{"id":32944,"date":"2026-02-12T00:01:07","date_gmt":"2026-02-11T21:01:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=32944"},"modified":"2026-02-12T14:53:39","modified_gmt":"2026-02-12T11:53:39","slug":"garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Security Guarantees for Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"

Security Guarantees for Ukraine. <\/span>Positive Developments and Issues that Need to Be Addressed<\/span><\/h1>\n

Despite all the difficulties, negotiations to end Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine are gradually moving forward. This raises the issue of post-war security guarantees for our country.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The USA and the Coalition of the Willing offer such guarantees in the form of involving their armed forces to assist our state in case of Russia\u2019s renewed attack.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

This would increase the potential of Ukraine and its partners to jointly deter Russia and repel its aggression. At the same time, the implementation of such plans is associated with a number of complicated problems that need to be re4solved.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The next stage of the negotiation process to end Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, which is taking place in January-February this year, has confirmed that significant problems on this issue have not been resolved.<\/span><\/strong> As is well known, this primarily refers to Putin\u2019s demands that Russia be given control over the territories of the Donbas that are currently controlled by Ukraine. Our state cannot agree to such demands on principle, which is also quite understandable.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, various options for resolving this issue are being considered, based on mutual compromises, which envisage the creation of a demilitarized and free economic zone under international control. So, sooner or later, the obstacles to the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine and the transition to comprehensive peace will be removed.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some progress in the negotiations has been acknowledged by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Head of the Presidential Office Kyrylo Budanov who is leading the Ukrainian delegation in Abu Dhabi. This has also been confirmed by US President Donald Trump, although he always emphasizes only the \u201csuccesses\u201d. Ultimately, Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s envoy Konstantin Dmitriev agrees with them, although Moscow is putting forward new demands that are unacceptable to Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, Putin would like to continue the war until Ukraine is completely destroyed, which, as we know, is his main goal. But Russia cannot achieve this through military successes or as a result of a humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine caused by the destruction of its energy system. Morover, the crisis that is significantly affecting the Russian economy does not allow it to continue the war.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, even after the war ends or is suspended, Russia will still pose a threat to Ukraine.<\/span><\/strong> This is true even if other political forces, including pseudo-democratic ones, come to power in the RF. Moscow is by no means willing to accept Ukraine\u2019s right to statehood and its European choice.<\/span><\/p>\n

Russia will never agree to Ukraine restoring its territorial integrity within the borders of 1991 either. Yes, even Alexei Navalny, the main Russian opponent of Putin\u2019s regime who advocated for the democratization of Russia, would categorically oppose the return of Crimea to Ukraine if he came to power. His followers share the same position.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, in any case, Ukraine needs reliable security guarantees in case of Russia\u2019s new attack.<\/span><\/strong> In other words, Ukraine must be able to repel such aggression. This is one of the key aspects of the peace talks. Currently, this is being agreed upon in the framework of dialogue between Ukraine and the USA with the participation of Europe. The USA is informing Russia of the decisions taken, trying to reach compromises with it.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to a statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the provisions on security guarantees have been 100% agreed with the USA. Judging by public statements by NATO and EU leaders, they have also been agreed with Europe as a whole.<\/span><\/p>\n

The specific content of these agreements has not yet been made public, which is quite logical, as any speculation should be avoided. However, certain assumptions can be made based on the open statements of the negotiators and publications in the media. After all, the principles of providing security guarantees to Ukraine are quite obvious. They will have three levels \u2013 from national to European and American \u2013 which will interact closely. Although it would be more appropriate to call them echelons rather than levels.<\/span><\/p>\n

First <\/span><\/strong>\u2013 will concern the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Their main task will be to cover the Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Belarusian borders and to counter Russia\u2019s aggression at the initial stage of the war. Engineering fortifications will be used in the defense zone on the line of demarcation between the parties and strongholds in the operational rear. At this, the USA, NATO, and the EU will continue to provide assistance in strengthening Ukraine\u2019s defense capabilities. However, after the end of the war, the content of the assistance may change, as Ukraine will not need as many weapons as it did during the period of active hostilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Second<\/span><\/strong> \u2013 will be the Multinational Force \u2013 Ukraine (MNF-U) in the form of military units of the armed forces of the countries participating in the Coalition of the Willing. Their functions will be similar to those of NATO\u2019s Rapid Response Forces and will include supporting the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the main areas of the Russian Armed Forces\u2019 attack, as well as ensuring conditions for the deployment of US troops and additional military contingents of our state\u2019s partners on the territory of Ukraine. Among the participants in the Coalition of the Willing, the United Kingdom and France have already expressed their official consent to send their troops to Ukraine. In principle, Germany, Turkey, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden have agreed to do so. However, the deployment of MNF-U in Ukraine will only be possible after the cessation of hostilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Third<\/span><\/strong> \u2013 will be composed of the US Armed Forces. It will most likely be based on the forces and resources of the 5<\/span>th<\/span><\/sup> Army Corps (HQ \u2013 in Poland) and the 3<\/span>rd<\/span><\/sup> Air Force (HQ \u2013 in Germany) from the US European Command, as well as the US Navy\u2019s 6<\/span>th<\/span><\/sup> Fleet (Mediterranean Sea). If necessary, they can be reinforced by bringing additional troops from the continental United States. American troops would be the main component of the coalition forces in Ukraine. In peacetime, their task would be to support the MNF-U, and in wartime \u2013 to assist the Armed Forces of Ukraine in conducting defensive and counteroffensive operations.<\/span><\/p>\n

