Confucius Institutes – Soft Power or a Tool of Chinese Intelligence?
The Confucius Institutes (CI) project was launched in 2004, and the developer of its programs and direct manager is the State Administration for the Promotion of Chinese Language in China (abbreviated as Hanban) of the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, together with foreign sinological centers. By 2020, it was planned to create a global network of 1,000 CI offices. At its peak, according to Chinese and international data, there were 530 CI offices and approximately 750 “Confucius Classrooms” in more than 160 countries [1], which was a record number among state cultural centers operating directly in academic institutions.
China positions the CI on a par with other organizations promoting language and culture, such as the Portuguese Camões Institute, the Brazilian Cultural Center, the British Council, the Alliance Française, the Italian Institute of Culture, the Spanish Cervantes Institute, and the German Goethe Institute. However, unlike those structures, many of the CIs operate directly on university campuses, which raises issues related to academic freedom and political influence.
After the creation of the CI, the then chief ideologist of the CCP, Li Changchun, called them a key element of China’s foreign propaganda apparatus. The effectiveness of this strategy is confirmed by the Brand Finance ranking: in 2025, Beijing rose to second place (after the United States) in the Global Soft Power Index [2], which experts explain by an extensive network of CIs.
Intelligence, Pressure and Financial Leverage
American and British intelligence agencies consider CI to be a tool of China’s economic intelligence. According to The Economic Times, back in 2018, FBI Director Christopher Wray warned the Senate that every student sent by China undergoes a party vetting process and may be “asked” to obtain scientific or technical research data. For its part, the Stanford Review described the case of an agent of the Chinese Ministry of State Security who posed as a student to obtain research results in the field of artificial intelligence and robotics and recruit “sympathetic” informants. The legal basis for such actions is the 2017 law of China “On National Intelligence”, which obliges all citizens and organizations, including those located abroad, to cooperate with (Chinese) intelligence services.
According to a recent report by the NGO “Transparency UK-China” [3], more than half of the Chinese scholars surveyed confirmed that Chinese students in the United Kingdom [4] had been instructed to monitor their colleagues and prevent discussions about the repression of Uighurs, the status of Taiwan, or the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Those who refused to cooperate were persecuted or had their families persecuted in China.
According to the “Institute for Higher Education Policy”, an independent think tank, Chinese students pay approximately £2.3 billion annually to British universities. And according to the Times Higher Education magazine, they account for up to 75 % of tuition fees in some postgraduate programs. Experts point out that this “dependence” forces some rectors to ignore the contradictions in order to avoid the risk of a significant budget deficit.
The West’s Reaction, China’s Maneuvers and New Rules
According to the University World News, in 2019-2022, all CIs were closed in Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland. Their staff was accused of spreading communist ideology and soft power, trying to block discussions on Tibet, and even conducting espionage activities. At the same time, there are still nearly 190 CIs in the EU.
In 2022-2024, Australia closed six of the thirteen CIs in the country under the “Foreign Relations Act”. Similarly, in Poland, in 2023, the leadership of the University of Wroclaw and the Warsaw University of Technology did not renew cooperation with the CI, considering it risky for the autonomy of their programs.
In the United States, since October 1, 2023, the “National Defense Authorization Act” [5] prohibited the Department of Defense from providing funding to American universities that have established CIs. However, the ban does not apply to direct scholarships for students, and foreign universities are not subject to this prohibition. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the legislation within the framework of the CI Scholarship Waiver Program. In addition, every aspect of cooperation with a Chinese organization is now subject to a detailed legal, financial, and security audit.
In response to such West’s actions, China tried to rebrand itself. Thus, CI’s headquarters in Beijing was transformed into the Center for Language Education and Cooperation, and funding was transferred to a special fund. Experts see this as a kind of PR stunt: the new “language centers” operate under the same rules, which makes it difficult to monitor their ties to China’s intelligence services.
