![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front3.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nDrone \u00e0 Osiny : le chaos informationnel comme outil<\/h3>\n
Un exemple frappant de la guerre hybride russe est l’incident survenu dans la nuit du 20 ao\u00fbt 2025, lorsqu’un drone a explos\u00e9 pr\u00e8s du village d’Osiny, dans la vo\u00efvodie de Lublin, en Pologne. L’explosion a incendi\u00e9 un champ de ma\u00efs et endommag\u00e9 les fen\u00eatres de plusieurs maisons, sans faire de victimes.<\/p>\n
Selon les premi\u00e8res informations contradictoires, il pourrait s’agir d’un fragment de moteur d’avion, et le Parquet a fait \u00e9tat d’un drone \u00e9quip\u00e9 d’un engin explosif. Le commandement de la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne a quant \u00e0 lui d\u00e9clar\u00e9 qu’aucune violation de l’espace a\u00e9rien n’avait \u00e9t\u00e9 enregistr\u00e9e. Les experts ont not\u00e9 que le drone aurait pu voler trop bas pour \u00eatre d\u00e9tect\u00e9 par les syst\u00e8mes radar concern\u00e9s.<\/p>\n
Le ministre de la D\u00e9fense nationale, W\u0142adys\u0142aw Kosiniak-Kamysz, a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 trois versions possibles : un drone russe ayant d\u00e9vi\u00e9 de sa trajectoire ; un drone destin\u00e9 \u00e0 la contrebande ; un acte de sabotage. Des informations ont \u00e9galement fait \u00e9tat d’un drone leurre, destin\u00e9 \u00e0 tester les syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne. Plus tard, le porte-parole du minist\u00e8re des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a confirm\u00e9 qu’il s’agissait bien d’un \u00abchahed\u00bb russe.<\/p>\n
Cependant, le d\u00e9bat autour de l’incident a \u00e9t\u00e9 domin\u00e9 par des discours politiques. Avant m\u00eame la fin de l’enqu\u00eate, le chef du d\u00e9partement de la D\u00e9fense a qualifi\u00e9 l’incident de provocation russe. Le diff\u00e9rend sur l’interpr\u00e9tation de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement, aliment\u00e9 par une forte polarisation politique, a montr\u00e9 que la politique a domin\u00e9 le d\u00e9bat, au d\u00e9triment d’une analyse sereine des menaces.<\/p>\n
L’absence de messages coh\u00e9rents et l’interpr\u00e9tation politique rapide pourraient, dans la pratique, jouer en faveur du Kremlin, pour qui le chaos et les troubles sociaux sont les principaux outils de guerre psychologique.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front4.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nInfrastructures critiques sous le feu des critiques<\/h3>\n
Selon un rapport du Conseil consultatif pour les affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res [3], les syst\u00e8mes \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques et hydriques europ\u00e9ens d\u00e9pendent encore de technologies obsol\u00e8tes, ce qui les rend vuln\u00e9rables aux cyberattaques et au sabotage. Breakthrough Energy [4] note que l’\u00e2ge moyen des infrastructures \u00e9lectriques dans l’UE est d’environ 40 ans. De plus, jusqu’\u00e0 90 % de la logistique militaire de l’OTAN repose sur des ressources civiles, ce qui accro\u00eet consid\u00e9rablement la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de l’ensemble du syst\u00e8me. Les c\u00e2bles sous-marins, qui transportent environ 95 % des donn\u00e9es et des transactions financi\u00e8res mondiales, sont particuli\u00e8rement vuln\u00e9rables. M\u00eame un incident apparemment mineur, comme une ancre qui tra\u00eene au fond de la mer, peut causer des milliards d’euros de d\u00e9g\u00e2ts.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front5.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nUn nouveau mod\u00e8le de sabotage : les proxies et l’\u00ab \u00e9conomie des petits boulots \u00bb [5].<\/h3>\n
Suite aux expulsions massives d’agents de renseignement russes en 2022, la Russie a chang\u00e9 de tactique. Au lieu d’op\u00e9rer par l’interm\u00e9diaire des structures de renseignement traditionnelles, le Kremlin a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 externaliser et \u00e0 recruter des \u00e9trangers, des migrants et des groupes criminels via des plateformes de messagerie comme Telegram.<\/p>\n
Selon Europol, la Russie utilise des r\u00e9seaux criminels existants en Europe qui effectuent des t\u00e2ches telles que la surveillance des exp\u00e9ditions militaires, le sabotage et le vandalisme. Ce mod\u00e8le \u00ab dispers\u00e9 \u00bb rend difficile l’identification des auteurs et r\u00e9duit les co\u00fbts op\u00e9rationnels du Kremlin. Il est important de noter que les sous-traitants ont rarement des liens directs avec les structures \u00e9tatiques russes, ce qui complique l’\u00e9tablissement de leur implication.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front6.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nExemples d’op\u00e9rations russes dans l’UE<\/h3>\n
