Leading global think tanks are paying close attention to the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the situation on the continent. According to Western experts, Russia has held the strongest position in the Black Sea region since 1991, and Moscow is ready to strengthen it even further, especially if the war ends in its favor.<\/p>\n
The Black Sea is of enormous geopolitical and geo-economic importance. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, its future and that of the entire Black Sea region depends on the outcome of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. With costs rising and diplomatic efforts intensifying, a ceasefire \u2013 though not the end of the struggle for Ukraine\u2019s future \u2013 seems more likely, even though Russia has not backed down from its maximalist political demands.<\/p>\n
With US President Donald Trump still unwilling to give up on mediating an end to the war, it is important to consider how different scenarios could affect the long-term future of the Black Sea region.<\/p>\n
Russia has been advancing territorially and politically in the Black Sea region for more than 20 years, patiently but steadily rebuilding the influence it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its current strategic position there is stronger than at any time since 1991. This has come after decades of conventional military operations and hybrid wars aimed at bringing new territories under Russia\u2019s influence or control.<\/p>\n
Ukraine is the most glaring case, as Moscow has occupied nearly 20 percent of its territory. The RF\u2019s control of Crimea, with its resource-rich territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as well as the Donbas, could potentially increase its mineral wealth by trillions of dollars. Russia remains deeply entrenched in Transnistria and has a certain degree of influence in Moldova, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, and even T\u00fcrkiye.<\/p>\n
There is a widespread belief that the end of the war is, by definition, a victory for peace, regardless of what that end may be. Many experts argue that Vladimir Putin has lost the battle in the Black Sea and is losing his war against Ukraine, given the staggering military, human, economic, political, reputational, and other losses for Russia, and that he is seeking to compensate at the negotiating table for what the RF has lost on the battlefield. After all, the Kremlin leader and his generals have been humiliated: the Russian army has lost more than one million people in the killed and wounded, and about a third of the Black Sea Fleet\u2019s vessels have been sunk or damaged. The economy is in a dire state, and Vladimir Putin himself has been issued an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.<\/p>\n
The end of the war would be a positive development, but the facts suggest otherwise. Russia\u2019s gains are of enormous strategic importance and will increase even further if President Putin ends the war on his terms. Without significant pressure from the West, impressive victories by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, or changes in Russian leadership and state policy, this war is likely to secure a number of geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits for Moscow. These include not only territory and a favorable position in the Black Sea region, but also recognition by the United States as an equal partner \u2013 a status that Vladimir Putin seeks. Russia\u2019s achievements have already shifted the balance of power in the region, and their impact could increase if the Russian president achieves his ultimate goals.<\/p>\n
Despite the impressive successes of Ukrainian troops in containing and wearing down the Russian army for nearly four years, Ukraine is unlikely to regain all the territory illegally seized by Russia in the near future. Most scenarios for the final stage of the war reflect strategic gains for Moscow and losses for Kyiv.<\/p>\n
The first scenario is a negotiated ceasefire or truce with a frozen conflict. This would freeze the line of contact, giving Russia long-term control over significant areas of Ukrainian territory, possibly under the supervision of something like a \u201cpeace council\u201d, as in the Gaza Strip, or with a demilitarized zone. The other is a negotiated ceasefire or truce with Russia, which would control the entire Donetsk region. Ukraine has rejected this option as unacceptable because it includes territory that Russia has not captured, and because of the lack of a promise of NATO membership or weak security guarantees. The third scenario involves a negotiated ceasefire or truce that would result in a \u201cdraw\u201d for both sides, which neither wants.<\/p>\n
An even worse scenario is a Russian breakthrough achieved by exhausting Ukraine, or a crisis in the Ukrainian leadership that would force Kyiv to ask for peace. Finally, there is a hypothetical possibility that Russia would achieve a victory that includes surrender and the resolution of \u201croot reasons\u201d and other long-standing Kremlin demands. However, these scenarios are unacceptable to Ukraine.<\/p>\n
