{"id":33151,"date":"2026-03-17T00:01:58","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T21:01:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33151"},"modified":"2026-03-18T12:28:44","modified_gmt":"2026-03-18T09:28:44","slug":"vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/","title":{"rendered":"Military Exercises in Belarus"},"content":{"rendered":"

Military Exercises in Belarus and the Threat to Ukraine from the North<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Within the framework  of its alliance with Russia, the leadership of Belarus is taking a series of measures to strengthen the Belarusian Armed Forces \u2013 as part of the two countries\u2019 regional military grouping \u2013 and to exert military pressure on Ukraine. Currently, there is no immediate threat of a new attack by Russia and Belarus on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. However, anticipating such a scenario, Ukraine is keeping its troops deployed in the northern sector. This diverts certain resources from the front lines, reducing Ukraine\u2019s capabilities to defend the Donbas and advance in Zaporizhzhia region. However, this is an objective price to pay for the security of Ukraine\u2019s northern regions, preventing their occupation by Russia, as it happened at the start of the war.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Since mid-January of this year, a series of military activities has been underway in Belarus, including inspections of headquarters and troops, partial mobilization, and various exercises.<\/b> Russian military units may eventually participate in these activities. And as early as October of this year, command-staff exercises of the CSTO peacekeeping forces, \u201cUnbreakable Brotherhood \u2013 2026,\u201d and special exercises involving joint units of radiation, chemical, and biological protection and medical support, \u201cBarrier-2026,\u201d are scheduled to take place there. Ultimately, these can also be considered joint exercises of the Belarusian and Russian armed forces, since the Russians will play the leading role there.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2013 and 2021, under the guise of similar exercises, Russia, with Belarus\u2019s support, was preparing to attack Ukraine and launch a full-scale war against it. At that time, the main preparations took place within the framework of joint military exercises such as \u201cZapad\u201d. No such exercises are planned for this year. But there is no need for them, since all the necessary infrastructure to ensure a renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine from the north has already been deployed. In fact, Russia only needs to redeploy its troops to Belarus and position them in staging areas along the main axes of the offensive operation. This can be done even during local exercises. This is because some of them take place near the border with Ukraine, precisely in the areas from which a new Russian offensive could begin. Field camps, depots, prepared positions, and shelters for equipment are also located there. They can be occupied quite quickly on the eve of a new attack on Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides, through Belarusian and joint exercises, Moscow will attempt to scatter the resources of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and divert them from the front lines. This is being carried out through demonstrative and continuous exercises to create the impression that Russia could actually resume hostilities against Ukraine from Belarusian territory. Although, in reality, such plans may not exist \u2013 at least not at the moment.<\/span><\/p>\n

Currently, this issue is becoming quite relevant for Russia, due to the stalled advance of the Russian Armed Forces in the Donbas and the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in  Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. In this situation, Ukraine\u2019s deployment of its troops \u2013 which are currently securing the border with Belarus \u2013 to active sectors of the front could lead to a turning point in the war in our favor. This is especially true given that Russian military personnel losses on the front lines already exceed their reinforcements. And a new mobilization in Russia is an extremely complex issue, as it would inevitably exacerbate internal tensions in the country and critically impact Russia\u2019s economy, which is already facing a labor shortage. Such problems are already being acknowledged not only by members of the Russian \u201cZ-community\u201d,  where some have a fairly accurate understanding of the situation, but also by Russian politicians in the public sphere. They believe that, given the current situation, Russia must halt its offensive and switch to a defensive posture, as a repeat of what happened in the second half of 2022 could occur. This is confirmed  by the events of 2023, when the Russian Armed Forces\u2019 strong defense from prepared positions managed to hold back the Ukrainian Armed Forces\u2019 offensive on the southern sector of the front.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, some in Russia continue to advocate for increasing military pressure on Europe to force it to stop supporting Ukraine. According to some Russian analysts, conditions are currently favorable for this, as the USA  is focused on military operations against Iran. Incidentally, this also has negative consequences for Europe.<\/span><\/p>\n

Various options for such pressure are being proposed \u2013 demonstrating military force along the borders with NATO and the EU, intensifying \u201chybrid\u201d warfare against Europe, provoking armed conflicts in the Baltic states with covert intervention, as well as an open military invasion under the pretext of defending Russia\u2019s Kaliningrad region. Belarus is also expected to be drawn into all such actions. It is from its territory that Russia could attack Lithuania or Poland. At the same time, Belarus would shield Russia from NATO in case of a new Russian invasion of Ukraine from the north or aggression against Estonia, Finland, or Norway.<\/span><\/p>\n

