The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Black Sea demonstrates how easy it is to close off an entire sea basin and even the airspace above it. As a result, the battle for maritime control is paradoxically being fought mainly on land, for example, with the use of missile systems, drones, reconnaissance, and strikes on infrastructure.<\/em><\/p>\n Similarly, the Baltic Sea is not just a \u201csea of peace\u201d or a zone of free navigation, even in international waters. It is a closed theater of war where geography, short reaction times, and weapon overload radically limit the traditional freedom of naval operations.<\/em><\/p>\n Increasingly, the future of security in Northern and Central Europe is being decided in the Baltic region. Western experts are therefore asking themselves: would the outcome of a potential conflict be determined by large fleets, or more precisely by geography, the range of strike systems, and the political and military willingness to use force? The most important factors may be the ability to quickly close off a sea area, resistance to a first strike, superiority in reconnaissance and precision strikes, rather than simply the number of ships.<\/em><\/p>\n The Baltic Sea is no longer a peripheral sea but has become a key military, energy, and logistics hub for Europe, operating under constant pressure below the threshold of open warfare. Since 2015, there has been Russia\u2019s growing activity, which after 2022 has taken on a distinct hybrid character. GPS jamming [1], presence of unmarked vessels near pipelines, fiber optic cables, and energy facilities, and the use of a so-called \u201cshadow fleet\u201d to circumvent sanctions pose a real threat to the security of the European Union\u2019s infrastructure.<\/p>\n Russia systematically tests NATO members\u2019 readiness through an intensive naval and air presence, military exercises, and provocations in close proximity to the Alliance\u2019s borders. The Baltic Sea, as an enclosed body of water, minimizes response time, and any incident at sea, in the air, or underwater can quickly take on strategic significance. Sabotage of infrastructure (in particular, the bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipeline) highlights the vulnerability of the seabed to hybrid activities and the difficulties of rapid response and clear attribution of responsibility [2].<\/p>\n Protecting densely located critical infrastructure, including gas pipelines, power and telecommunications cables, LNG terminals, and developing offshore installations, remains a particular challenge. At the same time, the Baltic Sea is a space for hybrid operations, including cyber attacks on port and logistics systems, pressure on commercial shipping, disinformation, and illegal activities such as smuggling and organized crime. The line between the military and civilian spheres is increasingly blurred, requiring close cooperation between the armed forces, governments, and the private sector.<\/p>\n The security of the Baltic Sea is no longer a problem for the future. The threats are here and now, requiring urgent and coordinated action by the states in the region and their allies. NATO\u2019s sustained presence in the region, through continuous naval and air patrols, rotational deployments, and regular multinational exercises, is crucial. This is not just a show of force, but a practical test of operational interoperability and the ability to respond quickly in crisis situations.<\/p>\n At the same time, effective protection of the Baltic Sea requires joint monitoring of maritime, air, and underwater spaces, supported by satellites, drones, sonar, and autonomous surface and underwater installations. Only such a system can detect threats in a timely manner, identify hybrid activities, and effectively protect key infrastructure, including gas pipelines, submarine cables, LNG terminals, and energy platforms. Cyber resilience and incident response coordination are also critical, covering ports, navigation systems, maritime logistics, and energy networks. Countries in the region must be capable of responding quickly to crises, including conducting maritime rescue operations and responding to environmental disasters. Full integration of situational awareness systems is becoming important, enabling real-time data sharing between naval forces, coast guards, and civilian agencies. Autonomous technologies capable of long-term patrols and critical infrastructure protection will play an increasingly important role, while a unified legal framework for crisis response, including hybrid operations in gray zones, will be necessary for effective actions.<\/p>\n The new security architecture of the Baltic region should be based on a regional command center and ongoing cooperation between national headquarters, which will enable coordination of operations and rapid response to crises. Joint logistics bases, modernization of military and civilian ports, and support for rapid response units will ensure effective deployment of forces and continuity of defense. Critical infrastructure protection requires surveillance systems, sabotage attack simulation, and the use of autonomous technologies, while cyber defense and electronic warfare protect navigation, communication, and military systems from interference such as GPS spoofing. Political and legal harmonization is important to ensure the rapid deployment of allied forces and a coordinated response to hybrid threats. In particular, cooperation with the defense industry and the development of innovations that improve military and intelligence capabilities cannot be ignored.<\/p>\n The effectiveness of these actions will depend on close cooperation between countries in the region \u2013 Poland, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Denmark, and the Baltic states \u2013 as well as support from other NATO allies. The integration of military and civilian capabilities within NATO and the EU remains important for maintaining stability in the Baltic region. Only a coordinated, multi-layered defense strategy can create a regional \u201cshield\u201d that protects critical infrastructure and guarantees the security of a maritime region that is currently under constant military, hybrid, and cyber pressure.