{"id":33072,"date":"2026-03-06T00:01:26","date_gmt":"2026-03-05T21:01:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33072"},"modified":"2026-03-07T08:33:59","modified_gmt":"2026-03-07T05:33:59","slug":"chotiristoronnij-dialog-z-pitan-bezpeki-quad","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/chotiristoronnij-dialog-z-pitan-bezpeki-quad\/","title":{"rendered":"The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to as QUAD"},"content":{"rendered":"

Quo Vadis <\/b>[1]<\/span>, QUAD?<\/b><\/h1>\n

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to as QUAD [2], is a coalition of four countries in (or with strategic interests in) the Indo-Pacific region (IPR): Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.<\/span><\/p>\n

QUAD was established in 2004 to address the aftermath of natural disasters in the Indian Ocean. The dialogue was formally established in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with the support of US Vice President Dick Cheney, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In 2008, due to Australia\u2019s withdrawal, QUAD ceased to exist [3].<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2017, during Donald Trump\u2019s first term, its activities were resumed, and since then QUAD has focused on efforts to develop a \u201cfree, open, and inclusive\u201d Indo-Pacific. According to official statements, QUAD advocates the development of partnerships based on shared values and interests: the rule of law, freedom of navigation, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, and freedom of trade. In reality, however, it is no secret that the main goal of the alliance is to contain China\u2019s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing sharply criticizes QUAD, constantly seeking to discredit, ridicule, or \u201cwater down\u201d this initiative.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, tensions arose among QUAD members in 2025, particularly between Washington and New Delhi over trade negotiations and India\u2019s oil imports from Russia. IPR countries also expressed concern about the growing militarization of competition between major powers. They feel compelled to choose between cooperation and trade with China on the one hand, and policy coordination with US partners and allies on the other.<\/span><\/p>\n

The QUAD leaders\u2019 summit, which was to take place in India at the end of 2025 with the participation of US President Donald Trump, did not take place in the end. This was primarily due to growing tensions between the two countries, as well as reports that the head of the White House had canceled his planned trip to New Delhi.<\/span><\/p>\n

The possibility of expanding QUAD to a QUAD-plus format, which would include other regional partners [5], seems increasingly likely, although analysts describe the current momentum as entering a period of \u201cstrategic pause\u201d following delays in holding high-level meetings.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the potential for strengthening interaction between QUAD members and enhancing its role as a key framework for cooperation in security, economics, and diplomacy remains promising.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Revival of QUAD<\/b><\/p>\n

Optimism about the future of QUAD cooperation is driven by three main factors: the revival of bilateral relations between its members, the escalation of Beijing\u2019s assertive actions in the region, and the powerful historical legacy that underpins this initiative.<\/span><\/p>\n

Bilateral Relations.<\/b> The USA has strengthened its bilateral relations with all of its QUAD partners.<\/span><\/p>\n

The USA-India.<\/b> Despite periodic contentious differences \u2013 over trade, Washington\u2019s role in brokering a ceasefire between Pakistan and India in May 2025, and Russian oil imports \u2013 both countries have made significant efforts to renew their partnership. Washington and New Delhi have exchanged trusted ambassadors to help strengthen ties [6]. This development was expected, as both countries have too many common interests to allow their partnership to falter [7].<\/span><\/p>\n

In early February 2026, the USA and India reached an agreement in principle on a large-scale trade deal, which is scheduled to be signed in March 2026 [8]. It provides for an increase in India\u2019s purchases of energy carriers, aircraft, and microchips worth more than $500 billion, as well as a reduction in US tariffs on Indian textiles and diamonds to 18%. In return, India has committed to reducing its purchases of Russian oil and lowering its own trade barriers.<\/span><\/p>\n

The USA \u2013 Australia.<\/b> Prime Minister of Australia Anthony Albanese\u2019s visit to Washington in October 2025 confirmed both countries\u2019 strong commitment to their strategic partnership, which has been the cornerstone of  US-Australian relations since World War II. Concerns about the future of AUKUS [9], an important multinational defense cooperation program that is an integral part of Australia\u2019s national security strategy, have been significantly reduced. Aparts from this, a key outcome of the Australian Prime Minister\u2019s visit was a strategic agreement on the extraction and processing of critical minerals.<\/span><\/p>\n

The USA-Japan.<\/b> The election of Sanae Takaichi as Japan\u2019s new Prime Minister in October 2025 marks a significant shift in policy. Her hawkish stance on China, commitment to Taiwan\u2019s independence, efforts to develop cooperation with South Korea, and strengthening security and economic ties with Washington have strengthened the USA-Japan alliance. She continues to support the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and the country\u2019s participation in QUAD, despite domestic political pressure.<\/span><\/p>\n

