War and Intelligence: How Operation Epic Fury Is Changing the Rules of the Game
Operation Epic Fury is one of the most striking examples of the transformation of modern armed conflicts, in which the line between military operations and intelligence operations is becoming increasingly blurred. In the traditional model of warfare, intelligence primarily served a preparatory function: its task was to identify the enemy’s capabilities and vulnerabilities and to gather information enabling the effective conduct of military operations. However, in the case of Operation Epic Fury this dynamic has shifted significantly. Available media reports and expert analyses indicate that intelligence activities were not merely a stage preceding the use of military force, but became one of the primary tools for conducting the operation itself.
As Western experts note, Israel began preparations for this operation [1] long before the open phase of the conflict. These preparations included both, the agents’ infiltrating into Iran’s government and military structures and developing the already existing agent networks capable of carrying out sabotage at the appropriate moment.
The conflict began on February 28, 2026, with joint USA and Israel’s strikes on targets in Iran, while subsequent actions were partly based on information provided by sources operating directly on the ground. This sequence of events suggests that intelligence operations were not merely a background to the military operation, but rather its first and most covert phase.
The most compelling example of this approach is the story of the Israeli intelligence service’s long-term infiltration of Iran. According to one account, the Mossad began establishing its network of agents in Iran around 2010. The goal of this operation was not only to collect intelligence but also to prepare sabotage operations against military infrastructure. For example, at the start of the operation, to neutralize air defense systems, over a hundred human intelligence sources and collaborators were activated; among other tasks, they were entrusted with jamming radar systems, identifying targets, and preparing conditions for subsequent airstrikes.
It should be noted, however, that not all details of these operations can be independently verified based on publicly available sources. Nevertheless, comparing various data allows us to reconstruct the overall operational logic: Israel’s advantage did not arise from a single breakthrough in the enemy’s defense system, but rather from a prolonged process of establishing operational access to its structures.
From this point of view, intelligence is not merely a tool for supporting military operations, but an integral element of strategic maneuvering. If the intelligence network was capable of identifying targets, carrying out sabotage operations, and helping to breach air defense systems, this means that the first phase of the operation took place even before the appearance of aircraft, missiles, and official military communications. It is exactly for this reason that intelligence operations were aimed at depriving Iran of the ability to conduct surveillance, respond, and coordinate its actions even before the conflict entered a visible military phase.
The second key element of the operation was intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel [2]. An analysis of available materials indicates that this was not merely a classic alliance in which one side provides information to the other. A more accurate description appears to be a model of multi-level cooperation encompassing infiltration into the enemy’s environment, real-time target identification, and strategic assessment of the situation.
Israel’s strikes were partly based on information provided by agents operating within Tehran. These sources indicated, in particular, the locations of checkpoints operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij [3]. Taken together, these data suggest that the operation was based on a combination of two components: sustained infiltration and the use of operational intelligence for precise targeting.
Experts also emphasize the importance of involving local agents. For instance, Rafael Jerusalem, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, stated in an interview with TF1 Info that many operations attributed to Israel [4] were made possible through cooperation with individuals operating directly within Iran.
This means that even the most technologically advanced operations depend to a significant extent on people operating within the enemy’s environment. Individuals who cooperate with Israel’s intelligence may be motivated by various factors – in some cases, opposition to the political system; in others, pragmatic considerations, such as making money or subsequently emigrating to the West.
The operational capabilities of Israeli intelligence also include a large Jewish community of Iranian origin, the formation of which began after the 1979 Islamic Revolution [5]. According to data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics and studies on Jewish migration from Iran, approximately 135,000–150,000 people of Iranian origin currently reside in Israel (including those born in Iran and their descendants born in Israel) [6]. Part of this community retains knowledge of the Persian language (Farsi), has a good understanding of the social and cultural realities of Iran, and is familiar with behavioral patterns characteristic of Iranian society. It is precisely this element that serves as a potential factor facilitating infiltration into the enemy’s environment and operating within local conditions without arousing suspicion.
It is worth noting that the use of the diaspora in intelligence operations is not unique to Israel. In the specialized literature, this is described as one of the classic methods for gaining operational access to the enemy’s environment. Members of émigré communities not only know the language, culture, and local customs; they often maintain family or business ties in their countries of origin.
Other intelligence services operated in a similar manner. During the Cold War, both the CIA and the Soviet KGB used emigrants to conduct intelligence and influence operations. Currently, this practice is being applied with redoubled intensity by the Russian Federation’s special services. An analysis of contemporary Chinese intelligence operations also indicates the use of members of the Chinese diaspora for activities related to technology transfer and the collection of economic intelligence [7].
