in cooperation with artillery, reconnaissance, air defense, engineering and other units, as well as army and tactical aviation. The main tasks include: waking units with a combat alert; marching; engineering arrangement of positions; offensive and defensive battles with live firing; missile attacks; reconnaissance; air support for ground troops; and logistics.<\/p>\n

    Various ship groups were formed as part of the Baltic and Northern Fleets, which went to sea training areas. Submarines interacted with them. Coastal forces were also involved, including marines, coastal anti-ship missile systems, and naval aviation. They practiced naval battles; strikes on enemy ships and coastal targets; air, anti-submarine, anti-mine and anti-sabotage defense of ships and bases; reconnaissance, communications and logistics of ship groups at sea were organized.<\/p>\n

    During such exercises as \u201cWest\u201d, and against a common operational background, separate trainings of the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were also conducted. All components of the Russian nuclear triad were involved, including the forces and means of the Strategic Missile Forces, Long-Range (Strategic) Aviation and the nuclear component of the Northern Fleet. Up to four launches of ballistic and cruise missiles with conventionally nuclear warheads were carried out from land, air and sea-based platforms.<\/p>\n

    Simultaneously with the \u201cWest\u201d, exercises were held in other military districts of the RF Armed Forces, though on a smaller scale. This mainly concerned the Southern Military District, which organized exercises symmetrical to the themes of the \u201cWest\u201d. For example, while in the Western MD the tasks of a strategic offensive operation were practiced, in the Southern Military District they rehearsed a defensive one, and vice versa.<\/p>\n

    As mentioned above, preparations for the first attack on Ukraine and the beginning of a full-scale war against it were carried out under the cover of the \u201cWest\u20132013\u201d and \u201cWest\u20132021\u201d strategic exercises. In the most complete form, this concerned other exercises. The relevant measures included:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • partial mobilization of reservists under the guise of increasing the number of contract soldiers. In this way, the Russian military command manned the existing subunits, units and formations to full strength and formed new ones;<\/li>\n
    • deployment of troops in field areas near the borders of Ukraine, including in Belarus. For this purpose, a complex of field camps and other infrastructure was built, including field roads and helipads;<\/li>\n
    • establishing command, control, intelligence, and communications. Field command posts, wartime lines and networks, units and means of electronic, optical, agent and other types of intelligence were deployed in the areas where troops were located. Aviation and other types of intelligence were also reinforced;<\/li>\n
    • covering the areas of troop concentration by means of military air defense. Their forces and means were deployed to their positions and put on combat duty;<\/li>\n
    • combat coordination of troops;<\/li>\n
    • improving combat skills;<\/li>\n
    • Improving the skills of staffs in commanding troops. All of this took place at both the operational and tactical levels during the training exercises;<\/li>\n
    • ensuring the logistics of troops in the field. Field warehouses, repair bases, hospitals, temporary accommodation centers for prisoners and refugees, and other rear facilities were deployed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      Similar, but on a smaller scale, activities were carried out during the preparation of conventional exercises.<\/p>\n

      All this is typical for the strategic exercise \u201cWest-2025\u201d.<\/span><\/strong> Thus, the main part of the exercise will be held in Belarus, and some events will take place at training grounds in Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts of Russia. This is quite logical, since the western regions of the Russian Federation are within range of Ukrainian missiles and UAVs, and therefore their participants can be hit.<\/p>\n

      According to official figures, 30,000 military personnel are involved in the exercise. Of these, only 8,000 will be in Belarus, including 6,000 Belarusian and 2,000 Russian soldiers and officers. Obviously, in addition to the personnel of the ground forces, the military personnel of the air and space forces, auxiliary units, headquarters and other security structures involved in the exercise are also taken into account. Most likely, conscripts and cadets are mostly involved, as contract soldiers are at war.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The leaderships of Russia and Belarus claim that the \u201cWest\u20132025\u201d is not directed against any specific countries or their alliances, and its scenario is purely conditional. At the same time, representatives of Belarus emphasize that the exercise does not pose a threat to Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

