{"id":33474,"date":"2026-04-20T00:01:30","date_gmt":"2026-04-19T21:01:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=33474"},"modified":"2026-04-21T20:38:57","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T17:38:57","slug":"zmina-vladi-u-ugorshhini-ta-%d1%97%d1%97-naslidki-dlya-yevropi-ukra%d1%97ni-i-rosi%d1%97-chastina-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/zmina-vladi-u-ugorshhini-ta-%d1%97%d1%97-naslidki-dlya-yevropi-ukra%d1%97ni-i-rosi%d1%97-chastina-1\/","title":{"rendered":"The Change of Government in Hungary and Its Implications for Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. Part 1"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">The Change of Government in Hungary and Its Implications for Europe, Ukraine, and Russia<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The change in Hungary\u2019s government following the parliamentary elections may influence future Hungarian policy, particularly regarding the abandonment of pro-Russian, anti-European, and anti-Ukrainian stances;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This is important for our country, as it will remove obstacles to European support for Ukraine, thereby strengthening its ability to counter&nbsp; Russia;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This topic should be considered in light of existing assessments and forecasts. Although they take on new significance when viewed in a comprehensive manner;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Precisely because of the topic\u2019s relevance, the analysis is presented in two parts. The first part addresses the characteristics of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s personality, peculiarities of his rule, and the 2026 parliamentary elections, while the second part focuses on Hungary\u2019s future policy.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Part I. Background. Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s 16 Years in Power and His Loss of Control<\/b><\/h2>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>From Europe and Democracy to Russia and a \u201cMafia State\u201d<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s role as the chief advocate of Russia\u2019s interests in Europe is everybody\u2019s knowledge. However, he was not always this way, as he began his political career as a supporter of Hungary\u2019s European and democratic development and of freeing the country from Moscow\u2019s long-standing control.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For example, in 1988, Viktor Orb\u00e1n was one of the founders of the Alliance of Young Democrats, which brought together young people with anti-communist and anti-Soviet views. The Alliance later evolved into the Fidesz party \u2013 the Hungarian Civic Alliance (in Hungarian, Fidesz \u2013 Magyar Polg\u00e1ri Sz\u00f6vets\u00e9g).<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s political popularity began to rise significantly after he spoke at the reburial ceremony for Imre Nagy and other Hungarian political figures executed in 1958 following the suppression of the 1956 anti-communist uprising in Hungary. In that speech, he called for free elections in the country and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory. As leader of the Fidesz party, Orb\u00e1n opposed nationalism, defended civil society, and countered the church\u2019s influence on politics. In this way, he gradually strengthened his political position and bolstered the party\u2019s political role in Hungary. In 1990, in the first free parliamentary elections in post-Soviet history held in Hungary, the Fidesz party received about 9% of the vote and formed its own parliamentary faction.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, due to his peculiar behavior \u2013 in particular, his attempts to enrich himself without any moral scruples \u2013 V. Orb\u00e1n fell under the influence of the Hungarian, and later the Soviet, mafia, which was linked to the KGB of the USSR and tasked with recruiting foreign politicians. This is precisely how V. Orb\u00e1n became the champion of Soviet, and later Russian, interests in Hungary and Europe.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In 1997\u20131998, following numerous media investigations, it became known how the FSB of the Russian Federation, which had replaced the KGB, actively facilitated V. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s rise to power. This was done by financing the election campaign of the Fidesz party. The funds were transferred through the head of the Russian mafia, S. Mogilevich, and his subordinate I. Korol, one of the leaders of organized criminal groups in Hungary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The then-chief of police in the Hungarian capital, S. Pinter, was also financially supported by the mafia and, at its behest, halted important investigations. After V. Orb\u00e1n for the first time became Prime Minister of Hungary, this police officer was appointed Minister of the Interior. Thus, with V. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s assistance, local and Russian criminal organizations gained complete freedom of action in Hungary. V. Orb\u00e1n himself and his government began implementing corrupt schemes with Russia regarding the supply of its oil and gas to Hungary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, at that point, Viktor Orb\u00e1n was still actively pursuing a course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration for the country. At the time, Russia was not yet able to exert significant influence over him and did not stand in the way of Hungary\u2019s course, since democratic forces were still in power in Moscow. Moreover, Russia\u2019s economy was still in crisis, so it was interested&nbsp; in maintaining constructive relations with Europe and the USA,&nbsp; which were providing it with loans. Therefore, under V. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s leadership, Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and was preparing to join the EU.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, Moscow did not forget about Viktor Orb\u00e1n and provided him with financial support, particularly during the 2002 parliamentary elections in Hungary. The bet was placed \u201con the long term\u201d.&nbsp; But Viktor Orb\u00e1n and his Fidesz party suffered a defeat.