President Trump has reaffirmed his support for regional cooperation, as demonstrated by his visits to Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea at the end of 2025, which the governments of those countries generally considered successful and highly valuable.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Chinese Factor<\/b><\/p>\n

China has once again embarked on an active round of \u201cwolf warrior diplomacy\u201d [10]. In particular, Beijing has focused its efforts on Japan, carrying out a series of aggressive actions. These include naval maneuvers, sharp verbal attacks, and measures such as halting tourism to Tokyo and banning Japanese artists from performing in China. China\u2019s maritime activity is increasing throughout the region. As Beijing\u2019s actions become more assertive, the likelihood that QUAD members will respond by strengthening their public cooperation also increases.<\/span><\/p>\n

President Trump has demonstrated serious intent to reach an agreement with China, and Washington is eager to finalize it this spring. At the same time, it is clear that the USA is strengthening its military commitments in the region, supporting Taiwan, competing with China in advanced technologies and space, and working to break China\u2019s monopoly in critical supply chains and manufacturing.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Trump administration\u2019s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy prioritize deterring China through force, but emphasize the importance of defending the country and sharing the burden of costs with allies. Furthermore, these documents emphasize that America\u2019s security and prosperity are inextricably linked to its ability to engage in robust and fair trade in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at preventing any adversary from achieving regional dominance while promoting stable economic ties.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regardless of any agreements reached, the rivalry between the USA and China will continue, and the QUAD will continue to play a vital role in this complex landscape.<\/span><\/p>\n

Long-Term Vision of the IPR<\/b><\/p>\n

Japan\u2019s position in the QUAD \u2013 and its position on China \u2013 has been significantly strengthened following the early elections on February 8, 2026. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi\u2019s Liberal Democratic Party secured a historic two-thirds majority in the lower house [11], the first time a single party has achieved this since World War II. This result strongly confirms the head of government\u2019s tough stance on security, which echoes the approach of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and closely aligns with the approaches of President Donald Trump. Shinzo Abe\u2019s legacy continues to shape the strategic architecture of the region. He championed the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which provided both the rationale and foundation for the QUAD\u2019s activities and justified its initiatives. The Japanese politician was perhaps the first foreign leader to embrace President Donald Trump\u2019s global leadership, and the revival of the QUAD has been one of the earliest and most significant international achievements of the current White House master.<\/span><\/p>\n

During his second term, President Donald Trump is trying to position himself as a peacemaker and unifier. QUAD offers valuable opportunities to support these goals, in particular by providing a foundation for strengthening economic security, which remains a key priority for the American leader.<\/span><\/p>\n

As US Presidents approach the end of their second terms, shaping their legacy becomes increasingly important. Donald Trump sees \u201cpeace through strength\u201d and economic prosperity for Americans as the cornerstones of his legacy. QUAD provides an opportunity to showcase his own achievements and pay tribute to Shinzo Abe\u2019s legacy.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Task for QUAD in Southeast Asia<\/b><\/p>\n

One of QUAD\u2019s key goals, as it strengthens its presence in the region, is to expand economic and physical security while maintaining the trust of other regional partners. In the past, QUAD had clearly stated that its goal was not to directly counter China, but to promote stability within a free and open framework. For this reason, QUAD\u2019s activities typically include a variety of innocuous initiatives. This approach has allowed partners to present themselves as a group that is not focused on confronting China. However, while this strategy has helped build trust within the partnership, it has done less to counter Beijing\u2019s malicious and aggressive destabilizing actions in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n

The current challenge for QUAD is to implement stronger economic security and defense measures, but to do so in a way that reassures other regional partners that the goal and outcome will be to strengthen regional stability.<\/span><\/p>\n

Based on the current situation surrounding QUAD activities, Western analysts are considering the following scenarios.<\/span><\/p>\n

Most Probable<\/b>: <\/span>a trade agreement between the USA and India will cement momentum for the next stage of QUAD development<\/b><\/p>\n

The most likely next important step for QUAD will be the postponed summit of participating countries\u2019 leaders in New Delhi. This meeting is scheduled for a later date and depends on whether the USA and India sign a bilateral trade agreement to resolve the current issues mentioned above.<\/span><\/p>\n

Once the USA-India trade agreement is concluded, it is likely to restore high-level trust and create significant momentum for the development of QUAD. In particular, the partners will seek initiatives related to economic security, such as cooperation on investment, coordination in the extraction and processing of strategic ores and minerals, and cooperation in the field of defense.<\/span><\/p>\n

