Problems and Prospects for Post-Putin Russia

The consequences of Putin’s policy, primarily his war against Ukraine, have led to a critical complication of Russia’s problems. At this, he demonstrates his inability to resolve them;

in this situation, Russia’s ruling elite is taking steps to prepare for a controlled transfer of power in the country. However, we should not rule out the possibility of a clash of interests between different power clans on this issue;

in order to create conditions for resolving these problems, Russia’s new leadership could make certain compromises with the West and Ukraine. However, in the long term, Moscow would return to its hard line;

on the one hand, these prospects would be positive for Ukraine, but on the other, they would require from Ukraine to maintain its ability to respond adequately to threats from the East.

The Possibility and Options for a Change of Power in Russia

Regardless of how much Putin wants to stay in power in the country and no matter what he does to achieve this, sooner or later it will come to an end. He is not immortal and will inevitably pass away or lose the ability to perform his duties due to old age. Besides, the Russian dictator is no longer satisfying the country’s ruling elite, as he is violating the unspoken agreement between them: “stability, security, and the opportunity to acquire wealth by any means in exchange for loyalty to him.”

Ordinary citizens’ trust in Putin is also falling as a result of the decline in living standards in the country and the endless prolongation of the war with no obvious prospects for victory. According to opinion polls, his approval rating has fallen to its lowest level since he announced partial mobilization in the autumn of 2022, currently being at 38 %.

The catalyst for these processes is the worsening economic situation in Russia under the influence of Western sanctions and other factors, which is clearly felt by the population, the country’s ruling circles, and the oligarchs. All their hopes for a quick restoration of peace and resolution of socio-economic problems through the implementation of US President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives have been shattered by Putin’s intransigence in continuing the war against Ukraine.

Based on historical experience, all this could lead to sharp destabilization and uncontrolled developments in Russia, posing a direct threat to its ruling elite, including physical liquidation of the current rulers. There were many such examples in Russia’s history.

Today, there are all grounds for such a scenario to unfold in Russia. Putin is old and sick and suffers from mental disorders. This is evident from his appearance, behavior, and speeches. Most of the people around him, who are over 70 years of age, are just like him. Therefore, they are objectively unable to see reality adequately and make right decisions.

As a result, Russia finds itself in a catastrophic situation that threatens its very existence. What else can happen to a country that has been waging a long war with no prospect of victory, suffering huge losses that are undermining its economy and demography, and finding itself isolated from the entire civilized world, while its “partners” only want to “grab” something from it?

At this, Russia’s elite cannot function normally due to external sanctions, the loss of its businesses, and other negative aspects associated with the war. The country’s population is suffering from economic hardships, which are becoming more and more severe. As a result, both the elite and the people are openly asking a perfectly logical question: why do they need Putin’s regime, which cannot ensure their interests, well-being, and security?

In other words, Russia is currently experiencing a classic revolutionary situation, described by the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks, Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), on the eve of the 1917 revolution, when “the bottoms don’t want and the tops are unable to live in the old way”. In modern conditions, the “tops” are Putin and his closest associates, and the “bottoms” are part of the Russian elite and citizens dissatisfied with what is happening in the country. Both the former and the latter clearly understand the situation and are trying to change it.

According to a number of experts, Putin and his associates have begun preparations for a controlled transfer of power in the country to his successor, with the aim of ensuring the security and business positions of their political-oligarchic group or clan.

We will not name specific individuals who may be brought to power after Putin, as the information available on this subject is mostly just conspiracy theories. However, all of them are representatives of certain clans promoting their protégés.

At the same time, Putin and his environment are taking steps to create a new ruling elite that is more loyal to them to replace the existing one. This is manifested in Putin’s intensified contacts with relatively young businessmen, as well as the promotion of participants in the war against Ukraine to positions in power.

For their part, certain forces or groups in Russia’s leadership that are competitors of Putin’s clan are taking steps to gradually remove him from power. The methods of such actions include providing Putin with distorted information on important issues concerning Russia’s real situation, as well as ignoring his decisions and pursuing their own course. So far, this only concerns the economy, but it may spread to other spheres.