La liste des incidents est longue. En 2024, des colis contenant des substances inflammables ont explos\u00e9 dans des centres logistiques DHL en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni. Un centre commercial situ\u00e9 au 44 rue Marywilska \u00e0 Varsovie a \u00e9t\u00e9 incendi\u00e9, les services de renseignement russes \u00e9tant impliqu\u00e9s. En Allemagne, l’eau des bases de l’OTAN a \u00e9t\u00e9 contamin\u00e9e et, en Norv\u00e8ge, des pirates informatiques prorusses ont pirat\u00e9 le syst\u00e8me de contr\u00f4le du barrage de Bremanger, semant le chaos. En Pologne, les services de renseignement ont repouss\u00e9 avec succ\u00e8s une cyberattaque contre le r\u00e9seau d’approvisionnement en eau d’une grande ville. Si les cons\u00e9quences physiques de ces incidents sont limit\u00e9es, leur impact psychologique est consid\u00e9rable.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front7.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa peur comme arme<\/h3>\n
Comme le soulignent les experts de l’IISS, le sabotage n’a pas seulement pour objectif la destruction physique, mais aussi l’\u00e9veil de la peur. Un seul incident peut d\u00e9clencher une avalanche de peur et de m\u00e9fiance. La Russie amplifie d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements par le biais de r\u00e9seaux de trolls et de m\u00e9dias pro-russes, cr\u00e9ant un discours : \u00ab L’Europe est fragile, l’OTAN ne vous prot\u00e9gera pas, vos gouvernements sont impuissants.\u00bb<\/p>\n
En cons\u00e9quence, la confiance dans les institutions s’affaiblit et les sentiments populistes se d\u00e9veloppent. De telles actions affectent directement la stabilit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9mocratie.<\/p>\n
L’exemple du TGV fran\u00e7ais dont les rails ont \u00e9t\u00e9 endommag\u00e9s juste avant les Jeux olympiques de 2024, illustre \u00e9galement l’impact du sabotage sur les processus politiques. Il en r\u00e9sulte non seulement le chaos, mais aussi une violente polarisation sociale.<\/p>\n
Selon le CSIS, la Russie esp\u00e8re que l’approfondissement des divisions sociales entra\u00eenera un soutien accru aux groupes radicaux. Comme le montre l’\u00e9tude cit\u00e9e par l’IISS, l’incapacit\u00e9 de l’\u00c9tat \u00e0 pr\u00e9venir de nouveaux incidents conduit au ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de \u00ab panique de la m\u00e9fiance \u00bb.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front8.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa doctrine Bartosz \u2014 la th\u00e9orie du chaos en pratique<\/h3>\n
Les actions d\u00e9crites sont coh\u00e9rentes avec le mod\u00e8le de guerre hybride pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 dans la monographie d’Alexander Bartosz, expert du Centre d’analyse militaro-diplomatique et colonel retrait\u00e9 du GRU. Il a soulign\u00e9 que la cl\u00e9 de l’efficacit\u00e9 des op\u00e9rations r\u00e9side dans une influence globale sur toutes les sph\u00e8res de la vie de l’ennemi, du cyberespace \u00e0 la conscience sociale [6].<\/p>\n
La strat\u00e9gie russe repose sur l’identification des faiblesses, la manipulation des \u00e9motions, une gestion flexible et une surveillance continue de la situation afin de clarifier les actions ult\u00e9rieures. Il ne s’agit pas d’improvisation, mais d’une doctrine \u00e0 long terme.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front9.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa r\u00e9action de l’OTAN et de l’UE : des pas dans la bonne direction, mais trop lents<\/h3>\n
En r\u00e9ponse aux actions de la Russie, l’OTAN et l’UE prennent des mesures : en 2023, une unit\u00e9 de protection des infrastructures sous-marines a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, en 2025, l’op\u00e9ration Baltic Guardian a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e et six pays nordiques ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 la plateforme NorthSeal [7]. La Commission europ\u00e9enne a mis en \u0153uvre les directives NIS2 et CER, qui renforcent les normes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Le Royaume-Uni a adopt\u00e9 la loi sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de 2023, la Pologne a ferm\u00e9 les consulats g\u00e9n\u00e9raux russes \u00e0 Poznan et Cracovie en 2024-25, et la France a accus\u00e9 la Russie d’actes de sabotage sp\u00e9cifiques.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/2front11.png\")
<\/a><\/h3>\nLe probl\u00e8me de l’attribution [8] et le besoin de dissuasion<\/h3>\n
