Ukraine is carrying out a strategic operation to force Russia to make peace by destroying key facilities in its oil and gas industry. At present, this operation can be considered effective. Given the pace at which Russian oil refining facilities are being taken out of commission, it can be concluded that a severe fuel crisis in Russia could arise as early as the beginning of this autumn. This will lead to the collapse of the Russian economy and social sphere. Therefore, the next two months will be decisive. Russia will intensify its military pressure on Ukraine and do its best to achieve this. However, it will not succeed in influencing our country. Therefore, it will be forced to give up the war and agree to negotiations. Otherwise, it may cease to exist.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n What could force Russia to stop the war against Ukraine? Presumably, if it loses the ability to continue hostilities. This is precisely what is intended right now as Ukraine conducts a 40-day operation to force Moscow to make peace.<\/b><\/p>\n The operation aims to cripple Russia\u2019s oil and gas industry, which is the backbone of the Russian economy, supplies fuel to the country and its armed forces, and serves as the main source of revenue for the Russian budget and business sector. To achieve this goal, the Ukrainian Defense Forces (UDF) are striking Russian oil refineries, oil depots, gas storage facilities, maritime terminals, oil pumping stations, gas compressor stations, and other targets. The Defence Forces of Ukraine have attacked these targets before, but now the strikes are being carried out systematically. In other words, these operations are highly organized and supported by all necessary resources. Moreover, unlike in previous years \u2013 and even since the beginning of this year \u2013 neither the United States nor Europe is hindering Ukraine\u2019s actions. Given this, it is quite evident that Ukraine is coordinating these operations with its Western partners, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. The final decision to launch the operation was made at the G7 summit in June of this year in the French city of \u00c9vian-les-Bains. On the sidelines of the summit, with Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy in attendance, the possibility of restoring peace in our country was discussed. The aforementioned operation was most likely chosen as the primary means to achieve this. At the same time, an agreement was reached on the division of roles and responsibilities among the parties. Thus, Ukraine carries out purely military tasks, while its partners provide financial assistance, supply drones, and provide intelligence.<\/span><\/p>\n During the operation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces primarily use long-range UAVs<\/b> manufactured by Ukraine in cooperation with its partners. This enables them to penetrate any enemy air defense system by overwhelming it with air strikes. The Ukrainian Defense Forces demonstrated this capability with strikes on the oil refinery in Kapotnya, near Moscow, on June 16 and 18 of this year. The refinery is located 15\u201318 km from the Kremlin, that is, within Moscow\u2019s air defense zone. At this, Ukrainian drones are capable of striking most of the key facilities of Russia\u2019s oil infrastructure all the way to Siberia. For example, on June 20 of this year, the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out another strike on an oil refinery in Tyumen, and on July 6 \u2013 on an oil refinery in Omsk. These facilities are located 2,000\u20132,500 km from the Ukrainian border. And given that the UAV did not fly a direct route but bypassed areas covered by air defense systems, it covered a distance of 3,400 km. Such a flight range indicates that the UAV could potentially also attack Russia\u2019s main oil and gas production regions, which are located in Western Siberia \u2013 including Tyumen, Omsk, and Tomsk regions \u2013 as well as in the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs. The Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug is also home to the so-called \u201cYamal Cross\u201d \u2013 a strategic gas transportation hub where 17 high-pressure main gas pipelines intersect. 85% of all Russian-produced gas is transported through that hub.<\/span><\/p>\n In addition to UAVs, cruise missiles are also being used to strike Russia\u2019s oil and gas infrastructure. Their warheads are more powerful than those of drones (about 800 kg versus 100 kg of explosives), and therefore their destructive potential is greater. However, such missiles are significantly more expensive and more complex to manufacture. Consequently, Ukraine cannot launch them in sufficient numbers. Furthermore, they are relatively easy to shoot down by air defense systems when used individually or in small groups.