The search for an answer to the question of the true root causes of the war takes us back to the 16^th century. But without going into a deep retrospective, let’s start with the present. Let us recall Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007. It is considered to be a message to the West that contained the main message: rejecting Russia’s role as a minor power in world politics. Putin then emphasized his determination to defend the interests of the state and to take an active part in shaping the global order – a true imperial narrative. The main aspects of the speech were the rejection of the unipolar (American) model of the world order, the inadmissibility of NATO’s eastward expansion, disarmament, and the Iranian nuclear program. Subsequently, on October 24, 2014, Putin delivered a similarly focused Valdai speech, which was considered a continuation of the Munich speech and the ideological basis for a great war.

Many experts saw Putin’s statements as early signs of Russia’s imperial reversal. They were right: the Munich speech was a clear, undisguised warning from Putin about the inadmissibility of US hegemony, Russia’s staying among the world’s leading powers, and its influence in the post-Soviet space.

And the warnings were not just verbal: by that time, Russia was already holding Transnistria, having formed the unrecognized TMR (1992-1993), having provoked a war in Abkhazia and having separated it from Georgia (1992-1993), having conducted the first military campaign in Chechnya (1994-1996), and being in the midst of the second Russian-Chechen war (1999-2009), which ended with the establishment of a pro-Russian Chechen government.

All of Putin’s wars, “frozen” conflicts, the formation of quasi-republics, and the use of Russian military contingents and private military companies such as “Wagner” abroad are targeted tools with a single goal: to keep countries under control, to prevent them from moving away from Russia and drifting toward the West and NATO.

The collective West, especially the United States, largely ignored these signals. As a result, in 2008, Putin launched the Russian-Georgian war, which resulted in South Ossetia becoming an unrecognized republic under Russia’s control. This was followed by the invasion of Syria (2015-2022) and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2022 – to date). This logical series is extremely telling.

It is wrong to say that the West’s passivity was complete: there was a dialogue between Moscow and Washington at the unofficial level (recall the regular visits of special envoys, contacts through intelligence services, and the use of mediation missions). However, the democratic world still showed weakness and indecision. It was this uncertainty that made it possible to reach a “point of no return”, which on the Ukrainian track was J. Biden’s meeting with V. Putin in Geneva in 2021. That meeting, according to some experts, paved the way for a full-scale war in 2022. And it is far from certain that, if agreements had been reached in Geneva, the compromise would have been in favor of Ukraine, as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Europe as a whole. So, we have what we have.

In this sense, D. Trump’s statements such as “this is not my war”, “had I been president, there would not have been this war” take on a certain positive, yet controversial color for us: suppose he had managed, as an imaginary American leader, to meet Putin halfway on Ukraine in exchange for the Kremlin’s financial and economic “carrots”– what would our state look like today? Would it exist at all?

It becomes clear why Trump’s America is trying its best to disassociate itself from the Russian-Ukrainian war: for it, this is a dead-end political puzzle that leaves the current president no room for loud victory statements. The US administration has realized that a compromise cannot be reached, so they are shifting the problem to Europe – this war has become a “European” war.

Trump seeks to build a “Great America” using his well-known Big Deal business strategy, which has paid some dividends in the past. However, this approach, as well as the attempt to “turn the tables” on Europe, has become his strategic mistake. The truth is that America will not become great by quarreling with everyone. The “diplomacy” of division, conflict, and shifting the blame for failures to others will only speed up this process.

Washington’s policy is increasingly adapting to Putin’s demands: just look at the speech of US Vice President J.D. Vance on February 14, 2025, at the 61^st Munich Security Conference and read the statements of Keith Kellogg – the United States recognizes the validity of Russia’s demands for NATO’s non-expansion to the east and is ready to discuss this issue as part of a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine. Thus, the United States de facto agrees that it is losing its geopolitical “hegemony” and is ready to give Russia control over the territories that the Kremlin considers its “zones of interest and traditional influence”. They are engaged in a dialogue with Putin, seeking compromises in the Big Deal format, and reaching agreements.

