{"id":33199,"date":"2026-03-23T12:22:24","date_gmt":"2026-03-23T09:22:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33199"},"modified":"2026-04-04T14:46:59","modified_gmt":"2026-04-04T11:46:59","slug":"chi-stane-iran-ukra%d1%97noyu-dlya-spoluchenix-shtativ","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/chi-stane-iran-ukra%d1%97noyu-dlya-spoluchenix-shtativ\/","title":{"rendered":"Will Iran Become the \u201cUkraine\u201d to the United States?"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Will Iran Become the \u201cUkraine\u201d to the United States?<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On March 16, 2026, the Washington Post reported that the US intelligence community had found no signs of a split within Iran\u2019s leadership following the launch of Operation \u201cEpic Fury\u201d. Despite several weeks of intense airstrikes, the Iranian regime shows no signs of imminent collapse [1]. On the contrary, external aggression has united radical factions and strengthened the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Moderate forces in Tehran have effectively been sidelined from decision-making [2].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, as it turned out, a rift over the advisability of this operation has emerged within President Donald Trump\u2019s team. Director of the National Counterterrorism Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Joe Kent has resigned [3]. He stated that he could not \u201cin good conscience support a war against Iran, which posed no immediate threat to the United States\u201d. According to him, this operation was launched due to \u201cpressure from Israel and the influential Jewish lobby\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For his part, the White House occupant, in his usual lecturing manner, pointed out that his decision to attack Iran had prevented World War III. Donald Trump expressed confidence that without the USA\u2019s strikes, Tehran would have acquired nuclear weapons within a month and used them against Israel and other countries in the Middle East.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The US President, who \u201csaved\u201d the world from the apocalypse, is so confident of victory over Iran that he has \u201cforbidden\u201d Tehran from blocking the Strait of Hormuz, since that would be \u201cunfair of them\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is worth recalling that as a presidential candidate, Donald Trump constantly promised that there would be no \u201cendless wars\u201d during his administration. His slogan \u201cAmerica First\u201d focused attention on domestic affairs, thereby guaranteeing that the USA would once again become, as he himself proclaimed, \u201cgreat\u201d. The war with Iran not only undermines these promises but may also pose as serious a challenge to Washington as the war against Ukraine does to the Kremlin.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine hoping for a quick victory with minimal losses. A surprise attack by the USA and Israel on Iran was expected to yield similar results. In both cases, the primary goal was regime change (a transfer of power from a hostile to a \u201cfriendly\u201d regime). The assassination of the spiritual leader of Iran\u2019s Shiites, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was intended to pave the way for local opposition figures to seize power and, in the worst-case scenario, lead to the realization of a \u201cVenezuelan scenario\u201d, in which his successors, frightened by the prospect of losing power \u2013 and possibly their lives \u2013 would accept American terms without hesitation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The war between the USA, Israel, and Iran has been going on for more than three weeks, but as early as the third day of hostilities, Donald Trump expressed confidence that the conflict would last four to five weeks [4]. However, the President added that the war could last even longer, and that even under this less optimistic scenario, he \u201cwon\u2019t get bored\u201d but will continue the war until the intended goals are achieved. One would hope that the war will indeed be short, but Defense Secretary [5] Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General Dan Kane have publicly announced the deployment of reinforcements to the Middle East. The armada assembled there has clearly proved insufficient to carry out the planned operations [6].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>The Goals and Means of the War Against Iran<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The official goals are purely military in nature \u2013 dismantling of the nuclear program, destruction of the ballistic missile arsenal and the navy, and cessation of support for Shiite movements in the Muslim world. In a word, this means the complete disarmament of Iran, and it is hard to imagine that any government defending its sovereignty would agree to these terms. Without a transfer of power to a government that is entirely dependent on Washington, it is unlikely that these demands will be met.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As for the possibility of a Washington-friendly government emerging, serious difficulties arise here. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called on Iranians to take to the streets and seize power, but how can such a development be expected when, on the one hand, explosions are raging, and on the other, security forces are firing on demonstrators? Moreover, incidents such as the bombing of a girls\u2019 school or a hospital do not win the USA any friends. Generally speaking, external pressure aimed at overthrowing a government tends to strengthen its cohesion rather than the opposite.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Military pressure clearly did not yield the expected results. The elimination of a significant portion of Iran\u2019s political and military leadership did not lead to capitulation, although this situation is causing concern among the country\u2019s establishment [7]. Despite the losses, the Iranian armed forces launched a counterattack less than two hours after the war began. It turned out that the authorities were prepared to withstand such a blow, and these events clearly caught the USA \u2013&nbsp; Israel coalition off guard. The very fact that the armada\u2019s offensive did not lead to Tehran raising the white flag came as a surprise to Washington, but this did not prompt the USA&nbsp; to develop a \u201cPlan B\u201d.