{"id":34289,"date":"2026-08-10T00:01:58","date_gmt":"2026-08-09T21:01:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=34289"},"modified":"2026-08-10T09:11:37","modified_gmt":"2026-08-10T06:11:37","slug":"parlamentski-vibori-v-rosi%d1%97","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/en\/publikacii\/parlamentski-vibori-v-rosi%d1%97\/","title":{"rendered":"Parliamentary Elections in Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: center;\">Parliamentary Elections in Russia&nbsp;and Possible Changes in the Country<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The political situation in Russia is changing. For the first time since the early 2000s, a political struggle is unfolding in the country between the ruling authorities and their opponents;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">so far, it has been covert and manifests itself only in the media. However, based on the results of the September 2026 elections, the \u201cUnited Russia\u201d party may lose its constitutional majority;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">in that case, the situation in Russia will most likely escalate as these processes spill over into the open. At the same time, unrest may break out among the country\u2019s population;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left; padding-left: 80px;\"><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">all of this will reduce Moscow\u2019s ability to continue the war against Ukraine. Furthermore, the conditions for Russia\u2019s disintegration will emerge.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>As in any totalitarian country, Russia\u2019s parliament does not play a significant role in the country\u2019s system of government. It legitimizes the actions of the authorities in both domestic and foreign affairs and serves as a powerful propaganda tool in support of their policies.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For example, Russia\u2019s Legislative Assembly \u2013 which comprises the Federation Council and the State Duma \u2013 operates entirely in Putin\u2019s interests and carries out the task of supporting his efforts to consolidate his dictatorship within the country and pursue an aggressive foreign policy. This also applies to Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and its annexation of Ukrainian territories.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Specifically, on March 1, 2014, during Russia\u2019s occupation of Crimea, the Federation Council approved the use of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory under the pretext of \u201cprotecting Russian citizens and the Russian-speaking population\u201d.&nbsp; On&nbsp; February 22, 2022, the upper house of the Russian parliament unanimously authorized the use of the army outside the Russian Federation. Two days later \u2013 on February 24 of that year \u2013 Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On March 20\u201321, 2014, the Russian Legislative Assembly ratified an illegal treaty on the \u201cadmission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation\u201d and adopted a federal constitutional law establishing two new \u201cconstituent entities\u201d \u2013 the so-called Republic of Crimea and the city of federal significance Sevastopol. During the full-scale war \u2013 on October 3\u20134, 2022 \u2013 the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation ratified further illegal treaties on the incorporation of Ukraine\u2019s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions into Russia, as well as on making corresponding amendments to the Russian Constitution.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In total, since the start of the full-scale war, the Federal Assembly of Russia has adopted 118 laws to support the so-called \u201cspecial military operation\u201d, 250&nbsp; laws to counter sanctions, and 59 laws restricting the creation, dissemination, and access to information. For the most part, these restrictions pertain to Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On July 27, 2026, the State Duma of the 8<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">th<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">&nbsp; (eighth) convocation, which had been passing the aforementioned laws since 2022, concluded its term. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 20 of this year.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The State Duma included the parties \u201cUnited Russia,\u201d the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), \u201cFair Russia,\u201d the \u201cLDPR,\u201d and \u201cNew People.\u201d As is well known, \u201cUnited Russia\u201d was the ruling party; it held a constitutional majority in parliament, fully supported Putin, and carried out all his directives. The rest of the&nbsp; parties constitute the so-called \u201csystemic opposition\u201d and also support the Kremlin\u2019s course, although recently their representatives have begun to voice criticism of the authorities and the situation in the country.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Elections in Russia have always been rigged by the authorities. The same will obviously be true of the parliamentary elections this September. Therefore, at first glance, they seem unworthy of attention. However, this is not the case. This year\u2019s elections in Russia involve some rather interesting twists and turns.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Indeed, unlike in previous years, when the \u201cUnited Russia\u201d party enjoyed genuinely high approval ratings, public trust in it has now fallen to an average of 33\u201335%, and in some regions as low as 10\u201320%. The reasons for this include a general deterioration in Russians\u2019 attitudes to the country\u2019s leadership and lawmakers due to the excessive prolongation of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and the intensification of its negative consequences, which are already affecting the majority of citizens. This process was catalyzed by the Ukrainian Defense Forces\u2019 strikes on Russian oil refineries and Wildberries warehouses, which caused a petrol shortage in Russia and inflicted enormous losses on businesses.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">These circumstances significantly limit the Kremlin\u2019s ability to rig the election results in favor of \u201cUnited Russia\u201d.