{"id":33202,"date":"2026-03-24T00:01:23","date_gmt":"2026-03-23T21:01:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33202"},"modified":"2026-03-24T18:39:37","modified_gmt":"2026-03-24T15:39:37","slug":"kriza-vladi-v-rosi%d1%97-ta-%d1%97%d1%97-naslidki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-chastina-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/kriza-vladi-v-rosi%d1%97-ta-%d1%97%d1%97-naslidki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-chastina-1\/","title":{"rendered":"The Crisis of Power in Russia and Its Consequences for Ukraine. Part 1"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: justify;\">The Crisis of Power in Russia and Its Consequences for Ukraine<\/h1>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Part I. Russia Is Beginning to Awaken. Signs of Preparations for a Coup in the Country<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Dissatisfaction with Putin\u2019s policies is spreading in Russia, as these policies are having negative consequences for the country and all strata of its society;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">this is beginning to be openly demonstrated by representatives of the Russian government, the media, and ordinary citizens alike;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Putin senses that the country\u2019s ruling elite may betray him, so he is shifting to remote control of the government;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">the result of these processes is a weakening of the Russian president\u2019s position, which could lead to his loss of power.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Everybody with common sense has long realized that the main obstacle to ending Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine is Putin\u2019s stance. He is determined to achieve his goals at any cost.<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> For him, the destruction of Ukraine has become the main goal of his life and a personal obsession of his maniacal nature. All the more so because the war has now gone so far that not only his power but his physical survival as well depends on its outcome. Therefore, he is ready to pay any price for victory over Ukraine and is trying to make this a reality. To this end, he has already sacrificed the lives of circa&nbsp; 1.3 million Russians who have died on the front lines or suffered severe injuries, Russia\u2019s economy, which is already on the brink of collapse, as well as the country\u2019s geopolitical interests in key regions of the world.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As a result, the Kremlin dictator has jeopardized the very existence of Russia as a single, unified state, yet he has still failed to achieve his desired outcome. And he will likely never be able to do so, as his so-called \u201cspecial military operation\u201d has finally reached a dead end. This is quite evident, as confirmed by events on the front lines. Not only is Russia unable to break through the front lines and force Ukraine to surrender, but it is also losing the territories it has occupied.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The vast majority of the Russian population \u2013 from oligarchs and ministers to ordinary citizens \u2013 has already begun to experience the negative consequences of Putin\u2019s actions. Society is suffering from the war; citizens are losing their incomes; and Western sanctions are not only undermining well-being, they are posing a threat to health and life. There are also those who believe that Russia is following in the footsteps of the former Soviet Union, and thus warn against it repeating the latter\u2019s fate.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In this regard, people in Russia are not only beginning to view Putin negatively, but are also realizing the need to remove him from power as the primary source of the country\u2019s domestic and foreign problems. And some are already determined to take concrete steps in this direction. Indeed, there are already certain signs of preparations for a possible coup d\u2019\u00e9tat in the Russian Federation. These emerged as early as last year, when Russia\u2019s economy began to plunge into crisis and the war reached a stalemate.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Since the summer of 2025, top Russian officials \u2013 or more precisely, the oligarchs behind them \u2013 have begun taking steps to counter Putin\u2019s destructive course. This was done through public demonstrations of the country\u2019s economic problems, intended to influence Putin. In particular, one of the most high-profile moves was made during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2025. In their speeches, Russian Minister of Economic Development M. Reshetnikov, Minister of Finance A. Siluanov, Governor of the Central Bank of Russia E. Nabiullina, Sberbank CEO G. Gref, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Budget and Taxes A. Makarov, and a number of other government officials, politicians, and businesspeople described the economic situation in the country as one on the brink of a deep crisis. Their remarks could not yet be interpreted as a rebellion against Putin, but they did send a clear signal. For the first time, Russian government officials allowed themselves to openly disagree with Putin, who had been emphasizing the successes of the Russian economy \u2013 including at that very forum.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, instances began to arise where the government failed to carry out Putin\u2019s orders. For example, in June of last year, Putin tasked the government with reducing the share of imports in GDP to below 17% by 2030. However, Minister of Economic Development of the RF M. Reshetnikov set entirely different goals, which involved balancing trade by increasing imports of goods from Russia\u2019s partner countries.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The same applied to plans to introduce the digital ruble in Russia. Putin ordered the Central Bank to accelerate this process in order to ensure the possibility of widespread use of such a payment method as soon as possible. However, the Central Bank\u2019s leadership is in no hurry to carry out Putin\u2019s order. In other words, the Russian government began acting partially independently of Putin as early as last year, something that was previously completely impossible.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Putin has also begun to be shut out of the real information space.