{"id":32977,"date":"2026-02-24T00:01:58","date_gmt":"2026-02-23T21:01:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=32977"},"modified":"2026-02-21T21:40:54","modified_gmt":"2026-02-21T18:40:54","slug":"trayektoriya-vid-nato-1-0-do-nato-3-0","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/trayektoriya-vid-nato-1-0-do-nato-3-0\/","title":{"rendered":"THE PATH FROM \u201cNATO 1.0\u201d TO \u201cNATO 3.0\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: justify;\">THE PATH FROM \u201cNATO 1.0\u201d TO \u201cNATO 3.0\u201d. THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At this year\u2019s Munich Security Conference, US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy [1] Elbridge Colby delivered a so called keynote speech. He pointed out that the US administration is striving to create \u201cNATO 3.0\u201d,&nbsp; which will entail&nbsp; Europe\u2019s \u201cmore equal\u201d responsibility for its own&nbsp; defense.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The speech sparked considerable debate among experts on the following topics: what does version \u201c3.0\u201d represent, when and what was the previous \u201c2.0\u201d,&nbsp; why and how do they differ from \u201c1.0,\u201d i.e., the original format of the Alliance?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Let\u2019s try to understand the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, behind which important transformational processes are hidden. We should also understand what is actually happening in the international organization whose membership we are seeking.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Let\u2019s start with history. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 for one reason: the inability of the UN to ensure peace on the planet. The post-war world at that time was unstable: the threat of revanchism in Germany remained serious; the USSR began to erect an \u201ciron curtain\u201d [2] with the West; In February 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia carried out a coup d&#8217;\u00e9tat with Moscow\u2019s support; in the spring of that year, Soviet troops blocked railways and roads to the western sectors of Berlin, which were under the control of the USA, Great Britain, and France. The USSR, in its traditional manner, sought to dictate terms and vetoed UN Security Council resolutions. Incidentally, Putin\u2019s rhetoric that the root causes of the war should be eliminated [3] should not only refer to the \u201cthreat\u201d of NATO\u2019s eastward expansion, but also to the origins of the problem, i.e., why, when, and by whom such threats were created.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The complex security situation forced a number of countries in the late 1940s to seek options for building a new European security architecture. The beginning of the formation of a new defense alliance on the continent was marked by a meeting on March 4, 1948, in Brussels between representatives of Belgium, Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France. It was there that the Anglo-French proposal to develop a mutual assistance treaty was first discussed. On March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed to jointly counter possible aggression from Germany and the USSR.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the very first meetings of the heads of the defense ministries of the allied states, it was recognized that the available military resources were insufficient for defense, and it was concluded that assistance from the United States was necessary. At that time, the idea arose to expand the Western defense alliance to include the United States and Canada, thereby creating a common defense system in the Euro-Atlantic region.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In April 1948, Ministers of Foreign Affairs&nbsp; of France and Great Britain submitted relevant proposals to the White House, and on June 11, 1948, the US Senate passed a resolution allowing the government to conclude peacetime alliance treaties with other states outside the American continent. The idea of creating a common defense system moved into the practical realm.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">NATO was established on April 4, 1949, in Washington as a military-political alliance uniting the states of North America and Europe. Its goals are to ensure collective security and protect shared values. The fundamental principle is the indivisibility of the security of Europe and North America, the commonality of views of member states on values and interests, and commitment to the preservation of democratic principles. The concept of the newly formed international organization was outlined in the early 1950s by its first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Ismay: \u201cKeep the Russians out, the Americans in, the Germans down\u201d [4].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">During the Organization\u2019s existence, the number of its members has increased from the initial 12 to 32 countries. None of them sought to attack the USSR, but rather to ensure their own security by saving their own resources, hiding under the \u201cumbrella\u201d of NATO.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But it is important to note that almost 80 years ago, Europe was primarily responsible for its own security. It was the Anglo-French proposal that became the basis for the creation of NATO in its current form. The project, which eventually brought together more than three dozen countries, was launched by a military-political alliance between Belgium, Great Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France. The basis for this decision was the awareness of the real threat posed by the USSR, the truly aggressive and defiant behavior on the European continent of the \u201cvictorious power\u201d in World War II. This is about the origins and root causes of the problem, as brazenly distorted by Putin\u2019s regime.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">After many decades, almost nothing has changed. The logic of the Cold War has been revived, the issue of European security has become topical again, and the initiative of France and Great Britain from April 1948 has returned to its roots.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the center of today\u2019s discussion is the question: how should the rules and priorities be \u201crewritten,\u201d how should the European security architecture be \u201crebuilt,\u201d and most importantly, what should the new security model look like?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The United States was one of the first to understand that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, like many other international institutions, needs a radical reboot. The alliance is important, but the issue of unity is now presented as a restoration of manageability, which changes the very form of relations with an emphasis on the sovereignty of states and their control over their own policies (migration, borders, etc.). Unity is seen as a worldview need for the reorganization of the security architecture.