Belarus in China’s Geopolitical Plans
In recent years, China’s presence in Belarus has become one of the most frequently mentioned motifs in descriptions of the so-called Eurasian “New Great Game”. However, if we take a closer look at the propaganda photos captioned “partner investments” and analyze the details, the picture turns out to be less impressive than the headlines claim.
This concerns, first of all, the volume, scale, and nature of this presence. Beijing is offering Minsk capital and industrial projects, but this does not mean the possibility of a real “escape from Moscow’s influence”, as some commentators try to portray it. On the contrary, China’s involvement often exacerbates asymmetry and creates new dependencies that do not give Lukashenko the freedom that some tend to attribute to him.
Russia Still Dominates Other Partners
The limitations are evident in the simplest figures: according to the UN Comtrade database, China’s exports to Belarus in 2024 amounted to approximately $6.58 billion. This is a significant amount in the context of the Belarusian market, but compared to the Minsk-Moscow relationship, it no longer looks like a “second source of power”. Russia remains a much larger trading partner and, more importantly, a guarantor of key elements of the Belarusian state’s functioning – energy, the industrial products market, and fiscal support mechanisms. In terms of the overall economic and political balance, Moscow has the tools to set the terms in the short term, while Beijing acts slowly and selectively.
The example of Great Stone – the largest joint Chinese-Belarusian project [2] – illustrates this duality perfectly well. The Great Stone Industrial Park is advertised as a strategic element of the New Silk Road [3]: an investment zone with a preferential tax regime and incentives for Chinese companies. Official announcements speak of hundreds of millions of dollars in declared investments and thousands of jobs, while the Belarusian government points to an increase in the number of residents and a declared investment amount of nearly $1.5 billion. All this sounds good and has real local significance: several factories, a logistics cluster, new jobs. But if we translate this into the structure of the national economy and energy dependence, it turns out that this is only a part (and a very small one) of what Russia actually provides: a continuous supply of raw materials, large markets, and a system of subsidies, without which the Belarusian economy quickly experiences difficulties.
In fact, most Chinese money functions as loans and obligations, and the value of direct investments is significantly lower than reported in media publications touting the “Chinese boom”. A significant part of Chinese participation takes the form of loans and projects with conditional financing, leading to Belarus’s long-term financial dependence on Chinese contractors and creditors. Beijing is not so much opening the door to a certain form of independence for Minsk as it is building a parallel network of economic and corporate dependencies, the political consequences of which are slow and sometimes limited. In other words, Chinese investments are more likely to reconfigure dependencies than eliminate them.
In contrast, Russia is Minsk’s dominant economic partner. According to Western experts’ analysis, its share in Belarus’ trade is now approaching 70% of the country’s total trade volume. Even before the Russian-Ukrainian war, Belarus exported about 37% of its goods to Russia (compared to almost 30% to the EU), but after the sanctions got tougher, Russia’s share as a target market and supplier of raw materials and energy grew even more. In many industries, exports to Russia make up more than half of all sales. In mechanical engineering and agriculture, they reach 60-65%. It is this market, not China or Europe, that supports the liquidity of state-owned enterprises and provides foreign currency inflows to the budget.
Belarus’ Complete Dependence on Russia in the Energy Sector
Energy is the foundation of the entire system. Belarus imports almost all of its gas and oil from Russia. In 2024, 98% of the country’s gas consumption was covered by Russian contracts with Gazprom, while oil supplies – approximately 18 million tons per year – were completely dependent on Russian imports. Besides, the price of these raw materials is a political element: Minsk pays below market prices, but in return agrees to systemic integration, a common customs area, and common security standards. Each gas crisis has shown that a few days of supply disruptions are enough to bring a significant part of the country’s economy to a halt. In 2023, after a brief price dispute, production at chemical plants in Grodno and Novopolotsk fell by 14%, and the government was forced to subsidize energy for heavy industry to the tune of 640 million Belarusian rubles.