All of the above directly or indirectly concerns Ukraine. Therefore, the military activities of Belarus and Russia on Belarusian territory require heightened attention.<\/b> This is especially true given that the media is beginning to portray those activities as Moscow and Minsk\u2019s actual preparations for a new offensive against Ukraine from the north, which is causing alarm among the Ukrainian population.<\/span><\/p>\n

Concerns on this matter are entirely understandable. The events unfolding in Belarus since the beginning of this year fully mirror the standard preparations for war undertaken by any country. Moreover, it does not matter against whom \u2013 Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, or others. According to a number of media reports, during a meeting of the Belarusian Security Council in January of this year, all such scenarios were considered and a plan of action was determined. These measures are now being implemented.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, from January 16 to March 10 of this year, at the behest of Belarusian President A. Lukashenko, a so-called unscheduled surprise inspection of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus was conducted.<\/b> In reality, it was entirely expected. Exactly such inspections have been taking place every year since the start of Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine. The inspection was comprehensive and is being carried out in several stages. From January 16 to 25 of this year, the higher echelons of state administration were inspected, namely the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Their ability to quickly switch from peacetime to wartime operations and organize the command of troops as part of the preparation and conduct of a defensive operation was assessed. Representatives of the Belarusian President\u2019s Administration oversaw the inspection.<\/span><\/p>\n

On January 26 of this year, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus began an inspection of the troops. Commands, formations, and units of the Western and Northwestern Operational Commands of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus were placed on heightened combat readiness. The readiness of headquarters and troops to act during a period of heightened threat and in wartime was assessed.<\/span><\/p>\n

On February 13 of this year, President of Belarus A. Lukashenko personally inspected the combat readiness of the country\u2019s armed forces. At the 227<\/span>th<\/span>  combined-arms training ground \u201cBorisovsky\u201d,  he heard  Minister of Defense V. Khrenin\u2019s report on the inspection conducted in accordance with the plans of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.<\/span><\/p>\n

From February 17 to 20 of this year, annual mobilization readiness exercises (training sessions) were conducted in all regions of the country. The aim was to improve the coordination of actions by local administrative bodies and organizations during the formation of territorial troops and units of the People\u2019s Militia. The exercises were directly supervised by the chairmen of the regional executive committees with the involvement of military commissariats. A certain number of Belarusian citizens subject to military service were called up for the exercises, including 400 reserve officers. They were used to reinforce the wartime strength of the 6<\/span>th<\/span>  Separate Mechanized Brigade (Grodno), a reserve regiment of the Western Operational Command, and a number of other units. During the reserve forces training session, theoretical and practical exercises were conducted to refresh their knowledge and skills.<\/span><\/p>\n

On March 11, 2026, following the completion of the inspection, there began exercises involving the ground forces, air force, and air defense units of the Belarusian Armed Forces.<\/b><\/p>\n

On March 11\u201313, training for a mechanized battalion of the 120<\/span>th<\/span>  Motorized Rifle Brigade (Minsk) took place at the 227<\/span>th<\/span>  General Military Training Ground \u201cBorisovsky\u201d.  The exercises focused on organizing and conducting defensive combat operations, drawing on the experience of modern wars and armed conflicts, particularly Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. The main focus was on the use of UAVs for reconnaissance and strike missions, as well as countering enemy drones. Emphasis was also placed on the tactics of small groups consisting of several fighters.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since March 12, joint exercises involving the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Belarusian Armed Forces have been underway, with the participation of units from the 15<\/span>th<\/span>  Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (Minsk area, S-300 air defense systems), the 120<\/span>th<\/span>  MRB (Brest Region, \u201cBuk\u201d air defense missile systems), and the 62<\/span>nd<\/span>  Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (Grodno, \u201cOsa\u201d air defense missile systems), as well as the 116<\/span>th<\/span>  Air Base (Lida area).<\/span><\/p>\n

The ability of the Air Force and Air Defense command to carry out tasks to protect the country\u2019s airspace is being tested. During the exercises, these Air Defense formations and units were on combat duty, and their subunits moved to training grounds where they conducted simulated and live missile launches.<\/span><\/p>\n

As stated by State Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council O. Volfovich, the exercises are taking place far from Belarus\u2019s western border and do not pose a threat to Poland or Lithuania. Similarly, the main activities of the joint Russian-Belarusian \u201cWest-2025\u201d strategic exercise were conducted deep within Belarusian territory. In other words, Minsk seems not to wish to provoke its neighbors, as it does not fully trust Moscow and is not confident that Russia would defend Belarus.<\/span><\/p>\n

