{"id":31618,"date":"2025-10-02T00:04:33","date_gmt":"2025-10-01T21:04:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=31618"},"modified":"2026-04-05T12:31:30","modified_gmt":"2026-04-05T09:31:30","slug":"komitet-derzhavno%d1%97-bezpeki-respubliki-bilorus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/komitet-derzhavno%d1%97-bezpeki-respubliki-bilorus\/","title":{"rendered":"The State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus"},"content":{"rendered":"

The State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus as the \u201cFoundation\u201d of Aleksandr Lukashenko\u2019s Regime<\/h1>\n

Modern Belarus is a country where the KGB [1] plays a key role in the political, economic and social spheres. Since September 2020, it has been headed by Lieutenant General Ivan Tertel [2], appointed by Aleksandr Lukashenko in the midst of an internal crisis caused by mass protests after the rigged presidential election. He replaced Lieutenant General Valery Vakulchik [3], who held the record for the longest tenure of any chief of the special service, having headed it for almost 8 years. This decision was interpreted as a gesture of strengthening loyalty and a tougher stance toward the opposition. Western analysts interpreted the appointment of Ivan Tertel as a symbol of the consolidation of the repressive apparatus in the hands of people ready to use the most brutal methods [4].<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>At the same time, as pointed out  by the specialized publication Intelligence Online, over time, Ivan Tertel ceased to be just an internal executor of security policy. He became a key player in the backroom channels of communication between Russia, Ukraine, and Western countries. This duality \u2013 the role of an internal pillar of repression and an external mediator \u2013 determined the nature of his actions: repression and diplomatic gestures began to function as interrelated instruments of state policy.<\/p>\n

From Polish Roots \u2013 to the KGB<\/h3>\n

Ivan Tertel was born on September 8, 1966, in the village of Prywalka (Polish: Przewalka) near Grodno, which has been a town of the Rzeczpospolita since the 16th<\/sup> century (before its partition in 1795) and was part of the Polish Republic between the two world wars. His parents, Stanislav Yanovych and Anastasia Kazymyrivna, were of Polish descent and were Catholics. His father\u2019s real surname was Tsertsel, and he named his son Yan (in honor of his grandfather). Among the relatives of this family there were even soldiers of the Armia Krajowa (Home Army) [5].<\/p>\n

After graduating from high school, Ivan Tertel (as he was written in his passport) studied at the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School.[6]. In 1989, the young Lieutenant was sent to serve in the 106th<\/sup>  Airborne Division of Tula. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ivan Tertel returned to Belarus, where he served in the Border Guard troops in 1993-2007. In 1994, he graduated from the Institute of National Security of the KGB of Belarus, and in 1996 \u2013 from Yanka Kupala University in Grodno (by correspondence).<\/p>\n

In 2007, Ivan Tertel was transferred to the KGB of the Republic of Belarus, where he became Deputy Head a year later. In particular, he was in charge of the units that dealt with corruption and economic crimes. In June 2020, Aleksandr Lukashenko appointed him Chairman of the State Control Committee, a structure with equally broad powers. However, in September of the same year, in the midst of the political crisis, as mentioned above, Ivan Tertel returned to the KGB, but in the status of a chief. His operational and administrative experience made him a natural candidate for implementing tough internal policies and conducting complex negotiations.<\/p>\n

The KGB Under Ivan Tertel\u2019s Leadership<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/a>After Ivan Tertel\u2019s appointment, the KGB\u2019s activity increased significantly. Under the leadership of an ethnic Pole,  the homeland of his ancestors became one of the main areas of activity of the Belarusian Chekists. For example, in December 2024, national television showed a film about a Polish citizen who allegedly tried to recruit a Belarusian diplomat in Chisinau. He was offered  EUR 100,000 for cooperation with Polish special services, but of course, he informed the competent authorities. It is possible that the KGB itself organized this provocation, which was also recorded on video.<\/p>\n

In September 2025, KGB officers detained a Pole, a Carmelite monk, Grzegorz Gawel, in Vitebsk region, who allegedly received secret information from a Belarusian citizen about the Russian-Belarusian \u201cWest 2025\u201d strategic  exercise. Apparently, there was also a KGB \u201csetup\u201d here.<\/p>\n

