According to many experts, the autumn of 2026 could mark a turning point in Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, offering real prospects for its conclusion in a manner that takes Ukrainian interests into account;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n The reason for this is a critical worsening of the economic situation in Russia, as well as the approaching US elections, which mean that D. Trump desperately needs examples of success in his peacemaking efforts;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n As before, Putin has no desire to end the war and continues to strive to achieve his goals despite all his problems. However, in the very near future, he will no longer be able to continue it;<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n therefore, the Kremlin may agree to resume peace talks. As before, it will try to stick to its own terms. But the economic crisis in Russia and pressure from the USA will force it to make concessions.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n The Economic Crisis and Russia\u2019s Ability to Continue the War<\/b><\/p>\n Russia\u2019s economic problems are well known. It is in a deep crisis from which there is no way out.<\/b> Even representatives of the Russian government now acknowledge this. According to an assessment by Elvira Nabiullina, the Governor of the Central Bank of the RF, in August 2026, the crisis in the Russian economy will reach a critical stage in just two or three months. Perhaps the Kremlin could find the funds to continue the war for some time yet. Specifically, it could completely liquidate the country\u2019s gold and foreign exchange reserves, which as of August of this year still amounted to 2,300 tons of gold worth $292 billion. Please, be reminded that Russia spends one billion dollars a day on the war. In other words, it is capable of continuing the war for at least another 9 months. But there is one circumstance that Russia will be unable to overcome under any circumstances. This refers to the fact that Ukraine is systematically destroying Russia\u2019s oil refining industry, as a result of which Russia is rapidly losing its ability to produce petrol and diesel fuel. The Russians have absolutely no way to resolve this problem, and therefore will run out of fuel in the near future. As a result, Russia\u2019s economy will grind to a halt, and the Russian armed forces will be unable to continue their military operations.<\/span><\/p>\n Many still doubt this, arguing that Russia has enough oil refineries, including in Siberia and the Far East, where Ukraine\u2019s military capabilities have not reached yet. And, as a last resort, Russia will be able to import petrol and diesel fuel from other countries. Among these are Russia\u2019s so-called \u201cfriends\u201d such as Belarus, India, China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and even Morocco.<\/span><\/p>\n All of this is nothing more than a fantasy fueled by Russian propaganda, or the remnants of a belief in Russia\u2019s greatness that has lingered since the days of the USSR. The looming catastrophe in Russia can be demonstrated through a quite simple analysis of the situation in its oil refining sector. Given the strategic importance of this issue, let\u2019s examine it in greater detail.<\/span><\/p>\n Consequences of Ukraine\u2019s Strikes on Russian Oil Refineries<\/b><\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s resumption of strikes on Russian oil refineries in early August 2026 \u2013 which resulted in the \u201cdestruction\u201d of Wildberries\u2019 warehouses \u2013 triggered the second phase of the fuel crisis in Russia.<\/b> The crisis is more severe than it was at the beginning of this summer, and there are signs that the Russian government has lost control over developments in this sector. This is evident from the situation in Moscow and Moscow Region, which is the worst in the entire country. In June, the government managed to avoid this situation by transporting petrol and diesel fuel reserves from other regions to the capital \u2013 at their expense, by the way. That\u2019s not possible now, since the fuel situation outside the Russian capital and its suburbs isn\u2019t much better, and reserves there are practically gone. It couldn\u2019t be any other way. In early summer, Ukraine destroyed 30\u201340% of petrol production facilities in the Russian Federation. The shortage was roughly the same \u2013 about 35,000 tons per day.<\/span><\/p>\n In July, Ukraine shifted its focus to online marketplaces. This was also important because it inflicted tangible damage on Russia\u2019s small businesses and, through them, on its banking sector \u2013 including banks directly linked to Putin and his inner circle. Nevertheless, Ukraine\u2019s shift in targets allowed Russia to repair some of its refineries and somewhat alleviate the petrol shortage.<\/span><\/p>\n In August, Ukraine continued its operation to destroy the enemy\u2019s oil refining industry. In addition to the damage already inflicted, by mid-month the Ukrainian Defense Forces had taken two-thirds of the petrol production capacity of Russian refineries out of commission. Whereas before the massive strikes they were producing 112 tons of petrol per day, they now produce only 30,000\u201335,000 tons \u2013 and possibly even less. The shortfall amounts to more than 70%.<\/span><\/p>\n Although diesel fuel production in Russia has fallen 2.5-fold, the situation with diesel is somewhat better. Previously, most of this fuel was intended for export. That is now prohibited. As a result, Russia can meet about 70% of its domestic demand. Currently, 80,000 tons are produced daily, while demand stands at 110,000\u2013120,000 tons.