{"id":29857,"date":"2025-06-04T00:05:53","date_gmt":"2025-06-03T21:05:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=29857"},"modified":"2025-06-13T19:17:12","modified_gmt":"2025-06-13T16:17:12","slug":"strategichne-partnerstvo-rosi%d1%97-i-bilorusi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/fr\/publikacii\/strategichne-partnerstvo-rosi%d1%97-i-bilorusi\/","title":{"rendered":"Partenariat strat\u00e9gique entre la Russie et la Bi\u00e9lorussie\u00a0: man\u0153uvres militaires conjoints \u00ab\u00a0Zapad-2025\u00a0\u00bb"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: justify;\">Partenariat strat\u00e9gique entre la Russie et la Bi\u00e9lorussie&nbsp;: man\u0153uvres militaires conjoints \u00ab&nbsp;Zapad-2025&nbsp;\u00bb<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Le d\u00e9ploiement permanent du contingent russe en R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie constitue l&#8217;une des priorit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques imm\u00e9diates de la Russie. Son fondement juridique est le Trait\u00e9 entre la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie et la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie sur les garanties de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l&#8217;\u00c9tat f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9 du 13&nbsp;mars&nbsp;2025 [1]. Ce trait\u00e9 l\u00e9gitime non seulement le d\u00e9ploiement des forces arm\u00e9es russes, mais aussi la cr\u00e9ation d&#8217;installations militaires (notamment de bases militaires) sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Dans le cadre de l&#8217;approfondissement du partenariat strat\u00e9gique russo-bi\u00e9lorusse, la Russie acc\u00e9l\u00e8re actuellement le renforcement de l&#8217;espace de d\u00e9fense de l&#8217;\u00c9tat f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9 dans trois domaines principaux [2]&nbsp;:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>Formation des militaires bi\u00e9lorusses dans les \u00e9tablissements d&#8217;enseignement sup\u00e9rieur militaire de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie. Plus de 300 militaires bi\u00e9lorusses suivent actuellement une formation dans les \u00e9tablissements d&#8217;enseignement du minist\u00e8re russe de la D\u00e9fense o\u00f9 ils ma\u00eetrisent les techniques de guerre modernes, en s&#8217;appuyant sur l&#8217;exp\u00e9rience des op\u00e9rations militaires sp\u00e9ciales, notamment l&#8217;utilisation de syst\u00e8mes sans pilote. Selon les m\u00e9dias, le 14 mai dernier, une formation d&#8217;\u00e9quipages de drones a eu lieu en Bi\u00e9lorussie sous la supervision du Centre r\u00e9publicain des syst\u00e8mes sans pilote de la R\u00e9publique populaire de Donetsk (ville de Donetsk). \u00c0 la demande de la partie bi\u00e9lorusse, des instructeurs sont venus pour la formation, partageant leur exp\u00e9rience acquise dans le domaine des \u00ab op\u00e9rations militaires sp\u00e9ciales \u00bb&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>coop\u00e9ration militaro-technique (le complexe militaro-industriel bi\u00e9lorusse est devenu une annexe du complexe militaro-industriel russe&nbsp;: environ 80&nbsp;% des entreprises bi\u00e9lorusses sont int\u00e9gr\u00e9es au complexe militaro-industriel russe). Le potentiel du complexe militaro-industriel bi\u00e9lorusse a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9montr\u00e9 lors du salon MILEX-2025 o\u00f9 le montant total des contrats conclus s&#8217;est \u00e9lev\u00e9 \u00e0 plus de 390 millions de dollars am\u00e9ricains&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>renforcement de la coh\u00e9sion des troupes et du travail des \u00e9tats-majors des deux \u00c9tats alli\u00e9s qui devrait \u00eatre d\u00e9montr\u00e9e principalement lors des exercices strat\u00e9giques conjoints \u00ab&nbsp;Zapad-2025&nbsp;\u00bb. La F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie entend utiliser les manoeuvres strat\u00e9giques conjointes \u00ab&nbsp;Zapad-2025&nbsp;\u00bb, dont la pr\u00e9paration fait depuis longtemps l&#8217;objet de l&#8217;attention des m\u00e9dias internationaux pour approfondir son partenariat strat\u00e9gique et renforcer sa coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Cet exercice devrait se poursuivre simultan\u00e9ment sur les terrains d&#8217;entra\u00eenement bi\u00e9lorusses et russes en septembre prochain. Son concept approuv\u00e9 pr\u00e9voit un \u00e9pisode op\u00e9rationnel de confrontation entre deux coalitions d&#8217;\u00c9tats&nbsp;: l&#8217;une dirig\u00e9e par la Russie, l&#8217;autre par l&#8217;Occident conditionnel, t\u00e9moignant de la volont\u00e9 de Moscou et de Minsk de renforcer l&#8217;alliance r\u00e9gionale face \u00e0 l&#8217;OTAN.