According to official data, in the first half of 2025 alone, KGB counterintelligence detained 14 people accused of espionage and treason. These facts were publicized as proof of the vigilance and effectiveness of the security agency. The narrative of an external threat served to legitimize harsh internal actions and expand the KGB\u2019s powers [7].<\/p>\n

A striking example of the KGB\u2019s operational activities was the detection (or perhaps \u201cdetection\u201d) of explosives warehouses in early 2024, where tens of kilograms of TNT, plastic explosives, and remote detonation devices were found. Ivan Tertel stated in an interview that people associated with those warehouses were trained abroad (a hint of Ukraine) and planned terrorist attacks in Belarus. Such successes strengthened the image of the KGB and were widely used in state propaganda.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>In parallel, information and psychological operations were conducted. On April 26, 2024, Ivan Tertel publicly named the addresses of two Kyiv hospitals as alleged hiding places for \u201cmilitants\u201d. Observers viewed this as an example of information pressure and an attempt to destabilize through disinformation. These actions demonstrated that the KGB\u2019s \u201crepertoire\u201d includes not only classical forms and methods of operational work, but also elements of information warfare.<\/p>\n

Since the beginning of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has sided with the aggressor, and the KGB has been massively persecuting its citizens for any support of our country and expressions of solidarity with it. As of March 2025, at least 41 people have been convicted of donating to Belarusian volunteers. At least 30 people have been convicted of intending to fight on the side of Ukraine. At least 93 people have been convicted of passing photos and videos of Russian military equipment to the media.<\/p>\n

Ukrainians in Belarus are also being persecuted. When entering Belarus, they are thoroughly checked and questioned by border guards and KGB officers, and some are not allowed to enter without explanation. Some Ukrainians are subject to criminal prosecution for \u201cagent activity\u201d, \u201cattempted sabotage\u201d and \u201cespionage\u201d. To date, at least 13 Ukrainian citizens have been convicted in Belarus.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the KGB has intensified its intelligence activities against Western countries [8]. For example, in September 2025, the special services of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania conducted a joint operation which eliminated an extensive Belarusian spy network. One of its curators, a KGB officer working under diplomatic cover in the Czech Republic, was declared persona non grata. Besides, Colonel Alexandru Balan, former deputy director of the Intelligence and Security Service of Moldova, was arrested in Romania [9]. According to Czech counterintelligence, he had been passing classified information to the KGB since 2024.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s Loyal Ally<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/strong>Since the beginning of his term, Ivan Tertel has constantly emphasized strong partnership contacts  with Russia. For his part, in September 2023, in an interview with the National Defense magazine, Director of the  Foreign Intelligence Service of the RF Sergei Naryshkin declared a strategic partnership and an exceptional level of cooperation with the KGB of Belarus [10]. This interaction resulted in foreign operations conducted by Belarusian intelligence, in particular in Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine. According to the Lithuanian Department of State Security (DSS), KGB recruitment methods include the use of compromising materials, staged accidents, and abuse of visa procedures. The KGB has also organized provocations against Polish diplomats, and since 2021, it has been conducting Operation \u201cShlyuz\u201d (\u201cGateway\u201d \u2013 Transl.), aimed at creating a migration crisis on the border with Poland [11]. These activities are hybrid in nature and range from classical intelligence forms and methods to influence and destabilization operations.<\/p>\n

The KGB\u2019s Infiltration into  the Diaspora and Opposition<\/h3>\n

Another area of activity of the KGB, headed by Ivan Tertel, was infiltration into emigrant and opposition circles abroad. The most high-profile example was the case of Daria Ostapenko (also known as Rita Martin), an activist who worked in the Polish opposition. In Poland, she was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison (a relatively lenient sentence) for spying for the KGB. She posed as a pro-democracy activist and since 2017 had been collecting information about emigrants and Belarusian opposition figures, which she then passed on to her curators in the secret service in Minsk.<\/p>\n

A similar situation occurred in Lithuania, where in September 2024, the Vilnius District Court sentenced lawyer Mantas Daniels to 9 years in prison for spying for the Belarusian KGB. According to the Lithuanian State Security Service, he collected information about opposition figures and refugees and then passed it on to the KGB through Belarusian propagandist Ksenia Lebedeva. This case demonstrated that Minsk systematically infiltrates opposition circles and identifies diaspora structures.<\/p>\n