Probable: the Evolution of the QUAD-Plus Model<\/b><\/p>\n

QUAD will likely seek to attract new partners. This approach will not force countries to choose between Beijing and QUAD countries, but rather create a framework that allows them to develop their own economies and security through voluntary cooperation.<\/span><\/p>\n

A rapid or formal expansion of the QUAD-plus model by adding permanent new members in the near future is unlikely. This is largely due to regional sensitivities, particularly concerns about expected militarization and pressure to take sides.<\/span><\/p>\n

Least Probable: Slowdown in the Development of QUAD<\/b><\/p>\n

A prolonged slowdown or further decline in the momentum of QUAD development could occur if the signing of a trade agreement between the USA and India stalls, exacerbating bilateral tensions and leading to the postponement (or cancellation) of the summit in New Delhi. Under this scenario, QUAD may remain functional but low-profile, focusing on the results of working groups (such as counterterrorism) without significant breakthroughs at the leadership or expanded format levels.<\/span><\/p>\n

Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/b>,
\n<\/span>expert in international relations<\/span><\/p>\n

Notes:<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

[1] Quo Vadis? \u2013 Latin expression meaning \u201cWhere are you going?\u201d. It refers to the phrase spoken by the Apostle Peter to Jesus Christ when he left Rome during Emperor Nero\u2019s persecution of Christians.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2] QUAD \u2013 abbreviation for Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3] Australia officially withdrew from QUAD on the initiative of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd\u2019s government. Canberra sought to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing, while China strongly protested against QUAD, seeing it as an attempt to contain its influence in the region. In 2007, the main initiator of QUAD, Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, resigned. Without his support and with India\u2019s doubts about the alliance\u2019s usefulness, the new Australian government saw no point in continuing to participate in that format. In addition, the administration of US President George W. Bush was focused on domestic economic problems and did not show active interest in the development of QUAD either.<\/span><\/p>\n

[4] The main problems are tariff disputes, legal uncertainty, and the need to revise the trade strategies of both countries following the US Supreme Court\u2019s decision to declare President Donald Trump\u2019s sweeping global tariffs illegal, which has led to delays and complications in trade negotiations.<\/span><\/p>\n

[5] The USA is interested in involving South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand in this format.<\/span><\/p>\n

[6] Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Vinay Mohan Kwatra was appointed India\u2019s Ambassador to the USA, and former assistant to President Donald Trump, White House Chief of Staff Sergio Gore (born Sergei Gorokhovsky), was appointed the USA\u2019s Ambassador to India. In addition, he has also been appointed special envoy to South and Central Asia.<\/span><\/p>\n

[7] The USA and India have a strategic partnership in the field of defense, which is actively developing and covers a wide range of areas. Washington and New Delhi have signed a framework agreement that defines the mechanisms for coordinating defense decisions between the two countries. An important document is the Memorandum on Logistics Exchange, which allows both sides to use each other\u2019s military bases for logistical support, significantly increasing the operational efficiency and mobility of troops. The USA is one of India\u2019s largest partners in conducting joint military exercises involving various branches of the armed forces. The USA has become one of India\u2019s largest suppliers of defense equipment over the past two decades. The cooperation includes not only sales, but also joint production and development of defense technologies, which supports the Indian defense sector and promotes technological development. In November 2025, the 22<\/span>nd<\/span>  meeting of the USA-India Military Cooperation Group took place, during which new areas of cooperation were discussed, including cybersecurity, missile defense, and intelligence.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

[8] On February 10, 2026, the US Supreme Court ruled that the tariffs imposed by the Donald Trump administration, including large-scale import duties in effect since April 2025, were illegal. In view of this, India postponed plans to send a trade delegation to Washington, as uncertainty arose regarding the future terms of the agreement. Negotiations may resume after the tariff issues are resolved and new terms are determined. The exact timing of the resumption of negotiations is unknown.<\/span><\/p>\n

[9] AUKUS is an acronym for Australia, United Kingdom, United States. A trilateral defense pact formed by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

[10] \u201cWolf warrior diplomacy\u201d is a persistent, often aggressive, and extremely nationalistic style of foreign policy adopted by Chinese diplomats in the late 2010s and early 2020s to counter Western criticism and promote China\u2019s interests. Its name comes from the popular Chinese action movie \u201cThe War of the Wolves\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

[11] With this number of votes, the Liberal Democratic Party and its leader Sanae Takaichi can pass any laws they want, ignoring the upper house of Parliament, and can also raise the issue of amending the Constitution.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to as QUAD [2], is a coalition of four countries in (or with strategic interests in) the Indo-Pacific region (IPR): Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33075,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-33072","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nThe Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly referred to as QUAD - 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