<\/p>\n The integration of capabilities across all domains (maritime, air, land, and even cyber and satellite) [3] in the Baltic Sea region may create a new level of security based on cooperation between allied states in interrelated areas: joint procurement, shared infrastructure, industrial and research cooperation. Joint procurement of military equipment, including patrol vessels, sonar systems, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, ammunition, and missiles, will reduce costs, increase operational compatibility, and gradually standardize equipment. Such activities can be implemented both within the framework of EU instruments such as EDIRPA [4] and the European Defense Fund, and within the framework of NATO mechanisms, in particular with the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, which should ensure faster replenishment and reduce fragmentation of the defense market.<\/p>\n The second pillar could be a shared infrastructure of bases that would allow for the reception, support, and servicing of allied forces, as well as the conduct of regional operations. The modernization of military and selected civilian ports, the construction of fuel and weapons depots, and the development of infrastructure for autonomous systems and command centres can increase flexibility and readiness to respond to crisis situations. These projects could be financed by both European and NATO funds, which would strengthen the alliance aspect of all efforts.<\/p>\n The third area should cover joint industrial production and research and development aimed at enhancing the region\u2019s technological sovereignty, developing innovative solutions, and supporting maritime superiority. Cooperation between national defense companies such as Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (Poland), SAAB (Sweden), Patria (Finland), Kongsberg (Norway), and ThyssenKrupp (Germany) is already focused on unmanned surface and underwater platforms, mine countermeasure systems, advanced electro-optical and radar sensors, and solutions using artificial intelligence and big data analytics. EU and NATO programs, including PESCO [5], the European Defense Fund, and DIANA [6], can ensure technology transfer and rapid implementation of innovations into operational practice.<\/p>\n The synergy of these three pillars not only enhances the operational compatibility and resilience of naval forces, but also strengthens the entire Baltic Sea region in case of military, technological, and resource crises. Priority operations should include critical infrastructure protection, intelligence and situational awareness support, mine countermeasures, counter-sabotage operations, and crisis response, including search and rescue and environmental operations. The use of autonomous systems (e.g., drones), sonar and reconnaissance networks, cooperation between naval and air forces, and the integration of air defense and electronic warfare capabilities strengthen the region\u2019s deterrence potential and resilience to pressure from Russia.<\/p>\n To increase the effectiveness of these operations, it is necessary to switch from purely national approach to a functional division of roles. The so-called eastern flank states, including Poland and the Baltic countries, have experience in dealing with direct threats and are prepared to respond quickly. The countries of Northern Europe, on the other hand, offer advanced maritime, technological, and intelligence capabilities. The integration of these approaches must begin now through joint operational planning, compatible command systems, and permanent information-sharing mechanisms within NATO. Such formats of regional cooperation allow for faster and more flexible operational actions, while NATO provides a broader system of deterrence and strategic coordination.<\/p>\n Finland and Sweden\u2019s decision to join NATO has changed the security dynamics in the region. With their defense experience and societal resilience, both countries are aware of the risks of the Kremlin\u2019s hybrid actions, including cyberattacks, disinformation, and information pressure. Their integration into NATO structures strengthens the unity of the Alliance, while demonstrating that strengthening European defense capabilities is not incompatible with maintaining strong transatlantic ties.<\/p>\n As a result, the combination of integrated military, infrastructure, and industrial capabilities with European strategic autonomy and strong transatlantic ties has created a coherent, resilient, and long-term security ecosystem in the Baltic Sea region. It is no longer a collection of national areas of responsibility. It has become a common space of deterrence, defense, and resilience, where cooperation, operational interoperability, and technological innovation reinforce each other.<\/p>\n Effective defense of the Baltic Sea requires treating the strategic differences between the states in the region as advantages rather than obstacles. Poland views the Baltic Sea primarily through the prism of land-based threats and the importance of logistics routes for NATO\u2019s eastern flank. Finland and Sweden focus on defending their own territory, rapid response, and the integration of all components of defense \u2013 military, civilian, and intelligence. The Baltic states must counter hybrid pressure and strengthen early warning, while Germany and Denmark emphasize operational compatibility, command, and operational support. Instead of artificial uniformity, a modular security architecture is needed, in which each state develops its own strengths but acts in close coordination with its partners.<\/p>\n Joint planning and regional strategy already cover cyclical threat assessments, integrated maritime and coastal operations, and coordination within NATO and the EU. The countries complement each other in terms of competencies. Poland provides land and maritime defense, Sweden provides submarines and special forces, Finland provides electronic and coastal defense, the Baltic states provide monitoring and asymmetric warfare, Denmark provides logistics operations and strait security, and Germany provides command, communications, and significant support capabilities. Each country develops its own niche, but within a single operational plan.