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag1.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-5udO5mXL\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-29860\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag1.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag1.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag1-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Le ministre russe de la D\u00e9fense, Beloussov, en visite \u00e0 Minsk, a soulign\u00e9 que \u00ab&nbsp;Zapad-2025&nbsp;\u00bb aura un caract\u00e8re exclusivement d\u00e9fensif, o\u00f9 il est pr\u00e9vu de \u00ab&nbsp;pratiquer des options d&#8217;actions conjointes pour repousser une agression contre l&#8217;\u00c9tat f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9 en utilisant le Groupe r\u00e9gional des forces de la Bi\u00e9lorussie et de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie, ainsi que les groupes de la coalition&nbsp;\u00bb [2], c&#8217;est-\u00e0-dire simultan\u00e9ment \u00e0 l&#8217;ouest et au sud. Selon les m\u00e9dias, le sc\u00e9nario des exercices pr\u00e9voit \u00e9galement des frappes avec des armes nucl\u00e9aires tactiques, dont les porteurs se trouvent sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Le chef du r\u00e9gime bi\u00e9lorusse, commentant les pr\u00e9paratifs des exercices, a assur\u00e9 que la Bi\u00e9lorussie et la Russie \u00ab n&#8217;attaqueraient personne \u00bb. Loukachenko avait tenu les m\u00eames propos \u00e0 propos des exercices op\u00e9rationnels \u00ab Allied Resolve-2022 \u00bb. Parall\u00e8lement, les exercices \u00abZapad-2021\u00bb ont servi de pr\u00e9texte \u00e0 un red\u00e9ploiement partiel des forces et des moyens en vue d&#8217;un d\u00e9ploiement avanc\u00e9, \u00e0 la veille d&#8217;un renversement de troupes \u00e0 plus grande \u00e9chelle lors de l&#8217;exercice \u00ab Allied Resolve-2022 \u00bb, qui s&#8217;est transform\u00e9 en une invasion \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle des forces arm\u00e9es russes en Ukraine. En 2021, les dirigeants bi\u00e9lorusses ont justifi\u00e9 la pr\u00e9sence d&#8217;unit\u00e9s russes en Bi\u00e9lorussie apr\u00e8s les exercices par la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&#8217;assurer la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de la direction op\u00e9rationnelle sud \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re avec l&#8217;Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Depuis lors, le r\u00e9gime bi\u00e9lorusse a confirm\u00e9 son engagement envers ses obligations militaires et politiques alli\u00e9es envers la Russie&nbsp;: mi-2023, Moscou et Minsk ont annonc\u00e9 le d\u00e9ploiement d&#8217;armes nucl\u00e9aires tactiques russes en Bi\u00e9lorussie, et en d\u00e9cembre&nbsp;2024, ils ont annonc\u00e9 leur intention de d\u00e9ployer de nouveaux missiles balistiques russes \u00e0 moyenne port\u00e9e \u00ab&nbsp;Orechnik&nbsp;\u00bb sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse. \u00c0 l&#8217;\u00e9t\u00e9&nbsp;2024, au d\u00e9but de l&#8217;op\u00e9ration Koursk des forces arm\u00e9es ukrainiennes, les troupes bi\u00e9lorusses ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9ploy\u00e9es de mani\u00e8re ostentatoire \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re sud, montrant \u00e0 Moscou leur volont\u00e9 de d\u00e9tourner l&#8217;arm\u00e9e ukrainienne du front principal.