{"id":32756,"date":"2026-01-11T00:01:35","date_gmt":"2026-01-10T21:01:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=32756"},"modified":"2026-01-16T22:14:13","modified_gmt":"2026-01-16T19:14:13","slug":"pidsumki-rozvitku-voyenno-politichno%d1%97-obstanovki-v-sviti-u-2025-roci-chastina-4-rosiya","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/pidsumki-rozvitku-voyenno-politichno%d1%97-obstanovki-v-sviti-u-2025-roci-chastina-4-rosiya\/","title":{"rendered":"Results of the Development of the Global Military-Political Situation in 2025. Part 4. Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"

SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE WORLD IN 2025 IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE\u2019S NATIONAL INTERESTS<\/span><\/h1>\n

Part 4<\/p>\n

Part IV. Russia as Ukraine\u2019s Main Adversary and Its Allies and Partners in the War Against Our State<\/span><\/h2>\n

Russia remained Ukraine\u2019s main adversary, continuing its full-scale war with the aim of destroying our state\u2019s independence and establishing control over it. At the same time, the worsening economic problems in Russia and pressure from the USA forced it to enter into negotiations to end the war or, at least, to imitate them.<\/p>\n

China, Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and, to a certain extent, India, are Russia\u2019s partners, who directly or indirectly supported it. At the same time, Moscow tried to use the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), as well as a number of other countries, for its own purposes. However, the attitude of all of them to Russia was purely situational and depended on their current interests and other circumstances.<\/p>\n

As a result, Russia failed to achieve its goals, became completely dependent on China, and found itself on the verge of disintegration. At the same time, Moscow hoped that it would be able to pressure Ukraine and force it to make concessions. Putin counted on Donald Trump\u2019s favor and the USA\u2019s willingness to divide the world with Russia and China. But those hopes did not come true.<\/p>\n

4.1. Russia<\/span><\/h3>\n

The year 2025 was a turning point for Russia. It still behaved like a great world power, trying to impose its will on Europe, and making efforts to achieve military victory over Ukraine, but began to lose ground.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s economy could not withstand Western sanctions, military spending, and falling world oil prices, and found itself on the brink of a deep crisis. At the same time, Moscow began to lose its influence in regions of the world that were important to it. Russia was no longer feared, and its partners began to distance themselves from it.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Russia\u2019s leadership found itself captive to false perceptions of the global situation and Russia\u2019s ability to achieve its goals. First and foremost, this concerned the Kremlin\u2019s misperception of Donald Trump\u2019s policy, which was based on the nature of his election campaign.<\/p>\n

Based on this, Putin became convinced that D. Trump was ready to divide the world with him and give him Ukraine. Putin\u2019s irrational view of US policy did not change even after D. Trump publicly demonstrated his contempt for Russia and began openly destroying its economy by lowering world oil prices and imposing sanctions on Russian oil companies.<\/p>\n

As a result, even after the onset of crisis processes in the Russian economy in the first half of 2025, Putin continued the war, hoping to force Ukraine to surrender. He used the negotiations to prolong the war and gain additional time to capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible. Plus, as part of the negotiation process, he tried to influence Ukraine through Donald Trump.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Putin made efforts to resume the strategic dialogue between Russia and the USA, which had been effectively suspended since 2014. By doing so, he hoped to demonstrate that Russia remained a leading power on a par with the USA, as well as to obtain Trump\u2019s agreement on the establishment of spheres of influence in the world.<\/p>\n

To this end, Moscow initiated negotiations with Washington on the control of strategic nuclear weapons, as well as the implementation of joint projects to develop Russian deposits of hydrocarbons and rare earth materials. Besides, according to a number of reports, Russia offered the USA to exchange Venezuela for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The USA agreed to a dialogue with Russia, which was initiated during a meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska in August 2025. However, Trump refused to share the world with him, as he did not consider Russia an equal partner and was confident in the USA\u2019s ability to achieve its goals independently, without regard to Russia. And after Moscow rejected his proposals to freeze the war along the front line and began to threaten the USA, he began to openly pressure Russia, including imposing sanctions against it, demonstrating force, and undermining its positions in those regions of the world that it considered its spheres of influence.<\/p>\n

