Recently, experts and political circles in Europe and Ukraine have been actively discussing the possibility of Russia\u2019s attack on the Baltic states even before the end of the Russia-Ukraine war. That way Moscow would attempt to undermine NATO\u2019s unity and ensure that Europe does not support Ukraine. That is why this issue is so important for our country. All the more so because Russia could indeed provoke a conflict in one of the Baltic states and then intervene there. Russia currently is not capable of a full-scale military invasion of the Baltic region.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n Putin\u2019s policy of restoring Russia as a \u201cgreat world power\u201d evidently involves bringing not only Ukraine but also other countries of the former USSR and Central and Eastern Europe under Russian control. <\/b>According to most expert assessments, if Russia manages to defeat Ukraine, the Baltic states could become the next targets of Russian aggression. In doing so, Russia may openly attack them or resort to the Crimea-Donbas scenario of 2014.<\/span><\/p>\n In the former case, the most likely course of action for Russia could be an offensive operation from Belarusian territory along the so-called Suwalki Corridor toward the Baltic Sea. The aim of the operation would be to create a land corridor to Kaliningrad region of the RF, as well as to separate Poland from the Baltic states with the aim of subsequently bringing them under control. It is entirely plausible that part of Polish territory could be occupied.<\/span><\/p>\n In the latter case, Russia could provoke internal conflicts in the Baltic states and then intervene there, either covertly or openly. This applies primarily to Estonia. It shares a direct border with Russia and has the largest Russian diaspora. Most ethnic Russians live in the Estonian city of Narva, which is located directly on the border. This could help Moscow in carrying out its plans.<\/span><\/p>\n At the same time, experts and politicians such as Prime Minister of Poland D. Tusk consider it entirely possible that Russia could attack the Baltic states even before the war against Ukraine ends. They say Moscow might do this to achieve political and economic goals that are important to it. First and foremost, these could include a split within NATO due to its members\u2019 differing attitudes to providing military aid to the Baltic states. Moscow may also hope that an armed conflict or war in the Baltic region would divert Europe\u2019s attention and resources away from Ukraine, which would then take a back seat. Finally, rapid and tangible successes in the Baltic region would help offset the negative perceptions within Russian society resulting from setbacks in Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n Since these scenarios directly affect Ukraine\u2019s interests, they should be paid special attention when assessing Russia\u2019s potential actions and their consequences. <\/b>To this end, we need to answer several key questions, namely: How well-founded are Moscow\u2019s aforementioned expectations?; What forces does Russia have, and are they sufficient to attack the Baltic states?; Is Russia actually preparing for aggression, or is it merely imitating it?; what could deter Moscow from starting a new war, and how can we prevent it from achieving its goals?<\/span><\/p>\n The questions raised are quite complex, but certain assessments can still be made.<\/span><\/p>\n Indeed, Russia\u2019s attack on the Baltic states could lead to disagreements within NATO regarding the provision of military aid to them.<\/b> This is especially true if the attack is covert. This scenario was simulated during special NATO exercises using Estonia as a case study. Based on the results, it was concluded that the Alliance is unable to effectively prevent a crisis from unfolding in that country as a result of Russian intervention.<\/span><\/p>\n Representatives of the NATO countries participating in the exercise were unable to reach an agreement on providing support to Estonia. As a result, the Alliance\u2019s forward forces stationed on Estonian territory \u2013 which include a German Army infantry brigade and a multinational battle group \u2013 did not intervene and left Tallinn to face Moscow alone. Consequently, Russia effectively occupied the city of Narva and part of Estonian territory. In light of this, it was concluded that it is necessary to strengthen countermeasures against Russia\u2019s subversive activities in the Baltic states, improve coordination processes regarding the provision of assistance to them, and reinforce defense forces along the Russian border. These decisions are already being successfully implemented with the support of the EU and NATO.<\/span><\/p>\n For instance, in Estonia, pro-Russian activists are being actively identified and subsequently deported. As part of the \u201cBaltic Defense Line\u201d program, borders with Russia are being fortified. A powerful defense line is being established, combining modern surveillance and electronic warfare capabilities with advanced systems of engineering barriers. Other EU and NATO measures are also being extended to the Baltic states, including the expansion of their forward military presence and the enhancement of air defense capabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n Besides, NATO has demonstrated its ability to respond rapidly to military crises. For example, during the mass incursion of Russian UAVs into Poland\u2019s airspace on the night of September 10, 2025, all necessary measures to repel the air attack were automatically taken by NATO air defense forces and means without any prior consultation. Operating alongside Polish air defense forces were Dutch F-35 fighter jets and German Patriot air defense systems deployed on Poland\u2019s territory, as well as an Italian Air Force G550 CAEW early warning aircraft. The problem arose solely because this system was designed to counter aircraft and missiles, not UAVs, resulting in low effectiveness. But this issue is being resolved with Ukraine\u2019s assistance.