&nbsp;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Such steps are only now being taken. Attempts are underway to form a coalition of those who wish to launch an armed uprising in Iran. According to the White House, the best candidates for this role are the Kurds [8] and the Azerbaijanis [9] \u2013 both ethnic groups constitute the overwhelming majority in northwestern Iran. However, such a development is not a foregone conclusion. Iran\u2019s current President, Masoud Pezeshkian, is of Azerbaijani descent. Azerbaijanis are also predominantly Shia, so they have close religious ties with Persians. Kurds, for the most part, are Sunni Muslims, but they have not had a good experience cooperating with Americans. They live not only in Iran but also in Iraq, T\u00fcrkiye, and Syria.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In 1991, during the first Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush called on Iraqi Kurds to revolt, but after the victory, he offered them no assistance, and the then-dictator Saddam Hussein brutally crushed them. More recently, the USA used the Kurds in Syria to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but after achieving the goal, Washington backed the victor, Ahmed al-Sharaa (an Arab). This raises the question of how far Azerbaijanis and Kurds are willing to risk their lives in this struggle. Moreover, such a tactic will undoubtedly face strong resistance from T\u00fcrkiye, where an armed conflict with the Kurds has been ongoing since 1984, and the prospect of a Kurdish state across the border is a clear red line for Ankara. Therefore, the most promising path for the USA&nbsp; to achieve its goals looks surprisingly thorny.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>A Military Option?<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Indeed, the USA \u2013 Israel coalition has a crushing military advantage over Iran. Iran\u2019s Air Force is relatively weak [10], its air defense was flawed [11], and today it can be said that the coalition has achieved complete air superiority. The situation is similar with the Iranian Navy [12]. The problem is that air and sea superiority are not enough to force Iran to capitulate. The experience of many wars proves this.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For example, in July 1943, during Operation Gomorrah \u2013 the \u201ccarpet bombing\u201d of Hamburg by Anglo-American aircraft \u2013 nearly 45,000 city residents were killed, but this had no strategic effect. It also proved limited in tactical terms, since, despite the destruction of nearly three-quarters of the city and over five hundred industrial enterprises, many of them resumed operations within a month. A similar air raid on Tokyo took place in March 1945 and resulted in 100,000 deaths. The human toll (greater than in Hiroshima or Nagasaki) and the subsequent airstrikes (which killed several hundred thousand more) did not bring Japan to its knees. Recently, the US&nbsp; Air Force had been bombing Houthi forces and government facilities in northern Yemen for nearly two months. After five weeks, the Pentagon estimated that the enemy\u2019s ability to launch missile strikes had decreased by 87%, and drone attacks \u2013 by 65%. However, three weeks later, the USA&nbsp; reached an agreement under which the Houthis agreed not to fire on American \u2013 but not Israeli \u2013 ships. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was unaware of those negotiations and sharply criticized the agreement.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Airstrikes can inflict very painful losses, but they will not necessarily force the enemy to surrender. Therefore, the extent of the losses the Iranians are willing to sustain is of decisive importance. There is no clear answer to this question, but it is worth recalling that, despite the destruction of nearly the entire Gaza Strip, Hamas remains there, and there are no signs that the Palestinians are ready to surrender. Iran\u2019s own experience is also worth noting. In 1980, it was invaded by Iraq and, despite suffering enormous losses over the course of eight years of war (an estimated half a million deaths, including those resulting from mass chemical attacks), emerged from the conflict without losing any territory. It should be noted that Iran fought that war alone, while Iraq was supported by both the West, led by the United States, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, many experts question the coalition\u2019s ability to bring about regime change in Iran without deploying ground troops. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has&nbsp; hinted on such a possibility. However, even a ground invasion does not guarantee success, as demonstrated by the case of the Gaza Strip, the vast majority of which was occupied by Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In this war (until a ground invasion takes place), the struggle will depend on Iran\u2019s ability to carry out attacks using missiles and drones, as well as on the coalition\u2019s ability to neutralize this threat. Iran lacks sufficient defenses against attacks, so, to put it simply, it will face the bombing head-on. The experience of many wars, including the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, shows that in a \u201cdo-or-die\u201d situation, the government is capable of compelling the population to make significant sacrifices; therefore, the Ayatollahs\u2019 rule cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, the situation looks different, since the absence of a victory does not mean defeat for the USA,&nbsp; Israel, and the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf. The coalition may&nbsp; fall apart due to differing priorities or conflicting interests [13].