Trump is confidently moving toward his own catastrophe and bringing the country closer to it, and these signs are already visible in the White House and the establishment. Sooner or later, Trump’s America will end, and we will witness many unexpected turns in that country. Today, Putin is skillfully taking advantage of Trump’s unprofessionalism, even gullibility, turning him into an accomplice to his own crimes.

Is everything that bad? No, Ukraine has more reliable partners in Europe. We are united by an understanding of a common threat. Europe is waking up, realizing that tomorrow Putin could be standing near Warsaw or Berlin if he is not stopped in Ukraine. At the same time, America just shrugs its shoulders. Trouble always unites those who find themselves in it: a burning house on the edge of the village must be put out together, because tomorrow the whole village will burn.

It is easy to see that all the political and diplomatic “dancing to tambourines” is taking place around one key issue: “addressing the root causes of war”. It is important to realize what these root causes are, and what and where the key to peace is.

Moscow has repeatedly spoken about the need to “eliminate the root causes of war” in various formats. These words were heard in the rhetoric of not only Moscow, but also Washington, Beijing, and others. The “root causes” thesis,created by the Kremlin regime, is not accidental – it is based on the idea of returning the world to a multipolar one, as well as Russia’s resumption of its role as a world power, membership in the G7 club, and “ruler of destinies” of other countries. Moscow persistently seeks influence and control over the territory of the “ex-USSR” – this is the angle from which Russia’s occupation of Transnistria (1992), the war in Georgia (2008), and eventually Ukraine should be viewed. Zbigniew Brzezinski warned us about this in his “Grand Chessboard”.

The “starting point” for Russia in Ukraine was the victory of the Orange Revolution in 2004. The revolution was perceived “behind the fence” as a challenge to its own interests in foreign policy, primarily because of Ukraine’s desire to move away from Russia and toward the West. In fact, this movement posed a real threat to the stability of the regime in Russia. Many experts point out that it was the Orange Revolution that laid the groundwork for Russia’s aggression. The northern neighbour’s hope to regain the status quo was finally dashed at the turn of 2013-2014 with the Euromaidan. The course chosen by the Ukrainian people to determine their own European future and their unwillingness to identify and combine it with the Soviet past meant the possibility of losing Ukraine for good, and thus losing Russia’s power, – this became the second “root cause” of the war.

Finally, the foreign policy aspect. Let’s recall Russian narratives about US global expansion, NATO’s eastward advance and the approach of danger to Russia’s borders, “color revolutions” financed by Western intelligence services, as a result of which Ukraine began to “drift” in a western direction, to come under “US control”, and so on. Thus, another root cause may be the alleged “prevention of Ukraine’s falling under the control of America and its allies” and the “absorption” of our country by the collective West and NATO.

Let’s draw a conclusion: each of these root causes is ideological, and none of them can be eliminated. Ukraine looks to the future, while the Kremlin is hopelessly stuck in the past, in the imperatives of “Russian greatness”. The world has changed, and Russia is a colossus on clay legs in it. This is reminiscent of the situation in the USSR in the late 1980s. The war and economic isolation finally threw the “state-civilization” into the past and destroyed its future. Such a morbid Putin’s “idea-fix” has no chance of being realized.

Yes, Putin is right: to end the war, its “root causes” must be eliminated. But those root causes are Putin’s fundamentally sick Russia, where a fascist oligarchic regime imbued with hatred, imperial superiority, revanchism, and waging wars of aggression as a means to achieve the Kremlin’s goals, has flourished under the forgiving gaze of Western democracies.

Today’s Putin regime is not only a global problem. It is also an opportunity to reboot Russia and stop it from returning to the past.

In the prehistory of the war, many mistakes and miscalculations were made. They were made by leaders of different states and at different times. Let’s try to record the main ones.

