The Change of Power in Hungary and Its Consequences for Europe, Ukraine, and Russia
Part II. The New Hungarian Government’s Foreign and Domestic Policies and Their Possible Directions
The previous article assessed Viktor Orbán’s regime in Hungary and identified the reasons why he lost his position as Prime Minister. As noted, the change in Hungary’s leadership may lead to a transformation of the country’s foreign and domestic policies. Given the fundamental differences between the political positions of Hungary’s future Prime Minister P. Magyar and those of the current incumbent, V. Orbán, the country’s course is likely to be different. It may be beneficial for Ukraine, though not always pro-Ukrainian.
Following the official change of power in Hungary, its foreign and domestic policies will be shaped by the positions and goals of the new head of the Hungarian government, P. Magyar, and his party, Tisza, as well as by the issues requiring urgent resolution. As P. Magyar has stated, he will restore Hungary’s full functioning within NATO and the EU, policy toward Russia will be pragmatic, and European aid to Ukraine will be unlocked. Furthermore, democratic norms and the rule of law will be restored in Hungary. In general, these promises align with P. Magyar’s worldview and actions, so he will likely make every effort to put virtually all of them into practice. After all, as reported by Hungarian media, he holds pro-European views and has sufficient experience working within EU institutions. He is also a conservative liberal, a supporter of free market relations, and a staunch fighter against corruption.
Pro-European views are also held by most of the top members of the Tisza party, who have lived and worked in Western countries or represented Hungary in EU and NATO structures. In particular, the leading candidate for the position of Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anita Orbán (who has no connection to her namesake V. Orbán), is a Euro-Atlanticist with anti-Russian views who studied and worked in the United States and the United Kingdom. All such party members are patriots of Hungary and prioritize its interests above all else, followed by the interests of the European Union or other countries, including Ukraine and Russia. However, they understand that they must be taken into account, as Hungary is dependent on them.
At the same time, certain subjective factors will also influence P. Magyar’s policies. According to some Hungarian experts, alongside his positive character traits, he also has negative ones. He is an ambitious careerist and may change his views depending on his current interests and the situation.
From 2002 to 2024, he was considered a supporter of Viktor Orbán, was a member of the Fidesz party, and fully endorsed the party’s policies and stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. For example, he supported Viktor Orbán when the latter was rolling back democracy in Hungary, justifying this by the need to create conditions for resolving the country’s economic problems. P. Magyar also publicly justified Russia’s attack on Ukraine, claiming that it was provoked by Ukraine’s plans to join NATO, which would allow the USA to deploy its offensive weapons on Ukrainian territory. Under this pretext, P. Magyar was categorically opposed to granting Ukraine membership in the Alliance, which, in his words, could lead to World War III. At the same time, he viewed Ukraine’s possible accession to the EU as a factor in the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
From 2010 to 2024, P. Magyar worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the government of V. Orbán, in the Prime Minister’s Office, and also served on the boards of state-owned companies. In other words, he could have been aware of the problem of corruption in the government but did not react to it in any way.
Everything changed following a high-profile political scandal in Hungary in February 2024. At that time, Hungary’s then-President K. Novák pardoned E. Konyá, the former deputy director of a state-run children’s home, who had been accused of covering up sexual abuse of children. The public reacted en masse to this, and protests against the current Hungarian government began. There was even talk of V. Orbán’s own involvement in the case. As a result, K. Novák resigned. She was followed by P. Magyar’s ex-wife, Minister of Justice of Hungary J. Varga, who had signed the pardon. V. Orbán managed to avoid accountability. Nevertheless, all those involved in the scandal were members of the Fidesz party or had direct ties to it.
Magyar used the scandal as a pretext to leave the Fidesz party. According to his public statements, he did so in protest against corruption in the country’s leadership. Although some experts believe that the Fidesz party no longer served P. Magyar’s interests, as he was unable to advance his desired career there.
In any case, P. Magyar’s media appearances generated significant attention in Hungary and made him a well-known figure. Thanks to this, he managed to become one of the leaders of the opposition party Tisza, which became the main rival of the ruling Fidesz party. In April 2026, Tisza won the parliamentary elections, paving the way for P. Magyar to assume the highest office in the country.
In any case, immediately after officially taking office, P. Magyar and the Fidesz party will be forced to urgently address a number of pressing problems created by V. Orbán or that arose during his tenure as Prime Minister.