The KGB\u2019s  Failures and Mistakes<\/h3>\n

Despite the image created by the KGB\u2019s own press service and state media, the special service has not escaped spectacular failures. In 2021, the Belarusian hacker group Cyber-Partisans successfully attacked the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs networks, and caused leaking of personal data and other information on more than 8,600 KGB officers. This was a serious blow to the credibility of the secret service as an impenetrable agency.<\/p>\n

The failure of a valuable agent, Colonel Aleksandru Balan, mentioned above, can also be considered a serious failure for the KGB. And the situation with agent Daria\/Rita shows the low level of work of the Belarusian Chekists with covert assistants. According to Polish media reports, she herself, while drunk, spilled the beans about working for the KGB, which led to her detention and arrest by local counterintelligence.<\/p>\n

Demonstrative Humanitarian Gestures<\/h3>\n

Since 2022, the KGB has been involved in exchanges of prisoners of war and civilians between Russia and Ukraine, which take place on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. From September 2022 to September 2025, a total of 56 such operations were conducted. The official version presented them as humanitarian actions, although independent observers emphasized their political nature.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the Lukashenko regime introduced selective pardons for political prisoners. In June 2025, the authorities released a group of opposition activists who had been deported to Lithuania, and in September, 52 people were released. According to Amnesty International, these actions were coercive: many of those released were forced to leave, but more than a thousand prisoners remain in Belarusian prisons. In reality, the humanitarian gestures of the Belarusian authorities were part of a political game: a signal to the West, while maintaining repression inside the country.<\/p>\n

Diplomatic Mediation<\/h3>\n

Ivan Tertel demonstrated his role as a mediator by participating in diplomatic events. According to BelTA, he was present, among other things, at Aleksandr Lukashenko\u2019s meeting with  US Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg. The Chief of the KGB discussed the reasons for pardoning prisoners and the goals of the \u201cgood neighborhood\u201d policy.<\/p>\n

According to Western experts, Ivan Tertel is viewed by the Belarusian authorities as a useful partner for Western countries seeking pragmatic channels of contact with Minsk. This allowed the regime to conduct technical negotiations without the need for full normalization of relations.<\/p>\n

Tertel As an Architect of Minsk\u2019s Future Strategy<\/h3>\n

The appointment of Ivan Tertel as head of the KGB was a turning point that led to both an escalation of repression in the country and an expansion of foreign activity. The KGB\u2019s involvement in international political mechanisms meant that prisoner exchanges and pardons began to function as transactional tools towards the West.<\/p>\n

This resulted in  a change in Belarus\u2019 international position. It began to act as a technical intermediary in matters related to the war in Ukraine. Ivan Tertel himself, thanks to his role as coordinator, became not only the executor of such operations, but also a behind-the-scenes negotiator and multiplier of political benefits for Minsk.<\/p>\n

According to Amnesty International, the most likely scenario for the coming years is the continuation of the \u201cdouble movement\u201d policy \u2013 a combination of internal repression and targeted (but limited) concessions to the West. This \u201cdiagnosis\u201d is confirmed by other sources. For example, Human Rights Watch has pointed out  that Minsk is trying to disguise repression with selective pardons, while the opposition human rights organization Viasna has reported that the release of political prisoners is accompanied by further waves of detentions. According to the Netherlands\u2019 think tank Clingendael, Minsk is making pragmatic gestures in favor of the West, while maintaining a hard line at home.<\/p>\n

At the same time, experts warn that after the so-called Budapest case [12], further counterintelligence scandals are expected in the European Union, which will make it difficult for Minsk to normalize relations with the West.<\/p>\n

Volodymyr Palyvoda,
\n<\/strong>expert in international relations<\/p>\n

Notes:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

[1] Among all the former Soviet Union republics, only Belarus has retained the previous name, almost the entire structure and broad powers of its national state security body. In 1991-2001, there was the KGB of the Republic of Tatarstan, which was later reorganized into the FSB Office for the Republic of Tatarstan. In May 1992, the KGB of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia (formerly an autonomous region of Georgia) was established.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2] The tenth head of the KGB of Belarus since the republic gained independence in 1991.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3] A graduate of the Kharkiv Higher Tank Command School (1985) and the Higher Military Counterintelligence Courses of the KGB in Novosibirsk (1992).<\/span><\/p>\n

