{"id":31387,"date":"2025-09-05T16:58:21","date_gmt":"2025-09-05T13:58:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/?p=31387"},"modified":"2025-09-08T07:48:34","modified_gmt":"2025-09-08T04:48:34","slug":"spilni-rosijsko-biloruski-strategichni-vijskovi-navchannya-zaxid-2025","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/igp.org.ua\/fr\/publikacii\/spilni-rosijsko-biloruski-strategichni-vijskovi-navchannya-zaxid-2025\/","title":{"rendered":"Exercices militaires strat\u00e9giques conjoints russo-bi\u00e9lorusses \u00ab\u00a0Ouest-2025\u00a0\u00bb"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: left;\">Exercices militaires strat\u00e9giques conjoints russo-bi\u00e9lorusses \u00ab&nbsp;Ouest-2025&nbsp;\u00bb&nbsp;: d\u00e9fis pour l&#8217;Ukraine<\/h1>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Dans le cadre de l&#8217;organisation et de la tenue des man\u0153uvres militaires strat\u00e9giques conjoints russo-bi\u00e9lorusses \u00ab&nbsp;Ouest-2025&nbsp;\u00bb pr\u00e9vus du 12 au 16&nbsp;septembre, du mat\u00e9riel militaire, des munitions et du personnel russes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transf\u00e9r\u00e9s sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse en juillet et ao\u00fbt.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">L&#8217;organisation d&#8217;opposition \u00ab&nbsp;Communaut\u00e9 des cheminots de Bi\u00e9lorussie&nbsp;\u00bb indique que des unit\u00e9s de trois divisions russes ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 livr\u00e9es au pays&nbsp;: la 2<sup>\u00e8me<\/sup>&nbsp; &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.multitran.com\/m.exe?s=division+d%27infanterie+de+marine&amp;l1=4&amp;l2=2\">division d&#8217;infanterie<\/a> motoris\u00e9e Taman, la 4<sup>\u00e8me<\/sup> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.multitran.com\/m.exe?s=division+blind%C3%A9e&amp;l1=4&amp;l2=2\">division blind\u00e9e<\/a> Kantemirovskaya et la 71<sup>\u00e8me<\/sup> &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.multitran.com\/m.exe?s=division+d%27infanterie+de+marine&amp;l1=4&amp;l2=2\">division d&#8217;infanterie<\/a> motoris\u00e9e de Pechenga [1].<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Les deux premi\u00e8res divisions font partie de la 1<sup>\u00e8re<\/sup> &nbsp;arm\u00e9e blind\u00e9e de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie et participent activement \u00e0 l&#8217;invasion de l&#8217;Ukraine depuis f\u00e9vrier&nbsp;2022&nbsp;; leurs unit\u00e9s ont ensuite avanc\u00e9 sur Tchernigiv et Kharkiv. La 71<sup>\u00e8me<\/sup> division a \u00e9t\u00e9 form\u00e9e sur la base de la 200<sup>\u00e8me<\/sup> brigade de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.multitran.com\/m.exe?s=division+d%27infanterie+de+marine&amp;l1=4&amp;l2=2\">&nbsp;d&#8217;infanterie<\/a> motoris\u00e9e de Pechenga (r\u00e9gion de Mourmansk), qui a \u00e9galement combattu dans la r\u00e9gion de Kharkiv.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Selon le vice-ministre lituanien de la D\u00e9fense, T. Godliauskas, les exercices \u00ab&nbsp;Ouest-2025&nbsp;\u00bb seront d&#8217;une ampleur bien plus r\u00e9duite qu&#8217;en 2021. Un maximum de 30&nbsp;000 militaires pourront y participer, dont 6&nbsp;000 \u00e0 8&nbsp;000 sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse, plusieurs milliers dans la r\u00e9gion de Kaliningrad et le reste dans des unit\u00e9s situ\u00e9es en Russie profonde.