This topic has already been discussed in more detail in our article “Putin Is Losing Control. How He Is Being Removed from Power”. Let us add just one more example of part of the Russian elite uniting not around Putin, but against him. For example, he demonstratively ignored the funeral ceremony of Minister of Transport of Russia Roman Starovoit (once he was governor of Kursk region), who committed suicide or was shot on the day of his dismissal. Despite this, many members of the Russian government, including nine Ministers, attended his funeral.

And the point here is not Starovoit himself, who was corrupt and profited from the construction of defensive lines on Kursk region’s border with Ukraine. The main topic is that top representatives of the Russian authorities openly went against Putin and were not afraid of his wrath.

In other words, Putin’s time is up, and the end of his era, in one form or another, is a matter for the near future. Therefore, there is a high probability of his voluntary departure or forced removal from power. The question now is how this will be carried out and what the consequences of the change of power in Russia will be. Based on the above, there are a few possible scenarios for further developments. Let us consider them in more detail.

Scenario One – a planned transfer of power from Putin to a designated successor who would satisfy the interests of all the major clans in Russia’s ruling elite. Such a process could be carried out without any particular problems or excesses under the pretext of his illness. This is exactly how, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, then-President of Russia Boris Yeltsin and his environment transferred power to Putin.

Most likely, the new government would try to normalize relations with the West and end or suspend the war with Ukraine on the basis of certain compromises, with the aim of creating the conditions for resolving the problems of the Russian economy. At this, the country’s domestic policy would soften.

However, in the long term, the Kremlin would have to return to confrontation with the West and restore a totalitarian system in the country, as Russia’s imperial nature would not allow it to live any other way.

Scenario Two – the removal of Putin from power by one or more political and economic clans without the consent of his immediate environment. This would lead to conflict among the country’s ruling elite, but with proper preparation, the rebels could prevail, especially with the support of the West.

This scenario would be similar to the removal from power of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. Both of them were afraid or unable to engage in a fierce confrontation with their political opponents and gave up power. The same scenario could happen now. Moreover, most of the people in Putin’s circle are as old and frail as he is, and some are tired of him.

The current opposition to Putin in the upper echelons of power in Russia is conditionally liberal and has no fundamental interest in continuing the confrontation with the West and the war against Ukraine. Therefore, in case of the current opposition’s victory, it could take a more active approach to restoring constructive relations with the USA, Europe, and Ukraine than would be the case in the first scenario.

In view of this, the West would make greater concessions. At the same time, the liberalization of the country’s domestic policy would be broader. In other words, the course of the new Russian government would resemble that of Mikhail Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s. However, the new Russian government would inevitably face the same problems and, as in the first scenario, would have to return to a more rigid foreign and domestic policy.

Scenario Three – Putin’s sudden death before the final agreement on his successor between the main clans in the country’s ruling elite. In this case, there could be disagreements between Putin’s environment and other clans regarding the person of the next Russian president.

Such disagreements would be more acute than in the previous scenario, as more parties would be involved. At the same time, the instinct for self-preservation would force clan leaders to reach certain compromises. However, these would be situational and unstable.

Therefore, Russia’s policy would be vague and would fluctuate from demonstrating a willingness to compromise with the West and Ukraine to taking a tougher stance. At the same time, there would be constant changes in the government, which would further complicate the situation.

However, the Kremlin’s general course would be aimed at improving relations with the West and suspending the war with Ukraine, since without this, Russia would not be able to avoid a crisis in the country with the corresponding socio-political consequences.

Scenario Four – the fall of the current government in Russia as a result of a sharp destabilization of the socio-political situation and the emergence of mass unrest, which could be led by Putin’s opponents within or outside the ruling elite.

Such a situation is entirely possible if Russia’s internal problems become critically deep and there will be no decisive success on the front. In this case, developments in the country would become uncontrollable. And the results would be unpredictable, ranging from the military junta coming to power in the country to its disintegration.

In the first case, after a temporary suspension of intense fighting on the front and even the surrender of certain territories, Russia would resume the war. The junta would use this to try to consolidate citizens around itself on the basis of the same imperial ideology as now, as well as to divert their attention from own problems. Also, due to the economic challenges, it would have significantly fewer opportunities than the current government.