Ukraine. In choosing its Euro-Atlantic future, Ukraine counted on a safe path, the unwavering support of the United States and its major Western partners. This imaginary “shield”, as well as the “security guarantees” enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum, gave hope for steady progress toward such a future. We made a mistake: the guarantees did not work, and the support was not that unwavering. This miscalculation cost us dearly, and we are still paying for it today with heavy losses.

The state, unfortunately, neglected possible dangerous scenarios, did not fully invest in the development of the Armed Forces, missile programs, defense industry, and did not strengthen the border. The war caught the country unprepared. The result is widely known.

The collective West. It miscalculated in many aspects: assessing the national spirit of Ukrainians, heroism, readiness for resistance, realism of planning and conducting combat operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It also underestimated the true intentions of the Kremlin leadership and Russia’s real capabilities.

The main mistake that led to the war was the US leaders’ unwillingness to reach agreements on geopolitical issues and to consider the conditions put forward by Putin in 2007-2021. His political isolation pushed him to decide to get closer to China, North Korea, and other allies and to start a war in Ukraine against the West to preserve his power. This worsened Ukraine’s already weak starting point at the beginning of the war.

Western Europe made systemic mistakes when its politicians flirted with Russia and allowed it to create financial and oil and gas dependencies. Cheap gas and oil turned into Russia’s insidious weapon. Europe was unprepared for diversification alternatives and faltered. Moscow had managed to create systemic long-term dependencies, and as a result, to influence capitals and politicians. Now, European countries are urgently strengthening their defense, activating all the capabilities of the military-industrial complex, introducing military training programs, reanimating underground bomb shelters, etc.

1. Trump is wrong that “this is not his war”. When a bloody massacre is taking place in the center of Europe, the fault for which lies partly with the United States, it is his war as well. Moreover, a 30-million-strong state that has no nuclear weapons, no significant military arsenals, and is fighting for its survival against a 140-million-strong nuclear triad has to invent and apply non-standard, cutting-edge warfare technologies. War is not only about losses, but also about an incredible surge of scientific and technological progress to destroy the enemy. Progress eliminates the possibility of the enemy using nuclear weapons, as it allows us to disable the means of its delivery. Everyone is studying this experience. And it is far from certain that the latest methods will not be used by other organizations and small countries against the United States.

Trump’s America is mistaken in believing that it is still possible to negotiate with Putin: time is lost. He not only knows, but has tested the weaknesses and unprofessionalism of the American team, and skillfully exploits them to achieve his own goals. Please, be reminded how during his last phone conversation with the Kremlin leader, the latter set conditions in a harsh, far from diplomatic manner, and D. Trump asked in response to provide “at least the proposals that would not be rejected immediately” – this fact is quite revealing.

Russia. Putin, inspired by his hawkish environment, made the main strategic mistake of his presidency when he threatened the West in 2007 in Munich, and then unleashed wars against Georgia and Ukraine. The Russian president hoped to regain control of the countries he considered “a historical part of Russia” by force. He decided to punish “disobedient nations” but miscalculated.

He was persuaded that the Ukrainian people overwhelmingly wanted to live under Russia’s protectorate, and that the revolutions of 2004 and 2013 were not natural, but “artificial, colour”, organized and financed by the US intelligence services and the collective West to weaken Russia. Despite all the efforts to “return” Ukraine by force, it has moved even further away from Russia. Putin’s war has made our country stronger, more resilient, more confident, and more pro-European. The Armed Forces, special services, and intelligence agencies of Ukraine are making history by destroying the “world’s second” army.

Putin, without even realizing it, has created what he sought to avoid. His strategic mistakes, caused by false ideologies, are doomed to failure. He wasted time and the opportunity to avoid a catastrophe.

This is not the only key mistake. Putin chose the path of systemic destruction of European unity, and he fully supported the rise to power in the United States of D. Trump, whom he knew well and believed to be under his control. Putin counted on one and only thing: the US President had to stop supporting Ukraine and force our country and Europe to accept Putin’s terms of “peace”. As a result, D. Trump, faced with unsolvable problems, began to withdraw from peace negotiations and pass this heavy “flag” to European states.

