{"id":33280,"date":"2026-04-01T00:04:24","date_gmt":"2026-03-31T21:04:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33280"},"modified":"2026-04-04T14:49:52","modified_gmt":"2026-04-04T11:49:52","slug":"33280","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/33280\/","title":{"rendered":"War and Intelligence"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: justify;\">War and Intelligence: How Operation Epic Fury Is Changing the Rules of the Game<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Operation Epic Fury is one of the most striking examples of the transformation of modern armed conflicts, in which the line between military operations and intelligence operations is becoming increasingly blurred. In the traditional model of warfare, intelligence primarily served a preparatory function: its task was to identify the enemy\u2019s capabilities and vulnerabilities and to gather information enabling the effective conduct of military operations. However, in the case of Operation Epic Fury this dynamic has shifted significantly. Available media reports and expert analyses indicate that intelligence activities were not merely a stage preceding the use of military force, but became one of the primary tools for conducting the operation itself.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As Western experts note, Israel began preparations for this operation [1] long before the open phase of the conflict. These preparations included both,&nbsp; the agents\u2019 infiltrating into&nbsp; Iran\u2019s government and military structures and developing the&nbsp; already existing agent networks capable of carrying out sabotage at the appropriate moment.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The conflict began on February 28, 2026, with joint USA&nbsp; and Israel\u2019s strikes on targets in Iran, while subsequent actions were partly based on information provided by sources operating directly on the ground. This sequence of events suggests that intelligence operations were not merely a background to the military operation, but rather its first and most covert phase.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The most compelling example of this approach is the story of the Israeli intelligence service\u2019s long-term infiltration of Iran. According to one account, the Mossad began establishing its network of agents in Iran around 2010. The goal of this operation was not only to collect&nbsp; intelligence but also to prepare sabotage operations against military infrastructure. For example, at the start of the operation, to neutralize air defense systems, over a hundred human intelligence sources and collaborators were activated; among other tasks, they were entrusted with jamming radar systems, identifying targets, and preparing conditions for subsequent airstrikes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It should be noted, however, that not all details of these operations can be independently verified based on publicly available sources. Nevertheless, comparing various data allows us to reconstruct the overall operational logic: Israel\u2019s advantage did not arise from a single breakthrough in the enemy\u2019s defense system, but rather from a prolonged process of establishing operational access to its structures.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">From this point of view, intelligence is not merely a tool for supporting military operations, but an integral element of strategic maneuvering. If the intelligence network was capable of identifying targets, carrying out sabotage operations, and helping to breach air defense systems, this means that the first phase of the operation took place even before the appearance of aircraft, missiles, and official military communications. It is exactly for this reason that intelligence operations were aimed at depriving Iran of the ability to conduct surveillance, respond, and coordinate its actions even before the conflict entered a visible military phase.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The second key element of the operation was intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel [2]. An analysis of available materials indicates that this was not merely a classic alliance in which one side provides information to the other. A more accurate description appears to be a model of multi-level cooperation encompassing infiltration into the enemy\u2019s environment, real-time target identification, and strategic assessment of the situation.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Israel\u2019s strikes were partly based on information provided by agents operating within Tehran. These sources indicated, in particular, the locations of checkpoints operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij [3]. Taken together, these data suggest that the operation was based on a combination of two components: sustained infiltration and the use of operational intelligence for precise targeting.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Experts also emphasize the importance of involving local agents. For instance, Rafael Jerusalem, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, stated in an interview with TF1 Info that many operations attributed to Israel [4] were made possible through cooperation with individuals operating directly within Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This means that even the most technologically advanced operations depend to a significant extent on people operating within the enemy\u2019s environment. Individuals who cooperate with Israel\u2019s&nbsp; intelligence may be motivated by various factors \u2013 in some cases, opposition to the political system; in others, pragmatic considerations, such as making money or subsequently emigrating to the West.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The operational capabilities of Israeli intelligence also include a large Jewish community of Iranian origin, the formation of which began after the 1979 Islamic Revolution [5]. According to data from Israel\u2019s Central Bureau of Statistics and studies on Jewish migration from Iran, approximately 135,000\u2013150,000 people of Iranian origin currently reside in Israel (including those born in Iran and their descendants born in Israel) [6]. Part of this community retains knowledge of the Persian language (Farsi), has a good understanding of the social and cultural realities of Iran, and is familiar with behavioral patterns characteristic of Iranian society. It is precisely this element that serves as a potential factor facilitating infiltration into the enemy\u2019s environment and operating within local conditions without arousing suspicion.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is worth noting that the use of the diaspora in intelligence operations is not unique to Israel. In the specialized literature, this is described as one of the classic methods for gaining operational access to the enemy\u2019s environment. Members of \u00e9migr\u00e9 communities not only know the language, culture, and local customs; they often maintain family or business ties in their countries of origin.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Other intelligence services operated in a similar manner. During the Cold War, both the CIA and the Soviet KGB used emigrants to conduct intelligence and influence operations. Currently, this practice is being applied with redoubled intensity by the Russian Federation\u2019s special services. An analysis of contemporary Chinese intelligence operations also indicates the use of members of the Chinese diaspora for activities related to technology transfer and the collection of economic intelligence [7].