Le plus grand d\u00e9fi pour l’Occident reste l’attribution. Les \u00c9tats h\u00e9sitent \u00e0 accuser la Russie sans preuves convaincantes, ce qui permet au Kremlin d’agir en toute impunit\u00e9. Les op\u00e9rations hybrides sont men\u00e9es dans ce qu’on appelle la zone grise, en de\u00e7\u00e0 du seuil de la guerre ouverte.<\/p>\n
Les experts du SCRS soulignent que l’Europe doit passer d’une strat\u00e9gie de r\u00e9silience \u00e0 une strat\u00e9gie de dissuasion. Sans co\u00fbts r\u00e9els importants, la Russie continuera de percevoir les op\u00e9rations hybrides comme une arme s\u00fbre et efficace.<\/p>\n
Il convient de rappeler que la guerre hybride russe ne vise pas \u00e0 d\u00e9truire physiquement les infrastructures ; son objectif est de semer le chaos, la peur et la destruction de la confiance. Si l’Europe ne tire pas les le\u00e7ons de cette situation et ne combine pas r\u00e9silience et dissuasion efficace, de nouveaux actes de sabotage constitueront non seulement une menace pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9, mais deviendront \u00e9galement une arme efficace dans la guerre de seuil men\u00e9e par le Kremlin.<\/p>\n
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
\n<\/strong>Expert en relations internationales<\/p>\nNotes :<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n[1] Acronyme de l’Institut international d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion sur les conflits militaires et politiques bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Londres.<\/span><\/p>\n[2] Acronyme du Centre d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques et internationales, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion am\u00e9ricain bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Washington, DC.<\/span><\/p>\n[3] Organisme ind\u00e9pendant qui conseille le gouvernement et le parlement n\u00e9erlandais en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/span><\/p>\n[4] Breakthrough Energy est le nom g\u00e9n\u00e9rique de plusieurs organisations fond\u00e9es par Bill Gates en 2015 qui visent \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l’innovation dans les \u00e9nergies durables et autres technologies afin de r\u00e9duire les \u00e9missions de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre. [5] March\u00e9 du travail temporaire, \u00e0 court terme ou en freelance o\u00f9 les personnes sont des travailleurs ind\u00e9pendants et r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9es pour des projets sp\u00e9cifiques ou des \u00ab contrats \u00bb plut\u00f4t que pour un salaire r\u00e9gulier.<\/span><\/p>\n[6] Bartosh A.A. Enjeux de la th\u00e9orie de la guerre hybride \/\/ https:\/\/readli.net\/voprosyi-teorii-gibridnoy-voynyi<\/span><\/p>\n[7] Plateforme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la \u00ab D\u00e9claration commune de coop\u00e9ration pour la protection des infrastructures en mer du Nord \u00bb. NorthSeal a pour objectif de surveiller les activit\u00e9s maritimes suspectes, d’assurer un \u00e9change rapide d’informations et de coordonner les actions conjointes entre les six pays riverains de la mer du Nord : la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, l’Allemagne, la Norv\u00e8ge, le Royaume-Uni et le Danemark.<\/span><\/p>\n[8] En cybers\u00e9curit\u00e9, processus d’identification des responsables d’une cyberattaque.<\/span><\/p>\n(Images sont g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es par un r\u00e9seau neuronal)<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n
Depuis son invasion de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier\u00a02022, la Russie m\u00e8ne une vaste campagne de subversion et d\u2019activit\u00e9s hybrides contre l\u2019Europe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31254,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-31253","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
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<\/a><\/h3>\nUn nouveau mod\u00e8le de sabotage : les proxies et l’\u00ab \u00e9conomie des petits boulots \u00bb [5].<\/h3>\n
Suite aux expulsions massives d’agents de renseignement russes en 2022, la Russie a chang\u00e9 de tactique. Au lieu d’op\u00e9rer par l’interm\u00e9diaire des structures de renseignement traditionnelles, le Kremlin a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 externaliser et \u00e0 recruter des \u00e9trangers, des migrants et des groupes criminels via des plateformes de messagerie comme Telegram.<\/p>\n