<\/span><\/p>\n In the near future, the challenge of penetrating the enemy\u2019s air defenses will be largely resolved through the introduction of ballistic missiles into service. Currently, their development and production are in the final stages. According to open-source data, the new ballistic missiles from the Ukrainian company Fire Point have an 800-kg warhead, a range of 855 km, and a maximum speed of 2,200 m\/s. In terms of their performance characteristics, they outperform the Russian missiles of the \u201cIskander-M\u201d operational-tactical missile systems and are capable of reaching Moscow. Potentially, only Russian S-400 air defense systems can intercept them. Currently, the Russian military command is urgently increasing the number of such systems in the air defense network of the Russian capital and the metropolitan area. However, Russia does not have enough of these air defense systems to also protect its oil infrastructure. Nor do the Russian government and military command plan to do so. Moreover, it lacks even simpler air defense systems to protect oil facilities from UAVs and cruise missiles. In other words, their numbers are also limited. As a result, they are allocated according to the principle of prioritizing the protection of Putin\u2019s residence in Valdai, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, as well as the Crimean Bridge as a symbol of Russia\u2019s imperial power. Whatever remains available after such allocation is sent to the front lines.<\/span><\/p>\n The responsibility for air defense at oil refineries and other oil and gas facilities falls on their owners. To this end, the government has authorized the creation of private security companies and equipped them with appropriate weapons, including short-range anti-aircraft guns. Selling or transferring air defense systems and more powerful anti-aircraft guns to private entities is currently prohibited. Evidently, the government is concerned that such weapons could fall into the hands of opponents of Putin\u2019s regime and be used \u2013 in particular, to shoot down aircraft that may be carrying senior government officials and commanders of the armed forces and other security agencies. It is also possible that such weapons could be used in conflicts between oligarchs. However, private entities without powerful air defense systems are unable to guarantee reliable protection of oil and gas infrastructure. That is precisely why it is systematically targeted by the Ukrainian Defense Forces.<\/span><\/p>\n To date, the Defence Forces of Ukraine have already damaged, to one degree or another, all major oil refineries in the European part of Russia and in Western Siberia.<\/b> Some of them have already been significantly or completely destroyed and will be out of operation for a long time. Among them are the Moscow, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Tuapse refineries. Unfortunately, it is difficult to completely destroy an oil refinery with a single strike. Therefore, the UDF are forced to attack each of them repeatedly. Nevertheless, as of today, between 43% and 66% of the refineries\u2019 design production capacity has already been taken out of service. To ensure Russia\u2019s basic functioning during the summer, it needs 85% of that capacity. Thus, the current shortfall stands at 20\u201330%.<\/span><\/p>\n Russia needs approximately 100,000 tons of liquid fuel per day. This means it must currently find a way to make up for a shortfall of 20,000\u201330,000 tons of petrol and diesel per day. But the Defence Forces of Ukraine are not stopping; they continue to strike at Russian refineries. Consequently, the shortfall in production capacity \u2013 and with it, the shortage of liquid fuel in Russia \u2013 is rapidly increasing. All of this has already begun to create major problems for Russia. There is indeed already a shortage of liquid fuel. Moreover, the situation is complicated by panic buying and the activities of speculators who are buying it up for resale. To control the situation, local authorities have restricted the sale of petrol and diesel fuel. The restrictions have already spread to virtually the entire country. However, this has only led to queues stretching for many kilometers at filling stations \u2013 queues that are visible even from space. And many filling stations have run out of fuel entirely.<\/span><\/p>\n Prices for liquid fuel have also risen significantly. Whereas petrol previously cost about 70 rubles per liter, the price now reaches up to 200 rubles in many regions. In Crimea and the Krasnodar Territory, scalpers are selling it for 450\u2013500 rubles. The same is true for diesel fuel.<\/span><\/p>\n As a result, the population is suffering, business logistics is disrupted, and the delivery of goods to shops \u2013 including food and essential items \u2013 is becoming more difficult. Moreover, the rise in fuel prices has led to higher transportation costs and increased prices for most goods and services.