{"id":31690,"date":"2025-10-06T00:04:43","date_gmt":"2025-10-05T21:04:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=31690"},"modified":"2025-10-06T16:22:32","modified_gmt":"2025-10-06T13:22:32","slug":"pivnichnoatlantichnij-alyans-chastina-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/pivnichnoatlantichnij-alyans-chastina-1\/","title":{"rendered":"The North Atlantic Alliance. Part 1"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">The North Atlantic Alliance.&nbsp;Distorted Views of It and the True Nature of NATO<\/h1>\n<h2>Part 1<\/h2>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px; text-align: left;\"><em>Russia\u2019s efforts to discredit NATO, as well as the lack of understanding by many experts of the true nature of the Organization\u2019s activities, leads to a negative perception of the Alliance in Ukrainian society;<br \/>\n<\/em><em>This is harmful to Ukraine, as it undermines public confidence in the Alliance as its main ally in the war against Russia and a guarantor of Ukraine\u2019s security in the future;<br \/>\n<\/em><em>With this in mind, the article offers an assessment of the actual role of the Alliance and its activities, as well as of Ukraine in the new system of European and Euro-Atlantic security.<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Lately, Russia has been actively using UAVs and military aircraft in its provocations against NATO and the EU, which has made the question of the effectiveness of the Alliance and its ability to protect its members, and Ukraine in case it joins it, extremely relevant.<\/strong> At this, many politicians and experts criticize the Alliance, which is allegedly losing its effectiveness. They argue that:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left; line-height: 15px;\">\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">the leadership of NATO and its member states fear a possible direct military clash with Russia, and therefore do not actually respond to its provocations. The same may happen in case&nbsp; of Russia\u2019s direct aggression, especially against new members of the Alliance;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">the Alliance does not have sufficient means to repulse a &nbsp;possible attack from Russia, which is superior in terms of its military potential. This situation will become critical if US President D. Trump succeeds in reducing America\u2019s responsibility for the security of Europe;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">NATO will not be able to respond to Russia\u2019s military invasion with lightning speed, as the Alliance\u2019s actions require coordination and compliance with certain bureaucratic procedures, which are not easy to fulfill. Besides, it will take a long time to move NATO troops to the front line, which will allow the Russian Armed Forces to occupy neighboring countries;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">as evidenced by the intrusion of Russian UAVs into Poland\u2019s airspace on the night of September 9-10, NATO\u2019s air defense system is ineffective. Obviously, other military components of the Alliance may be the same, lacking combat experience in warfare in modern conditions. Given this state of affairs, conclusions are being drawn that Ukraine should not rely on the Alliance\u2019s help, and that it is inappropriate for it to join. They say it is extremely dangerous for our country. Especially at the time when Russia continues to wage war against Ukraine. And even after the war is over, Russia\u2019s military threats to Ukraine will remain.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>But in reality, this is not the case. NATO undoubtedly has problems, but they are being resolved by the Alliance\u2019s leadership in close cooperation with the EU and with the help of Ukraine, which already has real, fairly modern experience in confronting Russia<\/strong>. NATO and EU experts are quite objective in their assessment of the situation, which is taken into account by the leadership of these Organizations. This is the basis for the relevant decisions and measures to implement them. Therefore, let us consider them in more detail.<\/p>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: justify;\">1. NATO and the EU\u2019s perception of challenges and threats to their security in the military and other spheres.<\/h3>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato1.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-5uXoK3bt\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-31699\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato1.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato1-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>It is common knowledge that Russia, with its aggressive foreign policy, is the most dangerous source of military threats to the Western world.<\/strong> To implement this policy, Russia uses force. This is evidenced by the war unleashed against Ukraine and Russia\u2019s attempts to blackmail the United States and Europe, including &nbsp;with threats to use nuclear weapons against them.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">At one time, such nuclear threats by Moscow were a serious deterrent to the United States and Europe, and as a result, they did not try to put pressure on Russia to avoid excessive aggravation of relations with it. Now the situation is somewhat different.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Of course, the West is aware of Russia\u2019s nuclear weapons. However, it believes that the probability of its actual use is low. Even with such an inadequate state power in Russia as the Putin regime. No matter how much this regime threatens the United States and Europe, it probably realizes that a retaliatory nuclear strike from them would certainly destroy both it and Russia. The same can be said about his environment. And China, on which Russia is completely dependent, would not allow it to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Such changes are confirmed by US President D. Trump\u2019s demonstrative rejecting &nbsp;Russian dictator Putin\u2019s proposal to start negotiations on the extension of the START III Treaty, which provides for nuclear arms control and reduction. In this way, Putin was trying to draw the United States into a dialogue with Russia with Ukraine \u201cout of the picture\u201d. But he failed to do so.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">According to US, NATO, and EU military experts, the likelihood of Russia\u2019s attack on Europe using conventional weapons is currently quite low. Russia lacks the military resources to do so, as most of them are used in the war with Ukraine. This is confirmed by the scale of the \u201cZapad-2025\u201d strategic exercize of the Armed Forces of Russia and Belarus in September 2025, which was significantly smaller than previous exercises of this type. According to Putin, the number of participants in the exercise was 100,000, although in reality no more than 30,000 troops, including the Belarusian military, took part in it.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">However, Western experts do not rule out that Russia\u2019s military aggression against Europe is possible in 5-7 years and if it defeats Ukraine or manages to stop the war on its own terms (including lifting at least some of the sanctions). This would allow it to rebuild its economy and armed forces, and accumulate sufficient potential for further military expansion on the European direction.