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Lessons were learned. In 2009\u20132010, Russia, in addition to funding his election campaign, assisted in organizing campaign events. His campaign was based on promises to address the country\u2019s economic problems, which were a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008. And as early as 2010, the Fidesz party won the elections again, and V. Orb\u00e1n returned to the post of Prime Minister of Hungary. Since then, he had managed to remain in power for 16 years\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">All this time, Moscow had V. Orb\u00e1n firmly in its grip, using compromising information against him regarding his ties to organized crime. However, V. Orb\u00e1n himself was interested in Russia\u2019s support and in obtaining cheap oil and gas from it. As before, the joint corrupt activities of V. Orb\u00e1n, his government, and the Russian leadership were based on trade in energy resources. That is precisely why V. Orb\u00e1n refused to diversify energy carriers, which contradicted the EU\u2019s policy of reducing Europe\u2019s energy dependence on Russia. And to conceal his true interests on this matter, he claimed that oil and gas prices in Europe were higher than those offered by Moscow. He also pointed out Hungary\u2019s lack of access to maritime terminals. Although, in reality, this could have been done via Poland and Romania, which was what had been proposed to Budapest.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">According to a number of experts, it was then that V. Orb\u00e1n began building a \u201cmafia state\u201d in Hungary, where all power effectively belonged to a group linked to the Fidesz party and to him personally. And Hungary became the most corrupt country in Europe. All these factors enabled Moscow to make Viktor Orb\u00e1n a champion of its interests within the European Union and NATO. However, in the early stages, his work on behalf of Russia was not particularly pronounced. For the most part, he merely created obstacles to Ukraine\u2019s European and Euro-Atlantic integration under the pretext of alleged violations of the rights of ethnic Hungarians living on its territory. And in order to strengthen his position within Hungary, counter the opposition, and conceal his criminal activities, V. Orb\u00e1n began rolling back democracy in the country. Specifically, this involves the suppression of the media: the transfer of various private media assets to the newly created KESNA, which reports directly to the Prime Minister\u2019s Chief of Staff, and the establishment of the MTVA Foundation, which consolidated four state-owned media companies and acquired the exclusive right to produce news content for public broadcasting. This also concerned violations of the independence of the judicial system, the redrawing of electoral districts in the interests of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s clear supporters so that a specific candidate would gain an advantage in single-member district elections, and so on. Furthermore, he began imposing a chauvinistic ideology on Hungarian society by promoting the idea of reviving \u201cGreater Hungary, comprising all the territories it has lost\u201d. This also referred to Ukraine\u2019s Zakarpatska&nbsp; region, where efforts began to stir up separatist sentiments among ethnic Hungarians within the local population.&nbsp;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In response to Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s violations of European norms and principles, EU leaders froze EUR 19 billion in loans to Hungary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Following Russia\u2019s first attack on Ukraine in February 2014, Viktor Orb\u00e1n shifted his policy toward a more pro-Russian stance, a move that was clearly made at Moscow\u2019s insistence. He opposed the European Union\u2019s imposition of sanctions against Putin\u2019s regime for Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea and provocation of the conflict in the Donbas.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, Viktor Orb\u00e1n still did not dare to defy Europe, as Hungary was heavily dependent on the EU. Therefore, he did not recognize the \u201cRussian\u201d status of Crimea and the self-proclaimed \u201crepublics\u201d in the Donbas, and was also forced to vote in favor of anti-Russian sanctions and other EU decisions regarding Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s policy became openly pro-Russian&nbsp; only with the start of Russia\u2019s full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022. Thus, he began consistently blocking all EU and NATO decisions related to putting pressure on Russia, providing aid to Ukraine, and strengthening European defense.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He tried to argue that the sanctions imposed on Russia were harming the European Union itself, and that aid to Ukraine was only prolonging the war. At this, he implied that Ukraine itself was to blame for the war because it had attacked the Donbas. Orb\u00e1n also insisted on the need to restore relations with Russia, claiming that Russia posed no military threat to Europe and that, therefore, there was no need to increase military spending.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He has also stepped up his efforts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine\u2019s Zakarpatska region, with the aim of diverting our country\u2019s attention and resources away from the front lines and disrupting military conscription in that region. To this end, Hungary intensified its information campaign, attempting to turn ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine against the Ukrainian authorities and incite them to refuse military service.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Viktor Orb\u00e1n also accused Ukraine of deliberately obstructing oil supplies to Hungary via the \u201cDruzhba\u201d pipeline. However, any interruptions in the pipeline\u2019s operation were exclusively the result of Russia\u2019s military actions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He held the same negative attitude to EU leadership. V. Orb\u00e1n accused the EU of restricting Hungary\u2019s freedom of action, interfering in its internal affairs, and forcing it to abandon Russian energy carriers, which could undermine the country\u2019s economy. He often spoke of excessive spending of European funds to aid Ukraine, funds that would be better directed toward solving the European Union\u2019s own problems.