<\/span><\/p>\n In other words, in general, NATO is capable of responding to Russia\u2019s military aggression against the Baltic states and is improving these capabilities. Disagreements, of course, may arise, but mechanisms to resolve them are already being established.<\/span><\/p>\n Russia\u2019s hopes of diverting Europe\u2019s attention and resources away from Ukraine are also quite evident.<\/b> This is already being done through the very threat of its attack on the Baltic states. And if that attack actually takes place, Ukraine will fade entirely into the background of European interests. This is evidenced by the situation surrounding the USA and Israel\u2019s military operation against Iran, which has largely overshadowed the Russian-Ukrainian war in the political and media spheres, and has also created the threat of a shortage of American weapons for Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n An armed conflict or even a war in the Baltic region would give rise to even more similar problems, as they would directly affect Europe. But Europe is already making targeted preparations for this. Under the EU\u2019s \u201cRe-Arming Europe\/Readiness 2030\u201d plan, a series of large-scale programs for arms production and the development of the European defense industry are being implemented. A total of EUR 800 billion has been allocated for this purpose. These funds are also earmarked for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine and the implementation of joint military-technical programs, including within European countries. Thanks to this, in the near future, Europe will build up sufficient arms reserves to repel Russian aggression in the Baltic region and to provide further assistance to Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n The Russian public\u2019s reaction to Russia\u2019s military invasion of the Baltic states will be quite mixed.<\/b> The same Russian chauvinists, of course, will be thrilled by it. They have always advocated for the expansion of military aggression into the Baltic region. Such ideas are actively supported by Z-bloggers and propagandists. However, most Russians are tired of the Russian-Ukrainian war and no longer hide this fact. Therefore, they are unlikely to support yet another war started by Russia. Moreover, even if Moscow manages to quickly capture the city of Narva or all of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, this will have only a temporary effect for it in terms of propaganda about the \u201csuccesses\u201d of Putin\u2019s regime. Russia\u2019s problems stemming from its war against Ukraine will persist. Moreover, new challenges will arise in the Baltic states even if NATO refuses to provide assistance to the countries in that region.<\/span><\/p>\n And if the Alliance or its individual members come to their defense, it will be a disaster for Russia, as it will face a far stronger adversary than it anticipated.<\/span><\/p>\n An attack on the Baltic states would require Russia to divert additional resources from those it has already committed to the war against Ukraine.<\/b> And it does not have that many resources to spare, especially given the economic crisis that is beginning to unfold in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n Our previous analyses have already provided assessments of the combined potential of NATO\u2019s first-line forces in Poland, the Baltic states, and Northern Europe, including their national armed forces. Overall, this is equivalent to eight standard Russian armies fighting on the front lines in Ukraine. Based on the principles of military science, achieving unquestionable success in an offensive operation requires, at a minimum, a three-to-one advantage over the enemy. That is, to attack the Baltic states \u2013 which would be supported by all of NATO or the majority of its members \u2013 Russia would need to concentrate at least 24 armies. Given the ongoing war against Ukraine, it is unlikely to be able to do so, even if it resorts to a general mobilization.<\/span><\/p>\n Therefore, Moscow can only hope that NATO will renege on its commitments to its Baltic allies and that the Alliance\u2019s forward forces will not go into battle. This is unlikely, but even then, Russia would need at least 2\u20133 armies. In principle, it could muster such a force, but only if the intensity of hostilities in Ukraine decreases or as a result of a second wave of mobilization. In both cases, Russia would face additional problems that would be difficult to manage. In the first scenario, Ukraine would have greater opportunities for a counteroffensive, which it would immediately exploit. In the second scenario, Russia\u2019s economic problems would intensify and socio-political tensions would escalate, with unpredictable consequences. Given this, Moscow\u2019s only realistic option remains provoking an internal conflict in Estonia and subsequently intervening in it. It has sufficient forces for this. One or two special forces brigades, which would send their \u201clittle green men\u201d there, would suffice.