On August 1, 2025, the “Freedom of Speech in Higher Education Act” came into force in the United Kingdom. The Office for Students’ Affairs (OSA) of the Ministry of Education has announced that any contract containing ideological clauses – including those related to the employment of Chinese teachers – must be amended or terminated. Twenty British “language centers” have already come under the scrutiny of the OSA, and the £585,000 fine previously imposed on the University of Sussex illustrates the scale of potential sanctions. Under Secretary of the Department for Education of the UK Jackie Smith has stated that academic freedom is “non-negotiable” and any form of intimidation on campuses will be severely punished. According to the NGO “UK-China Transparency”, CIs, which were initially perceived as mere soft power tools, later evolved into instruments of political and intelligence influence. They combine language instruction with ideological control, the acquisition of secret technologies, and transnational intimidation. Unless contracts with CIs are fully transparent and procedures for protecting academic freedom are effectively applied, universities risk losing their autonomy, and states are at risk of strategic knowledge leakage and increased spending on counterintelligence.
Five Pillars of Safe Academic Cooperation
For years, the activities of the CIs have been raising questions about the transparency of their funding, academic autonomy, and research safety. Therefore, it is crucial to introduce a system of safeguards that could limit China’s political influence without sacrificing the benefits of international scientific cooperation. Therefore, full disclosure of contracts is the first and simplest safeguard: publishing all provisions – along with information on funding sources – eliminates hidden clauses that could limit the freedom to choose personnel or research topics. The second pillar is the systematic assessment of the safety of research projects. Given the growing interest of countries in fields that combine artificial intelligence and biology, civilian and military purposes, it is important to apply procedures similar to those used in defense grants, and dual-use projects should be subject to export controls for data and technology. The third element is diversification of language partnerships: the Taiwan-funded Huayu BEST program and ASEAN university initiatives demonstrate that learning Chinese does not have to make research and education institutions dependent on Beijing. The fourth safeguard is secure reporting channels that allow students and staff to anonymously report cases of intimidation or political pressure without fear of retaliation. The final, fifth component is international coordination, exemplified by the “Five Eyes Alliance”, which has adopted common standards for sharing counterintelligence information on threats to research and a mutual warning system for foreign interference in universities and research centers.
The combination of these five measures creates an integral chain of protection. Each link covers a specific gap: from financial incentives to the risk of technology leakage and political pressure. This makes it possible to limit China’s influence without sacrificing the benefits of international academic cooperation. Therefore, experts believe that the future of the CI does not depend on changing the name or cosmetic rebranding, but on the implementation of real, effective principles of transparency and oversight. Without them, academic centers can become just another arena in the global game for influence, information, and technology.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
Notes:
[1] In Ukraine, the first CI was founded in 2007 at Luhansk National Pedagogical University (today there is no information about the CI on the university’s website). During 2008-2021, the CIs were opened at V. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv National Linguistic University, K. Ushynskyi South Ukrainian National Pedagogical University, Vinnytsia National Technical University, O. Honchar Dnipro National University, and V. Hnatiuk Ternopil National Pedagogical University. In 2019, the Confucius Music Center was founded at the Tchaikovsky National Music Academy of Ukraine. The so-called “Confucius classrooms” have been operating at Sumy State University, Zaporizhzhia National University, Borys Grinchenko Kyiv Metropolitan University, Kyiv Gymnasium of Oriental Languages No. 1, and Odesa Specialized School No. 117.
[2] An international consulting company specializing in brand valuation and analysis. It annually publishes rankings in various industries. In the 2023 Global Soft Power Index, China was ranked fifth.
[3] The aim of this organization is to conduct a thorough, independent study of the relationship between the UK and China, as well as to promote transparency. Particular attention is paid to the CCP’s activities in the country, to dual-use and military research involving British and Chinese scientists at universities, and to cooperation in these areas in the private sector.
[4] In the 2021/2022 academic year, almost 152 thousand Chinese students studied in UK higher education institutions. In the 2023/2024 academic year, the number decreased to almost 99 thousand. In the 2024/2025 academic year, only more than 17 thousand students from China were enrolled in British universities. The factors underlying this decline are multifaceted: from geopolitical tensions to increased competition from other English-speaking destinations, including Australia, which has seen a sharp increase in the number of Chinese students. For comparison, as of November 2024, 10,700 Chinese students were enrolled in Ukrainian higher education institutions.
[5] The law that sets out the budget, spending, and policies of the US Department of Defense for each fiscal year.