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This understanding finally took shape, it seems, not after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which, according to Elbridge Colby\u2019s conclusion, led to the transition to \u201cNATO 2.0.\u201d The \u201ctipping point\u201d was the start of Russia\u2019s large-scale war against Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On October 20, 2023, Joe Biden delivered a historic speech that was immediately dubbed the \u201cFulton speech\u201d [5]. He equated Putin\u2019s \u201cRussian empire\u201d with Hamas terrorists, defining them as global challenges to the survival of civilization. This Churchillian-style speech symbolically put an end to the existing security system and opened a new era for the creation of a new one. The bipolar system began to be replaced by a multipolar one, and \u201cNATO 1.0\u201d was being prepared for replacement with version \u201c2.0\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Washington finally recognized (for the first time) that the old security formats did not meet modern challenges, that NATO and the West had \u201cmissed\u201d the new threats posed by the imperial ambitions of Russia, China, and their satellites, continuing to enjoy, so to speak, the fruits of a peaceful, quiet life. The security environment required a reboot of the system. In the renewed Alliance, other institutions capable of adequately responding to new civilizational threats were to play a key role.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In particular, there was talk of creating mini-alliances similar to the AUKUS military bloc formed in 2021 [6] to deter potential Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region. There was also a vision of the need to project mini-alliances onto Europe, to create alliances between countries that share a common vision of security and existing threats, and to form a so-called \u201cNew Europe Bloc\u201d.&nbsp; It was predicted that similar alliances would also be formed in Asia, Africa, and South America. In the context of Ukrainian security interests, the creation of an Eastern European union with the participation of Great Britain was predicted. A new world of multi-blocism was emerging.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The \u201cNATO 3.0\u201d version appeared in American offices relatively recently. Its outlines, sketched out in the Pentagon and voiced by Elbridge Colby, provide an understanding of the modification of the previous model of the Alliance. The essence of the innovation is simple, it has clear historical origins and is caused by the unlearned lessons of the past. As already mentioned, the Anglo-French initiative of 1948 to conclude a mutual assistance treaty was prompted by an awareness of the real threats facing Europe. The same is true today, only with a certain scaling up of the security project.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The renewed NATO will most likely become a network structure \u2013 a series of military-security mini-alliances in Europe, states united by the principle of awareness of common threats and understanding of the need to counter them jointly. Obviously, one of the main principles of unification will be territorial proximity and shared borders, which traditionally combine logistics, economies, and resources. In a network structure, the question of coordinating security policies will arise, and this is where the United States of America sees its place, as it traditionally seeks to influence and manage processes without spending significant funds on them.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the Munich Security Conference,&nbsp; President of Finland Alexander Stubb spoke about the distribution of \u201cnew roles\u201d mentioned above: Washington\u2019s priorities are now, first, the Western Hemisphere; second, the Indo-Pacific region; and third, Europe. US Secretaries of State Marco Rubio and Elbridge Colby also sent unambiguous messages that Europe should restore the values of Western civilization and ensure \u201cmore equal\u201d responsibility for its defense.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is alarming that Donald Trump\u2019s administration has recently been seeking to return NATO to its \u201cfactory settings\u201d and reduce NATO\u2019s activities \u201coutside the US area of responsibility\u201d (primarily Iraq and Kosovo). The USA continues to play the role of \u201csystem administrator\u201d,&nbsp; pressuring allies not to invite Ukraine and Alliance partners in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) to the main official meetings of the July NATO summit in Ankara (obviously so as not to irritate Russia and China) [7]. \u201cThe USA is still committed to European security, but not every mission can be a top priority,\u201d Elbridge Colby told Alliance Defense Ministers. The transatlantic rift continues to grow. A report by the US Institute for the Study of War states that Russia remains committed to its original military goals, which include the collapse of NATO.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But there is a certain positive aspect to these new realities. Europe is receiving powerful \u201cpushes\u201d to change its \u201cattitude\u201d and is taking tentative, though not yet decisive, steps forward. It is finally waking up from its sweet and safe slumber, realizing what is happening. Work is in full swing in the offices of major European capitals. The discourse is centered on building new structures, institutionalizing spending, strengthening military production, and increasing capital investment in the security sector.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Alliance\u2019s new network structure, in the form of interconnected military-security mini-alliances in Europe, is an unconventional and seemingly effective solution to the problem. The absence of a single center and vertical management structure \u201cblurs the target\u201d for any aggressor and significantly complicates its plans to destroy the system from within.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Against this background, Ukraine faces an important prospect, while at the same time a new \u201cwindow of opportunity\u201d is opening up for it to position itself in the new world. War is not only about terrible losses, bloodshed, and destruction; it is also an opportunity to transform our country into an important and key player in the new security structures.