&nbsp; If the authorities declare a decisive victory, the fraud will become obvious. This will spark public outrage, which could escalate into mass protests, as happened in a similar situation in 2011\u20132013.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At that time, the protests were brutally suppressed by the authorities, after which they sharply intensified the repressive regime in the country. And to justify these actions and boost the approval ratings of Putin and \u201cUnited Russia\u201d \u2013 which had begun to fall \u2013 Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014, seized and annexed Crimea, and provoked an armed conflict in the Donbas.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Those measures worked at the time. Putin\u2019s approval rating rose, and people not only became afraid to take to the streets to protest but to criticize the government in general. Although street protests resumed in 2017\u20132019 \u2013 albeit on a smaller scale \u2013 this was a result of the country\u2019s social problems worsening due to Western sanctions and the drop in global oil prices.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Russia\u2019s socioeconomic problems have now reached a qualitatively new level, and in many cases, people have been driven to despair. Therefore, if the authorities openly falsify the elections, protests could resume and take on a significant scale, despite repression and the war. For the Kremlin, this is unacceptable, as it would shatter the myth of public support for its policies, derail mobilization, and make it more difficult to continue the war.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">To prevent such a turn of events, the Kremlin will be forced to agree to a reduction in \u201cUnited Russia\u201d\u2019s presence in the country\u2019s parliament and even to its loss of a constitutional majority. However, this will be offset by the formation of a coalition with some of the above-mentioned parties that are part of the \u201csystemic\u201d opposition. Meanwhile, administrative and other forms of pressure will be exerted on the leadership of the remaining parties.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In this regard, the rise in the \u201cNew People\u201d party\u2019s approval rating \u2013 which has already exceeded 13% \u2013 is noteworthy. According to experts\u2019 forecasts, it may rise to \u2013 or be propelled into \u2013 second place. The party espouses center-right and liberal views and was founded under the auspices of the Russian presidential administration with the aim of capturing protest votes and diverting them away from other parties. In the Russian State Duma, it votes almost unanimously with \u201cUnited Russia\u201d and will most likely form a parliamentary coalition with it.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, there are other possibilities as well. According to some speculations, the party may be \u201cpromoted\u201d by certain political-oligarchic forces linked to Sergei Kirienko, the first deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, and the younger generation of fsb leadership, with the aim of creating an alternative to \u201cUnited Russia\u201d. The Kovalchuk brothers are cited as representatives of such forces. One of them \u2013 Yu. Kovalchuk \u2013 is considered Putin\u2019s \u201cpersonal banker\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Despite this, they may be interested in a change of power in the country, as Putin is leading it to ruin. Furthermore, he has begun replacing the older generation of oligarchs with young businessmen loyal to him personally and redistributing financial and economic assets in their favor. Not to mention that funds are being seized from the oligarchs to finance the war. Therefore, a revolt in Russia is entirely possible.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This plan of action has already been discussed previously. Together with several other parties that will be part of the new State Duma, \u201cNew People\u201d will pursue its own agenda aimed at ending the war and normalizing relations with the West. And if the opportunity arises, they will even amend the country\u2019s Constitution and strip Putin of his actual powers. In this way, power in the country will be transferred through legal means, without an open coup or civil war.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">A rather interesting situation is also unfolding around the \u201cYabloko\u201d party, which is the only officially registered democratic organization in Russia that is not part of the \u201csystemic\u201d opposition. It was admitted to the elections and permitted to campaign on the basis of ending the war. Currently, over 70% of Russians support this idea, so the party has a good chance of winning a significant number of votes and entering the State Duma with a fairly large faction.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This issue also gives rise to various assessments and speculations. According to some experts, the Kremlin\u2019s actions regarding the \u201cYabloko\u201d party are intended to demonstrate the democratic nature and fairness of the elections, which should reduce tensions within Russian society.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It is also possible that the authorities might use the \u201cYabloko\u201d party as an indicator of citizens\u2019 true attitudes to the war. If its pre-election poll numbers begin to rise sharply, the Kremlin will be convinced of the reality and widespread nature of anti-war sentiment in the country. Based on this, a decision may be made to refrain from declaring general mobilization, as it would very likely lead to social unrest in the country. Conversely, if \u201cYabloko\u201d receives few votes, mobilization will be carried out in full.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In all of the scenarios mentioned, the authorities may allow \u201cYabloko\u201d to enter the State Duma but artificially suppress its results to a minimal level. As a result, the party will be unable to influence parliamentary decisions and, consequently, the country\u2019s policies. If necessary, the Kremlin may also exclude it from the elections under one pretext or another.