[4] On the eve of the 2020 presidential election, Aleksandr Lukashenko announced the possibility of reforming the KGB, as this body has powers and functions that are too broad for the Belarusian system of government, being a universal competence intelligence service with law enforcement functions. However, as shown by further developments in the country, that statement was purely pre-election rhetoric.<\/span><\/p>\n

[5] The armed forces of the Polish underground during World War II (1939-1945). The main task of the AK was armed resistance to Hitler\u2019s troops in the form of subversive activity  and sabotage, as well as the preparation of a nationwide uprising (the so-called Operation \u201cStorm\u201d), which was to break out at a favorable time. In relation to the USSR, Commander of the AK Division General Stefan Rowecki proceeded from the concept of two enemies, according to which Germany and the USSR, exhausted by the long confrontation, had to lose the opportunity for further military action, which would allow the AK, with the support of the UK and the USA, to raise a victorious nationwide uprising. In addition to the Germans, the AK fought against the UPA, as well as Belarusian and Lithuanian partisan armed groups.<\/span><\/p>\n

[6] At the military school,  he studied with his younger brother Yurii, who later commanded a special forces unit of the Belarusian border troops, in which Aleksandr Lukashenko\u2019s two older sons served. In 2018, Yurii Tertel was appointed head of the State Inspectorate for the Protection of Flora and Fauna under the President of Belarus.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7] In December 2024, the Chief  of the KGB Investigative Department, Konstantin Bychek, stated that a large number of foreign citizens, including those from Poland, the Baltic States, and other Western countries, convicted of espionage, were imprisoned in Belarus. According to him, the KGB is allegedly regularly approached by representatives of foreign special services with proposals to exchange those individuals for Belarusian citizens in their prisons. He also pointed out: \u201cAt this,  they offer robbers, rapists, fraudsters, drug addicts and others for exchange. In this regard, the official position of the KGB is that we do not exchange anyone. Neither Poland, nor the Baltic States, nor other Western countries have citizens of the Republic of Belarus who collaborated with the KGB, have been convicted of this and are serving their sentences there.\u201d This statement by the KGB representative is not true, because at that time several Belarusian citizens suspected of collaborating with Belarusian intelligence were detained abroad (in particular, in Poland). Probably, those individuals did not belong to the category of valuable agents who could be negotiated. On the other hand, the intelligence services usually do not officially recognize detainees as belonging to their agent apparatus.<\/span><\/p>\n

[8] The KGB includes the Main Directorate of Foreign Intelligence. In 2001-2013, the issue of creating a separate intelligence agency was considered, and a draft law \u201cOn Foreign Intelligence\u201d was even prepared. However, the idea was later abandoned.<\/span><\/p>\n

[9] In 2018-2021, he worked as a Security Adviser at the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in Ukraine. In 2023, he was dismissed from the service.<\/span><\/p>\n

[10] From August 1997 to January 2003, there was a Committee on Security of the Union of Russia and Belarus (liquidated due to the position of the Belarusian side). Today, the activities of special services of the Russian Federation and Belarus are coordinated through joint meetings of the boards of the FSB and KGB, as well as the Foreign Intelligence Service and the KGB.<\/span><\/p>\n

[11] According to the Border Guard Service of the Republic of Poland, during March 28-30, 2025 alone, Polish border guards counted 620 attempts to break through the border with Belarus. From April 4 to April 6, 2025, violators from Belarus made 480 attempts to illegally enter Poland. They threw stones at the border guards and the military assisting them. In total, in the first half of this year, security forces recorded almost 4.3 thousand attempts to illegally enter the country through the border fence. For comparison, in the whole of 2024, the number of such attempts was almost 30 thousand.<\/span><\/p>\n

[12] KGB agent and former Deputy Director of the Intelligence and Security Service of Moldova, Colonel Aleksandru Balan, met with Belarusian intelligence officers in Budapest in 2024 and 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31619,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-31618","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nThe State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus - Institute for Global politics<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/komitet-derzhavno\u0457-bezpeki-respubliki-bilorus\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus - 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