An analysis of the activities of Iranian intelligence services shows that they view the diaspora both as a target for monitoring opposition activities and as a potential source for collecting information or establishing operational contacts. The Freedom House report emphasizes that the Islamic Republic of Iran is among the countries that are particularly active in targeting their own diasporas abroad [8].
As mentioned above, for nearly fifteen years, Israel’s intelligence has been creating an agent network in Iran, which included the systematic recruitment of informants, reconnaissance of military infrastructure, and identification of vulnerabilities in the Iranian defense system. In this model, intelligence did not perform a purely informational function but served as an active tool in shaping the operational environment. In this sense, the prolonged infiltration of Israeli intelligence services into Iran can be interpreted as part of a strategy referred to in military literature as “preparation of the battlefield”. Thus, Operation Epic Fury was not merely a sudden escalation of the conflict, but the culmination of a much longer process of intelligence operations, the most visible phase of which was the military strikes.
An equally important element of this conflict is the response of Iran’s intelligence services, which have spent years building their own counterintelligence structures and internal control systems to counter the infiltration of foreign intelligence agencies. In Iran’s case, this system is particularly complex, as it is not based on a single central body but on several parallel centers responsible for national security and the protection of the regime – primarily the Ministry of Intelligence and the intelligence structures of the IRGC.
The conflict has also taken on a clear psychological dimension. Some operations attributed to Israeli intelligence can be interpreted as actions aimed at instilling a sense of insecurity among the Iranian political and military elite and fostering the belief in deep infiltration of the state apparatus. Large-scale sabotage and the elimination of high-ranking officials serve not only a military-intelligence function but also a strategic one – they demonstrate the inevitability of retribution and the omnipresence of Israel’s intelligence.
In response to the attack, Iranian intelligence services reported the arrests of individuals suspected of collaborating with foreign intelligence agencies. On the one hand, this may indicate genuine attempts to neutralize spy networks, and on the other, it may serve as a public statement intended to restore the impression of control over the situation [9].
Thus, Operation Epic Fury is unfolding simultaneously on several levels: military, intelligence, sabotage, psychological, and informational. The boundaries between these spheres are blurring, and success depends not only on the ability to inflict losses but also on the ability to shape the enemy’s perceptions and reactions.
At the same time, the growing role of technology in the target identification process carries a significant risk of operational errors. Systems based on satellite data, intelligence, and data analysis algorithms can significantly speed up decision-making, but their effectiveness depends largely on the quality of the input data and its correct interpretation. The lack of verification by human intelligence sources can lead to tragic mistakes, such as the attack on a girls’ boarding school that was mistakenly identified as a military target.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
‘Operation Epic Fury’, a secret military pact to weaponize OpenAI. Collage https://medium.com/
Notes:
[1] In Israel, the operation was codenamed “Roaring Lion.”
[2] Intelligence cooperation between the two countries takes place within the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding signed for a period of 10 years (2019–2028).
[3] A volunteer paramilitary unit established in 1979 by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and subordinate to the IRGC. Its main tasks include maintaining public order, suppressing internal protests, and enforcing Islamic norms of behavior.
[4] Israel traditionally neither confirms nor denies its involvement in the elimination of its enemies. This policy is known as the “policy of silence” or “neither confirm nor deny”. It allows Israel to avoid direct responsibility in the public sphere while maintaining flexibility in conducting covert operations.
[5] Israel’s 8th President (2000–2007), Moshe Katsav, was of Iranian descent, as were former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces and Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz.
[6] By 1979, the Jewish community in Iran numbered 80,000 to 100,000 people. Despite the mass emigration of Jews from the country following the establishment of a theocratic Islamic regime there, approximately 8,000 to 9,000 Jews remain in Iran, always ready to provide assistance to their historic homeland.
[7] China’s Law “On Intelligence”, adopted in 2017, requires Chinese citizens, including those abroad, to cooperate with Chinese intelligence. Formally, the law does not apply to so-called Huaqiao (ethnic Chinese who do not hold Chinese citizenship), but if they refuse to cooperate with PRC intelligence, this could have negative consequences for their family and friends in China.
[8] According to the latest data, nearly 4 million Iranians live outside Iran. This figure includes both those born in Iran and their descendants.
[9] According to the Iranian news agency Tasnim, in March 2026, seven people were detained in the country on suspicion of spying for Israel.