<\/span><\/p>\n To compensate for the shortage of petrol and diesel fuel in June of this year, approximately one million tons were withdrawn from reserves. That is, more than half of its total volume of 1.7 million tons. To cover this shortfall in August, approximately 2 million tons were already needed \u2013 twice as much as could have been in reserve at the beginning of August 2026. Hence the sharp increase in the fuel shortage. And this shortage will only grow, as the Ukrainian Defense Forces continue to actively destroy Russian refineries. Currently, all of them are within a 3,000-kilometer radius of Ukraine. About 90% of these have already been struck multiple times. Refinery owners are unwilling to carry out repairs, as they see no point in doing so. Anything that is restored is immediately put out of commission by Ukraine again \u2013 and in many cases, even before the refineries can be restarted. Therefore, it is more profitable for refinery owners not to process the oil but to ship it for export. What exactly is being done to ensure fuel supplies to the RF.<\/span><\/p>\n Russia\u2019s Efforts to Address the Fuel Shortage and Its Failure in This Regard<\/b><\/p>\n Russia is attempting to compensate for its shortage of petrol and diesel fuel through imports. This essentially means a shift in Russia\u2019s status from one of the world\u2019s largest energy carriers exporters to that of an importer forced to spend money rather than earn it. However, even this approach has failed to resolve the issues.<\/span><\/p>\n Currently, Belarus is Russia\u2019s largest supplier of oil. It ships the vast majority of the output from both Belarusian refineries, where Russian oil is processed. Total monthly supply volumes reach about 220,000 tons, which is the maximum possible. But this covers Russia\u2019s needs for only two days.<\/span><\/p>\n Furthermore, the refineries cannot operate non-stop. They require regular maintenance, which is typically carried out in the autumn. Therefore, as early as September of this year, one of them will be shut down for at least a month. And then the volume of Belarusian petroleum products supplied to Russia will be cut in half. This situation will continue at least until winter, since once the first refinery begins operations, the second one will be shut down for maintenance.<\/span><\/p>\n China is considered another partner of Russia. It is the largest buyer of Russian oil, but supplies Russia with extremely limited volumes of refined products, which remain in the Far East and cannot even meet local demand there. Chinese companies cannot increase petrol and diesel fuel shipments to Russia because their government has imposed an export ban. What Russia can currently purchase is being supplied under previously signed contracts.<\/span><\/p>\n India also imports large quantities of Russian oil. However, under the threat of US sanctions, it has begun to phase out these imports. Nevertheless, it maintains ties with Russia in the oil sector. The Russian company Rosneft owns 49% of the shares in the Indian company Nayara Energy. In June of this year, Nayara Energy sent a tanker to Russia carrying 60,000 tons of petroleum products. And that is all it can do in a month \u2013 enough to cover only half of Russia\u2019s daily needs. Moreover, the price of Indian petrol at the port of Arkhangelsk (the port farthest from Ukraine) was 150 rubles per liter, which is twice the all-Russian average of 70 rubles per liter. The oil was still sold on the exchange at the usual price. However, the government was forced to compensate Lukoil for the difference out of the state budget. This won\u2019t happen again, as there are no funds available. Therefore, there will be no petrol shipments from India.<\/span><\/p>\n Things didn\u2019t work out with Kazakhstan either. Only one small refinery, \u201cKondensat\u201d, agreed to supply petrol to Russia. It can essentially be disregarded, as it can deliver only 1,500 metric tons of petroleum products to the Russian market per day. Other refineries are reluctant to deepen their cooperation with Russia \u2013 which is entirely understandable. About 30% of Kazakhstan\u2019s oil industry is owned by the American corporations Chevron and ExxonMobil, which exceeds the share held by Kazakhstan\u2019s state-owned company \u201cKazMunayGas\u201d. Therefore, the USA is blocking the supply of Kazakhstan\u2019s oil to Russia. All the more so because doing so would make Ukraine\u2019s strikes on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium\u2019s oil terminal near Novorossiysk entirely legitimate.<\/span><\/p>\n T\u00fcrkiye has reportedly sent a tanker carrying 60,000 tons of oil to Russia. The tanker set sail for Arkhangelsk because Ukraine had closed off Novorossiysk. Even this amount of oil won\u2019t save Russia. And there likely won\u2019t be any more of it. T\u00fcrkiye risks falling under EU sanctions, which would be extremely painful for it, since Europe is its main trade and economic partner.<\/span><\/p>\n It is difficult to say how much petroleum products will be supplied to Russia from Morocco or Egypt. But that amount will clearly not meet its needs. There may be some additional supplies from similar countries. Russian embassies abroad have been tasked with securing fuel in their host countries at any cost. It is possible that some fuel will be procured this way, but it will amount to mere crumbs that will not resolve the problem of the acute fuel shortage in Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n Prospects for the Development of the Situation Regarding the Fuel Shortage in Russia<\/b><\/p>\n It is quite clear what will happen next. