{"id":33137,"date":"2026-03-14T08:22:38","date_gmt":"2026-03-14T05:22:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33137"},"modified":"2026-04-04T14:50:24","modified_gmt":"2026-04-04T11:50:24","slug":"al-ka%d1%97da-zabuta-ale-latentna-zagroza","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/al-ka%d1%97da-zabuta-ale-latentna-zagroza\/","title":{"rendered":"Al-Qaeda: A Forgotten but Latent Threat"},"content":{"rendered":"

Al-Qaeda: A Forgotten but Latent [1]<\/sup> Threat<\/h1>\n

Over the past few years, Al-Qaeda [2] has largely disappeared from the center of Western public debate. Media coverage is now dominated by the Russia-Ukraine war, the rivalry between the USA  and China, the situation in the Middle East, and cyber threats. Compared to the first decade of the 21<\/span>st<\/span>  century, when the organization posed a defining threat to global security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, its presence in public discourse is now negligible. However, as recent reports from international organizations and expert assessments show, a lack of media coverage does not automatically mean a loss of operational significance.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

A UN report dated February 4, 2026, pointed out that the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates remains constant, albeit fragmented and highly regionalized. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups retain operational capabilities in several areas of activity, and the nature of the threat varies by region.<\/span><\/p>\n

This means that today\u2019s Al-Qaeda is no longer a monolith capable of a single spectacular operation with global impact, but rather a network of affiliated organizations exploiting local conflicts, state weaknesses, and long-term ideological mobilization.<\/span><\/p>\n

Organizational Architecture<\/p>\n

In an analysis published late last year by the \u201cSouth Asia Times\u201d,<\/span>  Al-Qaeda was described as a \u201cdune-like\u201d organization \u2013 diffuse, flexible, and one that avoids a rigid, single-tier hierarchy. Its operational model is based on the formula of \u201ccentralized strategic leadership and decentralized execution\u201d.  In reality, this means that the main organization provides the ideological foundation, general priorities, and \u201cbrand\u201d, while the implementation of tactical tasks is left to regional branches, which operate with due regard to local political, social, and military conditions.<\/span><\/p>\n

This characteristic aligns with the conclusions presented in an analysis by the American research organization the Soufan Center. According to its data, the current strength of Al-Qaeda lies not in a central command or a unified organizational structure, but in the resilience and adaptability of its affiliates, such as those in Somalia, the Sahel [3], or the Arabian Peninsula, which are capable of integrating into local conflicts and building their own social base.<\/span><\/p>\n

This fragmentation has several key consequences. <\/span>First<\/b>, it complicates classic counterterrorism strategies based on \u201cdecapitation\u201d.  Between 2001 and 2011, fighting Al-Qaeda was largely focused on eliminating central leaders and command structures. However, as experience following Osama bin Laden\u2019s death has shown, the removal of the leadership did not lead to the collapse of the entire network, precisely because the affiliates had already developed operational autonomy by that time.<\/span><\/p>\n

Second<\/b>, a decentralized architecture provides significant ideological flexibility. Affiliates maintain general loyalty to the global jihadist narrative but adapt their messages to the local context. In West Africa, the narrative may focus on elite corruption and ethnic disputes; in Somalia, on clan rivalries and the presence of foreign troops; in Yemen, on the civil war and regional conflict. This adaptability enhances the resilience of these structures, as it allows them to integrate into existing social tensions rather than impose a homogeneous, \u201cimported\u201d structure.<\/span><\/p>\n

Third<\/b>, this model allows for the transmission of strategic direction without the need for the physical movement of personnel. Even if a specific affiliate, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) [4], articulates specific threats, their execution can potentially occur through other nodes in the network that are geographically closer to potential targets. This means that the network functions more as a system of interconnected modules than as a classic organization with a linear chain of command.<\/span><\/p>\n

This model was particularly important after 2014, when Al-Qaeda faced competition from the Islamic State (IS). Instead of competing with IS for spectacular and rapid territorial gains, Al-Qaeda, as expert analyses show, adopted a long-term strategy of \u201ccoexisting with the conflict.\u201d This meant abandoning the immediate establishment of quasi-state structures in favor of patiently integrating into local power structures and building relationships with tribes, militias, and insurgent groups.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this sense, decentralization was not only a result of external pressure but also a deliberate adaptation to the security environment after 2011. Intensive counterterrorism operations, the development of Western countries\u2019 intelligence capabilities, and competition from other armed groups made the centralized model more vulnerable to disruption. The network structure, on the other hand, allowed Al-Qaeda to survive the period of greatest pressure, preserve ideological continuity, and maintain affiliates in different  regions of the world.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, Al-Qaeda\u2019s current organizational architecture, based on a strong ideological \u201cbrand\u201d and decentralized operational activities, is one of the key factors in its resilience. It is precisely this capacity for local adaptation, tactical autonomy, and modular operations that ensures the organization, despite the loss of its central media visibility, remains a viable element of the global threat landscape.<\/span><\/p>\n

