The intrusion of Russian UAVs into Polish airspace in September forced NATO\u2019s leadership to take additional measures to strengthen its air defense. At the same time, the issue of the Alliance\u2019s participation in the protection of Ukraine\u2019s skies was actualized;<\/em><\/p>\n the relevant decisions on NATO\u2019s air defense have been made and are being implemented. However, the Alliance\u2019s involvement in strengthening Ukraine\u2019s air security is extremely complicated. Its establishment will require resolving a number of organizational and technical issues.<\/em><\/p>\n As a result of Russia\u2019s intensification of strikes against Ukraine with the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles, the issue of strengthening our country\u2019s air defense system is becoming more urgent.<\/strong> It is currently being addressed by increasing the number of air defense systems provided to Ukraine by its partners. These are mainly NATO member states.<\/p>\n At the same time, the intensification of Russia\u2019s provocative actions to deliberately violate the airspace of Ukraine\u2019s neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic states, which are NATO members, requires that the Alliance be directly involved in the defense of Ukrainian skies. This would also increase NATO\u2019s air security to the east, as most Russian strike aircraft would be neutralized before they approach its borders.<\/p>\n This problem, in the context of NATO\u2019s involvement in closing Ukraine\u2019s airspace or creating a \u201cno-fly zone\u201d over it, was raised at the beginning of Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022. However, it has not yet been resolved. Most likely, the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance and its member states sought to avoid participation in the Russian-Ukrainian war. The same is true now. After the incident involving the intrusion of two dozen Russian UAVs into Polish airspace on the night of September 9-10, this issue was raised again. However, as before, Russia categorically opposed it. According to Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov and other Russian officials, participation in the neutralization of Russian missiles and UAVs over Ukraine would mean that NATO is entering a war with Russia.<\/p>\n Given this, NATO refused to take such actions and chose a different path. A decision was made to launch Operation \u201cEastern Sentry\u201d which provides for the strengthening of the Alliance\u2019s air defense on the Russian direction by redeploying air defense forces and assets accordingly. It is planned to create a so-called \u201cdrone wall\u201d, that is, to build a separate system to counter UAVs. Ukrainian specialists are already being engaged and Ukrainian experience is being used for this purpose.<\/p>\n It is also proposed to transform the NATO \u201cBaltic Air Policing\u201d mission into a military defense operation. Obviously, this means increasing the number of NATO fighter jets that will be involved on a rotational basis in the protection and defense of Baltic airspace. The need for this was confirmed by the fact of the demonstrative intrusion of three Russian MiG-31 aircraft into Estonia\u2019s airspace on September 19, after the above-mentioned decisions were made public.<\/p>\n However, even if the issue of direct involvement of NATO member states in countering Russia\u2019s air attack over Ukraine\u2019s territory is agreed upon at the political level, this will not mean that all problems will be removed from the agenda<\/strong>. Many organizational and technical difficulties will remain.<\/p>\n In order to truly understand them, it is necessary to clearly define what the air defense system is, how it functions, and how it can be improved to meet today\u2019s needs. It is worth considering this topic in more detail on the example of air defense systems of developed countries and alliances, such as NATO and its members, Russia or Ukraine in all their known circumstances. For the sake of simplicity, we will limit ourselves to mentioning the main air defense systems in their service (taking into account that most of Ukraine\u2019s air defense systems are Western-made).<\/p>\n So, the air defense system of any country has two main components. Namely, military air defense (in Russian, \u201c\u0432\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f\u201d; in some cases, it is called \u201c\u0444\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0442\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f\u201d) and object air defense or the country\u2019s air defense. They are designed to destroy enemy aircraft, UAVs, and missiles at the tactical and operational levels. The United States and Russia also have strategic missile defense systems designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles. But they are beyond the scope of this article.<\/p>\n The main task of military air defense<\/strong> is to protect troops directly on the battlefield from enemy tactical air attack means, including UAVs, tactical aircraft, helicopters, and tactical missiles, including long-range and large-caliber multiple launch rockets (relative to MLRS). Although it can also engage UAVs, aircraft, and tactical missiles flying over the front line into the depths of the territory.<\/p>\n Military air defense is based on radar systems and short-range anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems (SAMs and AAUs) with a range of several hundred meters to 20 kilometers and an altitude of up to 5 kilometers. The most common of these are man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems such as \u201cStinger\u201d and \u201cArrow\u201d, and maneuverable armored SAMs and SAMs such as \u201cGepard\u201d, \u201cPantsir-S\u201d, \u201cShilka\u201d, and \u201cTunguska\u201d.