<\/p>\n Further integration should cover joint forces and infrastructure. Strong links between military planning, industry, and research will enable the development of unmanned systems, sensors, and mine countermeasures through joint testing laboratories and EU funding. The basis of this system should be integrated situational awareness, compatible C4ISR systems [6], and coordinated cyber defense of maritime infrastructure.<\/p>\n A key element should be joint training based on realistic scenarios, including sabotage of infrastructure, amphibious landings, blockade of straits, and cyberattacks, with the participation of NATO, the EU, government agencies, and the private sector [7]. The strategic integration of the Baltic Sea is based not on a single fleet, but on coordinated diversity, complementary capabilities, and shared tools, which creates a holistic vision and effectively enhances the security of the region.<\/p>\n Although Russia ranks second in the world in terms of global firepower statistics, and such countries in the region as Germany, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia rank significantly lower, the combined capabilities and strategic positions of the Baltic states and their allies form a real basis for defense. The combined defense budgets of the eight countries surrounding the Baltic Sea exceed Russia\u2019s military spending, which probably also provides an advantage and strengthens the region\u2019s resilience (although the accuracy of Russian data on their volume and sources of funding is questionable). Besides, it is not only the number of ships that matters, but also the use of the capabilities of other branches of the armed forces, the geography of the Baltic, distances, islands, and how all of the above instruments are used.<\/p>\n The Baltic Sea is not neutral and is no longer just a body of water. It has become a kind of \u201cweapon system\u201d in which the key factors are isthmuses, straits, islands, and control of airspace, rather than necessarily the size of the fleet, which can be sunk in one salvo from any shore.<\/p>\n According to Polish military experts, it would be advisable to consider combining Poland’s efforts in the southern Baltic Sea with Sweden, which is located on the opposite side. In essence, this would be a meridional maritime axis of cooperation, which could be reinforced by Germany and Denmark from the west, and Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland from the east, protecting Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea from the Gulf of Finland.<\/p>\n For security reasons, Kaliningrad region is of key importance to Poland \u2013 similar to the role of Crimea, which remains in Russia\u2019s hands, for Ukraine. These are areas from which the entire sea basin can be controlled and airspace influenced. Former US National Security Advisor Robert O\u2019Brien, in an interview with the German publication Bild, describing the importance of Kaliningrad in the context of strategic threats to the continent, said that it is \u201ca dagger in the heart of Europe\u201d. In theory, Russia\u2019s advanced position in Kaliningrad region is a tool for strategic pressure, but in practice it also creates a significant obstacle: isolated, with limited mobility and constantly monitored by NATO, the exclave [8] may turn out to be a trap rather than an advantage in a conflict.<\/p>\n The aforementioned Warsaw-Stockholm axis, thanks to the integration of all capabilities, can make the Baltic Sea an operational hostile zone for Russia. This axis, supplemented by all the Baltic countries, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, logistics, and interoperable command, will create a real security foundation for the region, where every important point, island, and port will become a point of strategic control.<\/p>\n Western analysts wonder whether the \u201cBaltic Axis of Cooperation\u201d will be able to close the gap and prevent enemy manoeuvres before the first shot is fired. Are the partners able to fully exploit the potential of their combined capabilities, or are there gaps that the enemy can exploit? Deterrence works best when it does not need to be used. Geography, concentration of capabilities, and combined resources will make the Baltic a line of defense, not just a space for dialogue. This creates an invisible but effective Baltic A2\/AD zone [9], the presence of which may determine the security of the entire region.<\/p>\n In the new world order, political declarations are less important than readiness, scale, and cooperation. In the region, the advantage will belong to those who combine their capabilities into a single, effective system. The Baltic Sea is becoming an instrument of deterrence, and the Poland-Sweden axis may be its best defender.<\/p>\n Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/strong>, Notes:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n [1] The Baltic states and those of Northern Europe, which border Russia and Belarus, have repeatedly drawn attention to the jamming and spoofing of GPS signals. Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n The Baltic Sea is no longer a peripheral sea but has become a key military, energy, and logistics hub for Europe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":32912,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-32911","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nEscalation of the Situation in the Region<\/h2>\n
Urgent Actions Are Needed<\/h2>\n
Integration of Forces Against the Background of Russia\u2019s Aggression<\/h2>\n
Differences As Strategic Assets<\/h2>\n
Fleet Strength or Other Capabilities?<\/h2>\n
\nexpert in international relations<\/p>\n
\n<\/span>[2] There is currently no final official conclusion as to who blew up the Nord Stream gas pipeline in September 2022, but German investigators believe it was a group of Ukrainian divers and military personnel. Ukraine denies any involvement in the explosions. Russia has accused the USA and the UK of sabotage, but no evidence has been provided.