In response, Moscow resorted to anti-American rhetoric, but limited it to a certain extent, as it did not want to spoil relations with Washington. Therefore, in 2025, Russia\u2019s confrontation with the West mainly took the form of its confrontation with Europe. Moscow accused it of \u201csupporting Nazism in Ukraine\u201d and \u201ccreating obstacles to the peace process\u201d, which was allegedly being conducted exclusively by Russia and the USA. Moreover, Russia\u2019s leadership really saw Europe as the main problem preventing it from achieving its goals in relation to the USA and Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Based on the above, Moscow attempted to influence Europe through blackmail, organizing provocations against it, and using other methods of hybrid warfare. Europe’s measures to strengthen its security were interpreted by Russia as preparations for war against it. This was used by the Kremlin to justify its actions against Ukraine, which it called \u201cEurope\u2019s tool for weakening Russia and undermining its positions\u201d, as well as to consolidate the Russian population on the basis of ideas about protecting the Russian Federation from external enemies.<\/p>\n

In the context of the new Cold War between Russia and Europe, but in fact with the USA, which did not yield to its interests, China remained Moscow\u2019s main support. It became its main trading partner and ensured the functioning of the Russian economy. China supplied Russia with a full range of necessary products, from consumer goods to automobiles and industrial equipment, as well as military materials and products. In addition, the People\u2019s Republic of China was the largest exporter of Russian oil.<\/p>\n

At the same time, China provided political support to Russia in its confrontation with the West, albeit in a rather limited form. This mainly included condemning Western sanctions against Russia and calling for taking into consideration Russia\u2019s interests in determining the terms of the end of the war and future peace.<\/p>\n

Given China\u2019s vital importance to Russia, the latter made every effort to maintain and develop relations with China, even at the expense of its own interests. Thus, Moscow maintained close relations with Beijing at all levels and consulted with it on all international issues sensitive to it, especially during the additional complication of Russian-American relations.<\/p>\n

This was especially true during the early days of Trump\u2019s second term, when he tried to get China to pressure Russia to stop the war against Ukraine, as well as when he decided to impose sanctions on Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025.<\/p>\n

The most significant events were the meetings between Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May 2025 in Russia and in September of the same year in China. The first was held as part of the celebrations in Moscow marking the 80th<\/sup> anniversary of the USSR\u2019s victory over Nazi Germany, and the second \u2013 on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Tianjin, China, and the parade in Beijing marking the end of World War II.<\/p>\n

In both cases, Xi Jinping demonstrated the dominant position of the PRC in relations with Russia and the Third World countries represented at those events. In fact, their leaders came to Moscow not because of their support for Russia, but because of the importance of China, represented by Xi Jinping, to them. The same can be said about the SCO summit and the parade in Beijing.<\/p>\n

Despite Moscow and Beijing\u2019s declarations of strategic partnership between them, China has pursued exclusively its own interests in cooperation with Russia. It has mainly used the RF and its war against Ukraine to strengthen its position in geopolitical competition with the USA and Europe by diverting their attention and efforts. At the same time, Russia\u2019s de facto cessation of trade and economic cooperation with Europe due to Western sanctions has enabled China to significantly expand its access to Russia\u2019s natural resources and market.<\/p>\n

At this, China traded with Russia exclusively on terms favorable to itself, including selling it dual-use and military products at significantly higher prices than to other countries. It also refused to buy Russian coal and significantly reduced its purchases of metallurgical products. Besides, China did not invest in Russia\u2019s economy, did not grant it loans, and virtually ceased cooperation with Russian companies and banks that were subject to sanctions. From October 2025, it began to reduce its purchases of Russian oil, which was subject to sanctions.<\/p>\n

However, China\u2019s policy did not prevent Russia from becoming even more dependent on it. In fact, Russia became China\u2019s satellite, which gave China powerful opportunities to influence it.<\/p>\n

Another key partner for Russia remained India, which continued to trade with Russia despite Western sanctions. In particular, it was the second largest importer of Russian oil after China. However, India also succumbed to pressure from the USA and Europe and began to partially abandon cooperation with Russia in the energy sector. An additional problem in trade between the two countries was created by their transition exclusively to Russian rubles and Indian rupees, which are not convertible worldwide. Therefore, neither Moscow nor India could use them for other purposes.<\/p>\n

In order to resolve these issues, in December 2025, Putin visited India, where he met with Indian Prime Minister N. Modi. Putin was accompanied by Russia\u2019s ministers of defense, finance, and economic development, as well as the head of the Central Bank and the heads of Rosneft, Rosatom, and Roscosmos. The parties reached agreements on increasing bilateral trade, but their practical implementation in the current situation surrounding Russia is questionable.<\/p>\n