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Le concept de l&#8217;exercice a \u00e9t\u00e9 approuv\u00e9&nbsp;: il s&#8217;agit de reproduire un \u00e9pisode op\u00e9rationnel de confrontation entre deux coalitions d&#8217;\u00c9tats&nbsp;: l&#8217;une dirig\u00e9e par la Russie, l&#8217;autre par l&#8217;Occident conditionnel. Autrement dit, sur le plan militaire et militaro-politique, \u00ab&nbsp;Ouest-2025&nbsp;\u00bb vise \u00e0 s&#8217;entra\u00eener \u00e0 des man\u0153uvres vers l&#8217;ouest du th\u00e9\u00e2tre d&#8217;op\u00e9rations militaires. Comme l&#8217;a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de division V. Revenko, chef du D\u00e9partement de la coop\u00e9ration militaire internationale du minist\u00e8re de la D\u00e9fense de Bi\u00e9lorussie, les points suivants seront abord\u00e9s lors de l&#8217;exercice&nbsp;:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left; line-height: 15px;\">\n<li>repousser les attaques a\u00e9riennes ennemies ;<\/li>\n<li>conduire une bataille d\u00e9fensive, vaincre un ennemi ayant p\u00e9n\u00e9tr\u00e9 les d\u00e9fenses et cr\u00e9er les conditions n\u00e9cessaires au r\u00e9tablissement de l&#8217;int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale de l&#8217;\u00c9tat&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>appuyer les op\u00e9rations a\u00e9riennes des troupes&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>combattre les formations arm\u00e9es ill\u00e9gales et les groupes de reconnaissance et de sabotage ennemis.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Revenko a soulign\u00e9 que les exercices Zapad-2025 constituent un \u00e9l\u00e9ment planifi\u00e9 de l&#8217;entra\u00eenement conjoint des forces et des moyens du groupe r\u00e9gional des forces arm\u00e9es de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie et de la Bi\u00e9lorussie. Cependant, leur \u00ab&nbsp;caract\u00e8re d\u00e9fensif planifi\u00e9&nbsp;\u00bb est contrebalanc\u00e9 par la d\u00e9claration concernant l&#8217;utilisation d&#8217;armes nucl\u00e9aires et de missiles \u00e0 moyenne port\u00e9e \u00ab&nbsp;Oreshnik&nbsp;\u00bb (sans utilisation pratique).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Selon le Service national ukrainien des fronti\u00e8res et la Direction g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du renseignement du minist\u00e8re de la D\u00e9fense ukrainien, il n&#8217;existe aucun indicateur cl\u00e9 de pr\u00e9paration \u00e0 des actions offensives sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse&nbsp;: accumulation de v\u00e9hicules blind\u00e9s lourds, d\u00e9ploiement de camps de campagne ou d\u00e9placement d&#8217;effectifs importants. Bien que la formation de groupes d&#8217;attaque ne soit actuellement pas enregistr\u00e9e, ce qui justifierait de consid\u00e9rer la Bi\u00e9lorussie comme un tremplin pour une nouvelle agression russe, un sc\u00e9nario de provocations depuis le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse ne peut \u00eatre exclu. \u00c0 cette fin, des combattants de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 militaire priv\u00e9e \u00ab&nbsp;Wagner&nbsp;\u00bb (environ 4&nbsp;000 \u00e0 5&nbsp;000&nbsp;hommes), rest\u00e9s en Bi\u00e9lorussie o\u00f9 ils participent \u00e0 des exercices conjoints avec l&#8217;arm\u00e9e bi\u00e9lorusse et effectuent des t\u00e2ches de pr\u00e9paration et de protection d&#8217;installations, notamment sur le terrain d&#8217;entra\u00eenement \u00ab&nbsp;Brestsky&nbsp;\u00bb, pr\u00e8s de la fronti\u00e8re avec la Pologne et l&#8217;Ukraine, pourraient \u00eatre impliqu\u00e9s. Compte tenu de leur exp\u00e9rience du combat, de leur motivation et de leur potentiel de pr\u00e9paration \u00e0 l&#8217;action, la Russie pourrait utiliser les wagn\u00e9riens pour cr\u00e9er de l&#8217;instabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re ukraino-bi\u00e9lorusse.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Afin de renforcer la section sud de la fronti\u00e8re avec l&#8217;Ukraine, la Bi\u00e9lorussie forme la 37e brigade d&#8217;assaut a\u00e9roport\u00e9e des forces d&#8217;op\u00e9rations sp\u00e9ciales qui sera principalement charg\u00e9e de la couverture de la fronti\u00e8re et sera dot\u00e9e de capacit\u00e9s importantes en mati\u00e8re de guerre \u00e9lectronique. Ainsi, la Bi\u00e9lorussie cr\u00e9e un groupe d&#8217;attaque mobile \u00e0 proximit\u00e9 imm\u00e9diate de la fronti\u00e8re avec l&#8217;Ukraine. D&#8217;une part, la cr\u00e9ation d&#8217;une telle unit\u00e9 peut \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme une escalade \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re bi\u00e9lorusse-ukrainienne&nbsp;; d&#8217;autre part, la capacit\u00e9 de combat des forces arm\u00e9es bi\u00e9lorusses \u00e0 mener une offensive avec la cr\u00e9ation de cette nouvelle brigade ne devrait pas augmenter significativement.