Scenarios favorable to Ukraine depend on factors that currently seem less likely, such as a significant increase in military support and economic pressure from the West, serious mistakes or losses by Russia, economic or political instability, or a coup in Moscow. However, since November 2022, Ukraine has lost only about 1 percent of its territory, while inflicting huge losses on the Russians. This suggests that Kyiv can keep further losses within reasonable limits while continuing to inflict significant economic damage on Russia\u2019s deep rear.<\/p>\n
None of these scenarios envisages a \u201cvictory\u201d for Russia or a \u201cdefeat\u201d for Ukraine in the traditional sense, but all of them leave the Kremlin in a more advantageous position in the region, both territorially and strategically, than it was 20 years ago. In fact, the overall balance of power looks quite favorable from the Kremlin\u2019s point of view, so we can expect Vladimir Putin to promote the following narratives about his achievements:<\/p>\n
Although Vladimir Putin would not say so directly, he would be satisfied that he remains alive and continues to rule Russia as a unitary state.<\/p>\n
In the northern coastal zone, Russia\u2019s occupation of Crimea is an extremely valuable military and geopolitical asset. From there, Russia could more easily continue to project its power into the Black Sea and beyond, even if a third of its Black Sea Fleet is destroyed, weakened, or blocked in Novorossiysk, if the oil terminals in the port of Tuapse are damaged, and the oil tankers that have so far sailed fairly freely in the Black Sea are sunk. It will be very difficult to drive Russia\u2019s main military forces out of Crimea, and reinforcements for the Black Sea Fleet are likely to return to Crimea after the war ends [2].<\/p>\n
The Kremlin continues to exert full pressure on Moldova, despite the fact that in September last year the majority of voters there chose a pro-European course. Russia still has significant influence in the country through pro-Moscow politicians and voters (not only in the Russian-speaking region of Gagauzia), and it can be expected that it will continue to use a range of hybrid tools to weaken the government\u2019s policies. A nightmare scenario for Romania \u2013 Russian control over Ukrainian territory up to Transnistria (including Moldova), which would essentially make Russia a neighboring country \u2013 is currently unlikely, but it remains one of Moscow\u2019s goals.<\/p>\n
Ukraine controls enough of the northern coast to have sea access to world markets. Russia\u2019s goal of controlling Odessa and the entire coastline to the Romanian border remains a distant dream. However, on December 2, 2025, Vladimir Putin again expressed his interest in cutting Ukraine off from the sea and capturing Odesa, which he calls a \u201cRussian city\u201d. Moscow controls a significant part of the coast east of Odesa, the entire Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait. Those waters, which were previously free for navigation, are no longer so, despite Moscow\u2019s signing of the 2003 Treaty on the Legal Status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.<\/p>\n
It is important to remember the Kremlin mentality, reflected in the works of the ideologist and propagandist of the \u201cRussian world\u201d Aleksandr Dugin: \u201cThe absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is Moscow\u2019s total and unlimited control over its entire length \u2013 from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories. One can divide this entire zone as much as one likes along ethnic and cultural lines \u2013 granting ethnic and religious autonomy to the Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc. \u2013 but all this is only possible with Moscow\u2019s absolute control over the military and political situation. These sectors must be radically separated from thalassocratic influence [3] – both from the West and from T\u00fcrkiye (or even Greece). The northern coast of the Black Sea must be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinate to Moscow [4].<\/p>\n
Russia\u2019s creeping takeover of Georgia has been a major success for President Vladimir Putin, even though millions of Georgians dispute the dominance of the ruling Georgian Dream party. It is too early to say that Georgia is \u201clost\u201d, but events have been developing in a negative direction for years, and the prospects are quite challenging.<\/p>\n
Russia\u2019s domination in Abkhazia and its naval base in Ochamchira give Moscow significant influence, if not control, over the entire coastline up to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s border. China is also trying to expand its influence in Georgia, although its attempt to build a deep-water port in Anaklia has reached an impasse. Moscow may not want a port with such significant Chinese involvement, no matter how \u201cbrotherly\u201d its relations with Beijing may be.<\/p>\n