Other areas of Moscow\u2019s foreign policy took a back seat. Russia\u2019s continued war against Ukraine without achieving decisive success increasingly undermined its authority in the world and weakened its international position, including in regions important to it. Even Russia\u2019s partners stopped taking it seriously. This was especially true after it began to abandon them without assistance.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, back in 2024, Moscow refused to help Armenia in its war with Azerbaijan, as a result of which it lost the war and Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, Russia did not save Bashar al-Assad\u2019s regime in Syria, which led to its fall under pressure from the rebels. In June 2025, Moscow abandoned Iran, which came under attack from the USA and Israel. And in January 2026, it ignored the US operation to capture Venezuelan President Maduro.<\/span><\/p>\n

As a result, Russia effectively lost the Caucasus, which came under the influence of T\u00fcrkiye and the USA. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia was resolved without Russia in 2025 through the mediation of Donald Trump. Russia\u2019s positions in Syria have been completely undermined. Russia\u2019s military bases in that country are essentially under Turkish control. Iran, Moscow\u2019s main ally in the Middle East, is in crisis due to Western sanctions and the consequences of the war. At this, Iran\u2019s ruling regime is facing a direct threat to its power.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moscow is also losing the Caribbean region, without any exchange for Ukraine. And Russian flags no longer protect its tankers, which are being detained by the USA in neutral waters.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia still retains influence in Central Asia, as evidenced by Putin\u2019s visit to Kyrgyzstan in November 2025. But China and the USA are actively pushing it out of the region. Moscow\u2019s attempts to bring its puppets to power in Romania during the 2024 presidential elections and in Moldova through the 2025 parliamentary elections have failed. And Serbia, which is the conduit for Russian interests in the Balkans, has begun supplying weapons to Ukraine, albeit covertly through intermediaries.<\/span><\/p>\n

All this is part of the process of the collapse of Moscow\u2019s sphere of influence, which it tried to create as part of Russia\u2019s transformation into a great world power. At the same time, the \u201caxis of evil\u201d which Russia formed to counter the West is also collapsing.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moscow can still achieve its local political goals, including in Europe. For example, it managed to secure favorable results in the Czech parliamentary elections in October 2025 and to promote the spread of Eurosceptic, far-right, and far-left sentiments in Europe. However, Moscow\u2019s opportunities are significantly less than they were in the second half of the 2010s, when various types of unrest organized by it took place in many European countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

Against this background, the internal situation in Russia began to get increasingly complicated. Western sanctions, excessive military spending, and, in particular, US actions to lower global oil prices undermined the Russian economy, which began to enter a deep crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Rosstat\u2019s preliminary estimates, Russia\u2019s GDP grew by 0.5-1% in 2025, while last year this figure was 4.1%. At this, the planned level of economic growth, taking into account the decision on a \u201csoft landing\u201d of the economy after its \u201cexcessive overheating\u201d, was set at 2-2.5%. That is, even according to official data, Russia\u2019s economic growth rate has slowed down more than four times compared to the previous year.<\/span><\/p>\n

The same applies to Russia\u2019s budget deficit. The planned level of this indicator for 2025 was 1.17 trillion rubles. In the spring of 2025, it was increased to 3.79 trillion rubles, and in the autumn \u2013 to 5.74 trillion rubles. In reality, by the end of the year, the deficit had grown to 7.3 trillion rubles.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, according to independent experts, the real picture is much worse. The above-mentioned economic growth rate of 0.5-1% is less than the statistical error, which is 3%. Therefore, in reality, GDP may not have grown in 2025, but may have decreased by 1-2%. The decline in production in the non-military sector was up to 6%.<\/span><\/p>\n

Most of the leading sectors of the Russian economy found themselves in a critical situation. These included: coal, metallurgy, and forestry industries, as well as diamond mining, due to Western sanctions that made their export impossible; automobile and agricultural machinery production due to reduced demand for their products; construction due to people\u2019s inability to buy apartments; agriculture due to high interest rates and a significant reduction in state support; and transport because of a decrease in transport volumes.<\/span><\/p>\n

In all of these industries, a process of partial or complete suspension of operations began in August 2025. Due to a lack of funds for mutual settlements, a crisis of non-payments is spreading, leading to the bankruptcy of an increasing number of economic entities. This applies not only to the industries mentioned above, but also to the high-tech sector. In 2025, the number of bankrupt IT companies increased by more than 30%.<\/span><\/p>\n