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Dans le contexte g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, il convient de noter qu&#8217;en 2025, la Bi\u00e9lorussie a augment\u00e9 ses d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense \u00e0 4,73 milliards de roubles, dont 4,47 milliards seront allou\u00e9s \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense et aux forces arm\u00e9es, et pr\u00e8s de 145 millions de roubles \u00e0 la formation et \u00e0 la mobilisation. Les d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense nationale augmentent de 1,15 milliard de roubles par rapport \u00e0 2024 [2].<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">La Bi\u00e9lorussie impose actuellement la cr\u00e9ation de sa propre base scientifique et industrielle pour la conception et la production de missiles. Elle cherche \u00e0 \u00e9largir son arsenal de missiles en cr\u00e9ant des armes \u00e0 plus longue port\u00e9e (plus de 300 km) bas\u00e9es sur la plateforme existante (Polonez) ou une nouvelle plateforme. Parall\u00e8lement, Minsk agit dans l&#8217;int\u00e9r\u00eat de la Russie.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">En Bi\u00e9lorussie, des bases juridiques ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tablies pour l&#8217;extension des fonctions des forces arm\u00e9es en temps de paix, d\u00e9finies dans le projet de loi portant modification des lois sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 militaire et la d\u00e9fense [3]. Les missions des forces arm\u00e9es bi\u00e9lorusses sont notamment&nbsp;:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: left; line-height: 15px;\">\n<li>\u00ab&nbsp;Participation \u00e0 la garantie de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 militaire de la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie, y compris la mise en \u0153uvre de mesures pr\u00e9ventives visant \u00e0 \u00e9liminer la menace militaire&nbsp;\u00bb&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>\u00ab&nbsp;Participation \u00e0 la pr\u00e9vention du d\u00e9clenchement d&#8217;un conflit arm\u00e9 interne et, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, \u00e0 sa r\u00e9solution&nbsp;\u00bb&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>\u00ab&nbsp;Protection des fronti\u00e8res de la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie dans l&#8217;espace a\u00e9rien&nbsp;\u00bb&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>\u00ab&nbsp;Disponibilit\u00e9 constante \u00e0 utiliser les forces et les moyens allou\u00e9s afin d&#8217;\u00e9liminer les situations de crise susceptibles de conduire au d\u00e9clenchement de conflits arm\u00e9s sur le territoire de la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie ou des \u00c9tats alli\u00e9s de la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie&nbsp;\u00bb&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>\u00ab&nbsp;Pr\u00e9vention (localisation) des incidents arm\u00e9s (actions, provocations), y compris les incidents frontaliers&nbsp;\u00bb&nbsp;;<\/li>\n<li>\u00ab&nbsp;Participation \u00e0 l&#8217;interaction avec les autres troupes et formations militaires, les organisations paramilitaires, la loi martiale et l&#8217;\u00e9tat d&#8217;urgence&nbsp;\u00bb.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, ce projet de loi cr\u00e9e un fondement juridique pour l&#8217;utilisation \u00ab&nbsp;pr\u00e9ventive&nbsp;\u00bb des forces arm\u00e9es bi\u00e9lorusses hors de leur territoire en temps de paix, sans proclamation de la loi martiale. De plus, ce projet de loi brouille les fronti\u00e8res entre temps de paix et temps de guerre, reprenant les dispositions pertinentes des documents doctrinaux russes, ainsi que le Trait\u00e9 entre la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie et la R\u00e9publique de Bi\u00e9lorussie sur les garanties de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l&#8217;\u00c9tat alli\u00e9 du 13&nbsp;mars&nbsp;2025 [4].