No matter how eager Moscow is to negotiate with the “decision-making center” (the US President), it now has to admit that Washington is losing influence and control over the situation. It should look for agreements with European leaders, i.e., with those whom it threatens with a “great war”, which is a completely different political configuration with unpredictable consequences.

Another of Putin’s visionary miscalculations is that he has declared Russia a “state- civilization” whose place is in Asia. In fact, he turned away from the pro-European course and chose a strategic partnership with China and other authoritarian regimes in the region. This strategic mistake will cost Russia its absorption by China in the future. Such processes are already underway. Beijing definitely does not do anything for nothing, it invests in the future only when it is sure of the result. China needs Russia’s resources and territory, it is gradually getting them now, and after the war in Ukraine is over, the process will become avalanche-like.

Of course, this is not a complete list of the problems that have led to the current state of affairs, but the above is enough to realize the depth and systemic nature of the crisis.

It is unlikely that today there is a responsible expert or politician who can clearly answer the question of how long the war will last and what its consequences will be. But there are some things that already have a definite answer.

Firstly, we can confidently state that the world will never be the same as it was before February 24, 2022. A new world is being formed, and the war is a manifestation of this process. It will continue and end in a certain status quo, but for sure Ukraine will survive as an independent state (perhaps on a smaller territory) and build its European future. It is very likely that other post-Soviet states will follow Ukraine in getting rid of Russia’s influence. Under such circumstances, as Zbigniew Brzezinski warned, Russia will lose its empire status.

Secondly, the Kremlin will not be able to force postwar Ukraine to become a “brotherly” country. The wounds, losses, destruction, abuse, and humiliation inflicted are so deep that they won’t be erased from memory for generations. Russia, in fact, has never been a “brotherly country”, but now and for many decades to come it will remain our implacable enemy, and for many others it will simply be an enemy, an adversary. Post-war Russia will exist in a hostile environment, and this will determine its military and political system. Ukraine will demand not only an apology from the aggressor, but also that the regime be condemned by an international court and reparations be paid. Communication will be complicated, and there will be no political and social dialog for a long time. A high fence will be erected along the border as a symbol of the ideological disunity of the states. A high level of conflict will persist on all international platforms – this is an issue for generations.

Thirdly. Worldview differences and the fundamental impossibility of eliminating the “root causes” of the war pave the way for its continuation. Russia will not be able to maintain its political and economic influence in Ukraine, but the struggle for “historical territories” will continue until the resource is exhausted. Putin’s regime will have no reason to “come to the aid of the Russian-speaking population” in Ukraine, but the thesis of “eliminating the military threat” at its borders, which will “come from” a militarized and Western-backed neighboring state, will remain. At some point in the war, exhaustion must set in, the fighting will stop, the situation will go into a frozen state for a while, but the hybrid war will continue. It will continue until there are fundamental changes within Putin’s Russia. Such events are bound to happen, and the Putin regime will be condemned by the new government and the “awakened society”, but we understand that this process will be long. The new post-Putin Russia is only visible in the long term.

Fourthly, Putin’s and even post-Putin Russia will lose its pretended status as a “global player”, “reliable partner”, and “strategic ally”. The state will become weaker and proportionally less interesting to the civilized West, including the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Even China is interested in Russia only as a large territory rich in natural resources. The regime will have no prospects in great global isolation. In today’s world, fixed ideas about a separate “state-civilization” are doomed. Without external support, integration into world markets, etc., the country will move towards destruction. The common task is to speed up this process.

Fifthly. Security issues in the new world will obviously come to the fore. This principle will quite predictably become dominant in the formation of new interstate relations, as well as in the formation of more modern and effective defense alliances. The old security architecture will become a thing of the past. Today’s NATO will be called into question. A new regional leadership will be formed, based primarily on the defense and security capabilities of states. And here Ukraine has good chances and prospects.