The main one is the worsening economic situation in the country, which is pushing it toward a crisis. To cope with this, Hungary needs loans from the EU, which Brussels has blocked due to violations of democracy and the rule of law in the country by V. Orbán’s regime, as well as due to his obstruction of the European Union’s plan to provide a EUR 90 billion financial loan to Ukraine and the implementation of the 20th package of sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, Hungary needs cheap Russian oil, which is supplied via the “Druzhba” pipeline. Recently, it has been out of service due to Russia’s damage to an oil pumping station near the Ukrainian city of Brody.
All of this also affects the interests of the EU and Ukraine. Therefore, joint measures are being taken to resolve the disruption to the pipeline. Thus, the issue of Hungary unblocking a loan for Ukraine and restoring the operation of the “Druzhba” pipeline has already been practically resolved. Currently, representatives of P. Magyar and EU leadership are discussing the possibility of Hungary fulfilling other requirements set by Brussels, which would allow it to access European financial funds. At the same time, preparations are underway for P. Magyar’s first foreign visits as Prime Minister, aimed at restoring Hungary’s positive relations with neighboring countries and the EU, which were damaged by V. Orbán. P. Magyar is scheduled to visit Warsaw, Vienna, and Brussels first. He has a personal friendship with President of France E. Macron, in whom he places particular hope for advancing Hungary’s interests.
Magyar has also confirmed his pragmatic approach toward Russia. Specifically, he has announced plans to continue purchasing oil and gas from Russia under existing contracts.
As for Moscow, the change of government in Hungary caused a negative reaction. Russia even classified Hungary as an “unfriendly country”. However, Russian leadership now states its readiness to maintain bilateral ties.
Once the above-mentioned priority issues have been resolved, P. Magyar, the Hungarian government, and the Tisza party will turn their attention to the Parliament to implement the key provisions of their election platform. In this regard, their priority will be to enhance Hungary’s role in the European Union and NATO. First and foremost, this will involve the country’s more active participation in the implementation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. If Hungary does not continue to pursue a pro-Russian policy, it will have no disagreements with Europe regarding the need to counter Moscow’s aggressive course. Therefore, it may become more actively involved in EU programs for the rearmament of Europe and NATO military exercises.
At the same time, P. Magyar will oppose the European Union’s decisions which, in his view, will be detrimental to Hungary. This may pertain to regulatory requirements imposed by EU leadership on its member states in the economic and migration spheres, as well as to issues regarding the allocation of funds for joint European Union programs. In other words, P. Magyar’s policy in this case will resemble that of V. Orbán.
As part of Hungary’s European policy, the country’s new leadership will pay special attention to strengthening its position in Central and Eastern Europe. P. Magyar has already announced plans to revitalize activities within the Visegrad Group (V4), which includes Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In recent years, the Group’s work has practically ceased due to pro-Russian stances of Viktor Orbán, as well as Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and, to some extent, Prime Minister of Czechia Andrej Babiš.
In the initial phase of implementing these plans, Péter Magyar will be supported by Hungary’s presidency of the Visegrad Group from July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026. Last year, his priority was identified as enhancing the competitive capabilities of the V4 region. It is evident that P. Magyar will continue to take steps toward achieving this goal and may even put forward new initiatives.
Besides, P. Madyar will oppose the creation of an anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian alliance in Central and Eastern Europe comprising Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, which V. Orbán has attempted to establish. This is especially important given the prospects of its possible expansion to include Bulgaria following the victory of the pro-Russian coalition led by former President R. Radev in the country’s parliamentary elections in April 2026.
The new Hungarian leadership will change Hungary’s course regarding Ukraine, which will take on a noticeably positive character. Hungary needs Ukraine as a buffer separating it from Russia, as a trading partner, and as a country that ensures the transit of Russian oil to Hungarian refineries.
Given this, Budapest will not block the EU’s decisions regarding support for Ukraine and the intensification of sanctions pressure on Russia. It will also cease to blackmail our country with threats to cut off electricity supplies, revoke benefits for refugees, and close borders to Ukrainian goods. There will be no provocations by Hungary against Ukraine. Instead, favorable conditions will emerge for deepening bilateral trade cooperation.
Magyar believes it is necessary to support Ukraine in determining the conditions for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. In his words, no one has the right to impose their will on Ukraine.