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is also worth paying attention to another important point. Over the past year, 620 missiles were manufactured for the Patriot systems. A significant portion of both this batch and previously stockpiled reserves was sent to Ukraine [14]. Given that it takes at least two missiles to shoot down a single ballistic missile, the coalition\u2019s situation in this regard does not look promising. Cost is a separate issue, as a drone can cost several thousand dollars, while a missile costs over a million.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Political Support for the War<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This raises another important question: support for this war within American society. Despite its initial success, this support is, to put it mildly, limited \u201327% to 41% of Americans view the initiative favorably [15]. This poor outcome stems from a lack of clarity regarding why the current US&nbsp; administration decided to go to war. Typically, in such cases, the President addresses the nation, and members of his administration provide a comprehensive explanation of the actions taken. This time, nothing of the sort happened. On February 28, 2026, immediately after the airstrikes began, Donald Trump posted an eight-minute speech on his Truth Social platform and then avoided journalists all weekend. No senior official appeared on popular political talk shows on Sunday morning. It was not until the third day, during Chancellor Friedrich Merz\u2019s visit, that journalists were able to ask the President questions about the war. Under the US&nbsp; Constitution, the power to declare war rests with Congress, which raised questions about the legality of the entire operation. To address this issue, Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefed key members of Congress on the third day of the war. His reasoning was surprising: he told members of Congress and senators that the USA . had learned of Israel\u2019s plans to bomb Iran and, fearing that Tehran\u2019s response would extend to American bases in the Persian Gulf region, had decided to take preemptive action and enter the war. The next day, President Donald Trump denied this and claimed that he was the one who had forced Israel to start the war. The Secretary of State then had to explain that his previous statement had been misrepresented. In such a situation, it is hard to believe that the US&nbsp; government had any kind of coordinated strategy. Instead, the average supporter of the \u201cAmerica First\u201d ideology might get the impression that it is actually \u201cIsrael First\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This lack of coordination looks even worse in a broader context. A week before the airstrikes began, the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Washington Post<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> published an article discussing serious concerns about the US&nbsp; military\u2019s readiness for the operation, which General Dan Kane,&nbsp; head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had expressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the US&nbsp; Armed Forces. Immediately before the war began, Vice President James D. Vance stated that a protracted conflict was impossible and that only short-term actions were feasible. After the war began, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Reuters<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> reported that US&nbsp; intelligence agencies had also expressed serious reservations about the operation\u2019s success. One might conclude that everyone was working hard to secure some sort of alibi in case of a fiasco. It is therefore difficult to understand why President Donald Trump, in some cases such a competent politician, decided to take the risk.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Malicious internet users have renamed Operation \u201cEpic Rage\u201d to \u201cEpstein&#8217;s Rage\u201d.&nbsp; According to their assumption, the military conflict with Iran is intended to divert public attention from the scandal involving the files of the late financier Jeffrey Epstein, which contain the names of many influential figures, and to save the reputation of the political elite.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This situation could get even worse, because, as the famous saying formulated two centuries ago by Carl von Clausewitz goes, war is waged in a \u201cfog\u201d. Each side begins military operations with a specific plan, but it usually fails to withstand the test of reality on the front lines. Of course, Iran cannot win this war, as the disparity in military strength and resources is enormous, but for Tehran, avoiding total defeat would constitute a victory, whereas the U.S.-Israeli side must achieve its goal\u2014to establish a government that is sympathetic, if not entirely subservient, to its interests. Thus, we are dealing with an extremely interesting phenomenon\u2014on the one hand, a massive asymmetry in military capabilities, and on the other, a disparity in objectives: Iran is a weak player, but it does not need much to succeed.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In this regard, the American society\u2019s attitude&nbsp; to the war will be of great importance. Most members of the establishment are \u201cin favor\u201d,&nbsp; but, as mentioned above, the average citizen does not share this point of view. Over time, if the potential negative consequences of this war become fully apparent \u2013 rising fuel prices and, as a result, rising prices for other goods, further losses of personnel and equipment, and increased military spending \u2013 then the current low level of support could decline even further.