The Kremlin continues to use its numerous assets in Bulgaria, including pro-Moscow parties and individual politicians, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, historical economic ties and pro-Russian sentiments, as well as hybrid warfare tools to undermine this critically important NATO member state. Nevertheless, the latest governments there remain firmly pro-NATO and pro-European, and the electorate clearly favors the West. The government\u2019s takeover of the Lukoil oil refinery in November 2025 and the US administration\u2019s sanctions against the company were important steps in reducing Russia\u2019s malign influence, but much remains unchanged. Bulgaria does not pay as much attention to Black Sea security as Ukraine or Romania. Sofia views the Black Sea more as a tourist destination than a source of problems, even after Russia closed parts of the Bulgarian EEZ for naval exercises and conducted inspections of merchant ships there.<\/p>\n
The Kremlin continues to fuel and exploit public discontent in Romania, which has long been a bastion of pro-NATO and pro-European policies. Moscow has significant influence in the hierarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church and among believers, as well as among supporters of the right-wing Alliance for the Union of Romanians party, which leads in the polls and is currently approaching 40% popularity.<\/p>\n
Russia is increasingly violating Romania\u2019s sovereignty. The country\u2019s Ministry of National Defense has pointed out that since 2022, Russian drones have carried out about 50 strikes near the Ukrainian border. In 30 of those cases, UAV debris was found on Romanian territory. On August 28, 2025, a Russian naval drone struck a Ukrainian vessel 30 kilometers up the Danube from the Black Sea coast, on the Romanian border. These incidents attract much less attention than Russian provocations against the sovereignty of Poland, the Baltic states, and Northern Europe, but they are no less alarming.<\/p>\n
If President Putin ends the war on his terms, Russia\u2019s influence is likely to grow in Bulgaria and Romania. Russian efforts to weaken or \u201ccapture\u201d key state institutions, or to support pro-Moscow forces, could eventually create a corridor of instability stretching from the Black Sea coast to the heart of Europe, through North Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and Slovakia. The governments of those three countries are open to the Kremlin\u2019s interests or even loyal to them.<\/p>\n
This outcome is not inevitable, but a negative outcome of the war would reinforce unfavorable trends in the Black Sea region and facilitate the Kremlin\u2019s penetration into what Vladimir Putin considers NATO\u2019s potential \u201csoft underbelly\u201d. Such a development would demonstrate once again that Russia can successfully compete with NATO\u2019s interests deep within the Alliance\u2019s territory. It would also signal to China, which is increasingly active in the Black Sea region, that the countries in this region are open to its malign influence.<\/p>\n
The Kremlin has not directly challenged T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s core interests in the Black Sea region, and the two countries continue to enjoy beneficial economic relations. Ankara has generally played a positive diplomatic role in the war. However, T\u00fcrkiye should be wary of Moscow\u2019s significant expansion of its sphere of influence in the Black Sea region, especially after the recent attacks on three Turkish ships in Ukrainian ports. Ankara is unlikely to change its diplomatic recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia. Nevertheless, as long as Russia respects T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s role in the southern Black Sea region and as the \u201cguardian of the straits\u201d [5], and offers attractive economic ties, Ankara\u2019s pragmatic approach to Moscow is likely to continue.<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye is likely to continue to strictly adhere to the Montreux Convention [6] as long as the war continues. It could improve regional security in the Black Sea by stepping up demining and other joint efforts with Bulgaria and Romania, as well as by selling ships to the Romanian Navy. Ankara can do little to prevent the Kremlin from using Crimea to project power in the region, but it can reduce Russian militarization of the Black Sea by using the Convention to prevent Russia from restoring its Black Sea Fleet to its pre-war size.<\/p>\n
At the moment the Black Sea is neither free nor open, even though merchant ships are sailing its waters. Ships carrying grain and other goods to and from Ukraine are forced to stay close to the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria to reduce the risk of Russia\u2019s attacks and sea mines. Ukraine, for its part, has recently sank three ships belonging to Russia\u2019s \u201cshadow fleet\u201d. Although the Black Sea Fleet remains confined to Novorossiysk, it still poses a threat. Once hostilities are over, Moscow would have significant opportunities to create risks for maritime transport or interfere with the activities of other states.<\/p>\n