Selon Europol, la Russie utilise des r\u00e9seaux criminels existants en Europe qui effectuent des t\u00e2ches telles que la surveillance des exp\u00e9ditions militaires, le sabotage et le vandalisme. Ce mod\u00e8le \u00ab dispers\u00e9 \u00bb rend difficile l’identification des auteurs et r\u00e9duit les co\u00fbts op\u00e9rationnels du Kremlin. Il est important de noter que les sous-traitants ont rarement des liens directs avec les structures \u00e9tatiques russes, ce qui complique l’\u00e9tablissement de leur implication.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nExemples d’op\u00e9rations russes dans l’UE<\/h3>\n
La liste des incidents est longue. En 2024, des colis contenant des substances inflammables ont explos\u00e9 dans des centres logistiques DHL en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni. Un centre commercial situ\u00e9 au 44 rue Marywilska \u00e0 Varsovie a \u00e9t\u00e9 incendi\u00e9, les services de renseignement russes \u00e9tant impliqu\u00e9s. En Allemagne, l’eau des bases de l’OTAN a \u00e9t\u00e9 contamin\u00e9e et, en Norv\u00e8ge, des pirates informatiques prorusses ont pirat\u00e9 le syst\u00e8me de contr\u00f4le du barrage de Bremanger, semant le chaos. En Pologne, les services de renseignement ont repouss\u00e9 avec succ\u00e8s une cyberattaque contre le r\u00e9seau d’approvisionnement en eau d’une grande ville. Si les cons\u00e9quences physiques de ces incidents sont limit\u00e9es, leur impact psychologique est consid\u00e9rable.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa peur comme arme<\/h3>\n
Comme le soulignent les experts de l’IISS, le sabotage n’a pas seulement pour objectif la destruction physique, mais aussi l’\u00e9veil de la peur. Un seul incident peut d\u00e9clencher une avalanche de peur et de m\u00e9fiance. La Russie amplifie d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements par le biais de r\u00e9seaux de trolls et de m\u00e9dias pro-russes, cr\u00e9ant un discours : \u00ab L’Europe est fragile, l’OTAN ne vous prot\u00e9gera pas, vos gouvernements sont impuissants.\u00bb<\/p>\n
En cons\u00e9quence, la confiance dans les institutions s’affaiblit et les sentiments populistes se d\u00e9veloppent. De telles actions affectent directement la stabilit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9mocratie.<\/p>\n
L’exemple du TGV fran\u00e7ais dont les rails ont \u00e9t\u00e9 endommag\u00e9s juste avant les Jeux olympiques de 2024, illustre \u00e9galement l’impact du sabotage sur les processus politiques. Il en r\u00e9sulte non seulement le chaos, mais aussi une violente polarisation sociale.<\/p>\n
Selon le CSIS, la Russie esp\u00e8re que l’approfondissement des divisions sociales entra\u00eenera un soutien accru aux groupes radicaux. Comme le montre l’\u00e9tude cit\u00e9e par l’IISS, l’incapacit\u00e9 de l’\u00c9tat \u00e0 pr\u00e9venir de nouveaux incidents conduit au ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de \u00ab panique de la m\u00e9fiance \u00bb.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa doctrine Bartosz \u2014 la th\u00e9orie du chaos en pratique<\/h3>\n
Les actions d\u00e9crites sont coh\u00e9rentes avec le mod\u00e8le de guerre hybride pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 dans la monographie d’Alexander Bartosz, expert du Centre d’analyse militaro-diplomatique et colonel retrait\u00e9 du GRU. Il a soulign\u00e9 que la cl\u00e9 de l’efficacit\u00e9 des op\u00e9rations r\u00e9side dans une influence globale sur toutes les sph\u00e8res de la vie de l’ennemi, du cyberespace \u00e0 la conscience sociale [6].<\/p>\n
La strat\u00e9gie russe repose sur l’identification des faiblesses, la manipulation des \u00e9motions, une gestion flexible et une surveillance continue de la situation afin de clarifier les actions ult\u00e9rieures. Il ne s’agit pas d’improvisation, mais d’une doctrine \u00e0 long terme.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa r\u00e9action de l’OTAN et de l’UE : des pas dans la bonne direction, mais trop lents<\/h3>\n
En r\u00e9ponse aux actions de la Russie, l’OTAN et l’UE prennent des mesures : en 2023, une unit\u00e9 de protection des infrastructures sous-marines a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, en 2025, l’op\u00e9ration Baltic Guardian a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e et six pays nordiques ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 la plateforme NorthSeal [7]. La Commission europ\u00e9enne a mis en \u0153uvre les directives NIS2 et CER, qui renforcent les normes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Le Royaume-Uni a adopt\u00e9 la loi sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de 2023, la Pologne a ferm\u00e9 les consulats g\u00e9n\u00e9raux russes \u00e0 Poznan et Cracovie en 2024-25, et la France a accus\u00e9 la Russie d’actes de sabotage sp\u00e9cifiques.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLe probl\u00e8me de l’attribution [8] et le besoin de dissuasion<\/h3>\n