Based on the experience of previous years, the Belarusian Armed Forces exercises, involving various formations and units, will continue at least until the autumn.  In addition to regular troops, territorial defense forces will also participate. The main exercises will take place at the Borisovsky, Obuz-Lesnovsky (Baranovichi District), and Gozhsky (Grodno District) training grounds, as well as at smaller training ground, including those near the border with Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n

As of today, there are no signs that Russia and Belarus are using the above measures to create strike force groupings on the border with Ukraine.<\/b> There are no additional Russian troops on Belarusian territory \u2013 at least not in significant numbers.<\/span><\/p>\n

Under current conditions, it is practically impossible to conceal large-scale troop movements from intelligence, just as it is impossible to secretly establish the necessary infrastructure for their deployment in staging areas. As noted above, such infrastructure has largely existed since 2021, but it would be impossible to deploy within it without the enemy noticing. Back then and in early 2022, even mainstream media reported on the buildup of Russian troops in Belarus and their locations. Therefore, they would be detected now that the Belarusian sector is under heightened surveillance by our intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Belarus cannot attack Ukraine on its own. It lacks the military strength to do so. It has only four mechanized brigades, which are insufficient even to secure its borders with NATO. That is why the main emphasis is placed on territorial defense \u2013 in fact, on guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the majority of the military in the Belarusian armed forces are not inclined to fight against Ukraine, as confirmed by all sociological surveys.<\/span><\/p>\n

Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko will not go against Ukraine either. He did not do so at the start of the war, when everyone was confident of Russia\u2019s inevitable victory. Now, with Russia on the brink of collapse, he is even less likely to risk such a venture. Not to mention that, unlike in 2022, Ukraine\u2019s northern border is protected by a robust defense system. It may have its flaws, but it exists. Furthermore, Ukraine is separated from Belarus by the Prypiat and Dnipro rivers and the marshy terrain of Polissia, with a limited number of bridges and roads \u2013 a natural barrier that is a significant obstacle in itself.<\/span><\/p>\n

All of this will make the enemy\u2019s advance extremely difficult and could prove beneficial to our defense. The enemy was unable to overcome it even at the start of the full-scale war, when Ukraine was significantly weaker. It is clear that this situation is understood by both Russia and Belarus. That is why they are not attempting to invade Ukraine from the north, merely demonstrating their military strength there. Although, as mentioned above, Russia will be short of  forces even on the active sections of the front.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, these circumstances do not mean that there are no threats to Ukraine from Belarus, which is capable of resorting to provocations.<\/b> Furthermore, Russian troops are stationed on its territory. Currently, they consist only of a group of Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35 aircraft at the airbase in Baranovichi and a Russian Navy communications hub.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, as evidenced by Russia\u2019s preparations for war against Ukraine and the \u201cWest-2025\u201d joint military exercises, a powerful Russian military force capable of offensive operations could be rapidly deployed in Belarus. Both developed transport and field infrastructure are available for this purpose. Moreover, reconnaissance operations against Ukraine are being conducted from Belarusian territory, and UAVs are being operated over the northern regions of our country. It should also be noted that Belarus\u2019s military-industrial complex operates entirely in the interests of the Russian armed forces. This is why Ukraine is forced to divert its forces to secure the border with Belarus. Consequently, there is a shortage of troops on the front lines, including those needed to strengthen defenses in the Donbas and advance the offensive in Zaporizhzhia. Thus, even without direct participation in Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, Belarus is effectively supporting the aggressor. It is therefore entirely appropriate that Ukraine\u2019s leadership is tightening its policy toward Belarus. This serves as a deterrent even without demonstrations of military force.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consequently, Belarus remains Russia\u2019s main ally in its war against Ukraine. It does not directly participate in combat operations, but plays a significant role in enhancing Moscow\u2019s ability to continue its aggression. This first of all  refers to Belarus\u2019s actions to divert Ukrainian forces from the front lines, as well as providing its territory for the deployment of Russian troops, conducting reconnaissance against our state, and operating unmanned aerial vehicles.<\/b><\/p>\n

Today, as part of these activities, several military exercises are taking place within the Belarusian armed forces, in which Russian military units may be participating. So far, the exercises are being held deep within Belarusian territory, but they may move closer to the Ukrainian border. There are no direct indications that Russia and Belarus are using these exercises to conceal preparations for a new attack on Ukraine from the north. However, this cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, Ukraine is forced to deploy its troops in its northern territory to deter its adversaries.<\/b><\/p>\n