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Geostrategic Consequences<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The US&nbsp; National Security Strategy, adopted in late 2025, called for a focus on the Indo-Pacific region. It is no secret that China is the United States\u2019 main rival in the struggle for global leadership. In light of this threat, the armed conflicts in Ukraine and Iran are secondary. At the start of his second term, Donald Trump eagerly implemented a policy aimed, on the one hand, at putting domestic affairs in order \u2013 boosting economic competitiveness, combating far-left ideas, curbing unrestricted immigration, and enhancing internal security \u2013 and on the other, at limiting less important international commitments: forcing Europe to shoulder the burden of defending against a possible Russian invasion and aiding Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">A year later, the situation looks quite different. The Russian-Ukrainian war has not ended, while the USA has launched a regime-change operation in Iran, which could have consequences similar to previous such actions, notably the seemingly laudable attempts to bring democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington risks getting \u201cbogged down\u201d in the Middle East, just as Moscow has been \u201cbogged down\u201d in Ukraine. That would be a mistake with incredibly dire consequences. Not only because the USA&nbsp; is wasting precious time needed to strengthen its position in the Far East, but above all because the American public has grown weary of international military expeditions. Donald Trump\u2019s breach of his campaign promises will undermine trust in the entire political class and could give rise to a movement even more radical than the \u201cMake America Great Again\u201d (MAGA) campaign, which analysts warn about. The \u201cAmerica First\u201d ideology did not entail isolationism, but rather aimed to rationalize involvement in the affairs of other countries. MAGA squared would advocate for the USA\u2019s&nbsp; withdrawal from all of Eurasia.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">To de-escalate the conflict with Iran will not be easy for D. Trump. Not only because it threatens to significantly undermine the image of a global superpower, but also because Iran does not agree to a ceasefire. Last June, exactly this situation arose, and it did not work in Tehran\u2019s favor. Why would the ayatollahs make this mistake a second time?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">A sweeping withdrawal from international commitments may even become necessary if a war with Iran (like the war in Iraq) costs trillions of dollars. The US&nbsp; public sector debt-to-GDP ratio already exceeds 120%, which is higher than it was at the end of World War II.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">China and Russia have every reason to support (without officially acknowledging it) Iran in its confrontation with the United States [16]. The more Washington becomes bogged down in the Middle East, the fewer resources and forces it can deploy to other regions [17]. Iran is also of immense strategic importance to both countries. It protects Russia from American penetration into its \u201csoft underbelly\u201d (Central Asia and Siberia) and provides it with access to the Indian Ocean. For China, on the other hand, it is a vital element of the East-West land route, allowing it to avoid a naval confrontation with the USA, for which it is not prepared.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Volodymyr Palyvoda,<br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">expert in international relations<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><b>Notes:<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[1] On March 18, 2026, the ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) released its \u201cAnnual Threat Assessment\u201d,&nbsp; which points out that Iran has suffered serious losses as a result of military operations and pressure, but remains one of the most dangerous players in the Middle East. Tehran retains the ability to operate through proxy networks, use missiles and drones, and conduct operations against the USA and its allies. The internal situation in the country is unstable. The economic crisis, corruption, and public discontent are undermining stability of the&nbsp; regime. However, this is precisely what makes it more dangerous \u2013 weakened regimes are more likely to take risky steps. Iran will almost certainly seek revenge and the restoration of its capabilities, including elements of its nuclear program.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[2] The liquidation of Secretary of Iran\u2019s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani who was considered the de facto ruler of the country even before the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was undoubtedly a significant success for Israeli intelligence. At the same time, as Western experts point out, he was nonetheless a pragmatic politician open to diplomacy. A few days before the start of the US&nbsp; and Israeli strikes, Ali Larijani flew to Oman for final mediation talks.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[3] Joe Kent was appointed director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)&nbsp; on February 3, 2025.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[4] On March 20, 2026, White House Press Secretary Caroline Levitt issued a statement noting: \u201cThe President an the Pentagon estimated that it would take approximately 4\u20136 weeks to complete the assigned tasks\u201d.&nbsp;<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[5] On September 5, 2025, US&nbsp; President Donald Trump signed an executive order authorizing the use of the name \u201cWar Department\u201d as a parallel designation for the Department of Defense, but only in ceremonial and informal contexts.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[6] According to <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Reuters<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, the Pentagon has requested $200 billion for a war against Iran, and the USA&nbsp; may deploy military forces to Kharg Island, through which 90% of Iran\u2019s oil exports pass. Another objective of this operation is to ensure the passage of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. Western experts point out the contradiction between Donald Trump\u2019s public assurances that there is no plan for a ground operation and the simultaneous preparation of a large budget request for a protracted campaign. On March 20, 2026, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Fox News<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> reported that the USA&nbsp; had deployed an amphibious task force of 4,500 sailors and Marines to the Middle East.