Le plus grand d\u00e9fi pour l’Occident reste l’attribution. Les \u00c9tats h\u00e9sitent \u00e0 accuser la Russie sans preuves convaincantes, ce qui permet au Kremlin d’agir en toute impunit\u00e9. Les op\u00e9rations hybrides sont men\u00e9es dans ce qu’on appelle la zone grise, en de\u00e7\u00e0 du seuil de la guerre ouverte.<\/p>\n
Les experts du SCRS soulignent que l’Europe doit passer d’une strat\u00e9gie de r\u00e9silience \u00e0 une strat\u00e9gie de dissuasion. Sans co\u00fbts r\u00e9els importants, la Russie continuera de percevoir les op\u00e9rations hybrides comme une arme s\u00fbre et efficace.<\/p>\n
Il convient de rappeler que la guerre hybride russe ne vise pas \u00e0 d\u00e9truire physiquement les infrastructures ; son objectif est de semer le chaos, la peur et la destruction de la confiance. Si l’Europe ne tire pas les le\u00e7ons de cette situation et ne combine pas r\u00e9silience et dissuasion efficace, de nouveaux actes de sabotage constitueront non seulement une menace pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9, mais deviendront \u00e9galement une arme efficace dans la guerre de seuil men\u00e9e par le Kremlin.<\/p>\n
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
\n<\/strong>Expert en relations internationales<\/p>\nNotes :<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n[1] Acronyme de l’Institut international d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion sur les conflits militaires et politiques bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Londres.<\/span><\/p>\n[2] Acronyme du Centre d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques et internationales, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion am\u00e9ricain bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Washington, DC.<\/span><\/p>\n[3] Organisme ind\u00e9pendant qui conseille le gouvernement et le parlement n\u00e9erlandais en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/span><\/p>\n[4] Breakthrough Energy est le nom g\u00e9n\u00e9rique de plusieurs organisations fond\u00e9es par Bill Gates en 2015 qui visent \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l’innovation dans les \u00e9nergies durables et autres technologies afin de r\u00e9duire les \u00e9missions de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre. [5] March\u00e9 du travail temporaire, \u00e0 court terme ou en freelance o\u00f9 les personnes sont des travailleurs ind\u00e9pendants et r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9es pour des projets sp\u00e9cifiques ou des \u00ab contrats \u00bb plut\u00f4t que pour un salaire r\u00e9gulier.<\/span><\/p>\n[6] Bartosh A.A. Enjeux de la th\u00e9orie de la guerre hybride \/\/ https:\/\/readli.net\/voprosyi-teorii-gibridnoy-voynyi<\/span><\/p>\n[7] Plateforme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la \u00ab D\u00e9claration commune de coop\u00e9ration pour la protection des infrastructures en mer du Nord \u00bb. NorthSeal a pour objectif de surveiller les activit\u00e9s maritimes suspectes, d’assurer un \u00e9change rapide d’informations et de coordonner les actions conjointes entre les six pays riverains de la mer du Nord : la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, l’Allemagne, la Norv\u00e8ge, le Royaume-Uni et le Danemark.<\/span><\/p>\n[8] En cybers\u00e9curit\u00e9, processus d’identification des responsables d’une cyberattaque.<\/span><\/p>\n(Images sont g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es par un r\u00e9seau neuronal)<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n
Depuis son invasion de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier\u00a02022, la Russie m\u00e8ne une vaste campagne de subversion et d\u2019activit\u00e9s hybrides contre l\u2019Europe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31254,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-31253","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
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<\/a><\/h3>\nLa peur comme arme<\/h3>\n
Comme le soulignent les experts de l’IISS, le sabotage n’a pas seulement pour objectif la destruction physique, mais aussi l’\u00e9veil de la peur. Un seul incident peut d\u00e9clencher une avalanche de peur et de m\u00e9fiance. La Russie amplifie d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements par le biais de r\u00e9seaux de trolls et de m\u00e9dias pro-russes, cr\u00e9ant un discours : \u00ab L’Europe est fragile, l’OTAN ne vous prot\u00e9gera pas, vos gouvernements sont impuissants.\u00bb<\/p>\n
En cons\u00e9quence, la confiance dans les institutions s’affaiblit et les sentiments populistes se d\u00e9veloppent. De telles actions affectent directement la stabilit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9mocratie.<\/p>\n