<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">La menace potentielle d&#8217;une implication des forces arm\u00e9es bi\u00e9lorusses dans des actions offensives sous la pression russe persiste, malgr\u00e9 les assurances selon lesquelles ces exercices ne repr\u00e9sentent aucun danger pour l&#8217;Ukraine, les pays baltes et la Pologne. Comme l&#8217;indique le minist\u00e8re ukrainien des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res dans son communiqu\u00e9, \u00ab&nbsp;nous nous souvenons de l&#8217;am\u00e8re exp\u00e9rience et du prix des fausses d\u00e9clarations des dictateurs russe et bi\u00e9lorusse. Le d\u00e9ploiement de troupes russes aux fronti\u00e8res de l&#8217;Ukraine en 2021-2022 s&#8217;est d\u00e9roul\u00e9 sous le couvert des man\u0153uvres militaires conjoints russo-bi\u00e9lorusses \u00ab&nbsp;Ouest-2021&nbsp;\u00bb [5].<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Par ailleurs, il convient de noter que l&#8217;entr\u00e9e de troupes russes dans le pays dans le cadre de l&#8217;exercice Zapad-2025 ne laissera pas d&#8217;autre choix aux dirigeants bi\u00e9lorusses si Moscou d\u00e9cide de refuser le retrait d&#8217;une partie de ces troupes, invoquant la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de \u00ab&nbsp;garantir la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l&#8217;\u00c9tat de l&#8217;Union dans un contexte international difficile&nbsp;\u00bb.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>Maria Gutsalo,<br \/>\n<\/strong>experte, docteur en sciences politiques<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\"><strong>Sources utilis\u00e9es :<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[1] https:\/\/belzhd.info\/military-transportation\/voinskie-perevozki-po-bzhd-s-4-po-9-avgusta-2025-goda-v-ramkah-uchenij-zapad-2025\/<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[2] https:\/\/pravo.by\/document\/?guid=12551&amp;p0=H12400048<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[3] https:\/\/pravo.by\/document\/?guid=3941&amp;p0=2025039001<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[4] https:\/\/bintel.org.ua\/analytics\/geopolitics\/garanti%d1%97-bezpeki\/<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 10pt;\">[5] https:\/\/mfa.gov.ua\/news\/zayava-mzs-shchodo-zaplanovanih-vijskovih-navchan-na-teritoriyi-respubliki-bilorus<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Maria Gutsalo<\/p>\n<p>Dans le cadre de l&#8217;organisation et de la tenue des man\u0153uvres militaires strat\u00e9giques conjoints russo-bi\u00e9lorusses \u00ab\u00a0Ouest-2025\u00a0\u00bb pr\u00e9vus du 12 au 16\u00a0septembre, du mat\u00e9riel militaire, des munitions et du personnel russes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transf\u00e9r\u00e9s sur le territoire bi\u00e9lorusse en juillet et ao\u00fbt<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":31388,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_crdt_document":"","ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[261,260],"tags":[278],"class_list":["post-31387","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analitika","category-publikacii","tag-gucalo","wp-image-borders"],"translation":{"provider":"WPGlobus","version":"3.0.2","language":"fr","enabled_languages":["uk","en","ru","fr","ar"],"languages":{"uk":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"en":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ru":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"fr":{"title":true,"content":true,"excerpt":true},"ar":{"title":false,"content":false,"excerpt":false}}},"gutentor_comment":0,"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - 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