Another deterrent for Belarus is Ukraine\u2019s increasingly tough policy toward it, which is entirely justified and fair.<\/b><\/p>\n

Yurii Mykhailenko,
\n<\/b>Institute for  Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n

Within the framework\u00a0 of its alliance with Russia, the leadership of Belarus is taking a series of measures to strengthen the Belarusian Armed Forces \u2013 as part of the two countries\u2019 regional military grouping \u2013 and to exert military pressure on Ukraine<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33152,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-33151","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\nMilitary Exercises in Belarus - Institute for Global politics<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Military Exercises in Belarus - Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Institute for Global politics\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-03-16T21:01:58+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-03-18T09:28:44+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/bel16.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"248\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Vladimir\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"15 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Vladimir\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b\"},\"headline\":\"Military Exercises in Belarus\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-16T21:01:58+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-18T09:28:44+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":4620,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/03\\\/bel16.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"\u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0439\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Analytics\",\"Publications\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/\",\"name\":\"Military Exercises in Belarus - Institute for Global politics\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/03\\\/bel16.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-16T21:01:58+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-18T09:28:44+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/03\\\/bel16.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/03\\\/bel16.jpg\",\"width\":300,\"height\":248},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/publikacii\\\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"\u0412\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0456 \u043d\u0430\u0432\u0447\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0432 \u0411\u0456\u043b\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0441\u0456\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/\",\"name\":\"Institute for Global politics\",\"description\":\"Institute for Global politics\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"\u0411\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0444\u0435\u043d \u0406\u043d\u0442\u0435\u043b\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":false,\"contentUrl\":false,\"width\":236,\"height\":92,\"caption\":\"\u0411\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0444\u0435\u043d \u0406\u043d\u0442\u0435\u043b\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b\",\"name\":\"Vladimir\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/337d171e43cb32013fa13b960c45294ce7c40201b83e85776d82f2019322e347?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/337d171e43cb32013fa13b960c45294ce7c40201b83e85776d82f2019322e347?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/337d171e43cb32013fa13b960c45294ce7c40201b83e85776d82f2019322e347?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Vladimir\"},\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/igp.org.ua\\\/en\\\/author\\\/vladimir\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Military Exercises in Belarus - Institute for Global politics","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Military Exercises in Belarus - Institute for Global politics","og_url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/","og_site_name":"Institute for Global politics","article_published_time":"2026-03-16T21:01:58+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-03-18T09:28:44+00:00","og_image":[{"width":300,"height":248,"url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/bel16.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Vladimir","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Vladimir","Est. reading time":"15 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/"},"author":{"name":"Vladimir","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#\/schema\/person\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b"},"headline":"Military Exercises in Belarus","datePublished":"2026-03-16T21:01:58+00:00","dateModified":"2026-03-18T09:28:44+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/"},"wordCount":4620,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/bel16.jpg","keywords":["\u041c\u0438\u0445\u0430\u0439\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043a\u043e"],"articleSection":["Analytics","Publications"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/","url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/","name":"Military Exercises in Belarus - Institute for Global politics","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/bel16.jpg","datePublished":"2026-03-16T21:01:58+00:00","dateModified":"2026-03-18T09:28:44+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/bel16.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/bel16.jpg","width":300,"height":248},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/publikacii\/vijskovi-navchannya-v-bilorusi\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"\u0412\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0456 \u043d\u0430\u0432\u0447\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u0432 \u0411\u0456\u043b\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0441\u0456"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#website","url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/","name":"Institute for Global politics","description":"Institute for Global politics","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#organization","name":"\u0411\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0444\u0435\u043d \u0406\u043d\u0442\u0435\u043b","url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":false,"contentUrl":false,"width":236,"height":92,"caption":"\u0411\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0444\u0435\u043d \u0406\u043d\u0442\u0435\u043b"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/#\/schema\/person\/183f5573a75f3cc0f668a1034203cc5b","name":"Vladimir","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/337d171e43cb32013fa13b960c45294ce7c40201b83e85776d82f2019322e347?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/337d171e43cb32013fa13b960c45294ce7c40201b83e85776d82f2019322e347?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/337d171e43cb32013fa13b960c45294ce7c40201b83e85776d82f2019322e347?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Vladimir"},"url":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/author\/vladimir\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33151","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33151"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33151\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33182,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33151\/revisions\/33182"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33152"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33151"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33151"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33151"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}