<br \/>\n<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[7] According to foreign media reports, following the liquidation&nbsp; of Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council; his deputy, Ali Bateni; Gholamreza Soleimani, head of the Basij volunteer paramilitary force within the IRGC; and Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib, Iranian high-ranking officials are frightened and fear for their safety. They are all wondering who will be the next target, as Israel will not stop until all the country\u2019s leaders have been killed and the Islamic Republic has been overthrown.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[8] According to estimates, 3 to 5 million Kurds live in Iran, accounting for 3 to 5% of the country\u2019s population. Unlike the majority of Iran\u2019s population, who are Shia, most Kurds are Sunni. This religious difference, along with cultural and linguistic distinctions, exacerbates tensions between the Kurds and the central government. Kurdish political and armed organizations are actively fighting for autonomy or self-determination.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[9] According to estimates, 25 to 35 million Azerbaijanis live in Iran, accounting for 35 to 42% of the country\u2019s population.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[10] Due to international sanctions and embargoes, Iran has long faced difficulties in acquiring modern aircraft, spare parts, and technologies for the repair and modernization of its air force. The Iranian Air Force relied heavily on obsolete Soviet and American-made aircraft purchased before the 1979 revolution or in the 1980s. This reduced their combat effectiveness and reliability. Due to Iran\u2019s isolation and sanctions, it was difficult to maintain a high level of training for flight crews and technical personnel.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[11] Iran\u2019s air defense relied on outdated Soviet and Chinese systems, which do not always effectively detect modern targets, especially small drones and high-tech missiles. It also proved insufficiently large-scale and extensive to effectively withstand massive strikes involving hundreds of missiles and drones simultaneously. Such attacks can \u201coverload\u201d the system, leading to its partial or complete paralysis. Iran did not have a sufficient number of modern air defense systems capable of effectively countering the latest means of air attack, in particular precision-guided missiles and drones equipped with electronic warfare capabilities. During previous military campaigns, particularly in conflicts with Israel, a significant portion of Iran\u2019s layered air defense system was destroyed or rendered inoperable, weakening its overall defense capabilities.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[12] During the war against Iran, the USA&nbsp; sank a significant number of Iranian Navy ships using tactical ballistic missiles. The list includes at least one Project 877 \u201cVarshavianka\u201d submarine. Iran had a total of three such submarines, which spent more time in dry dock than at sea. The contract for their delivery to Tehran was signed by the USSR, but fulfilled by Russia.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[13] Donald Trump is trying to publicly distance himself from the riskiest aspect of the escalation \u2013 strikes on oil and gas facilities \u2013 and has demanded that Israel cease its attacks on Iran\u2019s energy infrastructure. Benjamin Netanyahu has so far agreed not to do so, but it is unclear how this will fit into Israel\u2019s broader strategy of deterrence and pressure against Iran.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[14] On March 19, 2026, US&nbsp; Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that ammunition stocks are depleted, in part due to shipments to Ukraine. According to him, the United States must now use its ammunition primarily for its own needs, rather than supplying it to others.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[15] The difference in the figures depends on the specific poll and the wording of the questions, but overall, less than half of the USA\u2019s &nbsp; population approves of this war.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[16] On March 14, 2026, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Abbas Araghchi stated that his country continued military cooperation with Russia and China even during the war in the Middle East. Earlier, US&nbsp; media, citing intelligence sources, reported that Russia was sharing intelligence with Iran regarding the deployment of US&nbsp; military bases. Of course, the Russians officially denied this, and Donald Trump himself stated that there was \u201cno reason to believe\u201d that Moscow was helping Tehran. However, he later acknowledged that Russia \u201cmay be providing some\u201d assistance to Iran during the Israeli-American operation in the region. On March 17, 2026, the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Wall Street Journal<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> reported that Russia was not only sharing satellite intelligence data with the Iranians but also sharing its experience with the use of UAVs gained in Ukraine.<br \/>\n<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[17] During a hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 18, 2026, CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated that the USA&nbsp; would continue to support Ukraine in its war with Russia, despite the escalation surrounding Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n<p>On March 16, 2026, the Washington Post reported that the US intelligence community had found no signs of a split within Iran\u2019s leadership following the launch of Operation \u201cEpic Fury\u201d.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33200,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-33199","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Will Iran Become the \u201cUkraine\u201d to the United States? 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