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The \u201cYabloko\u201d party may also be used by Putin\u2019s hidden opponents to form a coalition against \u201cUnited Russia\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>In other words, for the first time since the early 2000s, preparations for parliamentary elections in Russia are accompanied by a real struggle between various political forces, even though outwardly most of them appear to be pro-government.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Evidence of these changes is the emergence in March 2026 \u2013 and the rapid spread across social media \u2013 of a wave of statements by all sorts of people criticizing the situation in the country, the government, and Putin personally, as well as calling for an end to the war. At first, the authorities ignored this, but then began shutting down popular messaging apps and restricting access to the Internet. Repression against those engaged in such activities has also resumed. But this is no longer yielding results.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the current situation, Putin and the \u201cUnited Russia\u201d party desperately need visible successes on the front lines that can be presented as a victory in the war. Along with boosting their approval ratings, this would also allow them to suspend the war \u2013 the only way to stem the tide of the country\u2019s deepening socio-economic crisis. These crises are currently escalating rapidly and could reach catastrophic proportions as early as this autumn, as we have repeatedly noted.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As is well known, given Russia\u2019s inability to occupy all of Ukraine, Putin is attempting to seize at least the entire Donbas region, which would allow him to declare that the \u201cobjectives of the special military operation have been achieved\u201d and to justify the war and the losses incurred in it. This is precisely where he is currently concentrating his main forces and military resources.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">However, it is clear that, with less than two months to go before the elections, the Russian armed forces will not be able to occupy the entire territory of the Donbas. This is evident from developments on the front lines, where the situation has essentially reached a stalemate, and Russian troops\u2019 advances are at their lowest levels in practically the entire war. The only thing increasing is the number of casualties among Russian servicemen, which, on the contrary, have reached their highest levels. At the same time, socioeconomic problems in the country are intensifying.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Therefore, Putin and the \u201cUnited Russia\u201d party will go into the elections without any notable successes and in a weak position. As a result, the party will effectively be unable to secure enough votes to obtain a parliamentary majority. This will force the Russian authorities to choose between open, large-scale election fraud and forming a coalition with other parties \u2013 a move with highly uncertain consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Based on this, it is highly likely that the political situation in Russia will escalate after the parliamentary elections. This will result from the onset of an open struggle between the current government \u2013 and Putin personally \u2013 and their opponents among the aforementioned forces.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the same time, unrest among the population may break out, driven by socioeconomic factors and provoked by election fraud and mobilization. This unrest will be supported and led by Putin\u2019s opponents within the current ruling elite.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Internal conflict within the country will also affect its armed forces. It could spark new mutinies, similar to the \u201cmarch for justice\u201d on Moscow led by Yevgeny Prigozhin and his militants in June 2023.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Overall, these factors will reduce Russia\u2019s ability to continue the war. And if Russia does not stop the war by this winter, Ukraine will also launch strikes against Russia\u2019s energy infrastructure. First and foremost, these strikes will target facilities that supply electricity to Moscow. By autumn, Ukraine will already have ballistic missiles capable of carrying out this task. They will plunge Russia into complete chaos.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>Thus, the term of the&nbsp; State Duma of the 8<\/b><b>th<\/b><b> convocation in Russia has come to an end; this Duma fully supported Putin\u2019s course and served to provide legislative backing for his war against Ukraine. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 20, 2026.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>For the first time since the early 2000s, the run-up to the elections has been marked by a political struggle between Putin\u2019s \u201cUnited Russia\u201d party and his hidden opponents from among certain political-oligarchic forces that have their own parties. At the very least, that is the impression being created.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>If these forces do indeed exist and are capable of getting their candidates elected to parliament, an open or covert opposition to \u201cUnited Russia\u201d will emerge there. This will create the conditions for a change in power in the country, or at least a limitation of Putin\u2019s powers.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>After the elections, the situation in the country will most likely escalate. A political confrontation will begin between the current government and the new opposition, accompanied by unrest among the population. At the very least, this will reduce Moscow\u2019s ability to continue the war against Ukraine; at worst, it will set in motion the process of Russia\u2019s disintegration.<\/b><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><b>Yurii Ilchenko,<br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Yurii Ilchenko<\/p>\n<p>The political situation in Russia is changing. For the first time since the early 2000s, a political struggle is unfolding in the country between the ruling authorities and their opponents<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":34290,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[268],"class_list":["post-34289","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-ilchenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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