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">And that\u2019s not all. As it later became clear, Orb\u00e1n and his ministers systematically passed on classified information about the European Union\u2019s plans to Moscow. This allowed Russia to react to them in advance in its own interests. It is evident that this was also done with NATO\u2019s military plans. However, even without that, V. Orb\u00e1n maintained direct contact with Putin. Since the start of the war in 2022, they have met at least four times.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, V. Orb\u00e1n has become a sort of magnet for other pro-Russian politicians in Central and Eastern Europe. One of V. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s allies is Slovak Prime Minister R. Fico, who has coordinated his pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian activities with him. Close behind them is Czech Prime Minister A. Babi\u0161, although he has so far refrained from taking active measures against Ukraine and from directly supporting Russia. In addition to Moscow, V. Orb\u00e1n has been supported by US&nbsp; President D. Trump and his administration, who have their own interests regarding him. Indeed, D. Trump used him to weaken Europe by undermining its unity. This was done to prevent Europe from consolidating itself as a separate global power center and competitor to America, as well as to strengthen America\u2019s influence over it. The substance of these actions is outlined in the USA\u2019s&nbsp; National Security Strategy, which was adopted in December 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Russia and the USA\u2019s interests regarding Viktor Orb\u00e1n in Hungary essentially coincided, so they effectively coordinated their actions. Thus, in October 2025, a meeting between Putin and Trump was announced in Budapest to discuss a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Hungary was chosen specifically to boost Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s image. However, due to Moscow\u2019s refusal to make concessions, the meeting did not take place.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">According to some European experts, another group that supported Viktor Orb\u00e1n was the owners of major German companies in the oil and gas, chemical, and automotive sectors. They are interested&nbsp; in restoring ties with Russia to further their business interests. Without this, Orb\u00e1n simply could not have acted at his own discretion in defiance of the EU\u2019s course. However, before the start of the immediate preparations by Hungary\u2019s political forces for the parliamentary elections in April of this year, the EU leadership still managed to influence Orb\u00e1n and unblock the processes of imposing new sanctions against Russia and providing further aid packages to Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>The Collapse of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s Regime As a Failure of His Ideology<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">These issues came to the fore during the preparation and conduct of the parliamentary elections in Hungary in April 2026. Specifically, they manifested in the election campaigns of the main contenders and the actions of Russia, the United States, and the European Union.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Thus, in their rhetoric, Viktor Orb\u00e1n and his Fidesz party criticized Ukraine and the EU leadership, which they allegedly blamed for all of Hungary\u2019s problems. In this context, the aforementioned narratives were repeated, amplified by Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s explicit promises to support Russia\u2019s policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Ukraine was aggressively demonized as a cautionary example for Hungary. According to many experts, it seemed as though Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s main opponent in those elections.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Hungarian leadership\u2019s propaganda campaign was accompanied by actions that were effectively anti-Ukrainian. In particular, Viktor Orb\u00e1n blocked the EU\u2019s decision to grant Ukraine a&nbsp; EUR 90 billion loan, as well as the adoption of the 20<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">th<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">&nbsp; package of sanctions against Russia. All of this was done on Moscow\u2019s clear instructions with the aim of depriving Ukraine of the ability to resist Russian aggression and to prevent Russia from incurring additional losses due to new European sanctions. However, at the official level, he described this move as a response to Ukraine\u2019s alleged deliberate shutdown of the \u201cDruzhba\u201d oil pipeline. As V. Orb\u00e1n claimed, Ukraine was attempting to influence the outcome of the Hungarian elections by creating an artificial economic crisis in the country. The oil pipeline was indeed not functioning, but not because of Ukraine, but as a result of a Russian strike on an oil pumping station near the Ukrainian city of Brody.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In response to this Hungarian stance, EU leadership blocked the provision of another EUR 16 billion loan to Hungary. As a result, the total amount of funds that Hungary could have received but did not receive due to V. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian policies amounted to EUR 35 billion.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Budapest also engaged in direct provocations against Ukraine. For example, on March 5 of this year, the Hungarian National Tax and Customs Administration detained seven cash collectors from Ukraine\u2019s Oschadbank on allegations of money laundering. At the same time, $40 million, EUR 35 million, and 9 kg of gold were seized from them, all of which were being transported entirely legally from Raiffeisen Bank, Austria, to Ukraine. Based on a completely fabricated case, Hungary\u2019s leadership accused Ukraine of interfering in the Hungarian elections by financing the opposition.