Due to a lack of funds in the state budget, similar problems began to arise in the military-industrial complex in the second half of 2025, even though it has priority funding.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to many experts, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), by the summer of 2025, most Russian military-industrial complex enterprises had exhausted their capacity to produce weapons. Previously, the problem of insufficient production capacity was resolved by expanding it. Since the summer of 2025, this process has practically ceased.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, starting in September 2025, the growth rate of arms and military equipment production began to slow down, and in some areas, there was even a physical decline in output. The production of armored combat vehicles declined the most, while the production of ammunition and artillery decreased overall. The production of control, guidance, and communication systems maintained positive dynamics but became unstable. The production of aviation equipment, which mainly included UAVs, remained at a high level, but in November 2025, its production rates began to decline.<\/span><\/p>\n

The main reason for the problems in the Russian military-industrial complex is the lack of funds in the country\u2019s state budget to ensure its proper financing. Therefore, military enterprises, like most others in the country, do not have the necessary funds to ensure the smooth organization of the production process, including the purchase of necessary materials and components from suppliers, the payment of salaries to employees, and the payment of electricity, transport and utility costs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex is becoming one of the main drivers of the payment crisis in Russia, including in the civilian sector. Currently, the payment crisis in the country has already affected about 40% of large companies, leading to an increase in late payments and a decline in production volumes. The total debt has exceeded 3.8 trillion rubles.<\/span><\/p>\n

In addition to the lack of funds, a number of other problems create significant obstacles to the work and development of Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex. The main ones are: Russian industry\u2019s inability to replace foreign materials and components lost as a result of Western sanctions; cessation of supplies to Russia of high-tech equipment used for the production of weapons; and a shortage of highly qualified personnel.<\/span><\/p>\n

The situation is even worse in the RF\u2019s regions. The main source of revenue for their budgets is taxes from local businesses. Therefore, the reduction or suspension of their operations leads to increased financial problems for the regions. At the end of the year, 56 federal subjects faced local deficits.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sectors and individual enterprises of the Russian economy that are in crisis, as well as regions, were supported by the government at the expense of the state budget. At this, oil export revenues remained the main source of state budget revenues. That is why the US actions to reduce world oil prices, EU sanctions, and Ukraine\u2019s strikes on Russian oil industry facilities had critical consequences for Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

This situation has a steady tendency to further complicate. During 2025, the share of loss-making companies in the Russian oil and gas sector increased from about 40% to 50%. Russia\u2019s Gazprom remains unprofitable, staying afloat only thanks to its subsidiary Gazprom Neft. A further decline in global oil prices and their stabilization at this level will make the entire oil industry unprofitable.<\/span><\/p>\n

These circumstances, combined with excessive increases in military spending, were the main cause of the rapid growth of the RF\u2019s budget deficit and all the other problems that followed. Russia has no real opportunities to cover the deficit and will not be able to obtain any in the near future.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is because Western sanctions prevent Russia from taking out external loans, and China will not lend to it; tax increases are destroying small and medium-sized businesses or driving them into the shade, which reduces tax revenues; borrowing on the domestic market is too expensive and leads to an unacceptable increase in public debt.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to a forecast by the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, which is close to the Russian government, if the issue of increasing budget revenues or reducing expenditures is not resolved in the near future, a banking and financial crisis in the country will become inevitable in the first half of 2026. After that, Moscow will largely lose the ability to continue financing the war.<\/span><\/p>\n

Especially as the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Russia due to the negative consequences of the war has already led to the spread of anti-war sentiment in the country. Currently, more than 85% of Russians are in favor of ending the war as soon as possible. At the same time, protests have begun among those who find themselves in the most difficult situation. So far, these protests have been relatively minor, but they are growing.<\/span><\/p>\n

4.2. Russia\u2019s Partners<\/span><\/h3>\n

As mentioned earlier, Russia\u2019s main partners that directly or indirectly supported its war against Ukraine remained China, Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. At the same time, Moscow tried to use for its own purposes the integration associations it had created in the post-Soviet space as a counterweight to NATO and the EU, namely the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and the Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). The policy of the PRC as a leading global power will be discussed in the next section. For now, let us focus on other countries and organizations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Belarus remained the closest ally of the Russian Federation and maintained close ties with it in the military and military-technical spheres. As part of the Regional Grouping of Forces of Russia and Belarus, it played the role of the Russian Federation\u2019s front line in the western direction of its confrontation with NATO.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russian troops were stationed on Belarusian territory both on a permanent basis and during joint military exercises. However, Russia did not create strike forces there that could threaten Ukraine with a new attack from the north. Only Russian UAV strikes on Ukraine were coordinated from Belarusian territory.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, Belarus conducted active military exercises near the border with Ukraine, with the aim of distracting the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the front with Russia. At the same time, provocations against Poland and Lithuania were carried out from Belarusian territory, including the organization of border incidents and violations of their airspace using UAVs.<\/span><\/p>\n