<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> This was not too difficult to achieve, since he, like any dictator, tends to believe only what he wants to hear. The country\u2019s military leadership directly exploits these characteristic traits of the Russian president, feeding him false impressions about the course of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. The most high-profile example of this is the public statement made last December by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces V. Gerasimov, claiming that Russian forces had captured the city of Kupiansk. As everyone knows, this did not happen.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Similarly, the President\u2019s Economic Advisor, M. Oreshkin, assures Putin of the positive dynamics of the Russian economy and the absence of any significant problems there. In this way, they prevent attempts by representatives of the Russian government to convey to the President what is actually happening in the country\u2019s economy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is quite evident that Putin is being misinformed regarding the personal qualities, plans, and intentions of US President Donald Trump. And this is not being done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which publicly speaks the truth about him, but by the leadership of the Russian intelligence services. As a result, Putin makes ill-advised decisions that the government, once again, fails to implement. Or, when implemented, they lead to negative consequences for Russia, putting him in an awkward position. In both cases, this undermines Putin\u2019s authority \u2013 and, with it, his power. An example is his orders to capture certain settlements or territories by arbitrary deadlines. As a rule, such orders are not carried out and only generate yet another round of disinformation from the Russian military command.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Putin\u2019s orders in the economic sphere are just as detached from reality, particularly regarding the rapid restoration of high growth rates in the Russian economy. The latest such directive to the government came in February of this year, demanding that economic growth rates be raised to a level higher than the global average in the very near future. And this amid a sharp acceleration of crisis processes in the country. It is no surprise that the government, effectively ignoring his demands, simply issued a formal reply.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Finally, Putin\u2019s hopes that US&nbsp; President Donald Trump would be favorable toward both him personally and Russia proved to be completely groundless. He also hoped that Trump would be willing to \u201cdivide\u201d the world with Putin, dismantle NATO, and force Ukraine to capitulate. All of Putin\u2019s hopes turned out to be in vain. In reality, Trump\u2019s policy only appeared to be that way. In fact, he is trying to weaken Russia as the United States\u2019 main military adversary and competitor in the global energy market. At present, Trump has practically achieved his goal. Russia is in a deep crisis, and a temporary rise in oil prices resulting from the USA and Israel\u2019s war against Iran will not save it. Moreover, D. Trump has taken away Russia\u2019s European oil and gas market, which was the RF\u2019s&nbsp; main source of budget revenue. Despite the fact that D. Trump has indeed created problems in relations between the USA&nbsp; and Europe, he has not only failed to destroy NATO but, on the contrary, has helped strengthen its European component. Indeed, the USA&nbsp; has pushed Europe to implement a large-scale rearmament program, which has significantly increased its ability to counter Russia. Putin was also disappointed with D. Trump\u2019s attitude to Ukraine. For example, the USA has stopped providing financial aid to Ukraine, but continues to supply it with weapons through NATO and using European funds. D. Trump is indeed pressuring Ukraine to hand over the entire Donbas region to Russia. However, he is not imposing sanctions or restrictions on Ukraine in this regard. The USA&nbsp; imposes such measures only against the Russian Federation and its partners, as was the case with the Russian companies Lukoil and Rosneft, as well as with India.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Most likely, Putin is finally beginning to realize what is actually happening. He has also sensed a threat to his rule. That is why, since last December, he has sharply reduced his public political activity and has practically stopped appearing in public<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. According to a number of assessments, he is mostly hiding in his bunkers under heavy guard.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">An additional factor that pushed Putin in this direction was the lightning-fast USA\u2019s&nbsp; operation in Venezuela, during which President N. Maduro was captured, and the local authorities were forced to pursue a pro-American policy. Also, the war launched by the USA&nbsp; against Iran and liquidation&nbsp; of its leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and a number of other high-ranking officials.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Through all of this, Donald Trump is not only demonstrating his utter contempt for Moscow and its interests; it is also perceived by Moscow as the USA preparing to attack Russia. A particular shock for Putin was the betrayal by the bodyguards of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro and Ali Khamenei, which undermined his trust in his own security detail. As a result, since January and especially since March of this year, Putin has retreated even further into the background and begun to govern the country remotely.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Such actions by Putin have begun to weaken his power, as remote governance does not allow for full control over the situation in the country. Certain political forces dreaming of change in the country have clearly taken advantage of this. A manifestation of this is the spread of negative assessments of the situation in the country in Russia\u2019s information space, which has been occurring since February of this year. Initially, these were disseminated by little-known bloggers, and later representatives of the Z-community joined in. Their comments mainly focus on the worsening economic problems in Russia, the failure of the so-called \u201cspecial military operation\u201d,&nbsp; and Moscow\u2019s inability to adequately respond to the USA\u2019s&nbsp; actions in Venezuela and Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">They did not target Putin personally or other members of Russia\u2019s top leadership, but even before this, their statements would have been equated with extremism and the discrediting of the Russian army. People were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms for significantly milder criticism of what was happening in the country. In February and March of this year, Russian authorities did not resort to any repression.