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Armed Forces of Ukraine, military experts, manufacturers, volunteers, non-governmental organizations, and others are currently writing a textbook for \u201cNATO 3.0\u201d about a new type of global conflict and technologies for confronting a more powerful adversary that possesses superior economic and human resources and nuclear weapons. We have something to offer our Western partners. And this is not only military technology tested in the wars of the 21<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">st<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> century, not only the widespread use of all types of drones, electronic warfare, smart navigation and communication systems, and much more. A separate section in textbooks will cover non-standard military strategy and tactics for conducting combat operations against an enemy superior in all spheres of combat, as well as in areas that are not clearly defined on the map by lines, territories, spatial boundaries, time, or other dimensions. This refers to a blurred, hybridized arena of confrontation where traditional means of warfare are irrelevant.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Ukraine is already capable of providing the West with a new vision of defense strategy in a hybrid war that is still unclear and unexplored by its partners. Without our state as a key player in the regional security system and an outpost on the eastern security and defense flank of a reformatted Europe, it is impossible to build a new secure world that will rise from the ruins of the alliances and institutions that existed before February 24, 2022.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Currently, we are faced with the urgent task of not only studying the formats and current standards of \u201cNATO 1.0\u201d that we have to implement. We need to engage in a mature dialogue with key partners on the joint development of new rules, flexible procedures, and, if necessary, certain standards that will be effective in the conditions of modern warfare.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We must finally understand which version of NATO we want to participate in. We need to take more initiative and participate directly in the formation of a new networked European security alliance, as Ukraine has objectively become a key player and leader in the field of security in Eastern Europe.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Yuriy Romaniuk,<br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">expert on political and security issues,<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">candidate of pedagogical sciences<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">,<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">expert in international relations<\/span><\/p>\n<p><em><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">Photo ua.news<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><b>Notes:<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[1] In 2025, US President Donald Trump allowed the use of the name Department of War as a parallel to the Department of Defense, but only in ceremonial and informal contexts. The change is related to the Ministry\u2019s former name until 1947. Only an act of Congress can officially change the name of the Ministry.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[2] The Iron Curtain is a political clich\u00e9 introduced into active use by Winston Churchill on March 5, 1946, in his Fulton speech, which became one of the hallmarks of the Cold War. It meant an informational, political, and border barrier that isolated the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries from Western countries.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[3] According to Putin, the \u201croot causes\u201d of the war in Ukraine are a series of events and threats which he uses to justify the aggression. The main points of his rhetoric include:<\/span><\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left; line-height: 15px;\">\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\"> The Kremlin leader claims that the West has broken its promises not to expand the Alliance eastward and that Ukraine\u2019s accession to NATO would pose a direct military threat to Russia.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\"> He calls the 2014 Revolution of Dignity a coup provoked by the West, which led to the rise of \u201cneo-Nazis\u201d to power and the outbreak of civil war;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\"> Putin declares the need to stop the \u201cgenocide\u201d of the Russian-speaking population of the Donbas, allegedly carried out by the \u201cKyiv regime\u201d for eight years.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\"> He claims, without evidence, that Ukraine was preparing to develop its own nuclear weapons.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\"> The Russian President names the main goals of the so-called \u201cspecial military operation\u201d as \u201cdemilitarization and denazification\u201d,&nbsp; which Moscow needs in order to eliminate Ukraine\u2019s military potential and \u201ccleanse\u201d it of nationalist ideology.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\"> The Russian leader also positions the war against Ukraine as a struggle for &#8220;his values and his people&#8221; against Western influence.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">The international community and Ukraine reject these statements as groundless propaganda aimed at concealing Russia\u2019s imperial ambitions and denying Ukrainian statehood.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[4] Some sources offer a more vivid translation that better conveys the meaning of this phrase: &#8220;Russians out the door, Americans into the house, Germans under the bench.&#8221;<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[5] An analogy is drawn with Winston Churchill\u2019s famous speech on March 5, 1946, delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, USA.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[6] AUKUS (an abbreviation of Australia, United Kingdom, United States) is a trilateral defense pact formed by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The announcement of the creation of this pact was published on September 15, 2021. Its main goal is to exchange technologies, in particular the construction of nuclear submarines for Australia, as well as cooperation in the fields of AI, quantum technologies, and cybersecurity.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[7] Ukraine and other countries are being offered to limit their participation to \u201cparallel events\u201d on the periphery of the summit. This decision is causing concern among some European allies who consider the partnership with Kyiv to be critical for deterring Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yuriy Romaniuk, Volodymyr Palyvod<\/p>\n<p>At this year\u2019s Munich Security Conference, US Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy [1] Elbridge Colby delivered a so called keynote speech.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":32979,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-32977","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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