Along with this, Belarus and Russia pursued a joint policy of confrontation with the West and pressure on Ukraine. Belarus\u2019 military-industrial complex also worked for Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

Along with this, in 2025, on Donald Trump\u2019s initiative, contacts between the USA and Belarus were resumed. In this regard, a key event was a telephone conversation between Donald Trump and Alexander Lukashenko in August 2025. They discussed the upcoming meeting between the US and Russian Presidents in Alaska, as well as the fate of political prisoners in Belarus. Besides, US President\u2019s representative K. Kellogg made quite a few to Minsk during the year.<\/span><\/p>\n

Through these actions, D. Trump tried to influence Putin and demonstrate to him the benefits of normalizing relations with the USA. In particular, in response to Lukashenko\u2019s release of a group of political prisoners, the USA lifted sanctions on the Belarusian companies Belavia and Belaruskali.<\/span><\/p>\n

North Korea (DPRK) provided direct military assistance to Russia, including directly on the front lines in Kursk region of the Russian Federation. Approximately 11,000 DPRK troops were sent to participate in combat operations on the side of the Russian Armed Forces. They were involved in combat operations directly on the front lines alongside Russian troops. In addition, North Korea supplied Russia with shells, self-propelled artillery units, ballistic missiles, and other weapons. Thus, the DPRK effectively became a participant in the war on the side of Russia, although its military units did not enter the territory of Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

North Korea\u2019s actions were aimed at: promoting the interests of China, which is using the Russian-Ukrainian war to strengthen its position in competition with the USA and Europe; expanding the basis for deepening its partnership with Russia as an alternative to China; demonstrate its determination in the confrontation with the West; provide opportunities for the DPRK Armed Forces to gain real combat experience in case of war with South Korea; sell obsolete weapons and ammunition, which gave North Korea additional funds for the development of its military industry.<\/span><\/p>\n

In general, North Korea achieved its goals. At this, its losses on the front lines, which amounted to about 6,000 military personnel, were of no consequence to the country\u2019s leadership. However, since the summer of 2025, North Korea has effectively ceased its military support for Russia. In particular, its troops were withdrawn from Russia, and arms supplies were reduced to a minimum. According to official reports, after the Russian Armed Forces regained control of Kursk region, engineering units from the DPRK were sent there to participate in demining and restoration of combat areas. However, this has not been unequivocally confirmed.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to some estimates, the reason for these changes in North Korea\u2019s position was the influence of China, which was accused by the USA and Europe of facilitating the DPRK\u2019s actions and could have been subject to sanctions. This could have caused China greater political, reputational, and economic damage than the benefits of Pyongyang\u2019s support for Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran pursued similar goals to North Korea, with the exception of certain aspects related to their different geographical locations. Iran\u2019s main contribution to Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine was the supply of long-range Shahed-type UAVs. Initially, this involved ready-made devices, and later components for them. These became Moscow\u2019s main tool for striking deep into Ukrainian territory. They are currently more dangerous than cruise missiles.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, Iran played a significant role in diverting US efforts by escalating the armed conflict in the Middle East, with Israel at its center. To this end, Tehran encouraged Hamas and other Islamic extremists to attack it, and also began striking Israeli territory, ostensibly in response to Israel\u2019s attacks.<\/span><\/p>\n

This forced the USA and Israel to take more decisive action against Iran, namely, to conduct a military operation against it in June 2025. The air strikes destroyed Iran\u2019s nuclear infrastructure, making it impossible for it to develop nuclear weapons, and caused significant damage to the country\u2019s military capabilities. Iran was unprepared for such a turn of events, lost the will to continue military confrontation, and agreed to a de facto surrender.<\/span><\/p>\n

The defeat in the clash with the USA and Israel significantly undermined the morale of Iran\u2019s leadership and led to a decline in its authority in Iranian society. This was compounded by the economic crisis in the country, which was the result of American and European sanctions and worsened in the second half of 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