The chemical industry, particularly fertilizer production, plays a significant role in Belarus’ domestic economy. The two largest companies, “Belaruskali” and “Grodno Azot”, generated approximately 15% of export revenues until 2022, or more than $3.5 billion annually. After the European Union imposed sanctions and Baltic ports were closed, potassium exports almost halved. In 2024, approximately 6 million tons of potash were exported through the Russian ports of Ust-Luga and Murmansk, compared to 12 million in the record year of 2020. This means that today the fertilizer sector is completely dependent on Russian logistics and port infrastructure. By offering alternative transport channels, Russia has effectively taken control of one of the most profitable segments of Belarusian exports.
This structure – cheap Russian energy in exchange for loyalty – forms the basis of Belarus’ current economic model. China appears in this arrangement as an additional creditor, not a counterweight. Of the $6.5 billion in Chinese exports to Belarus in 2024, the majority consisted of machinery and electronic equipment, financed largely by loans from Chinese state-owned banks. However, the value of direct Chinese investment was less than $700 million, which is several times less than the debt to Beijing. This means that Belarus buys Chinese technology with Chinese money, which it then has to repay through exports that depend on Russian raw materials.
China’s Symbolic Game
Although China’s economic presence is relatively “calm”, gradual, and largely secured by loans, in the symbolic and political sphere, Beijing is increasingly entering a more tense market – security and defense. It is in the military sphere that it is most evident how the authorities in Minsk are trying to use every opportunity to maneuver, even while remaining effectively in Moscow’s shadow.
In the summer of 2024, the world media circulated photos of Chinese soldiers training at the Brest training ground as part of the Eagle Assault 2024 exercises. For Minsk, this was a propaganda success. It demonstrated that Belarus is still perceived by states outside the region as a partner, not just a vassal of Russia. However, for Beijing, this was an operation with much broader significance: an attempt to enter the geostrategic space of the West with its own narrative that China is not just an investor or trade intermediary, but also an actor capable of projecting power onto European territory.
According to Western experts, the very choice of location and timing for these exercises was a political message. The maneuvers began just as Washington was hosting a NATO summit dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Alliance. Exactly when the USA’s capital was discussing expanding cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners – Japan, Australia, and South Korea – Beijing was sending its own signal from the other side of the world: if NATO looks to Asia, China may appear on NATO’s borders in Europe.
It was a kind of “strategic symmetry”, a mirror image of Western gestures toward Asia made by Beijing, this time toward Minsk. However, while for China this was a political experiment, for Belarus it had a more practical dimension: to show the West that, despite isolation and sanctions, Minsk remains part of global military and economic flows.
Although “Eagle Assault 2024” was formally described as counterterrorism exercises, its scenario went far beyond traditional maneuvers of this type. They included airborne and counter-sabotage operations, as well as simulated combat operations in urban environments. It is difficult to call them typical counterterrorism exercises: rather, they should be viewed as “counterrevolutionary” training, consistent with China and Belarus’ long-term strategy of strengthening the resilience of authoritarian regimes to social pressure.
It should be noted that from an operational point of view, these were not large-scale maneuvers. Just over 300 military personnel took part, mainly from Chinese airborne units. However, the symbolic significance of this event was enormous. For the first time in its history, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army found itself so close to the borders of the European Union and, therefore, physically within the observation zone of NATO member states.
But even in this regard, the Russians are clearly in the lead. Russia is investing directly in Belarus’ military and energy infrastructure, increasingly viewing its neighbor’s territory as a logistics base. In 2024, construction began on a military base in Mogilev region, which will include fuel depots, technical stations, and infrastructure for short-range missile systems. At the same time, airports in Baranovichi, Machulishchy, and Bobruisk are being modernized, with new runways and shelters capable of accommodating Russian tactical bombers. In Gomel and Mozyr regions, the railway network and fuel terminals are being expanded, allowing for the rapid transport of military equipment and raw materials to the south. These are not partnership projects, but rather integration projects – they are becoming an extension of Russia’s military infrastructure, and decisions on their use are made in Moscow.
Complete Dependence on Moscow, Particularly in the Production of Weapons
Belarus lacks an independent defense industry capable of comprehensively producing modern weapon systems; both technologically and logistically, it remains dependent on Russian suppliers. Since the 1990s, key components of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ weapons – from aircraft and missile systems to communications equipment – have come from Russian production lines. In 2024, more than 90% of the military equipment used by the Belarusian army was of Russian origin, and almost 80% of current arms purchases were financed by loans or subsidies provided by the Russian Federation.