<\/span><\/p>\n As a result, the crisis in the Russian economy is accelerating, compounded by a decline in the country\u2019s oil export revenues. These revenues plummeted following the end of the war between the USA and Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, mounting fuel shortages are fueling public discontent and spreading anti-government sentiment. Moreover, Russia\u2019s single economic space has begun to disintegrate. In a number of regions, the export of fuel beyond their borders has been banned, and checkpoints are being set up at administrative borders. In some places, petrol stations are refusing to fill up cars with out-of-state license plates altogether. In other words, the situation of the 1990s \u2013 which nearly led to Russia\u2019s collapse \u2013 is repeating itself.<\/span><\/p>\n The leadership of the RF still refuses to acknowledge these problems<\/b>. According to the Kremlin, the liquid fuel situation is stable. Price increases for fuel from vertically integrated companies remain within inflation limits. Damage to oil infrastructure is being promptly repaired. Russia has sufficient fuel reserves, and restrictions on its sale and queues at filling stations are the result of panic buying. Fuel shortages can be quickly offset through imports. Such claims are completely false. Russia will in no way be able to cope with its problems without ending the war and in the wake of Ukraine\u2019s strikes on Russian oil infrastructure. Therefore, the problems will not only worsen but will escalate into a catastrophe.<\/span><\/p>\n Russia cannot strengthen the air defenses of its oil refineries. As already noted, it lacks the necessary forces and resources. In contrast, Ukraine currently has a sufficient number of air strike capabilities, and these will not run out. Therefore, Ukraine will continue to strike Russian oil refineries and other oil infrastructure until they are completely destroyed. There is no point in repairing them \u2013 and, by and large, no way to do so anyway. Anything that is repaired is destroyed again. There is simply nothing to replace the equipment with, since it is mostly American and German-made and is not sold to Russia due to sanctions. Moreover, it cannot even be smuggled in, as it is too large and conspicuous. Everyone understands this, which is why refinery owners have stopped restoring them altogether until the war ends. Especially since neither they nor the state have the funds for non-stop repairs.<\/span><\/p>\n Of course, it is possible to purchase liquid fuel abroad. And Russia is doing just that. In June of this year, it increased its fuel imports from Belarus 2.5 times, to 140,000 tons. A preliminary agreement has been reached to purchase approximately 240,000 tons of fuel from India within a month. China could supply the same amount. And Kazakhstan \u2013 another 50,000 tons. That totals 680,000 tons per month \u2013 which would last Russia less than a week. On top of that, Ukraine is also systematically attacking Russian oil terminals and tankers in the Black and Baltic Seas, which will significantly complicate fuel deliveries from India. Not to mention that the terminals are designed to load oil onto tankers, not to unload petroleum products from them.<\/span><\/p>\n Another thing: petroleum products need to be stored somewhere. That\u2019s exactly what oil depots are for. But they, along with the rest of Russia\u2019s oil and gas infrastructure, are being destroyed by Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n The situation with China is even more complicated. Petroleum products can only be transported from China to the central and western parts of the country by rail tank wagons. However, the capacity of the Russian railway in the Far East and Siberia is relatively low, which will lead to transportation bottlenecks. Similar obstacles will arise when transporting petroleum products from Kazakhstan.<\/span><\/p>\n For now, Russia has its own reserves of liquid fuel amounting to 1.7 million tons. However, these reserves are likely even smaller, as Ukraine is targeting storage facilities. Even without this, the reserves would last only 65\u201385 days given the current shortage and 17 days if refineries were to shut down completely.<\/span><\/p>\n A key component of Ukraine\u2019s operation to force Russia to make peace is the isolation of Crimea, along with the destruction of its energy infrastructure.<\/b> This has already been largely accomplished, and Russia\u2019s attempts to counter Ukraine in any way have not yielded significant results. For instance, all bridges connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine have been destroyed. The largest oil depots in Feodosia and Sevastopol have been destroyed. There is nowhere left to unload fuel, even if it were delivered to the Peninsula. All power plants and distribution substations have been damaged. Crimea is effectively in a systemic blackout. One can forget about fuel on the Peninsula altogether. Russia\u2019s latest \u2013 and, let\u2019s hope, last \u2013 attempt to deliver fuel to the Peninsula ended in complete failure. On July 7 of this year, Ukraine destroyed ten tankers in the Azov and Black Seas that Russia had been using to try to transport fuel to the Peninsula.