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As a result, critical activism in Russia reached a qualitatively new level and took on the character of a mass information campaign. Even some members of the Russian State Duma joined in, not to mention top bloggers. Since February of this year, they have begun to openly criticize the leadership, though they still did not mention Putin himself.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In this regard, the most resonant was the February statement by&nbsp; M. Arefiev, the&nbsp; deputy head of the State Duma\u2019s Committee on Economic Policy,&nbsp; who accused the country\u2019s authorities of destroying the state\u2019s economy. He also predicted a deep crisis in the country in 2026. This forecast was essentially made against the background of Russian media reports on Putin\u2019s aforementioned directive to the government to accelerate the country\u2019s growth rate to exceed global averages.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It was later endorsed by G. Zyuganov, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RF, who sharply criticized the report on the Russian government\u2019s performance in 2025. His criticism primarily concerned the financial and economic sector, Central Bank policy, the housing and utilities sector, and, in general, the country\u2019s political system.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">And in March of this year, retired Colonel General L. Ivashov, former head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense, publicly acknowledged the failure of the \u201cSpecial Military Operation,\u201d predicting the collapse of Russia as early as 2027. At the same time, he highlighted the negative aspects of the Russian military command\u2019s activities and the practices that dominate the Russian army. These critics were not punished. Only a few Russian propagandists condemned their statements.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Another telling aspect of the Russian media\u2019s activities is the portrayal of Putin as an old and frail man who, in fact, is no longer capable of effectively governing the country. One example is the allegedly&nbsp; accidental publication on the presidential administration\u2019s website of a draft message in which Putin congratulates women on International Women\u2019s Day. In the video, he is coughing and gasping for breath, which clearly indicates his poor health. In the view of most experts, such a video could not have appeared by mistake in the public domain, since everything concerning Putin personally is thoroughly vetted.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>The criticism of the leadership of the RF reached its peak with a series of posts by the well-known pro-Kremlin Russian blogger I. Remeslo on March 17\u201318 of this year<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. He described the war against Ukraine as a dead-end conflict that only inflicts damage on Russia, and also called for Putin to be tried as an illegitimate president, a war criminal, and an embezzler of state funds.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This sparked a widespread and intense reaction in Russia and around the world. It was, actually,&nbsp; the first and, so far, the only such incident. All the more so because, until then, I. Remeslo had held firm pro-government positions, supported Russia\u2019s leadership, and criticized the opposition. Besides, he personally wrote a series of denunciations against Russian opposition leader A. Navalny and his associates regarding alleged fraud in their Anti-Corruption Foundation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Russia\u2019s authorities once again showed virtually no reaction and took no repressive measures against I. Remeslo. The blogger was merely admitted to a psychiatric hospital. But his father and sister are psychiatrists. Therefore, this looks less like the repressive psychiatry that existed in the former Soviet Union and more like the fact that he was simply temporarily hidden away.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Against this backdrop, in February and March of this year, a conflict situation arose and is escalating in some regions of Siberia, over the veterinary authorities\u2019 forcible seizure from farmers of livestock, which is then destroyed.<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> This is supposedly explained by the need to prevent the spread of a dangerous infectious animal disease. However, this has caused distrust among the public, as veterinary officials cannot confirm the existence of an epidemic and do not allow farmers to send biological samples for independent testing. Moreover, in many cases, those carrying out the seizure and destruction of livestock do not have the necessary documentation. And the compensation does not cover the losses.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As a result, farmers are losing their primary assets \u2013 and with them, their livelihoods. Local authorities are failing to provide adequate assistance and are generally avoiding contact with those affected. Rumors are also fueling tensions, suggesting that livestock is actually being seized and destroyed not because of an epidemic, but in the interests of the company \u201cMiratorg\u201d,&nbsp; which is attempting to become a monopoly in Russia\u2019s meat and dairy market. Moreover, the company is allegedly linked to&nbsp; Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council, former President and Prime Minister D. Medvedev.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In response, people have begun to resort to &nbsp; protests and are urging their relatives among the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d participants to leave Ukraine and return home armed to defend their interests and property. The authorities are using force against them, which further increases tensions in the region. However, the consequences are even broader. The destruction of hundreds of head of livestock will inevitably lead to a meat shortage in Russia and a sharp rise in meat prices, which will become yet another factor exacerbating social tensions in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><strong>Yurii Ilchenko,<\/strong><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><em>(Image generated by neural network)<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yurii Ilchenko<\/p>\n<p>Russia Is Beginning to Awaken. Signs of Preparations for a Coup in the Country<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33203,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[268],"class_list":["post-33202","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-ilchenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Crisis of Power in Russia and Its Consequences for Ukraine. 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