In early 2026, the political and economic situation in Iran became critical, leading to mass protests by Iranians against the country\u2019s current leadership headed by Ayatollah A. Khamenei. The latter became the main target of the outrage of Iranian citizens demanding change in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s leadership is trying to stop the protests by reassuring the people with various promises and by using force. However, this only intensifies anti-government sentiment. Moreover, the use of force by the authorities is causing human casualties. The USA is already using these circumstances as a pretext for the possible overthrow of the ruling regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n

Along with the countries mentioned above, Moscow also tried to involve the CSTO as an organization and its members in the war against Ukraine. However, none of them, except Belarus, supported Russia\u2019s actions. In view of this, it used the CSTO to demonstrate that it has military allies who supposedly support it in its confrontation with NATO.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, even in this scenario, the CSTO\u2019s activities posed a threat to Ukraine, as in 2013 and 2021, under the guise of military exercises, Russia deployed its troops to attack Ukraine. Similar exercises were conducted in September 2025 on the territory of Belarus.<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides, the CSTO member states remained Russia\u2019s partners in the military-technical sphere. They did not supply it with weapons (at least openly), but participated in their production and helped it obtain the necessary components in circumvention of Western sanctions. At the same time, Russia\u2019s allies effectively ensure its security in Central Asia, allowing it to free up forces for action against Ukraine and the West.<\/span><\/p>\n

The work of the Collective Security Treaty Organization was defined by the \u201cPlan for Joint Training of Management Bodies and Formations of the CSTO Collective Security System Forces and Means for 2025\u201d. The document reflected Russia\u2019s vision of threats to its security, which were defined as: \u201cincreasing instability and growing contradictions in world politics; intensification of unfriendly activities by the USA and NATO in Europe; the origins of Islamic extremism\u201d. Based on this, the CSTO\u2019s main efforts were focused on countering challenges to the organization in the Eastern European and Central Asian regions of collective security.<\/span><\/p>\n

In accordance with this approach, a set of measures was carried out, including a series of joint military exercises united by a single operational background. The idea behind these exercises in Europe was to prepare for a possible armed conflict or war between Russia and the USA\/NATO against the background of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. In Central Asia, issues related to countering the spread of Islamic extremism to Central Asia and, through it, to Russia were addressed.<\/span><\/p>\n

The long-term prospects for the CSTO\u2019s activities were determined during the organization\u2019s summit in November 2025 in Kyrgyzstan. The leaders of the organization\u2019s member countries signed 15 documents, including a new Collective Security Strategy until 2025 and a Cooperation Plan for 2026-2030. Basically, these documents provide for the improvement of the collective security system, countering new challenges posed by international terrorism and cyber threats, as well as the development of military-technical cooperation.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, a strong foundation for a solid union of CSTO members was never established. Only Belarus supported Russia\u2019s confrontation with the West and the war against Ukraine. The countries of Central Asia were interested only in joint counteraction to Islamic extremism and assistance from Russia in this matter. At this, they had already largely reoriented themselves towards China in economic terms. And in 2024, Armenia suspended its participation in the CSTO altogether.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the context of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, the Eurasian Economic Union took on additional significance for Russia. Through the EAEU, Russia has attempted to compensate in some way for the severing of economic ties with Europe, to find ways to circumvent Western sanctions, and to maintain its influence over the countries of the post-Soviet space.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2025, the key events in the work of the EAEU were the Eurasian Economic Forum in Minsk in June and the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in St. Petersburg in December. Plans to deepen integration within the union and cooperation with external partners were discussed. During the meeting, the document \u201cEurasian Economic Path 2.0\u201d was adopted, which is a strategy for the further development of the EAEU until 2040.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, the worsening economic problems in Russia, which is the foundation of the EAEU, reduced the union\u2019s activity. Western sanctions against Russia also had a negative impact on its work, deterring its partners from cooperating with it. Secondary sanctions by the USA and the EU made it more difficult for Russia to circumvent the sanctions restrictions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Developments in Russia and around it in 2025 finally confirmed its inability to achieve its geopolitical goals of becoming a leading world power on a par with the USA and China. At the same time, it lost the opportunity to defeat Ukraine and began to surrender its positions in regions of the world that were important to it. Moreover, Russia faces the threat of disintegration, following the example of the former USSR.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Yurii Mykhailenko,
\n<\/span><\/strong>Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n

Russia remained Ukraine\u2019s main adversary, continuing its full-scale war with the aim of destroying our state\u2019s independence and establishing control over it. At the same time, the worsening economic problems in Russia and pressure from the USA forced it to enter into negotiations to end the war or, at least, to imitate them<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":32757,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-32756","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nResults of the Development of the Global Military-Political Situation in 2025. 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