L’exemple du TGV fran\u00e7ais dont les rails ont \u00e9t\u00e9 endommag\u00e9s juste avant les Jeux olympiques de 2024, illustre \u00e9galement l’impact du sabotage sur les processus politiques. Il en r\u00e9sulte non seulement le chaos, mais aussi une violente polarisation sociale.<\/p>\n
Selon le CSIS, la Russie esp\u00e8re que l’approfondissement des divisions sociales entra\u00eenera un soutien accru aux groupes radicaux. Comme le montre l’\u00e9tude cit\u00e9e par l’IISS, l’incapacit\u00e9 de l’\u00c9tat \u00e0 pr\u00e9venir de nouveaux incidents conduit au ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de \u00ab panique de la m\u00e9fiance \u00bb.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa doctrine Bartosz \u2014 la th\u00e9orie du chaos en pratique<\/h3>\n
Les actions d\u00e9crites sont coh\u00e9rentes avec le mod\u00e8le de guerre hybride pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 dans la monographie d’Alexander Bartosz, expert du Centre d’analyse militaro-diplomatique et colonel retrait\u00e9 du GRU. Il a soulign\u00e9 que la cl\u00e9 de l’efficacit\u00e9 des op\u00e9rations r\u00e9side dans une influence globale sur toutes les sph\u00e8res de la vie de l’ennemi, du cyberespace \u00e0 la conscience sociale [6].<\/p>\n
La strat\u00e9gie russe repose sur l’identification des faiblesses, la manipulation des \u00e9motions, une gestion flexible et une surveillance continue de la situation afin de clarifier les actions ult\u00e9rieures. Il ne s’agit pas d’improvisation, mais d’une doctrine \u00e0 long terme.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLa r\u00e9action de l’OTAN et de l’UE : des pas dans la bonne direction, mais trop lents<\/h3>\n
En r\u00e9ponse aux actions de la Russie, l’OTAN et l’UE prennent des mesures : en 2023, une unit\u00e9 de protection des infrastructures sous-marines a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, en 2025, l’op\u00e9ration Baltic Guardian a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e et six pays nordiques ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 la plateforme NorthSeal [7]. La Commission europ\u00e9enne a mis en \u0153uvre les directives NIS2 et CER, qui renforcent les normes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Le Royaume-Uni a adopt\u00e9 la loi sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de 2023, la Pologne a ferm\u00e9 les consulats g\u00e9n\u00e9raux russes \u00e0 Poznan et Cracovie en 2024-25, et la France a accus\u00e9 la Russie d’actes de sabotage sp\u00e9cifiques.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLe probl\u00e8me de l’attribution [8] et le besoin de dissuasion<\/h3>\n
Le plus grand d\u00e9fi pour l’Occident reste l’attribution. Les \u00c9tats h\u00e9sitent \u00e0 accuser la Russie sans preuves convaincantes, ce qui permet au Kremlin d’agir en toute impunit\u00e9. Les op\u00e9rations hybrides sont men\u00e9es dans ce qu’on appelle la zone grise, en de\u00e7\u00e0 du seuil de la guerre ouverte.<\/p>\n
Les experts du SCRS soulignent que l’Europe doit passer d’une strat\u00e9gie de r\u00e9silience \u00e0 une strat\u00e9gie de dissuasion. Sans co\u00fbts r\u00e9els importants, la Russie continuera de percevoir les op\u00e9rations hybrides comme une arme s\u00fbre et efficace.<\/p>\n
Il convient de rappeler que la guerre hybride russe ne vise pas \u00e0 d\u00e9truire physiquement les infrastructures ; son objectif est de semer le chaos, la peur et la destruction de la confiance. Si l’Europe ne tire pas les le\u00e7ons de cette situation et ne combine pas r\u00e9silience et dissuasion efficace, de nouveaux actes de sabotage constitueront non seulement une menace pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9, mais deviendront \u00e9galement une arme efficace dans la guerre de seuil men\u00e9e par le Kremlin.<\/p>\n
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
\n<\/strong>Expert en relations internationales<\/p>\nNotes :<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n[1] Acronyme de l’Institut international d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion sur les conflits militaires et politiques bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Londres.<\/span><\/p>\n[2] Acronyme du Centre d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques et internationales, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion am\u00e9ricain bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Washington, DC.