<\/span><\/p>\n Crimea is rapidly losing its significance as a symbol of Russia\u2019s imperial power, as its stronghold on the Black Sea, and as a logistics hub for Russian troops operating in the South of Ukraine. Let\u2019s not speculate, but the conditions for its return to its native Ukrainian \u201charbor\u201d are gradually being created.<\/span><\/p>\n Overall, these circumstances confirm that Russia will not be able to cope with the fuel crisis without ending its war against Ukraine.<\/b> However, instead, it is intensifying its military pressure on Ukraine, hoping that Ukraine will give up further operations to destroy Russian oil and gas infrastructure. It is precisely for this purpose that Russia has been carrying out the massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine that have been observed recently. This is extremely painful for Ukraine and its citizens, but Russia is unable to achieve its desired outcome. This is especially true given that it lacks the capacity to inflict significant damage on Ukraine, as its production capacity for drones and missiles is limited, and its partners are not supplying it with such weapons.<\/span><\/p>\n Besides, the Kremlin is attempting to enlist US President Donald Trump in its pressure campaign against Ukraine on this issue, hoping that he still supports Russia. Putin made one such attempt during a phone call with D. Trump on July 4 of this year. However, D. Trump is unlikely to force Ukraine to halt its operation to undermine Russia\u2019s oil and gas industry, as this benefits American business and D. Trump personally.<\/span><\/p>\n In any case, Ukraine will not yield to Russia but will continue its operation to force Russia to make peace.<\/b> If strikes on Russian oil refineries continue at the current pace, up to 80% of their capacity will be destroyed within one and a half to two months, exceeding the critical threshold. <\/span>Consequently, by early autumn, Russia will face an acute fuel shortage, leading to the collapse of the Russian economy.<\/b> This will most likely also trigger social and political crises. Indeed, the ongoing fuel shortage in Russia will lead to a significant reduction \u2013 and eventually a near-total halt \u2013 in transportation, thereby disrupting normal life and economic activity. And once the shortage reaches 80% or more, everything will simply grind to a halt. Fuel will be reserved only for the military and the operations of law enforcement agencies. This is precisely what will constitute Russia\u2019s economic collapse. The country\u2019s economy will begin to crumble, and there will be shortages of food and basic necessities. In such a scenario, the Kremlin will be forced to change its position and agree to a ceasefire along the front lines. When critical circumstances arise, Putin will indeed be forced to make concessions. This is evidenced by his agreement to allow Russian troops to withdraw from the occupied territories of Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnipro in the autumn of 2022, which came about as a result of a real threat of their defeat. At that time, Russian propaganda justified Putin\u2019s decision quite well, and nothing bad happened to him. The same will happen now. Especially since most Russians have absolutely no need for either the Donbas, Kherson, or Zaporizhzhia.<\/span><\/p>\n Thus, as Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine effectively shifts to a stalemate, its air component takes on critical importance. Currently, Ukraine is conducting an operation to force Russia to make peace by destroying its oil and gas industry with drone and missile strikes. And it has already yielded certain results. 43% to 66% of Russia\u2019s oil refining capacity has been destroyed, causing a fuel shortage. In the near future, this shortage will become critical, leading to the collapse of the Russian economy and undermining its ability to continue the war.<\/b><\/p>\n In response, the Kremlin is employing its traditional methods of terror against Ukraine\u2019s civilian population, intensifying airstrikes on cities and other populated areas, as well as on civilian infrastructure. However, Ukrainians are only growing more united in their resistance against the enemy.<\/b><\/p>\n The next two months will be decisive. Russia will focus all its resources on exerting the maximum possible military pressure on Ukraine and may also threaten to use nuclear weapons. However, if Russia does not cease hostilities along the front lines, it faces economic, sociopolitical, and military catastrophe. It may also find itself facing a threat to its very existence.<\/b><\/p>\n Yurii Mykhailenko, Yurii Mykhailenko<\/p>\n Ukraine is carrying out a strategic operation to force Russia to make peace by destroying key facilities in its oil and gas industry<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":34103,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[272],"class_list":["post-34102","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-mixajlenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
\n<\/b>Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"