Africa As an Attraction Centre: The Sahel and Somalia<\/b><\/p>\n

Africa remains the most important area of activity for Al-Qaeda-linked organizations. Research confirms that the level of violence in regions such as the Sahel remains high. According to ACLED data [5], in the Benin-Niger-Nigeria border triangle, between 2024 and 2025, the number of incidents involving jihadist violence increased by 86%, and the number of fatalities \u2013 by 262%.<\/span><\/p>\n

Meanwhile, in Somalia, the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab [6] retains the ability to carry out attacks, control rural areas, and influence local authorities and the government. According to an analysis by the Soufan Center, these regional entities are currently the most dynamic component of the Al-Qaeda network. In reality, this means that the organization functions as a catalyst for protracted low-intensity conflicts, weakening state institutions and perpetuating chronic instability.<\/span><\/p>\n

From a Local Insurgent to an Organization Seeking a Global Role<\/b><\/p>\n

The activities of AQAP, long considered one of the most operationally capable branches of the al-Qaeda network, have recently drawn special attention. Historically, this group has focused primarily on the Yemeni theater of operations, exploiting the chaos of the civil war, the rivalry between the government in Aden and the Houthi movement, and the fragmentation of state structures. However, as shown by studies conducted at the turn of 2025 and 2026, AQAP is signaling its desire to move beyond the role of a purely local insurgent group.<\/span><\/p>\n

In an analysis published in February 2026, War on the Rocks [7] draws attention to a clear escalation of anti-Chinese rhetoric in statements by the current emir of AQAP, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki. According to him, the PRC is a \u201cpagan, infidel regime,\u201d and Beijing\u2019s policy toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang is presented as justification for potential retaliatory actions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Given this, one can conclude that China is no longer a peripheral actor in the AKAP narrative and is being integrated into the list of its main ideological opponents. However, experts clearly distinguish between rhetoric and actual capabilities. They emphasize that direct AKP attacks on Chinese territory remain unlikely due to the organization\u2019s limited capacity in this regard and the extensive apparatus of Chinese security agencies. The real risk is more closely tied to Beijing\u2019s overseas interests \u2013 infrastructure, investment projects, and diplomatic and business personnel in unstable regions where AQAP or its affiliated organizations may exert indirect influence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Any potential operation against China would not necessarily take the form of direct expansion from Yemen but could occur through other nodes of Al-Qaeda\u2019s global network. In this context, one can cite Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) [8], groups linked to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [9], and the presence of militants in Afghanistan.<\/span><\/p>\n

The decisive factor here is Al-Qaeda\u2019s network architecture, which allows for the transmission of strategic momentum without the need to directly move militants from one theater of operations to another. In reality, this means that an ideological message formulated by the AQAP leadership can be utilized by other affiliates or sympathizers located closer to potential targets \u2013 both geographically and logistically. This model aligns with the principle of \u201ccentralized leadership and decentralized execution\u201d described above.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is worth noting that the shift in Houthi rhetoric is part of a broader trend toward the internationalization of its message. Historically, the group has focused on the so-called \u201cnear enemy\u201d (the local government in Yemen) and the \u201cfar enemy,\u201d embodied by the United States. Current narratives indicate an attempt to adapt to shifts in the balance of power within the international system, where China\u2019s growing presence in regions with unstable security situations is creating new arenas for potential symbolic and operational confrontation.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, an analysis of AQAP\u2019s activities in 2025 and 2026 does not indicate that it has regained the capacity to conduct operations on a scale comparable to its most notorious attempted attacks of 2009\u20132010 [10]. Instead, it is more a matter of attempting to restore its \u201cauthority\u201d by expanding its list of opponents and fitting into the global narrative of \u201cdefending Muslims\u201d in different regions of the world.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, AQAP is currently in a phase of strategic positioning: on the one hand, it remains an actor rooted in the realities of the civil war in Yemen, and on the other hand, it seeks to be an entity that contributes to the global narrative of the Al-Qaeda network and signals its ability to operate beyond its own region. It is precisely this ambition, even if largely rhetorical, that ensures AQAP remains a key element of the broader Al-Qaeda threat architecture.<\/span><\/p>\n

Afghanistan As a Centre for Transferring Capabilities<\/b><\/p>\n

The aforementioned UN report points out  that the situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban\u2019s seizure of power remains ambiguous. The document does not mention the restoration of a centralized global command structure for Al-Qaeda, similar to the one that existed in the 1990s, but emphasizes the preservation of ties and personal contacts between various jihadist groups operating in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to UN experts, Afghanistan remains a territory where elements linked to Al-Qaeda are present, and relations between the Taliban and this network are complex and historically rooted. This does not imply formal integration or open patronage, as was the case prior to 2001, but rather an environment conducive to maintaining contacts, training militants, and exchanging expertise. The UN emphasizes that the threat is of an evolutionary nature and depends on regional conditions.<\/span><\/p>\n

In other expert analyses, Afghanistan is described as a \u201ccapacity transfer laboratory\u201d. It is a territory where various elements of the global Al-Qaeda network, even if they operate autonomously, can benefit from the same operational environment. In practice, this means the ability to:<\/span><\/p>\n