At the same time, P. Magyar has confirmed that Budapest’s position on military-technical cooperation with Ukraine remains unchanged. Hungary will neither supply weapons to Ukraine, nor allow their transit through its territory, nor carry out joint projects in this area. The reason is most likely that the Hungarian government continues to seek to avoid straining relations with Russia.
At the same time, P. Magyar opposes accelerating Ukraine’s EU accession process. He believes that a country at war cannot become a member of the European Union. He insists that all candidate countries must adhere to the same EU membership conditions, which must be met.
As before, the situation of ethnic Hungarians in our country will remain another issue in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations. P. Magyar does not deliberately escalate the issue as V. Orbán did, but it will still be raised by the Hungarian side.
Against this background, Hungary will end its pro-Russian policy. At the same time, its contacts with Russia will be limited, including at the highest levels. Besides, Budapest will step up efforts to gain access to alternative energy sources and build the infrastructure for their delivery. The practical implementation of joint projects with the British company Shell and the French company Engie will begin or accelerate. Specifically, this involves laying pipelines through Poland to oil and gas terminals on the Baltic Sea.
However, Hungary will continue to purchase Russian energy carriers, as implementing the aforementioned plans is a rather complex task. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the new Hungarian government, like the previous one, will have corrupt ties to Russia. Therefore, P. Magyar is unlikely to adopt a hardline policy toward Russia. Relations between Budapest and Moscow will deteriorate, but will not reach a critical point.
Hungary’s domestic policy will also undergo changes. These will primarily involve dismantling Viktor Orbán’s system of power, establishing and consolidating a new system of governance, restoring democracy in the country, as well as intensifying the fight against corruption – or eliminating rivals under the guise of such efforts. Such a policy will be facilitated by the Tisza party’s constitutional majority, which will allow it to independently pass necessary laws, remove Viktor Orbán’s appointees from office, and initiate criminal proceedings against them. Such steps by Hungary’s new government may complicate the domestic situation in the country, particularly due to resistance from its previous leadership. Despite his defeat, Viktor Orbán remains a prominent player in Hungarian politics and will attempt to weaken the positions of Péter Magyar and the Tisza party. This is especially true given that in four years, the party will have to face parliamentary elections again, and before that, local elections.
Russia’s subversive activities could become a negative factor for Hungary. Russia will attempt to weaken Hungary as a member of the EU and NATO, as well as destabilize the situation in the country so that pro-Russian forces return to power. To this end, Moscow will support the Fidesz party as the main and most effective opponent of Hungary’s new government. Furthermore, Russia will hinder Hungary’s economy by manipulating the supply of energy resources to the country. In addition, Moscow will attempt to constantly provoke tensions in Hungary’s relations with the EU and Ukraine. To this end, it may carry out attacks on the infrastructure of the “Druzhba” oil pipeline on Ukrainian territory, as well as resort to sabotage on the gas pipelines that supply Russian gas to Hungary. Russia will blame Ukraine for such actions, which could further strain Hungarian-Ukrainian relations.
Despite the fact that Budapest’s policy will not be entirely pro-Ukrainian, the rise to power of P. Magyar and the Tisza party in Hungary is a positive sign for Ukraine. As previously noted, the issue of unlocking the EU loan – the most critical problem for our state – has been practically resolved. Furthermore, Hungary will cease creating other obstacles to Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU and NATO. In comparison, P. Magyar’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine and his negative stance toward our country’s accelerated accession to the European Union are not critical. Ukraine will not be able to join the EU before 2027 for objective reasons. Most European leaders oppose such a prospect. Ukraine has never viewed Hungary as a reliable arms supplier.
Thus, the victory of the Tisza party in the Hungarian elections has paved the way for radical changes in the country’s foreign and domestic policies. Preparations for implementing these changes are currently underway. In general, they are positive for Ukraine and will include Hungary’s abandonment of pro-Russian, anti-European, and anti-Ukrainian policies. However, Hungary will not take a hardline stance against Russia nor adopt fully pro-Ukrainian positions. At the same time, Russia will attempt to restore its influence in Hungary by undermining the country’s stability and creating conditions for pro-Russian forces to return to power.
It is quite possible that Russia will launch new attacks on the infrastructure of the “Druzhba” oil pipeline and carry out sabotage on the gas pipelines that supply gas to Hungary. It will blame Ukraine for this in order to provoke a new escalation in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations.
Yurii Mykhailenko,
Institute for Global Politics
Collage: Source: Channel 24