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The election campaign of his main rival, P. Magyar, leader of the \u201cTisza\u201d party, was entirely different. He promised that Hungary would return to full participation in the European Union and NATO, and that the suspended aid to Ukraine would be unblocked. At this, he called Russia an adversary of Europe and Hungary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The election campaign in Hungary was accompanied by massive rallying activity by supporters and opponents of both candidates, who had sharply opposing slogans. At the same time, clashes between them were successfully avoided. Young people, who want change in the country, were the most active. Moreover, some young people promised to leave Hungary if no changes took place.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s anti-European, anti-Ukrainian, and pro-Russian policies have failed. Overall, Hungarian society has finally come to realize what Russia is all about and the war it has unleashed against Ukraine. Furthermore, Viktor Orb\u00e1n has discredited himself through his corrupt activities and his inability to address the country\u2019s economic problems, which have only grown worse. Consequently, Viktor Orb\u00e1n began to lose the support of Hungarian society, while his main political opponent, P\u00e9ter Magyar, saw his support grow, as demonstrated by the results of opinion polls.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Naturally, Russia could not allow this to happen. In addition to providing V. Orb\u00e1n with financial assistance for his election campaign, a group of Russian political strategists was also sent to Hungary. This group was led from Moscow by S. Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Russian President\u2019s Administration. He is considered an expert on interfering in elections in other countries. Recently, he has been involved in this regarding the presidential elections in Romania in 2024\u20132025 (held in two rounds, as the results of the first round were annulled due to fraud) and the parliamentary elections in Moldova in 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Donald Trump also attempted to assist Viktor Orb\u00e1n. On the eve of the elections, he sent US Vice President J. Vance to Hungary. Vance spoke at a joint press conference with Viktor Orb\u00e1n and openly supported him. Incidentally, at that time, he also accused Ukraine of interfering in the elections in the USA&nbsp; and Hungary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, neither anti-Ukrainian and anti-European rhetoric, nor demonstrations of loyalty to Russia, nor support for Putin and Donald Trump helped Viktor Orb\u00e1n. The majority of Hungarians did not vote for him. And the population\u2019s desire for change was confirmed by the high voter turnout, which reached 80%. This was one of the most compelling indicators in Hungary\u2019s entire post-Soviet history, confirming the importance of such elections for Hungarian society.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">P\u00e9ter Magyar\u2019s \u201cTisza\u201d party won, garnering 53.5% of the vote, while Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s \u201cFidesz\u201d party received only 39%. In other words, \u201cTisza\u201d holds a constitutional majority. This guarantees P. Magyar&nbsp; the position of Prime Minister.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Based on his campaign platform, Hungary\u2019s course is set to change, which will be important both for Hungary itself and for Europe and Ukraine. We will examine this issue in more detail in the next section.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Thus, over the course of his political career, Viktor Orb\u00e1n has gone from being one of the leaders of Hungary\u2019s democratic forces and a supporter of its European course to a champion of Russia\u2019s interests in Europe and the de facto head of the Hungarian mafia. As a result, his loss of power is entirely logical, as Hungarian society did not approve of his leadership.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>The parliamentary elections in Hungary marked the end of the Orb\u00e1n era, which will most likely lead to a shift in the country\u2019s policy, including a return to active participation in NATO and the EU, as well as a departure from a pro-Russian course and an end to the blocking of aid to Ukraine.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>As for Russia, it has also lost and seen its influence wane in Hungary, and with it, effectively, throughout all of Central and Eastern Europe. This is a continuation of Moscow\u2019s failed interference in elections in other countries. Please, be reminded that last year, its proxies suffered defeats in Romania and Moldova.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Along with Russia, US&nbsp; President Donald Trump also lost, as he is becoming a toxic figure for Europe. The negative attitude of Hungarians, as part of the European community, to him was confirmed by US&nbsp; Vice President Jeff Vance\u2019s visit to Hungary on the eve of the country\u2019s parliamentary elections. After that, Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s approval rating dropped even further.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>A change in government in Hungary will have positive consequences for Hungary itself, for Europe, and, we hope, for Ukraine. Hungary will strengthen its international standing and economy, Europe will become more united and stronger, and Ukraine will enhance its ability in confrontation with&nbsp; Russia thanks to European assistance.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>This turn of events will undoubtedly cement a turning point in the Russia-Ukraine war. The Russian Armed Forces are still actively conducting offensive operations on the front lines, but their effectiveness has declined. The Russian economy\u2019s capacity to sustain the war has also diminished. And now Russia is also losing its ability to politically influence Europe regarding its support for Ukraine.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Yurii Mykhailenko,<br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n<p>Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s 16 Years in Power and His Loss of Control<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33476,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-33474","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Change of Government in Hungary and Its Implications for Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. 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