If Russia ceases to exist as a single state, the confrontation between it and the West and the war against Ukraine will automatically end. At this, Ukraine will face new problems related to the emergence of hotbeds of conflict near its borders, refugee flows, etc.

Post-Putin Russia and Its Future Policy Towards Ukraine

The leadership of the Russian Federation and the leaders of all its clans most likely are aware of the danger of a critical situation arising in the country. Therefore, they will make efforts to ensure a controlled transfer of power. In view of this, the most likely scenario is one that falls between the first and second options.

Thus, the interested parties in the ruling elite of the Russian Federation would reach mutually acceptable compromises regarding Putin’s successor and the mechanism for transferring power. Putin could agree to this voluntarily in exchange for safety guarantees. After that, he could be appointed to some symbolic government position, sent into retirement with restrictions on his activities, or liquidated under the guise of illness.

There are quite a few similar precedents. Among them, we can point out: the appointment of former Prime Minister and President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev as Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council; the removal from office and retirement of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev; the assassination (according to some versions) of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin under the guise of a stroke. All of them had no less power and opportunities to retain their power, but failed to do so.

Putin’s successor would be presented by Russian propaganda as his follower, who would continue to pursue a tough policy of defending Russia’s interests. At this, it would be assumed that such a course is still supported by the majority of Russians. Nevertheless, whoever this person could be, at the initial stage, the new Russian president would be under the control of the clans that brought him to power. Therefore, he would be forced to defend their interests.

Currently, their main interests are to create conditions for the normal functioning of the Russian economy as the basis for maintaining stability in the country, as well as the business positions and wealth of its ruling circles. These goals can only be achieved by restoring normal relations between Russia and the West and ending or suspending the war against Ukraine, which would allow for the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions and a reduction in military spending. This is what Moscow’s foreign policy would be aimed at, despite declarations of its permanence. Its main focus would be on reaching certain compromises with the USA, Europe, and Ukraine.

At the same time, following the example of the USSR’s leadership in the 1980s, the Kremlin could begin a process of limited democratization of Russia in exchange for Western aid. Of course, the rigid power vertical would not be abolished, real opposition’s activity would not be allowed, and fair elections would not be held. Instead, the Russian leadership would limit its control over the country’s economy and interference in its work, slightly expand freedom of speech, allow some currently banned social networks to operate, and soften the persecution of citizens for criticizing the authorities.

All this would be accompanied by a change in the overall rhetoric of the Russian leadership and Russian propaganda, which would be aimed at justifying the policy’s changes, as they would provoke an ambiguous reaction in Russian society.

In line with Russia’s usual practice, emphasis would be placed on the mistakes of the country’s previous leadership (in the person of Putin), which would be called as the main cause of the country’s problems. And in the absence of quick success in overcoming them, relatively mild accusations against him could turn into the debunking of his cult of personality.

Taking these steps would allow the Kremlin to normalize Russia’s relations with the West, strengthen its international position, resume participation in the international organizations, and improve the economic situation in the country.

However, the USA and China still would not recognize Russia as an equal and would not “share the world” with it. Therefore, it would not be able to reach the level of a world power but would remain a regional center of power with limited ability for aggression against neighboring countries. At this, China would maintain its influence over Russia, although Moscow would be able to weaken it by improving relations with Western countries and increasing trade with them.

Besides, Russia would unlikely be able to restore its position in the European and global energy markets, which have already been redistributed by other countries, including the USA. There would also be difficulties with the return of foreign companies to Russia. Some of them would not want to do so due to a loss of trust in Russia, while others would not be allowed by the Russian authorities because they would compete with domestic producers.

These factors would prevent Russia from fully reviving its economic potential and its position in the global economy, which were undermined by the war against Ukraine. This would complicate Moscow’s ability to increase its military potential.

As the new Russian president strengthened his position and created his own clan, he would try to break away from his dependence on the previous political and oligarchic circles and replace them with his own appointees. This could lead to a worsening of the political situation in Russia, and the outcome would depend on the determination of the parties and their ability to defend their interests.

Most likely, this situation would not lead to a large-scale internal conflict in the country but would be resolved in some way. At one time, Putin did this to his advantage, relying on the Russian special services. It is hard to say at this point whether his successor would be able to repeat something similar.