The system would operate in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty on collective defense. Within the first 24 hours of Moscow\u2019s military escalation against Ukraine, the USA and the Coalition of the Willing are expected to issue a diplomatic warning to Russia, followed by a response from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If Russia does not stop, 72 hours after the first violation, a coordinated response from the Coalition of the Willing, including American troops, would be launched.<\/span><\/p>\n

In principle, this approach is quite promising. At the same time, a specific question remains unanswered: will it actually guarantee Ukraine\u2019s security?<\/span><\/strong> First and foremost, this concerns the ability of the proposed format of interaction between Ukraine and its partners to deter Russia from launching another attack, should it decide to do so. It is worth trying to resolve this issue.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is impossible to guarantee with 100% certainty that Russia will be deterred from attacking another country, including Ukraine.<\/span><\/strong> Putin thinks irrationally and may even disregard the threat of nuclear war. He and his associates have repeatedly threatened the USA and Europe with the use of nuclear weapons. And in 2022, Russia nearly launched a nuclear strike on Ukraine in order to thwart the Ukrainian Armed Forces\u2019 counteroffensive in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Kherson regions.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is also provided for by the Russian Military Doctrine, which allows for such a possibility, including against non-nuclear countries, if there is a threat to Russia\u2019s existence. At the moment, the spread of the economic crisis in the RF makes such a threat quite real. Therefore, Moscow, as an act of revenge, may launch nuclear strikes against the USA, Europe, or Ukraine. Because Russia may again start a conventional, non-nuclear war against Ukraine. At the same time, it hopes that Ukraine\u2019s partners will not fulfill their obligations to it, as they will not dare to fight Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

Moscow\u2019s expectations are based on objective grounds. Indeed, the inertia of European countries, differences between them, and fear of Russia may prevent them from quickly adopting and implementing the necessary decisions, while Donald Trump\u2019s policy is volatile in nature, which makes the USA appear to be an unreliable partner.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, in any case, a possible system of guarantees for Ukraine will force Moscow to be more cautious.<\/span><\/strong> So far, it has refrained from attacking NATO countries, even such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. They do not have significant military capabilities, but they are protected by the Alliance, which can give Russia a worthy rebuff with catastrophic consequences for it.<\/span><\/p>\n

The security guarantees offered to Ukraine are less convincing than those defined by the NATO Treaty. However, they are, so to speak, close to them. Therefore, Russia will be forced to make more balanced decisions than in 2014 and 2022, when Ukraine was much weaker.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s military capabilities are now significantly greater. And in combination with direct military assistance from its partners, especially the USA, they would reach a qualitatively new level. Although Ukraine has already proven its ability to resist Russia on its own, albeit with the financial and military-technical support of its partners.<\/span><\/p>\n

As is well known, Russia occupied most of Ukraine\u2019s territory in the early stages of its military invasion in 2014 and 2022, when Ukraine was unable to organize strong resistance on all fronts. Why this happened is another matter. But after the Ukrainian Defense Forces consolidated their positions, the pace of the Russian advance slowed significantly, and in some regions of our country, they were driven out altogether. As a result, since 2023, Russia has been able to capture no more than 3% of Ukraine\u2019s territory, and even then at the cost of enormous losses that are incomparable to its successes. Russia\u2019s attempts to break through the front line and force Ukraine to surrender have failed completely. Now it is practically impossible to do so. And the suspension of the war will give Ukraine a chance to catch its breath and further strengthen its defenses.<\/span><\/p>\n

One more thing: it will be important for Ukraine\u2019s partners to act quickly in implementing the measures specified in the security guarantees<\/span><\/strong>. For the reasons mentioned above, many are unsure whether partners will really dare to fight Russia on Ukraine\u2019s side. But the Coalition of the Willing did not get its name for nothing. It brings together countries that are firm in their opposition to Moscow\u2019s military expansion. They are convinced that if Russia defeats Ukraine, Europe will be next. They cannot allow the Russians to do this. Therefore, unlike other NATO and EU members who are wary of Russia, they will stand up for Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