The large natural gas reserves in the Black Sea \u2013 in the territorial waters or EEZs of Romania, Bulgaria, and T\u00fcrkiye \u2013 need to be developed, as they are essential for the growth of their economies, reducing dependence on Russian fuel sources, and strengthening European energy security. In the Black Sea region, where Russia\u2019s influence is so strong, the Middle Corridor [7] may become less successful as a trade route connecting Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe.<\/p>\n
Romania will be the largest gas producer in the EU in 2027, when it begins operating the 7,500 km\u00b2 Neptun Deep field, which contains approximately 100 billion m\u00b3 with an annual production of 7-8 billion m\u00b3. The country has been producing gas for several years under the Midea project (with US investment). When Bulgaria begins to exploit approximately 60 billion m\u00b3 at its Khan Tervel and Khan Asparuh fields, it will be able to cover all its domestic production and exports to the region.<\/p>\n
The Sakarya field in T\u00fcrkiye contains approximately 540 billion m\u00b3, which is the largest gas reserve in the Black Sea. T\u00fcrkiye has also served as the main transit route for Russian gas and oil, which it processes in several locations. It is no secret that this fuel is of Russian origin, but it is still traded openly, reflecting market conditions and Europe\u2019s continuing reluctance to sever ties with Russia. Russia controls a significant portion of Ukraine\u2019s vast offshore gas reserves and uses captured drilling platforms for both military and energy purposes.<\/p>\n
Senior officials in Romania and Bulgaria expect the Kremlin to use hybrid measures to prevent the exploitation of their reserves, many of which are located in the EEZ. They are not covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, so they are easier to disrupt. Russia has interfered in drilling areas in the past. Neither country has sufficient naval forces to prevent interference in the development of resources, the exploitation of which is very expensive and vulnerable during drilling and the construction of other infrastructure. Moscow is less inclined to interfere in the exploitation of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Black Sea energy resources, given its pragmatic relationship with Ankara.<\/p>\n
A peaceful and stable Black Sea region can contribute to European energy security thanks to an underwater power cable that will be laid with the participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, and Romania. Two \u201cTurkish Stream\u201d gas pipelines and several data cables cross the Black Sea, strengthening the connection with the Middle Corridor. Bulgaria\u2019s decision to terminate Russian gas transit contracts from January 1, 2026, to completely exit the Russian gas market by 2028, and to switch to imported liquefied natural gas is an important step forward in reducing Moscow\u2019s ability to blackmail Sofia.<\/p>\n
The future of the Black Sea region depends on how Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine ends. The stakes are highest for Ukraine, but they are significant for every other Black Sea state and for those outside the narrow geographical zone \u2013 the Caucasus, the Balkans, and beyond, and in some scenarios, even Central Europe. The question is how NATO and the EU will respond to these new geopolitical realities.<\/p>\n
The Russian-Ukrainian war has higher stakes than Vladimir Putin\u2019s stated goal of returning the country to Russia\u2019s sphere of influence \u2013 a strategy he considers necessary for his efforts to restore Russia\u2019s status and project power into neighboring territories and onto the world stage. Ukraine and the Black Sea region are also key battlegrounds in his efforts to shape a new international order alongside China, Iran (another potentially key player in the Black Sea region), and others. While the West pays much deserved attention to the Baltic region, Russia views the Black Sea as the most strategically important and vulnerable region on its borders. It remains the most important \u201claboratory\u201d for the Kremlin, where it practices combined kinetic\/hybrid warfare against the West.<\/p>\n
Unless there are major changes in Ukraine and Russia, the security situation in the wider Black Sea region is likely to deteriorate further, especially if the war ends on Vladimir Putin\u2019s terms. Although the end of the \u201chot\u201d phase of the war is likely to be generally welcomed, the Kremlin\u2019s control over such a large number of strategically important territories would strengthen its geopolitical position. This cannot help having negative consequences for all coastal states and beyond. It is unlikely that conditions will return to what they were before 2008 \u2013 Moscow will not give up the territories it has illegally seized. This may well affect activity in the Middle Corridor, and China will have a greater presence in the Black Sea region.<\/p>\n