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to operate as they are now, the fuel crisis in Russia will significantly worsen as early as October 2026. <\/b>In June and August of this year, the Forces of Defence of Ukraine disabled up to 70% of the capacity of Russian oil refineries located 3,000 km from Ukraine. By the end of September \u2013 at the latest, mid-October of this year \u2013 they will be largely destroyed. As a result, Russia will have refineries remaining only in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Those will cover no more than 15% of its liquid fuel needs. Foreign supplies will, at best, add another 10% to that. In other words, in just one month, Russia will have at most 25% of its total liquid fuel needs met. However, if refineries are shut down for maintenance \u2013 which is unavoidable \u2013 and given that supplies from other countries will most likely be disrupted, Russia will be left with up to 13% of what it needs.<\/span><\/p>\n Such volumes of liquid fuel will be sufficient only to ensure the functioning of government agencies and emergency services, as well as to meet the minimum needs of the armed forces on the front lines. The economy and transportation networks will be left with nothing and, for the most part, will cease to function. And then chaos will engulf Russia. This could happen in October\u2013November of this year, since some fuel reserves are likely still available. But this outcome is inevitable.<\/span><\/p>\n Of course, Russia is also inflicting significant damage on us. It has managed to significantly disrupt the logistics of major Ukrainian retail chains, undermine the operations of our steel industry, and block maritime trade. However, Ukraine has done the same to Russia, both on its own and with the support of our Western partners. The only difference is that we are depriving Russia of fuel, which is of strategic importance, while Russia cannot do the same to us. Furthermore, even if Russia manages to inflict critical damage on the Ukrainian economy, Ukraine will immediately receive assistance from its Western partners \u2013 something none of Russia\u2019s partners would do for it. The Kremlin is most likely aware of what could happen to Russia. That is why it is trying to stop Ukraine and force it to capitulate by intensifying terrorist attacks on its civilian sector. Moreover, Russia will be capable of doing this even after its economy plunges into a deep crisis, as it will have sufficient resources for such actions. However, such actions will be a sign of the Kremlin\u2019s desperation, as it is unable to turn the situation to its advantage. It is trying to inflict maximum damage on Ukraine; however, this does not diminish Ukraine\u2019s defense capabilities or its ability to counter Russia. Moreover, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are launching counterattacks and recapturing territories occupied by Russia. Therefore, the war is only dragging on.<\/span><\/p>\n The USA\u2019s Interests and Possible Actions<\/b><\/p>\n The situation described above runs counter to the interests of US President D. Trump. After all, all of this is unfolding on the eve of the US congressional elections.<\/b> The White House leader\u2019s missteps in domestic and foreign policy \u2013 including the delay of the USA\u2019s military operations against Iran and the failure of mediation efforts to end Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine \u2013 have led to a significant decline in his standing and a drop in the Republican Party\u2019s approval ratings. This is already a significant problem. And it is becoming particularly acute for D. Trump due to the Democratic Party leaders\u2019 intentions to launch judicial investigations into his illegal actions should they gain a majority in both chambers of Congress. In that case, they plan to raise the issue of impeaching D.Trump.<\/span><\/p>\n The USA will not be able to achieve tangible success in the war with Iran in the near future. That is why it is trying to strangle it economically and has already achieved some tangible results. But in order to completely dismantle the state and military systems of the Islamic Republic of Iran \u2013 which is currently underway \u2013 it will take time, which D. Trump does not have.<\/span><\/p>\n In contrast, his mediation efforts regarding Ukraine and Russia hold promise. As already mentioned, Russia is on the brink of a sharp escalation of the political crisis that has already begun. It merely needs to be accelerated. US intelligence, experts, and D. Trump himself understand this. He has repeatedly confirmed that he is aware of the real situation in Russia\u2019s economy and on the front lines. At the same time, he has all the leverage needed to force Putin to make peace, or at least to begin negotiations on a realistic basis.<\/span><\/p>\n For instance, the USA could supply Ukraine with more powerful and long-range weapons, as well as additional missiles for the Patriot air defense system. This would enable the Armed Forces of Ukraine to intensify strikes against Russia\u2019s energy and military-industrial infrastructure and ultimately cripple its economy and its ability to continue the war. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will strengthen their air defense system, which will curb Russia\u2019s attempts to pressure Ukraine through terrorist attacks.