<\/p>\n They also include such SAMs as \u201cBuk\u201d and S-300V and S-500 (which are upgrades of the S-300 in the military air defense version), but they are located in rear military locations. By the way, the indices \u201c125\u201d, \u201c300\u201d, \u201c400\u201d, “500\u201d do not mean the range of the SAM, which is a common misconception, but rather its series or type. The real range is determined by the characteristics of the missile and the height of the target, since the current level of technology development allows them to be destroyed only in line of sight (radar or optical).<\/p>\n Therefore, if a target is flying below the horizon level for ground and naval air defense systems or is masked by terrain curves or forests and buildings, no SAM or AAU system will shoot it down. And the destruction of targets in the near zone, when they are visible visually, is complicated by the speed of flight, which does not allow for a reaction.<\/p>\n After UAVs appeared and began to be used on a massive scale, specialized electronic warfare and small arms were put into service with military air defense. Conventional assault rifles, machine guns, and even smooth-bore hunting rifles are also used. Experience has shown that shooting at tactical drones with shot or buckshot is more effective than with bullets, even from automatic weapons. The armed forces of Russia and Ukraine also use old small-caliber anti-aircraft guns that have been decommissioned and stored in warehouses.<\/p>\n In terms of organization, the military air defense forces include: separate air defense brigades or regiments within armies and corps; air defense battalions within divisions; air defense companies within brigades and regiments; air defense platoons and squads within battalions and companies.<\/p>\n The task of object air defense or the country\u2019s air defense<\/strong> is to cover the most important objects in the depths of the country\u2019s territory, including large cities, power plants, strategic enterprises, airfields, military bases, nuclear missile systems, etc.<\/p>\n Ideally, the entire territory of the country should be protected, but this is practically impossible due to the limited range of even the most powerful SAMs and the difficulty of producing them in sufficient quantities due to their high cost. In particular, the declared range of the Patriot system is 160 km, while the S-400 has a range of up to 400 km (which is an exaggeration of Russian propaganda). But this is only for targets moving at high altitude. For other targets, the ranges are shorter.<\/p>\n It is thanks to these circumstances that air attack assets can bypass the areas of operation of active enemy air defense systems. Based on the above, it was calculated that Ukraine needs at least ten Patriot air defense systems. According to publicly available data, there are currently fewer of them available, which makes it impossible to reliably provide air cover for the country. The situation in Russia is even worse. It has a lot of S-400s, but its territory is much larger. In addition, it cannot replenish the loss of these systems caused by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.<\/p>\n To some extent, these problems are resolved by other means. The classical air defense system includes three main components: radar systems for detecting air targets on land, air and sea, medium- and long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, and fighter aircraft. They are organized into three echelons.<\/p>\n The first echelon includes radars for detecting air targets moving at low altitude. They are located along the border or front line and have a relatively short detection range of up to 30 km, but they allow to determine the facts of air attack aircraft overflight and their direction of movement. These indicators are used to target the active assets of the second echelon and other available forces. In wartime, the first echelon of targeted air defense actually merges with the rear zone of military (frontline) air defense.<\/p>\n The second echelon includes medium-range air defense systems such as IRIS-T, HAWK, and S-300 with a range of 40 to 80 km (a range of up to 200 km is also claimed, but this is not true). The task of this echelon is to destroy air targets that have broken through the front line. The second echelon\u2019s assets cover designated targets located in a strip up to 100 km wide from the border or front line.<\/p>\n The third echelon consists of long-range air defense systems such as Patriot and S-400. They are used to destroy enemy air attack means that also break through the second echelon. As a rule, such SAMs are deployed at a distance of more than 100 km from the border or front line, but they can be located closer.<\/p>\n The gaps between the areas of operation of the SAMs are covered by air defense fighter aircraft. They are also supposed to destroy air targets that are not affected by SAMs. Almost all fighters in service with the armed forces of NATO member states, Ukraine, and Russia can perform such tasks, including F-16, F-35, MiG-29, MiG-31 (long-range interceptor), Su-27, Su-35, and Su-57.<\/p>\n However, their capabilities to detect air targets with their own onboard radars are relatively limited. Therefore, they need to be guided by ground-, sea-, and air-based radars. Ground-based and sea-based radars are basically identical and can guide fighters at a distance of up to 350 km. The use of long-range radar detection and control aircraft can increase this distance to 650 km. Such aircraft include the Western E-3A Sentry, Saab-340 AEW&C, E-550A, E-2C Hawkeye, and the Russian A-50 and A-100.<\/p>\n At the same time, all of these weapons are not effective enough to counter long-range UAVs. For example, they are difficult to detect because they are relatively small in size and mostly made of radio-transparent materials such as plastic or foam. It is possible to use medium- and long-range air defense systems against them, but it is not cheap at all. The same applies to fighters. Besides, they have a much higher speed than UAVs, which allows them to attack only one or a few of them with onboard guns, and after the aircraft turns around, other drones usually fall out of its field of vision.