<\/span><\/p>\n Right now there are possible signs that Russia is preparing to attack the Baltic states.<\/b> However, these are observed only in the political and information spheres. For instance, Moscow accuses Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia of allowing Ukrainian drones to fly through their airspace to strike Russian ports and oil and gas terminals in the Baltic Sea. Despite the lack of evidence, Russia is threatening them with an adequate response for intervening in the war on Ukraine\u2019s side.<\/span><\/p>\n At the same time, if Moscow truly plans to launch a military aggression in the Baltic region, it must carry out more extensive preparations, without which successful military operations would be impossible. The necessary minimum includes:<\/span><\/p>\n expanding the capacity and appropriately upgrading transport infrastructure from the interior of the Russian Federation toward the Baltic region to ensure troop deployment and logistics;<\/span><\/p>\n deployment of all necessary infrastructure, including air defense systems to cover troop concentration areas, field camps and fortified positions for their deployment, forward landing zones for military aviation, and depots for ammunition, fuel, and food;<\/span><\/p>\n the deployment of units and formations to operational areas, the formation of strike groups and battle formations, the establishment of wartime command, communications, and reconnaissance systems, and the organization of military exercises simulating future operations.<\/span><\/p>\n Carrying out such measures takes a considerable amount of time \u2013 from several months to a year. Nothing of the sort is currently being observed. And no army can simply march out of the barracks and begin combat operations. This is a rule of military science and has been confirmed in practice.<\/span><\/p>\n This is exactly how preparations for all modern wars have taken place, including the military operations of the United States and its allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011, and Iran in 2026. This is exactly how Russia acted in preparing for the First and Second Chechen Wars in 1994 and 1999, during the attacks on Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, as well as at the start of the full-scale war against our country in 2022. All of the above issues were addressed by Russia during exercises such as \u201cZapad\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n However, in 2022, Russia overlooked one of these points, namely, it failed to build up sufficient stockpiles of the material and technical resources necessary to wage war, as it hoped to win it quickly. As a result, it was forced to withdraw from northern Ukraine because it could not ensure the logistics for its troops. This marked the beginning of its subsequent defeat.<\/span><\/p>\n It is impossible to conceal preparations for war. Intelligence agencies monitor these activities and report them to the government, which then decides how to respond in each specific situation.<\/span><\/p>\n In other words, as of today, the likelihood of Russia\u2019s full-scale attack on the Baltic states is quite doubtful, but it should not be ruled out entirely<\/b>. NATO leadership takes this fact into account, taking its own measures to deter Moscow and prepare to repel a possible Russian aggression. At this, despite the deepening rift between the USA and Europe \u2013 including European countries\u2019 refusal to support a USA\u2013Israel operation against Iran \u2013 the USA continues to actively participate in these exercises and even leads them. Thus, in April and May of this year, large-scale strategic exercise by the US Armed Forces and NATO\u2019s Allied Joint Forces, \u201cSword 26\u201d, are taking place in Poland, the Baltic states, and Northern Europe. It has replaced command-post exercises such as \u201cDEFENDER\u201d, which were conducted in Europe in recent years, and represents an evolution of those exercises. During the \u201cSword 26\u201d exercise, the entire range of issues related to deterring Russia and repelling potential aggression on its part is also being addressed.<\/span><\/p>\n At the same time, a number of new principles are being taken into account, as defined by the US Army\u2019s Continuous Transformation Strategy and NATO\u2019s Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative (EFDI). They reflect the nature of the new Euro-Atlantic and European security architecture, which involves a redistribution of roles between the United States and Europe: the USA focuses its efforts on containing China, while the EU and the European component of NATO focus on countering Russia with American support. At the same time, the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles and artificial intelligence systems in modern warfare is taken into account.