However, as noted above, in any case, in the long term, the Russian government would return to confrontation with the West and totalitarian domestic policy. There is no alternative to Moscow’s return to this course, since Russia’s imperial nature does not allow for its existence in conditions of democracy and the absence of external enemies.

It is precisely the position of a “besieged fortress” and totalitarianism that are the main factors restraining internal contradictions for any country that was created on imperial principles, i.e., by seizing neighboring territories and enslaving their peoples. This was demonstrated by the attempts to democratize the USSR in the second half of the 1980s and Russia in the first half of the 1990s, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of centrifugal processes in the Russian Federation.

If Russia’s ruling elite fails to implement the scenario under consideration, the situation in the country could indeed become critical.

The likelihood of such an outcome was demonstrated by the rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin, owner of the private military company Wagner, and his march on Moscow in June 2023. According to most estimates, he failed to achieve his goals or, at least, destabilize the situation in the country, solely because of the indecisiveness of his actions. During the rebellion, the Russian authorities at the central and local levels were effectively paralyzed, and a significant part of the population supported him.

Specific individuals who could lead a new rebellion or revolution in Russia have not yet openly emerged. However, according to analysts, they could be influential generals and officers of the Russian Armed Forces who are dissatisfied with Russia’s de facto defeat in the war, as well as with the current government and situation in the country. They could also be joined by some members of the country’s upper crust who have their own ambitions for power.

A sharp deterioration in the country’s economic problems, as happened in the USSR in the late 1980s, or Russia’s obvious failure on the front could trigger a crisis. At this, if the authorities lose control of the situation, centrifugal processes could begin in the country, leading to its collapse.

Based on the experience of events in Russia in the 1990s, the centers of disobedience in the country could be autonomous republics created on a national basis, or economically self-sufficient regions that can exist without Moscow.

Autonomous republics such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Buryatia, Yakutia, and others retain their national identity and could break away from Moscow if it fails to satisfy their economic interests and maintain control by force.

In turn, Moscow’s policy to reorient the country’s trade and economic ties from the West to the East are creating the basis for disobedience in the Siberian and Far Eastern regions of Russia. This brings them closer to foreign partners, primarily China. And Moscow, as an intermediary, only gets in their way. The same applies to the northwestern regions of Russia, which can cooperate directly with the EU without Moscow’s interfering.

According to some experts, unlike the collapse of the USSR, the disintegration of the Russian Federation would not have a decisive impact on the geopolitical situation in the world. It is already bipolar, with two leading centers of power, the USA and China. The disappearance of the Russian Federation would only change the balance of power between them in a certain way due to China’s loss of the opportunity to use it as a factor of pressure on the USA and Europe. There would be no global negative consequences for the world economy, as Russia occupies an insignificant place in it and can easily be replaced by other countries.

In fact, the collapse of the Russian Federation would only matter to its neighboring countries, which are either its opponents or allies. Europe, Ukraine, and Turkey would get rid of  major challenges and threats to their security and interests, while Iran and the countries of Central Asia would lose their important trading partner.

At the same time, the disintegration of the Russian Federation is highly likely to lead to civil war on its territory and a series of armed conflicts. This would pose a threat of losing control over nuclear weapons and their use by the parties to the conflict against each other or by extremists and terrorists against other countries. Technological accidents and disasters, mass refugee flows, and the proliferation of weapons could also become significant problems.

In view of the above, the world’s leading countries would try to prevent the collapse of the Russian Federation or to mitigate such a process as much as possible. At this, the USA and NATO could take measures to establish control over Russian nuclear weapons and their removal in case of Russia does collapse. Plans for such actions were considered by the USA in the period before and after the collapse of the USSR. The US Armed Forces conducted exercises to practice the use of special forces for these purposes.

China could do the same with regard to Russia’s nuclear weapons located in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. This is especially likely given that those regions would most likely be captured by China.

It is also worth noting the USA’ intentions to create a new Golden Dome missile defense system. One of its tasks may be to destroy Russian missiles in cases of unauthorized launches. Given Ukraine’s scientific and technical potential, it may be involved in this project.

Ukraine Will Continue to Occupy a Key Place in the Kremlin’s Policy.

