{"id":33213,"date":"2026-03-25T00:01:49","date_gmt":"2026-03-24T21:01:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33213"},"modified":"2026-03-25T12:36:10","modified_gmt":"2026-03-25T09:36:10","slug":"kriza-vladi-v-rosi%d1%97-ta-%d1%97%d1%97-naslidki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-chastina-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/kriza-vladi-v-rosi%d1%97-ta-%d1%97%d1%97-naslidki-dlya-ukra%d1%97ni-chastina-2\/","title":{"rendered":"The Power Crisis in Russia and Its Implications for Ukraine. Part II"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">The Power Crisis in Russia and Its Implications for Ukraine<\/h1>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\">Part II. On the Brink of Change. The Initiators of the Coup in Russia and Their Actions in the Final Stage of the Change in State Power<\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Putin\u2019s opponents are mainly oligarchs who are dissatisfied with his current redistribution of property. They are supported by a certain segment of the ruling elite;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">at present, they have nearly created the conditions to launch active measures to remove Putin from power. The method \u2013 to destabilize the situation in the country;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Putin and his inner circle are trying to take certain countermeasures. In particular, they are strengthening the security forces under their control;<br \/>\n<\/span><\/i><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">all of this could serve as a basis for a civil war to break out in Russia, leading to its subsequent collapse. In such a case, Ukraine would have the opportunity to regain control over its lost territories.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>The circumstances surrounding Putin give the impression that certain forces are deliberately acting within Russia and, likely, beyond its borders with the aim of creating conditions to remove him from power.<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> It is hard to tell exactly who these forces are at this point, but they most likely include some Russian oligarchs who are dissatisfied with the policies of the current president of the Russian Federation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Their core is undoubtedly made up of members of the so-called \u201cfamily\u201d of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin \u2013 namely, the group of oligarchs that emerged and took shape under his rule, along with their descendants. As the economic crisis in the country worsened, Putin began confiscating their property, transferring it to a new generation of oligarchic circles that had formed specifically around him. This is one of the ways he is consolidating his power with the help of those loyal to him.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Of course, the old oligarchic clans disagree with this and may have begun to join forces to remove Putin from power and replace him with their own representative. Moreover, according to some estimates, they have allies within Putin\u2019s inner circle, in particular, first deputy head of his administration, S. Kirienko. He is not a liberal, does not respect Ukraine, and has supported Putin\u2019s policies. However, he may have realized where they would lead. In fact, S. Kirienko controls Russia\u2019s information sphere. Therefore, he could initiate a wave of criticism against the Russian president in the Russian information space.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is quite likely that such oligarchs are attempting to co-opt one of the heads of Russia\u2019s intelligence agencies or law enforcement agencies. At least it is known that the person \u201coverseeing\u201d Putin on their behalf is the current Secretary of the Russian Security Council and former Defense Minister, S. Shoigu. This is precisely why Putin has been unable to definitively remove him from power or bring him to trial for large-scale corruption-related abuses. It is quite possible that such activities by representatives of Boris Yeltsin\u2019s \u201cfamily\u201d are supported by someone in the FSB leadership.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Such efforts to remove Putin from power are standard in nature. The implementation of certain plans through non-military means can be done in several stages.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The first of these is the discrediting of the head of state, namely Putin. Currently, this is being carried out in the form of an information campaign with negative coverage of the situation in Russia, emphasizing its internal and external problems. Naturally, these are linked to the Russian president\u2019s activities. As previously noted, this campaign could have been organized by S. Kirienko, with bloggers, experts, and propagandists serving as its executors \u2013 who may not even know why or how they are being used.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the second stage, Putin\u2019s power begins to wane. This has already been partially achieved by intimidating him with the prospect of suffering the same fate as Nicol\u00e1s Maduro or Ali Khamenei, who were betrayed by their inner circles and bodyguards. In fact, Putin has now stepped back from public appearances and is carrying out his duties remotely. In other words, he has transformed from the country\u2019s actual leader into a figurehead.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The third stage involves provoking and intensifying protest sentiment in the country. This may be achieved by seizing livestock en masse from Siberian farmers and destroying it, causing people to lose not only their property but also all means of subsistence. This creates the groundwork for a social explosion and rebellion in the Siberian region of the country, which will divert the forces of the Russian National Guard from the western part of Russia and could become the trigger for a general social explosion. This could be exacerbated by the failures of the Russian Armed Forces on the front lines in Ukraine, particularly the setbacks of the spring-summer offensive, which resulted in heavy losses among Russian troops and equipment. Currently, elements of such a scenario are already unfolding. All of this could provoke a situation similar to the rebellion led by V. Prigozhin and his march on Moscow. This will be carefully planned and organized by Putin\u2019s current opponents, including with the involvement of influential Russian generals who will agree to lead such actions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the fourth stage, all these circumstances will be used to directly remove Putin from power. Thus, based on past experience, mass unrest in Russia could force him to hide in one of the bunkers in a remote region of the country, specifically in Altai. After that, he will lose contact, and a new governing body similar to the State Committee for Emergency Situations will be established in Moscow, which will assume full power in the country and stabilize the situation through the forceful suppression of public protests and promises to resolve existing problems. And the blame for these actions will be shifted onto Putin. This is a common tradition in Russia, where each new leader accuses the previous one of all the country\u2019s woes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Putin and his inner circle cannot fail to foresee such a scenario. That is why they are trying to keep the reins of power firmly in their hands.