\n<\/span>[3] Lately, there has been a trend in interstate strategic competition toward increasing the role of political, diplomatic, economic, and informational methods of confrontation in conflicts, with five domains considered to be the environment for military confrontation: land, sea, airspace, outer space, and cyberspace. In this regard, the concept of \u201cmulti-domain operations\u201d is becoming widespread among NATO member states as the most effective tool for achieving operational and tactical goals. Its purpose is to create an advantage and neutralize the enemy with minimal losses through the use of weapons, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare in all areas, which provides a synergistic effect.
\n<\/span>[4] EDIRPA \u2013 an acronym for European Defense Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act. It is a short-term European Union program aimed at stimulating joint procurement of the most critical types of weapons by EU member states. Created after Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine, the program has a budget of EUR 310 million (until the end of 2025) to compensate for administrative costs in joint purchases of missiles, ammunition, and air defense systems.
\n<\/span>[5] PESCO \u2013 an acronym for Permanent Structured Cooperation. A long-term initiative of the European Union, launched in 2017, aimed at deepening defense cooperation between EU member states. It allows participation in joint projects, coordination of investments, and improvement of the operational compatibility of armed forces.
\n<\/span>[6] DIANA \u2013 an acronym for Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. NATO\u2019s defense innovation program for the North Atlantic, which aims to accelerate high-tech dual-use innovations to address critical defense and security challenges. DIANA helps startups develop technologies in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology, biotechnology, and space.
\n<\/span>[6] C4ISR \u2013 an acronym for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance. It is an integrated system of military command, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It provides information superiority, situational awareness in real time, and speeds up decision-making. It is the NATO standard for coordinating military operations.
\n<\/span>[7] In December 2025, the newspaper Die Welt, in collaboration with the German Center for Military Games at the Helmut Schmidt University of the German Armed Forces, conducted exercises simulating Russia\u2019s invasion of Lithuania. The exercise involved 16 former senior officials from Germany and NATO, legislators, and leading security experts, who played out a scenario set in October 2026. According to the exercise scenario, Russia used a humanitarian crisis in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad as a pretext to seize the Lithuanian city of Marijampol\u0117, a key transport hub in the narrow strip between Russia and Belarus. Russian claims that the invasion was a humanitarian mission were sufficient for the USA to refuse to invoke Article 5 of NATO, which provides for assistance to allies. Germany proved indecisive, and Poland, although mobilized, did not send troops across the border to Lithuania. The German brigade already deployed in Lithuania did not intervene, partly because Russia was using drones to lay mines on the roads leading from its base. \u201cDeterrence depends not only on capabilities, but also on what the enemy thinks about our will, and in the military game, my \u2018Russian colleagues\u2019 and I knew that Germany would hesitate. And that was enough to win,\u201d said Vienna-based military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady, who played the role of Chief of the General Staff of the RF\u2019s Armed Forces.
\n<\/span>[8] An exclave is a part of a state\u2019 territory that is geographically separated from the main part of the country and surrounded by the territories of other states (one or more). If an exclave has access to the sea, it is called a semi-exclave.
\n<\/span>[9] A2\/AD \u2013 an acronym for Anti Access\/Area Denial. A device (or devices) or measures designed to prevent an enemy from occupying or crossing a certain territory\/water area or section of airspace.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"