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag2.png\" data-rel=\"lightbox-gallery-5udO5mXL\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-29861\" src=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag2.png 300w, https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/zapag2-45x45.png 45w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>\u00c0 l&#8217;heure actuelle, l&#8217;ouverture d&#8217;un nouveau front par la Russie et une r\u00e9p\u00e9tition du sc\u00e9nario de&nbsp;2022 depuis le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse en&nbsp;2025 semblent peu probables. Dans le m\u00eame temps, compte tenu de la situation g\u00e9ographique de la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie, des risques potentiels d&#8217;escalade subsistent en raison des intentions agressives de la Russie, de son refus de faire des concessions et de la poursuite de ses actions militaires en Ukraine. La R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie, devenue une base arri\u00e8re et logistique \u00e0 part enti\u00e8re pour les troupes russes, joue un r\u00f4le dans ces intentions de la Russie.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Afin de d\u00e9montrer sa \u00ab&nbsp;disponibilit\u00e9 au dialogue, au compromis et \u00e0 la r\u00e9duction des tensions&nbsp;\u00bb dans ses relations avec l&#8217;Occident, le ministre bi\u00e9lorusse de la D\u00e9fense Khrenin a fait une d\u00e9claration retentissante concernant \u00ab&nbsp;la r\u00e9duction des param\u00e8tres de l&#8217;exercice Zapad-2025 et le d\u00e9placement de ses principales man\u0153uvres plus profond\u00e9ment \u00e0 l&#8217;int\u00e9rieur du territoire bi\u00e9lorusse, depuis les fronti\u00e8res occidentales&nbsp;\u00bb [3]. De toute \u00e9vidence, la d\u00e9cision de modifier le format des manoeuvres prise par les parties vise \u00e0 \u00e9viter de nouvelles tensions dans les relations avec l&#8217;Occident, \u00e0 d\u00e9montrer des intentions pr\u00e9tendument \u00ab&nbsp;pacifiques&nbsp;\u00bb, \u00e0 r\u00e9duire l&#8217;attention m\u00e9diatique et \u00e0 renforcer les positions dans les n\u00e9gociations sur le r\u00e8glement du conflit russo-ukrainien.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><strong>Il convient \u00e9galement de garder \u00e0 l&#8217;esprit que l&#8217;introduction de troupes russes en Bi\u00e9lorussie dans le cadre de l&#8217;exercice Zapad-2025 ne laissera pas d&#8217;autre choix aux dirigeants bi\u00e9lorusses si Moscou d\u00e9cide de refuser le retrait d&#8217;une partie de ces troupes et leur d\u00e9ploiement permanent, invoquant la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de \u00ab&nbsp;garantir la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l&#8217;\u00c9tat de l&#8217;Union dans une situation internationale difficile&nbsp;\u00bb. Dans ce contexte, une concentration suppl\u00e9mentaire des forces arm\u00e9es russes au sein du Groupe r\u00e9gional des troupes (Forces) de l&#8217;\u00c9tat f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9 constituerait une menace potentielle pour l&#8217;ensemble de la r\u00e9gion. <\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Maria Gutsalo,<br \/>\n<\/strong>experte, candidate en sciences politiques<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><strong>Sources utilis\u00e9es&nbsp;:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\">[1]&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bintel.org.ua\/analytics\/geopolitics\/garanti%D1%97-bezpeki\/\">https:\/\/bintel.org.ua\/analytics\/geopolitics\/garanti%D1%97-bezpeki\/<\/a><br \/>\n[2]&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/xn--c1anggbdpdf.xn--p1ai\/actual_comment\/242591\/\">https:\/\/xn--c1anggbdpdf.xn--p1ai\/actual_comment\/242591\/<\/a><br \/>\n[3]&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/belta.by\/society\/view\/hrenin-osnovnye-manevry-uchenija-zapad-2025-perenesut-vglub-belarusi-717503-2025\/\">https:\/\/belta.by\/society\/view\/hrenin-osnovnye-manevry-uchenija-zapad-2025-perenesut-vglub-belarusi-717503-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Maria Gutsalo<\/p>\n<p>Le d\u00e9ploiement permanent du contingent russe en R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie constitue l&#8217;une des priorit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques imm\u00e9diates de la Russie<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":29858,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[278],"class_list":["post-29857","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-gucalo","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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