Another question is whether they would have time to technically adopt all the necessary decisions in case of Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine. However, as experience shows, it is impossible to start a war suddenly. War requires serious preparation and a wide range of measures that cannot be concealed. Intelligence is watching everything, and it is only a matter of how the country\u2019s political leadership takes its information into account.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, the Coalition of the Willing will have enough time to prepare for Russia\u2019s new aggression<\/span>. However, building and implementing a system of security guarantees for Ukraine in the scenario described above is indeed a difficult task and requires the resolution of a number of complex organizational and technical issues.<\/span><\/strong> As in any military structure, it must have command, intelligence, and logistics bodies, management and communication networks, as well as operational plans of action for various situations. Creating such bodies and developing and testing plans takes a lot of time and effort.<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides, no one has yet raised the question of how such a system would interact with NATO and how it would be integrated into the new Euro-Atlantic and European security system. Most of the member countries of the Coalition of the Willing are also members of the North Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, providing military assistance to Ukraine in case of Russia\u2019s attack would mean that NATO would automatically enter the war, including those Alliance members who do not want to. Such a situation must be somehow predictable, including in the Alliance\u2019s operational plans. And these are only the problems that are \u201con the surface\u201d. In reality, there may be many more. At this, some of them are practically impossible to resolve.<\/span><\/p>\n

Along with internal difficulties, the main external problem in building a system of security guarantees for Ukraine is Moscow\u2019s categorical opposition to the deployment of NATO member countries\u2019 troops on Ukrainian territory.<\/span><\/strong> It calls this an unconditional threat to Russia\u2019s security, especially in the context of the ongoing war. With this in mind, Moscow considers the units of Ukraine\u2019s partners that may be deployed on its territory to be legitimate targets for attack.<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite the fact that NATO has no intention of attacking Russia (and Russia knows this), the presence of Western troops in Ukraine would indeed be a challenge for the Russians. Such a foreign military presence would make it impossible for Moscow to implement its geopolitical plans to destroy Ukraine as an independent state. And Moscow will never give up on this. In addition, NATO\u2019s military presence on Ukrainian territory will signal Russia\u2019s ultimate defeat, as avoiding this was one of its main stated goals in the war against Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

In conclusion, Moscow will never agree to include the security guarantees for Ukraine proposed by the USA and the Coalition of the Willing in a peace agreement. Unless, of course, it is forced to do so by insurmountable circumstances, such as a critical worsening of the economic crisis in the country. However, if NATO troops are deployed on Ukrainian territory without Russia\u2019s consent, it is unlikely that Russia would attack them, as this would automatically mean war with the North Atlantic Alliance.<\/span><\/p>\n

Whatever they say, Russia does not want such a war and is not ready for it. Especially given the economic crisis spreading across the country. However, even if it wanted to attack Europe, China would not let it do so. Europe is its main trading partner after the USA, so it will not allow such military action by Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this regard, we can recall the PRC\u2019s reaction to Warsaw\u2019s closure of the border with Belarus in September 2025 after Russian UAVs invaded Polish airspace. The very next day, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Yi arrived in Poland with the aim of personally resolving the problems with the transit of Chinese goods to Europe by rail. It is obvious that Beijing also worked with Warsaw and Minsk on this issue. Russian UAVs did not fly into Poland again.<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, Ukraine really needs reliable security guarantees for the period after the end of the war. It can obtain them from the USA and the Coalition of the Willing in the form of the deployment of their troops on Ukrainian territory. At this, they will act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty on collective defense.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

At the same time, putting security guarantees for Ukraine into action will require resolving a bunch of tricky political, organizational, and military issues. Some of these are already being worked on, while others haven\u2019t even been brought up yet. But without this, it\u2019s impossible to guarantee our country\u2019s security.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The main problem is Russia\u2019s categorical opposition to the possible deployment of NATO military units on Ukrainian territory. Moreover, it considers them legitimate targets for attack. However, Moscow is unlikely to dare to do so, as this would mean war with the North Atlantic Alliance. At present, it cannot afford to do so.           <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Yurii Ilchenko,
\n<\/span><\/strong>Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yurii Ilchenko<\/p>\n

The next stage of the negotiation process to end Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine has confirmed that significant problems on this issue have not been resolved<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":32945,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-32944","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nSecurity Guarantees for Ukraine - Institute for Global politics<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/garanti\u0457-bezpeki-dlya-ukra\u0457ni-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Security Guarantees for Ukraine - Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/garanti\u0457-bezpeki-dlya-ukra\u0457ni-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-02-11T21:01:07+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-02-12T11:53:39+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/garantii.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"229\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"15 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Vladimir\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b\"},\"headline\":\"Security Guarantees for Ukraine\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-02-11T21:01:07+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-02-12T11:53:39+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":7956,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/02\\\/garantii.png\",\"keywords\":[\"\u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0439\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Analytics\",\"Publications\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-2\\\/\",\"name\":\"Security Guarantees for Ukraine - 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