<\/span><\/p>\n Another tool at D. Trump\u2019s disposal will soon be the Lindsey Graham Act, which calls for the imposition of tough sanctions against Russia, as well as secondary restrictions on countries that trade with it. The bill is highly likely to be passed by the US Congress as early as this month, which will enable D. Trump to halt trade between certain countries and Russia. Given this, the US President may issue an ultimatum to Putin regarding the issues mentioned above. Most likely, delivering this ultimatum to the Russian dictator in one form or another was the main purpose of CIA Director J. Ratcliffe\u2019s visit to Moscow on August 25 of this year. Other issues may also have been discussed. There are many theories, and they are well known. But the main issue was still Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, as D. Trump himself acknowledged.<\/span><\/p>\n The Deadlock in Russia\u2019s War Against Ukraine and Ways Out of It<\/b><\/p>\n All of the circumstances mentioned are driving Putin, so to speak, into a deadlock.<\/b> Agreeing to end the war without achieving at least its minimum objectives \u2013 namely, the capture of the entire Donbas region \u2013 is unacceptable to him. Such a move would mean not only that Russia had lost, but also that he had suffered a personal defeat and failed to achieve his sacred goal of restoring the Russian Empire. Putin cannot allow himself to do this, both because of his own ambitions and because of the nature of his psyche. At the same time, he is unable to continue the war, as this would inevitably lead to a catastrophe for Russia as early as this autumn. Therefore, Putin will most likely agree to resume dialogue after consultations with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan on August 31\u2013September 1, 2026. But, as before, he will drag out the talks and put pressure on Ukraine by every means possible \u2013 both on the front lines and by escalating terrorist attacks.<\/span><\/p>\n However, unlike in the past, Ukraine is now capable of responding effectively. As mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not only firmly holding their positions but are also launching counterattacks. In terms of the effective use of UAVs, we are on par with Russia and even slightly outnumber them. And the fact that Russia now has jet-powered drones does not give it any particular advantage. Drones are now being destroyed just as others were before. We should have our own ballistic missiles very soon. In light of this, if the war is not suspended by winter, we will enter it on equal footing with Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n There are only two ways out of the current situation.<\/span><\/p>\n First: Ukraine will disable Russian oil refineries by the end of September through mid-October of this year. This will significantly deprive Russia of the ability to continue the war and will ultimately destroy its economy. As a result, the conditions for Ukraine\u2019s victory and the restoration of its territorial integrity will be established.<\/span><\/p>\n Second: The USA, and possibly Europe, will not allow us to do this, since such a turn of events would pose a real threat of Russia\u2019s disintegration with unpredictable consequences, including the possible loss of control over its nuclear weapons. In that case, Ukraine may be forced into protracted, fruitless negotiations. The war would then continue into the following year, 2027.<\/span><\/p>\n Therefore, everything will be decided as early as September\u2013October of this year.<\/span><\/p>\n Consequently, due to worsening economic problems and a lack of tangible successes on the front lines, Russia finds itself in a critical situation. Ukraine\u2019s strikes on Russian oil refineries are seen as the catalyst, leading to a persistent shortage of liquid fuel in Russia. In the near term, this could both undermine its economy and drastically reduce its ability to continue the war.<\/b><\/p>\n Despite this, Putin refuses to end the war and is striving to achieve at least some of his objectives, which could provide an opportunity to announce \u201cvictory\u201d. First and foremost, the goal is to seize the entire territory of the Donbas, which is of fundamental importance to him. To this end, Russia\u2019s offensive operations are intensifying in the East of Ukraine, and terrorist attacks against Ukraine are escalating.<\/b><\/p>\n In fact, the situation is hopeless. It can only change through the intervention of external forces \u2013 specifically, tougher measures by D. Trump against Russia. All he needs to do is provide Ukraine with powerful long-range weapons and air defense systems, as well as enact the Lindsey Graham Act, which provides for the imposition of effective sanctions against Russia and secondary restrictions against countries that trade with it. This could force Putin to agree to resume negotiations. But he will still drag his feet on this and put pressure on Ukraine with all available forces on the front lines and by escalating terrorist attacks. However, Ukraine is now capable of responding adequately to the enemy. Moreover, the severe fuel shortage in Russia \u2013 part of the country\u2019s overall economic crisis \u2013 will pave the way for our victory.<\/b><\/p>\n Yurii Ilchenko, Collage \u00a9 TSN<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Yurii Ilchenko<\/p>\n According to many experts, the autumn\u00a0 of 2026 could mark a turning point in Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":34422,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[263,260],"tags":[268],"class_list":["post-34421","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-podi-faktit-komentari","category-publikacii","tag-ilchenko","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"en","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
\n<\/b>Institute for Global Politics<\/span><\/p>\n