<\/span><\/p>\n[3] Organisme ind\u00e9pendant qui conseille le gouvernement et le parlement n\u00e9erlandais en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/span><\/p>\n[4] Breakthrough Energy est le nom g\u00e9n\u00e9rique de plusieurs organisations fond\u00e9es par Bill Gates en 2015 qui visent \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l’innovation dans les \u00e9nergies durables et autres technologies afin de r\u00e9duire les \u00e9missions de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre. [5] March\u00e9 du travail temporaire, \u00e0 court terme ou en freelance o\u00f9 les personnes sont des travailleurs ind\u00e9pendants et r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9es pour des projets sp\u00e9cifiques ou des \u00ab contrats \u00bb plut\u00f4t que pour un salaire r\u00e9gulier.<\/span><\/p>\n[6] Bartosh A.A. Enjeux de la th\u00e9orie de la guerre hybride \/\/ https:\/\/readli.net\/voprosyi-teorii-gibridnoy-voynyi<\/span><\/p>\n[7] Plateforme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la \u00ab D\u00e9claration commune de coop\u00e9ration pour la protection des infrastructures en mer du Nord \u00bb. NorthSeal a pour objectif de surveiller les activit\u00e9s maritimes suspectes, d’assurer un \u00e9change rapide d’informations et de coordonner les actions conjointes entre les six pays riverains de la mer du Nord : la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, l’Allemagne, la Norv\u00e8ge, le Royaume-Uni et le Danemark.<\/span><\/p>\n[8] En cybers\u00e9curit\u00e9, processus d’identification des responsables d’une cyberattaque.<\/span><\/p>\n(Images sont g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es par un r\u00e9seau neuronal)<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n
Depuis son invasion de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier\u00a02022, la Russie m\u00e8ne une vaste campagne de subversion et d\u2019activit\u00e9s hybrides contre l\u2019Europe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31254,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-31253","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
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<\/a><\/h3>\nLa r\u00e9action de l’OTAN et de l’UE : des pas dans la bonne direction, mais trop lents<\/h3>\n
En r\u00e9ponse aux actions de la Russie, l’OTAN et l’UE prennent des mesures : en 2023, une unit\u00e9 de protection des infrastructures sous-marines a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e, en 2025, l’op\u00e9ration Baltic Guardian a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9e et six pays nordiques ont cr\u00e9\u00e9 la plateforme NorthSeal [7]. La Commission europ\u00e9enne a mis en \u0153uvre les directives NIS2 et CER, qui renforcent les normes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Le Royaume-Uni a adopt\u00e9 la loi sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de 2023, la Pologne a ferm\u00e9 les consulats g\u00e9n\u00e9raux russes \u00e0 Poznan et Cracovie en 2024-25, et la France a accus\u00e9 la Russie d’actes de sabotage sp\u00e9cifiques.<\/p>\n
<\/a><\/h3>\nLe probl\u00e8me de l’attribution [8] et le besoin de dissuasion<\/h3>\n
Le plus grand d\u00e9fi pour l’Occident reste l’attribution. Les \u00c9tats h\u00e9sitent \u00e0 accuser la Russie sans preuves convaincantes, ce qui permet au Kremlin d’agir en toute impunit\u00e9. Les op\u00e9rations hybrides sont men\u00e9es dans ce qu’on appelle la zone grise, en de\u00e7\u00e0 du seuil de la guerre ouverte.<\/p>\n
Les experts du SCRS soulignent que l’Europe doit passer d’une strat\u00e9gie de r\u00e9silience \u00e0 une strat\u00e9gie de dissuasion. Sans co\u00fbts r\u00e9els importants, la Russie continuera de percevoir les op\u00e9rations hybrides comme une arme s\u00fbre et efficace.<\/p>\n
Il convient de rappeler que la guerre hybride russe ne vise pas \u00e0 d\u00e9truire physiquement les infrastructures ; son objectif est de semer le chaos, la peur et la destruction de la confiance. Si l’Europe ne tire pas les le\u00e7ons de cette situation et ne combine pas r\u00e9silience et dissuasion efficace, de nouveaux actes de sabotage constitueront non seulement une menace pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9, mais deviendront \u00e9galement une arme efficace dans la guerre de seuil men\u00e9e par le Kremlin.<\/p>\n
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
\n<\/strong>Expert en relations internationales<\/p>\nNotes :<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n[1] Acronyme de l’Institut international d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion sur les conflits militaires et politiques bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Londres.<\/span><\/p>\n[2] Acronyme du Centre d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques et internationales, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion am\u00e9ricain bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Washington, DC.