      However, the aim of the exercise is openly proclaimed as follows: deepening military integration between Russia and Belarus; demonstration of the Union State\u2019s strength; deterrence of the United States and NATO; and improvement of the Russian-Belarusian military security system. The latter issue is given a special role in the context of the implementation of the bilateral security guarantees agreement of December 6, 2024.<\/span><\/p>\n

      According to representatives of the military and political leadership of Belarus, the treaty is the quintessence of military cooperation between Belarus and Russia within the framework of the Union State. It is based on the concepts of national security and military doctrines of both countries, including their nuclear component.<\/span><\/p>\n

      At this, attention is focused on the allegedly aggressive actions of the United States and NATO against Russia and Belarus, in particular: intensification of anti-Russian and anti-Belarusian military exercises; provocations near the Russian and Belarusian borders; building up groups of troops and developing military infrastructure in neighboring countries; strengthening intelligence against Russia and Belarus; deployment of military plants in Poland and Ukraine; calls for and support for combat actions in Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

      In a word, Ukraine is called a source of threats to Russia and Belarus.<\/span><\/p>\n

      The combination of the <\/span>\u201c<\/span>West\u20132025<\/span>\u201d<\/span> with the CSTO exercises is noteworthy. This demonstrates Russia\u2019s unity with its allies from the former Soviet Union in confronting the United States and NATO, although this is not the case. In view of all the above, the \u201cWest\u201d can also be considered Moscow\u2019s military and political tool in strengthening Russia\u2019s positions in the post-Soviet space.<\/span><\/p>\n

      According to the above tasks, the \u201cWest\u20132025\u201d scenario, like previous similar exercises, provides for practicing one of the options for the use of the Regional Group of Forces of Russia and Belarus in a war with the United States and NATO in the European theater. Given the involvement of most of the forces and means of the Russian Armed Forces in the war against Ukraine and the dominant advantage of NATO\u2019s Allied Forces over the Armed Forces of Belarus, the exercise will most likely focus on strategic defense operations. However, it may also include an offensive component.<\/span><\/p>\n

      According to a number of media outlets, one of the central episodes of the exercise will be the training of the<\/span> team of the \u201c<\/span>Oreshnik<\/span>\u201d<\/span> missile system, which was allegedly transferred by Russia to the Belarusian armed forces. Besides, units of the Belarusian Armed Forces that can use Russian tactical nuclear weapons located on Belarusian territory will be trained. However, experts have doubts that Russia transferred the <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Oreshnik<\/span>\u201d<\/span> complex (which may not exist at all) to Belarus and deployed tactical nuclear weapons on its territory.<\/span><\/p>\n

      During the preparation of the exercise, a set of standard activities was carried out, including: partial conscription of reservists into the Armed Forces of Belarus; re-equipment of training grounds and field camps; repair and modernization of transport communications in the areas where the main elements of the exercise were practiced; redeployment of certain units of the Russian Armed Forces to the territory of Belarus; training on future actions in the exercise.<\/span><\/p>\n

      At the same time, \u201cWest\u20132025\u201d is somewhat different from other such exercises and has its own peculiarities. These include:<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      • Unlike before, the exercise is taking place on the territory of Belarus, far from its borders with Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. As explained by the Belarusian leadership, this decision was made to reassure Europe and Ukraine and demonstrate that it does not threaten them;<\/span><\/li>\n
      • the number of personnel involved in the exercise is significantly lower than in 2021. This fact is understandable, as due to the war, Russia does not have enough military personnel to conduct large-scale exercises;<\/span><\/li>\n
      • unlike in 2013 and 2021, no strike groups of troops are being created on the border with Ukraine. There are no such groups on the directions of Poland and the Baltic and Northern European countries;<\/span><\/li>\n
      • no plans for exercises of the Baltic and Northern Fleets or Russian nuclear missile forces are declared;<\/span><\/li>\n
      • the active phase of the exercise will last only five days, whereas previously it took at least two to three weeks.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Given these features, Western and Ukrainian experts conclude that the likelihood of Russia using the \u201cWest\u20132025\u201d strategic exercise to attack Europe or invade Ukraine from the north is low.<\/span><\/p>\n