<\/p>\n In such a situation, the forces and means of object air defense are complemented by the aforementioned means of military air defense. In addition, interceptor drones and light aircraft (such as sport aircraft) with machine guns are used to destroy UAVs. But organizing massive raids by unmanned aerial vehicles still breaks through the air defense system. The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war undoubtedly proves this.<\/p>\n Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine and Russia have been taking consistent steps to adapt all components of their air defense systems to counter UAVs.<\/strong> However, the leadership of NATO and its member states did not pay due attention to this issue. <\/strong>Most likely, they hoped that Moscow would not dare to use UAVs for direct provocations. And the available air defense systems would be able to destroy those few drones that would accidentally enter their airspace.<\/p>\n As a result, in the case of the above-mentioned incident, Poland\u2019s air defense system, as part of NATO\u2019s joint air defense system, did not actually work. It is known that Polish and Dutch F-16 and F-35 fighters managed to shoot down only three or four Russian UAVs out of about twenty. They used missiles that are much more expensive than drones. We will not assess NATO\u2019s air defense, but it is likely that without practical experience it would not be able to effectively counter a missile attack from Russia.<\/p>\n This raises the question: how could such an air defense system enhance Ukraine\u2019s defense? However, even if it could work effectively, in its current configuration it can only destroy airborne assets over Ukraine in a limited way.<\/p>\n For example, it would be able to shoot down drones using military air defense systems such as the \u201cGepard\u201d at a range of no more than 20 kilometers into the interior of Ukraine. The use of more powerful systems such as IRIS-T and HAWK will increase this figure to about 100 km, but their missiles are too expensive to destroy UAVs. In addition, no defense industry will be able to produce a sufficient number of such missiles to systematically repel massive drone attacks, including with the combined efforts of the United States and Europe.<\/p>\n The same applies to helicopters, light aircraft, and tactical fighters. Helicopters and light aircraft will be able to destroy drones only on approach to the Ukrainian-Polish border. The use of fighter jets would also be too expensive. Interceptor drones are a solution, but their range is still limited to tens of kilometers.<\/p>\n Based on the technical characteristics of Patriot, HAWK and IRIS-T, cruise and ballistic missiles can be shot down at a range of up to 160 km from the borders of Central and Eastern Europe with Ukraine. This will indeed strengthen the air defense of Ukraine\u2019s western regions. However, such a solution would require an increase in the number of these SAMs in the CEE countries, which would again be a problem. At least until they are produced in sufficient quantities, which will take time and considerable money.<\/p>\n Therefore, it is necessary to determine new approaches to overcome all these obstacles. At a minimum, the relevant actions should include:<\/p>\n first, bringing the interaction between the air defense systems of Ukraine and the CEE and NATO countries to a qualitatively new level, including joint fire control;<\/p>\n second, deployment of military air defense forces and assets of neighboring and other NATO member states on the territory of Ukraine in order to move the UAVs\u2019 defeat zone away from the border;<\/p>\n third, to ensure that helicopters, light aircraft and tactical fighters of NATO member states can operate in Ukrainian airspace together with the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This will also make it possible to move the destruction of UAVs and missiles to the east.<\/p>\n Without all of this, it is virtually impossible to strengthen the protection of Ukraine\u2019s skies and, consequently, reduce the threat of air attacks on Central and Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n Thus, Russia\u2019s increased missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, as well as its intensification of provocations against the CEE and Baltic states using UAVs and tactical aircraft, require that all parties join forces to counter the Russian threat.<\/strong><\/p>\n At the moment, this could be achieved by directly involving Ukraine\u2019s neighboring NATO member states in the defense of its airspace. However, this would require resolving a number of complex problems, including the need to overcome Russian resistance, deepen cooperation between Ukraine\u2019s and NATO\u2019s air defense systems, and ensure that NATO air defense forces and means can operate both on Ukrainian territory and in its airspace.<\/strong><\/p>\n If all this is not done, any plans to strengthen Ukraine\u2019s and NATO\u2019s air security against threats from Russia will not be fully realized.<\/strong><\/p>\n Heorhii Zagorskyi, (Image generated by neural network)<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Heorhii Zagorskyi<\/p>\n The intrusion of Russian UAVs into Polish airspace in September forced NATO\u2019s leadership to take additional measures to strengthen its air defense<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31529,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[301],"class_list":["post-31527","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-zagorskij","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
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