<\/span><\/p>\n[3] Organisme ind\u00e9pendant qui conseille le gouvernement et le parlement n\u00e9erlandais en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/span><\/p>\n[4] Breakthrough Energy est le nom g\u00e9n\u00e9rique de plusieurs organisations fond\u00e9es par Bill Gates en 2015 qui visent \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l’innovation dans les \u00e9nergies durables et autres technologies afin de r\u00e9duire les \u00e9missions de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre. [5] March\u00e9 du travail temporaire, \u00e0 court terme ou en freelance o\u00f9 les personnes sont des travailleurs ind\u00e9pendants et r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9es pour des projets sp\u00e9cifiques ou des \u00ab contrats \u00bb plut\u00f4t que pour un salaire r\u00e9gulier.<\/span><\/p>\n[6] Bartosh A.A. Enjeux de la th\u00e9orie de la guerre hybride \/\/ https:\/\/readli.net\/voprosyi-teorii-gibridnoy-voynyi<\/span><\/p>\n[7] Plateforme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la \u00ab D\u00e9claration commune de coop\u00e9ration pour la protection des infrastructures en mer du Nord \u00bb. NorthSeal a pour objectif de surveiller les activit\u00e9s maritimes suspectes, d’assurer un \u00e9change rapide d’informations et de coordonner les actions conjointes entre les six pays riverains de la mer du Nord : la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, l’Allemagne, la Norv\u00e8ge, le Royaume-Uni et le Danemark.<\/span><\/p>\n[8] En cybers\u00e9curit\u00e9, processus d’identification des responsables d’une cyberattaque.<\/span><\/p>\n(Images sont g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es par un r\u00e9seau neuronal)<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n
Depuis son invasion de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier\u00a02022, la Russie m\u00e8ne une vaste campagne de subversion et d\u2019activit\u00e9s hybrides contre l\u2019Europe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31254,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-31253","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n
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\n<\/strong>Expert en relations internationales<\/p>\n
Notes :<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n [1] Acronyme de l’Institut international d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion sur les conflits militaires et politiques bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Londres.<\/span><\/p>\n [2] Acronyme du Centre d’\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques et internationales, un groupe de r\u00e9flexion am\u00e9ricain bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Washington, DC.<\/span><\/p>\n [3] Organisme ind\u00e9pendant qui conseille le gouvernement et le parlement n\u00e9erlandais en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/span><\/p>\n [4] Breakthrough Energy est le nom g\u00e9n\u00e9rique de plusieurs organisations fond\u00e9es par Bill Gates en 2015 qui visent \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer l’innovation dans les \u00e9nergies durables et autres technologies afin de r\u00e9duire les \u00e9missions de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre. [5] March\u00e9 du travail temporaire, \u00e0 court terme ou en freelance o\u00f9 les personnes sont des travailleurs ind\u00e9pendants et r\u00e9mun\u00e9r\u00e9es pour des projets sp\u00e9cifiques ou des \u00ab contrats \u00bb plut\u00f4t que pour un salaire r\u00e9gulier.<\/span><\/p>\n [6] Bartosh A.A. Enjeux de la th\u00e9orie de la guerre hybride \/\/ https:\/\/readli.net\/voprosyi-teorii-gibridnoy-voynyi<\/span><\/p>\n [7] Plateforme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la \u00ab D\u00e9claration commune de coop\u00e9ration pour la protection des infrastructures en mer du Nord \u00bb. NorthSeal a pour objectif de surveiller les activit\u00e9s maritimes suspectes, d’assurer un \u00e9change rapide d’informations et de coordonner les actions conjointes entre les six pays riverains de la mer du Nord : la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, l’Allemagne, la Norv\u00e8ge, le Royaume-Uni et le Danemark.<\/span><\/p>\n [8] En cybers\u00e9curit\u00e9, processus d’identification des responsables d’une cyberattaque.<\/span><\/p>\n (Images sont g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es par un r\u00e9seau neuronal)<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Volodymyr Palyvoda<\/p>\n Depuis son invasion de l\u2019Ukraine en f\u00e9vrier\u00a02022, la Russie m\u00e8ne une vaste campagne de subversion et d\u2019activit\u00e9s hybrides contre l\u2019Europe<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31254,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[270],"class_list":["post-31253","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-palivoda","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"\n