<\/span><\/p>\n As a result of these approaches, the \u201cSword\u201d series of exercises differs in certain respects from \u201cDEFENDER\u201d. For instance, the main aim of the \u201cDEFENDER\u201d exercise was to address the challenges of the strategic deployment of US forces to the European theater of operations by rapidly moving them from the USA to Europe and ensuring logistics support. In \u201cSword 26\u201d, the focus has shifted to the use of forces already deployed in the European theater, as well as to the integration and implementation of advanced technologies in the operations of the armed forces on the modern battlefield. Additionally, a transition has been made from traditional combat operations to next-generation combat technologies.<\/span><\/p>\n However, these changes do not mean a reduction in the USA\u2019s cooperation with NATO in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO). The United States continues to play a leading role in organizing and conducting the largest-scale operational and combat training exercises for the US Armed Forces and NATO Allied Forces. In particular, overall command and control of the planning and conduct of the \u201cSword\u201d exercises has been assigned to US Army Europe and Africa.<\/span><\/p>\n According to Commander of USAREUR-AF General C. Donahue, the United States\u2019 participation in and leadership of these exercises demonstrate America\u2019s unwavering commitment to collective defense with Europe. In other words, despite President D. Trump\u2019s public criticism of NATO, the United States continues to play an active role in the Alliance, including in the military sphere. This is also evidenced by the nature of the \u201cSword 26\u201d joint command and staff exercise, which consists of three interconnected exercises, including: \u201cSaber Strike\u201d, \u201cImmediate Response\u201d, and \u201cSwift Response\u201d. During these exercises, tasks are fulfilled involving the rapid deployment of US forces to the forward area of the European theater of operations and their support. A central role is assigned to the US Army\u2019s 5<\/span>th<\/span> Corps, which is stationed in Poland and Germany.<\/span><\/p>\n Several other NATO military exercises are planned for the European theater of operations in May and June of this year, including in the Baltic region. The main ones are the naval exercises <\/span>\u201cNEPTUNE STRIKE 26-2\u201d <\/b>and <\/span>BALTOPS 26.<\/b><\/p>\n \u201cNEPTUNE STRIKE 26-2\u201d<\/b> is being conducted from late April through the second half of May this year in the North and Mediterranean Seas. Related activities extend to the Baltic and Black Seas and Central and Eastern Europe. The strike forces are led by US and UK aircraft carrier strike groups. The exercise focuses on organizing naval operations during a war between Russia and NATO. One of the scenarios involves repelling a Russian amphibious landing on the coasts of the Baltic states.<\/span><\/p>\n BALTOPS 26<\/b> is scheduled to take place this June in the Baltic Sea, Poland, and the Baltic states, with the participation of approximately 20 NATO countries. The aim of the exercise is to deter Russia and enhance interoperability among participating nations. The exercise will involve tasks related to amphibious landings, repelling amphibious assaults, and conducting naval operations. The exercise is a key measure for enhancing security in the Baltic region.<\/span><\/p>\n Another deterrent for Moscow is the critical deterioration of the Russian economy, which is nearing a crisis.<\/b> And the rise in oil prices resulting from the USA and Israel\u2019s war against Iran only allows for a slight delay of its collapse, rather than the initiation of a new war.<\/span><\/p>\n Thus, as part of its neo-imperial policy, Russia is asserting claims to the Baltic region, which it considers its \u201clost territory\u201d. Given this, Moscow is considering plans to regain control over the Baltic states, including through the use of military force. If Russia defeats Ukraine, the Baltic states could become the next target of Russia\u2019s aggression. However, Russia may attack them even before the war against Ukraine ends, with the aim of dividing NATO, diverting Europe\u2019s attention and resources, and compensating for its failures in Ukraine. In particular, it is entirely possible that Moscow will attempt to provoke a conflict in one of the Baltic states, followed by covert or overt intervention. At present, Russia lacks the capacity to launch another full-scale war, as most of its military resources are deployed on the front lines in Ukraine.<\/b><\/p>\n Despite this, NATO and the EU are continuing their preparations for a potential war with Russia. Currently, the main measures include increasing forward military presence, strengthening borders, and improving decision-making processes regarding collective defense. All of this is supported by the organization of regular military exercises along routes of Russia\u2019s potential invasion.<\/b><\/p>\n Therefore, Russia\u2019s attack on the Baltic states would elicit a corresponding response from the West \u2013 that is, NATO would mount a counteroffensive with the participation of the United States, which is prepared for this. Of course, problems may arise, but the Alliance will be able to handle them.<\/b><\/p>\n Yurii Mykhailenko Channel 24 collage<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n Recently, experts and political circles in Europe and Ukraine have been actively discussing the possibility of Russia\u2019s attack on the Baltic states<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":33629,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-33628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
\n<\/b>Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n