        At the same time, a provocation by Russia and Belarus is quite possible, as demonstrated by the intrusion of about twenty Russian UAVs into Polish airspace on the night of September 9-10.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Given this threat, as well as the fact that Russia continues to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, Europe and, to some extent, the United States are somewhat concerned about the <\/span>\u201c<\/span>West\u20132025<\/span>\u201d<\/span> exercise.<\/span><\/strong> To prevent risks on their part, they are taking measures to contain Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

        The most illustrative of these is a series of exercises in response to the <\/span>\u201c<\/span>West\u20132025<\/span>\u201d.<\/span> These include: in Poland \u2013 <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Iron Defender\u20132025<\/span>\u201d<\/span>; in Lithuania \u2013 <\/span>\u201cPerk<\/span>\u016bno Griausmas<\/span>\u201d<\/span>; in Latvia \u2013 <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Namejs\u20132025<\/span>\u201d<\/span>; in Finland \u2013 <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Karelian Fortress<\/span>\u201d<\/span>, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>Southern Griffin\u20132025<\/span>\u201d<\/span>, and \u201cKinetic Stronghold\u20132025<\/span>\u201d<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Other measures include: deploying additional NATO forces and assets to provide air cover for the Baltic States and Poland; strengthening options to counter air attack capabilities from Russia and Belarus; temporarily building up NATO troops on the Russian and Belarusian directions; strengthening borders with Russia and Belarus; and partially closing the airspace of the Baltic States and, possibly, Poland, Finland, and Norway.<\/span><\/p>\n

        As NATO representatives explain, all of this is a clear signal of allied solidarity within the Alliance and a means of jointly deterring Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

        Thus, in an effort to increase pressure on Europe, Ukraine, and the United States, Russia’s leadership, with the participation of its colleagues from Belarus, has resumed strategic exercises based on the <\/span>\u201c<\/span>West<\/span>\u201d<\/span> model. The next one, <\/span>\u201c<\/span>West\u20132025<\/span>\u201d \u2013<\/span> in September.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Although Moscow and Minsk claim that the nature of the exercise is \u201cneutral\u201d, it is directed against NATO and Ukraine. At the same time, due to the fact that most of the Russian Armed Forces are involved in the war against Ukraine, the scope of the exercise is limited.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        The exercise is likely to practice methods of conducting a defensive operation. Russia does not have enough forces to attack Europe and invade Ukraine from the north. But Russia\u2019s drone and missile strike on Poland has increased the likelihood of NATO intervention in the Russian-Ukrainian war.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Europe and, to a certain extent, the United States are concerned about the exercise because they believe it is a threat to their security. Therefore, they are taking measures in response, such as their own military exercises, as well as additional NATO forces and means to protect Poland and the Baltic States and Northern Europe. In this way, NATO is deterring Russia and reaffirming its support for Ukraine. All this fully meets the interests of our country.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

        Yuriy Mykhailenko,
        \n<\/span><\/strong>Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n

         <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Yuriy Mykhailenko<\/p>\n

        Russia and Belarus have resumed joint strategic exercises such as \u201cWest\u201d(Rus.\u201cZapad\u201d \u2013Transl.), aimed at exerting forceful pressure on Europe and the United States and dispersing Ukraine\u2019s security measures<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31476,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-31474","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nSCPE of Russia and Belarus \u201cWest-2025\u201d - Institute for Global politics<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/skshn-zaxid-2025\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"SCPE of Russia and Belarus \u201cWest-2025\u201d - Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/skshn-zaxid-2025\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2025-09-11T21:04:39+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-09-12T16:17:50+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/skshn.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"18 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/skshn-zaxid-2025\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/skshn-zaxid-2025\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Vladimir\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b\"},\"headline\":\"SCPE of Russia and Belarus \u201cWest-2025\u201d\",\"datePublished\":\"2025-09-11T21:04:39+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-09-12T16:17:50+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/skshn-zaxid-2025\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":11564,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/skshn-zaxid-2025\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/skshn.png\",\"keywords\":[\"\u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0439\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Analytics\",\"Publications\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/skshn-zaxid-2025\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/skshn-zaxid-2025\\\/\",\"name\":\"SCPE of Russia and Belarus \u201cWest-2025\u201d - 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