NATO and the EU may begin to pay more attention to the Black Sea in order to counter Russian and Chinese activities more vigorously and strengthen their deterrence. Although the EU, France, and the USA have increased their focus on the region in recent months, many other priorities compete for their attention and resources. More active European involvement is critical, as the Donald Trump administration has made it clear that it cannot take on more responsibility for regional security in the Black Sea than the Europeans.<\/p>\n
More active involvement of the USA seems unlikely, as it already has significant commitments through NATO in Romania, Bulgaria, and T\u00fcrkiye, and is currently prioritizing other regions and issues. Georgia needs more attention from the EU and the USA, but Brussels and Washington have approached the region in recent years in a way that has diminished their influence.<\/p>\n
Ankara could play a positive role as the \u201cguardian of the straits\u201d by seeking to demilitarize the Black Sea, as it did for a short period after the Crimean War (1853-1856), by preventing Russian warships from passing through the straits to rebuild the Black Sea Fleet. However, the likelihood of conflict with Moscow in this context seems low, even if T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s leaders would prefer a smaller Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. This aspect should be discussed at the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara.<\/p>\n
Volodymyr Palyvoda, (Image generated by neural network)<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Notes:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n [1] An international transitional body authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 of November 2025 to support the administration, reconstruction, and economic recovery of the Gaza Strip after the completion of Israel\u2019s military operation. The resolution also allows for the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force there. Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n Leading global think tanks are paying close attention to the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the situation on the continent. According to Western experts, Russia has held the strongest position in the Black Sea region since 1991, and Moscow is ready to strengthen it even further, especially if the war ends in its favor<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":32765,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-32762","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
\n<\/strong>expert in international relations<\/p>\n
\n<\/span>[2] Units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet are actively participating in the so-called \u201cspecial military operation\u201d: The 810th<\/sup> Marine Brigade, as well as submarines, landing ships, and aircraft, provide fire support from the sea, strike coastal targets, control maritime communications, and support amphibious landings.
\n<\/span>[3] The influence of sea powers or civilizations (from the Greek words \u201cthalassa\u201d \u2014 sea, \u201ckratos\u201d \u2014 power), where economic, political, and cultural life is centered around the sea, shipping, and control of sea spaces, often determined by geographical location and defining historical development and world politics.
\n<\/span>[4] Aleksandr Dugin. \u201cFundamentals of Geopolitics. The Geopolitical Future of Russia.\u201d Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997.
\n<\/span>[5] Black Sea Straits \u2013 the established name for the system of maritime waterways from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, consisting of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmara, which connects them.
\n<\/span>[6] The Convention on the Regime of the Straits is an international agreement that restored Turkey’s sovereignty over the Black Sea Straits in 1936 and regulates maritime traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea through these straits. In peacetime, the Convention guarantees complete freedom of passage for all civilian vessels and restricts the number, tonnage, and armament of military vessels, with specific provisions governing their entry and duration of stay. During a war in which T\u00fcrkiye is not involved, military ships of states at war may not pass through the straits, except when returning to their base.
\n<\/span>[7] The Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is a multimodal logistics route that connects China and Europe, bypassing Russia, passing through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and T\u00fcrkiye, and then on to the EU. It is an alternative to traditional routes through Russia and is becoming increasingly relevant in the context of geopolitical changes.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"