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">However, this prospect is a matter of the future. Currently, the main threat from Moscow is that it is intensifying hybrid wars against Europe and, to some extent, against the United States, trying to compensate for the lack of its military power. In particular, Russia will traditionally try to bribe Western politicians and take advantage of the fact that American and European businesses are interested in cooperating with it. It will also necessarily resort to subversive information influence, support for pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, left-wing and far-right forces in Europe and the United States, and cyber-attacks.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">There are also provocations against NATO and EU countries in the form of violations of their air and sea borders by Russian warplanes and ships. However, they have been limited until recently. Besides, Russian and Belarusian special services are trying to demonstratively break through Belarus\u2019 border with Poland and Lithuania, involving migrants from problematic regions of the world.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Right now, the above-mentioned activities of Russia are complemented by jamming GPS signals and deliberate damage to the cable networks of NATO and the EU countries that lie at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. As a result, European countries are experiencing communication problems, which cannot but cause them significant economic losses. In addition, there may even be disasters with human casualties. This is evidenced by the incident with the plane of the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen on September 1, when its pilots were forced to fly and land without the GPS system due to a failure in receiving its signals.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The goal of such hybrid wars by Moscow is to weaken NATO and the EU by undermining stability in the member states of these Organizations and provoking discord between them, as well as to influence their policies through the Russian lobby. Sadly, Russia is succeeding in achieving its goals, as evidenced, for example, by the positions of the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia, who, under Moscow\u2019s influence, openly promote its interests in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato2.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-5uXoK3bt\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-31700\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato2.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato2-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Another most acute source of threats to the United States and Europe is China. However, they view it, so to speak, from different perspectives<\/strong>. For example, the United States considers it a geopolitical competitor and military adversary at the strategic level (in the nuclear missile sphere) and in the Asia-Pacific region (Indo-Pacific in the American interpretation). For Europe, China is only a competitor, considered the leader of the totalitarian world. At the same time, China supports Russia, which is why it continues to wage war against Ukraine and intensify its confrontation with the West. In this way, China is diverting the &nbsp;USA\u2019s &nbsp;attention from the Asia-Pacific theater of operations, switching it to the European theater of operations. This, and not D. Trump\u2019s \u201cwhims\u201d, is the reason for his concept of the need to strengthen Europe\u2019s responsibility for its security, which will significantly improve the USA\u2019s capabilities in confronting China. Especially when &nbsp;China is actively building up and modernizing its military capabilities.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Although, according to some estimates, D. Trump may decide to actually divide the world with Xi Jinping in the form of establishing a strategic partnership between the United States and China. That is, he may decide to return to the policy of his predecessor B. Obama. To some extent, this is evidenced by D. Trump\u2019s refusal to start a tariff war with China and the successful negotiations on a trade agreement. One of the key steps in this direction may be the US President\u2019s visit to China, which is expected early next year.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato3.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-5uXoK3bt\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-31701\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato3.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato3.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/nato3-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>The third group of threats to the United States and Europe is international terrorism, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, cross-border crime, and increased migrant flows.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In some periods, these threats come out on top. The most illustrative of these facts is the large-scale terrorist attack by Islamic extremists on the United States on September 11, 2001. In response, the United States declared a war on terrorism and launched a military operation in Afghanistan to destroy centres of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">In the 2010s, Islamic extremists sharply intensified their terrorist activities in Europe, which is considered a response to the US military operations with the participation of NATO countries in Iraq and Libya. During the same period, the flow of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe increased significantly, resulting in a migration crisis in the EU. According to many estimates, all those processes were provoked by Russia, aiming to weaken NATO and the EU.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">The above mentioned threats are enshrined in the conceptual documents of the USA, NATO, and the EU in the security sphere, which guide their actions.<\/p>\n<p>To be continued&#8230;<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Oleh Bereziuk, Heorhiy Zahorskyi, Yurii Mykhailenko,<br \/>\n<\/strong>Institute for Global Politics<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><em>(Images generated by neural network)<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Oleh Bereziuk, Heorhiy Zahorskyi, Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n<p>Russia\u2019s efforts to discredit NATO, as well as the lack of understanding by many experts of the true nature of the Organization\u2019s activities, leads to a negative perception of the Alliance in Ukrainian society<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31694,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[273,301,272],"class_list":["post-31690","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-berezyuk","tag-zagorskij","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The North Atlantic Alliance. Part 1 - Institute for Global politics<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/pivnichnoatlantichnij-alyans-chastina-1\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The North Atlantic Alliance. 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