<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> In this endeavor, Putin relies on the \u201chawks\u201d in his inner circle, who also want to continue the war against Ukraine at all costs. According to reports from representatives of the Russian opposition, the main figure among these \u201cwar hawks\u201d is I. Sechin. He previously served as Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and now heads the state-owned oil company Rosneft. In other words, he is Putin\u2019s \u201coverseer\u201d of the government, overseeing the main source of his revenue. Besides, I. Sechin is reportedly involved in overseeing Russia\u2019s intelligence services.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As part of efforts to consolidate his power, Putin is focusing on strengthening Russia\u2019s National Guard \u2013Rosgvardia \u2013 as the main pillar of his regime. On February 11 of this year, he approved regulations governing the Rosgvardia\u2019s General Staff. Among other things, its tasks include participation in the formulation and implementation of state policy, domestic intelligence within the country, as well as the development and use of information technologies.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Putin held an operational meeting with the permanent members of the Russian Federation Security Council on February 27 of this year. Issues related to the protection of the foundations of the country\u2019s constitutional order were discussed. The decisions made have not been made public, but they may have concerned countering possible attempts to overthrow the current government in various ways.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">According to most assessments, it was for this very purpose \u2013 and not to hinder Ukraine\u2019s use of UAVs \u2013 that Russian authorities began shutting down mobile internet in Moscow and other major Russian cities in March of this year. Prior to that, the popular video-sharing platform YouTube and the messaging app Telegram had already been blocked. This did indeed create additional obstacles to organizing mass protests, but it also served as an additional factor in escalating tensions and spreading such sentiments within Russian society. Indeed, on Russian social media platforms that are still operational, calls are spreading for citizens to participate in protests on March 29 of this year.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>In other words, Putin will certainly defend himself by any means, including the use of force. And this could directly threaten the outbreak of a civil war in Russia.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Such an outcome would be the best for Ukraine, as it would shatter the Russian front, allowing our country to restore its territorial integrity. However, after that, Ukraine will face a host of problems related to the need to rebuild the de-occupied territories, as well as their political, economic, and ideological reintegration.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Our front line will hold, which will make it possible to contain the sources of instability emanating from Russia \u2013 the consequences of any civil war. These include massive flows of refugees and migrants, the spread of cross-border crime, and an increase in the illicit trade in weapons. After all, there will be a vast amount of them in free circulation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, there will be a problem with controlling Russian nuclear weapons. They could fall into the hands of any party to the civil war and be used both in Russia and against other countries, including Ukraine. To be sure, the USA has established specific contingency plans to prevent such a scenario. These were developed and refined even before the collapse of the Soviet Union and called for the deployment of Special Forces to secure Russian stockpiles of nuclear munitions and the delivery systems on which they are deployed.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, a much worse scenario cannot be ruled out. As a result of a civil war, a military junta could seize power in Russia. It would continue the war against Ukraine with even greater intensity. However, to do so, it would first need to restore the normal functioning of the Russian economy. And that is an extremely difficult task.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>So, Putin\u2019s policies are causing increasingly negative consequences for Russia, which are beginning to reach a critical point. First and foremost, this concerns his desire to continue the war against Ukraine until its complete destruction. As a result of the ruling regime\u2019s actions, the Russian Federation has suffered unacceptably high human casualties and material losses, plunging it into an economic crisis, causing it to lose its positions in regions of the world that are important to it, and leaving it facing the threat of disintegration, as once happened to the USSR.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>The aforementioned problems affect the interests of the majority of Russian society and are causing dissatisfaction with the country\u2019s leadership. At this, people at all levels are beginning to realize the fallacy of Putin\u2019s course, which is leading Russia into a dead-end existence with no positive prospects for the country.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>In the current situation, certain political and oligarchic forces in Russia are attempting to take action to change the government. At present, these efforts are aimed at discrediting Putin and weakening his hold on power, as well as laying the groundwork for social unrest. All of this is already yielding certain results.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>At the same time, Putin is not giving up power and is doing his best to retain it, including through the use of force. As a result, there is a risk of civil war breaking out in Russia, which could lead to the collapse of its front in Ukraine.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Thanks to such further development of events, Ukraine will have the opportunity to regain control over the lost territories. And if Russia were to disintegrate, it would no longer be able to pose a threat to the security of Ukraine, Europe, and the world at large.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Yurii Ilchenko,<br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yurii Ilchenko<\/p>\n<p>The Initiators of the Coup in Russia and Their Actions in the Final Stage of the Change in State Power<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33214,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[268],"class_list":["post-33213","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-ilchenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Power Crisis in Russia and Its Implications for Ukraine. 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