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">An analysis of the activities of Iranian intelligence services shows that they view the diaspora both as a target for monitoring opposition activities and as a potential source for collecting information or establishing operational contacts. The Freedom House report emphasizes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is among the countries that are particularly active in targeting their own diasporas abroad [8].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As mentioned above, for nearly fifteen years, Israel\u2019s intelligence has been creating an agent network in Iran, which included the systematic recruitment of informants, reconnaissance of military infrastructure, and identification of vulnerabilities in the Iranian defense system. In this model, intelligence did not perform a purely informational function but served as an active tool in shaping the operational environment. In this sense, the prolonged infiltration of Israeli intelligence services into Iran can be interpreted as part of a strategy referred to in military literature as \u201cpreparation of the battlefield\u201d.&nbsp; Thus, Operation Epic Fury&nbsp; was not merely a sudden escalation of the conflict, but the culmination of a much longer process of intelligence operations, the most visible phase of which was the military strikes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">An equally important element of this conflict is the response of Iran\u2019s intelligence services, which have spent years building their own counterintelligence structures and internal control systems to counter the infiltration of foreign intelligence agencies. In Iran\u2019s case, this system is particularly complex, as it is not based on a single central body but on several parallel centers responsible for national security and the protection of the regime \u2013 primarily the Ministry of Intelligence and the intelligence structures of the IRGC.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The conflict has also taken on a clear psychological dimension. Some operations attributed to Israeli intelligence can be interpreted as actions aimed at instilling a sense of insecurity among the Iranian political and military elite and fostering the belief in deep infiltration of the state apparatus. Large-scale sabotage and the elimination of high-ranking officials serve not only a military-intelligence function but also a strategic one \u2013 they demonstrate the inevitability of retribution and the omnipresence of Israel\u2019s intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In response to the attack, Iranian intelligence services reported the arrests of individuals suspected of collaborating with foreign intelligence agencies. On the one hand, this may indicate genuine attempts to neutralize spy networks, and on the other, it may serve as a public statement intended to restore the impression of control over the situation [9].<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Thus, Operation Epic Fury is unfolding simultaneously on several levels: military, intelligence, sabotage, psychological, and informational. The boundaries between these spheres are blurring, and success depends not only on the ability to inflict losses but also on the ability to shape the enemy\u2019s perceptions and reactions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, the growing role of technology in the target identification process carries a significant risk of operational errors. Systems based on satellite data, intelligence, and data analysis algorithms can significantly speed up decision-making, but their effectiveness depends largely on the quality of the input data and its correct interpretation. The lack of verification by human intelligence sources can lead to tragic mistakes, such as the attack on a girls\u2019 boarding school that was mistakenly identified as a military target.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Volodymyr Palyvoda,<br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">expert in international relations<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><em><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u2018Operation Epic Fury\u2019, a secret military pact to weaponize OpenAI.&nbsp;<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Collage https:\/\/medium.com\/<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><b>Notes:<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[1] In Israel, the operation was codenamed \u201cRoaring Lion.\u201d<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[2] Intelligence cooperation between the two countries takes place within the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding signed for a period of 10 years (2019\u20132028).<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[3] A volunteer paramilitary unit established in 1979 by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and subordinate to the IRGC. Its main tasks include maintaining public order, suppressing internal protests, and enforcing Islamic norms of behavior.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[4] Israel traditionally neither confirms nor denies its involvement in the elimination of its enemies. This policy is known as the \u201cpolicy of silence\u201d or \u201cneither confirm nor deny\u201d.&nbsp; It allows Israel to avoid direct responsibility in the public sphere while maintaining flexibility in conducting covert operations.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[5] Israel\u2019s 8<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">th<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> President (2000\u20132007), Moshe Katsav, was of Iranian descent, as were former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces and Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz.<br \/>\n<\/span><\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[6] By 1979, the Jewish community in Iran numbered 80,000 to 100,000 people. Despite the mass emigration of Jews from the country following the establishment of a theocratic Islamic regime there, approximately 8,000 to 9,000 Jews remain in Iran, always ready to provide assistance to their historic homeland.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[7] China\u2019s&nbsp; Law \u201cOn Intelligence\u201d,&nbsp; adopted in 2017, requires Chinese citizens, including those abroad, to cooperate with Chinese intelligence. Formally, the law does not apply to so-called Huaqiao (ethnic Chinese who do not hold Chinese citizenship), but if they refuse to cooperate with PRC intelligence, this could have negative consequences for their family and friends in China.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[8] According to the latest data, nearly 4 million Iranians live outside Iran. This figure includes both those born in Iran and their descendants.<br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400; font-size: 10pt;\">[9] According to the Iranian news agency Tasnim, in March 2026, seven people were detained in the country on suspicion of spying for Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n<p>How Operation Epic Fury Is Changing the Rules of the Game<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33282,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-33280","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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