As noted above, at the initial stage, the new Russian government could make certain compromises with Ukraine on ending the war, with the aim of creating conditions for resolving the problems of the Russian economy.

According to analysts’ assessments, at a minimum, this could involve Russia’s agreement to secure the border with Ukraine along the current front line and return certain territories to it (in particular, parts of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv regions). At this, all ultimatums to Ukraine would be lifted, except for its neutrality. At a maximum, Moscow could return most of Ukraine’s eastern and southern regions to Ukraine and propose joint ownership of Crimea. The basis for this is provided by Russian and Ukrainian legislation, which allows dual citizenship.

At the same time, Moscow would not give up its strategic goals of regaining control over Ukraine. To this end, Russia would use the same methods as it did in Georgia.

Thus, Moscow would use the elections in Ukraine to promote its puppets in the government of our state. At present, this is practically impossible, since there are no organized pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, and the overwhelming majority of the population has a sharply negative attitude to Russia. But over time, this situation could change in Moscow’s favor. Especially with Russia’s support. Therefore, Russia would work for the future.

Additional opportunities for Moscow to draw Ukraine into its sphere of influence would be provided by the establishment of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries after the war and the signing of a peace agreement. At this, Russia could offer Ukraine various preferences, including the resumption of Russian gas export to Ukraine and its transit through Ukrainian territory.

The population of the occupied territories, which would be returned to our state, could become a separate channel for Russia to promote its interests in Ukraine. The residents of those regions, especially young people, have undergone ideological indoctrination and may become open to Russian neo-imperial ideas. Among them could be agents of Moscow’s influence.

In the future, after the Russian leadership returns to pursuing a tough foreign policy, this would also be reflected in its attitude to Ukraine. In other words, everything that happened after the collapse of the USSR would be repeated, including political, economic, and military pressure on Ukraine to force it to abandon European and Euro-Atlantic integration in favor of entering Russia’s sphere of influence.

The disintegration of Russia could have quite ambiguous consequences for Ukraine. On the one hand, the threat of Moscow’s new attack on our state would be eliminated. Besides, Ukraine would be able to restore its territorial integrity by regaining the territories occupied by Russia and those that were transferred to it during the existence of the USSR.

At the same time, Ukraine would face all the negative consequences of Russia’s collapse that were mentioned above. Moreover, Ukraine’s immediate proximity to Russia would make them particularly sensitive for us.

All this requires the continuation of measures to counter threats to Ukraine from the East. In general, they should include:

• maintaining the needed capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to deter Russia and ensure their ability to repel a future attack and respond adequately to other threats;
• deepening Ukraine’s integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic security systems. This will be a reliable guarantee of Ukraine’s security and will contribute to strengthening Europe’s defense;
• preserving and strengthening the political and economic components of countering Moscow’s expansion, which will inevitably continue even if there is a change of power in Russia.

Thus, Russian President Putin is gradually losing his ability to effectively rule the country. In view of this, his inner circle and leaders of other clans in the ruling elite are taking steps to ensure a controlled transfer of power to a designated successor. At the same time, the fall of Putin’s regime could result from the actions of his opponents in the upper echelons of power or from revolutionary processes.

In case of a planned change of power in Russia, the new leadership of the country could move towards a more liberal policy and agree to certain compromises with the West and Ukraine, with the aim of creating conditions for resolving the problems of the Russian economy. This would allow Moscow to improve relations with the West and avoid an economic crisis in the country. However, it would still not be able to become a major world power and restore its economy to pre-war level.

In the long term, Moscow is highly likely to return to a tough foreign and domestic policies. This would also apply to its policy towards Ukraine. Therefore, Russia would continue the same course towards our country that it has pursued since the collapse of the USSR.

However, the possibility of an uncontrolled development of the situation in Russian Federation and its collapse should not be ruled out. On the one hand, this would deprive Moscow of the opportunity to launch a new attack on Ukraine, and on the other hand, it would create new challenges and threats to our state related to the emergence of armed conflicts near its borders.

In any case, threats to Ukraine from the East will remain relevant. With this in mind, even after the war ends, Ukraine must maintain a strong military potential aimed at ensuring its security. At this, the deepening of Ukraine’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures will continue to be of great importance.

Institute of Global Politics