Minsk purchases not only tanks and anti-aircraft systems from Moscow, but also ammunition, spare parts, and electronics. It also modernizes its older designs in Russia. Over the past five years, Belarus has acquired, among other things: a batch of Su-30SM aircraft, Tor-M2 anti-aircraft missile systems, Polonez-M multiple launch rocket systems (partly based on Chinese components but with Russian system integration) [4], as well as Russian-made radar systems and surveillance drones. The value of these contracts exceeded $1.1 billion, most of which was financed through settlements within the Union State or through long-term loans on preferential terms.
It is important to note that Minsk has also lost the ability to independently maintain many weapons systems, especially modern aviation and missile systems, which requires constant cooperation with Russian repair and maintenance plants. In 2023, as much as 92% of the spare parts and components used by Belarusian aviation units came from Russia. A similar situation is observed in the armored land vehicle sector; Belarusian factories in Orsha and Baranovichi can carry out repairs, but modernization and the supply of key components depend on Russian deliveries.
For some time, Belarus tried to maintain the appearance of autonomy by developing its own military modernization projects, such as the Polonez multiple launch rocket system and the BTR-70MB1 armored personnel carriers. However, most of these initiatives rely on Russian components and licenses, and their production does not exceed a few dozen units per year. Even in the fields of military electronics and optics, where Minsk had experience dating back to the Soviet era (the “Peleng” and “Agat” factories and the “Radar” Design Bureau), dependence on the Russian market and components is now complete.
As a result, the Belarusian defense system resembles a subsidiary of the Russian military-industrial complex rather than an independent national structure. Moscow not only supplies equipment, but also controls its maintenance, access to codes, parts, and even training programs. This dependence is systemic: without access to Russian parts and services, the Belarusian Armed Forces would cease to be operationally capable within a few months.
China Is Not an Alternative
As shown by the above examples, there is no question today that China is a real alternative to Russia for Belarus: neither economically, politically, nor even militarily. Beijing not only does not try to replace Moscow as Minsk’s main patron, but even deliberately avoids such a role. China’s actions are selective, cautious, and focused primarily on its own interests: gaining access to markets, logistics infrastructure, and political footholds in the region, which in the long term could expand the PRC’s global influence. In this logic, Minsk is more of a tool, a transit point, and a testing ground than a strategic partner on par with Beijing.
Therefore, China’s growing presence in Belarus should not be seen as a sign of Minsk’s “liberation” from Moscow’s influence. Beijing does not offer Lukashenko an alternative model of security or financing which could counterbalance Russia’s instruments of pressure. On the contrary, Chinese loans and investments, if they materialize at all, create new networks of dependencies, although their nature is much less political and more pragmatic. China is not interested in confronting Russia in a territory that Moscow considers its exclusive sphere of influence.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Russian-Chinese alliance, although increasingly described as a “no limits” partnership, actually has many limitations and areas of mistrust. Moscow and Beijing cooperate closely where they share a common interest in weakening the West and maintaining control over the post-Soviet periphery, but their strategic goals are fundamentally different. For Russia, Belarus remains part of its “near abroad”, an integral element of its own national security and a buffer against NATO. For China, it is only a fragment of a broader project of economic and logistical expansion towards Europe, in which Minsk plays a rather instrumental role.
How Great Is Beijing’s Interest in Belarus?
Belarus is considered a “strategic hub”, in particular as a gateway to the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, China redirected its trade routes through Belarus, making it a key railway corridor. A joint statement by the governments of China and Belarus outlines plans to deepen cooperation within the Belt and Road Initiative, including a free trade, investment, and transport agreement, which is expected to increase Belarusian exports to China by 12% and Chinese investments by 30% over five years. This document emphasizes the importance of Minsk, but only within the framework of the Chinese government’s own goals. This is by no means an attempt to “take away” a partner from Moscow.
Moreover, Beijing remains very cautious about getting involved in issues that could be interpreted as challenging Russian sovereignty. China uses soft instruments: infrastructure investments, loans, institutional presence, and symbolic cooperation. This asymmetry of methods only confirms that we are not dealing with rivalry over Minsk, but rather with a quiet coexistence of influence, in which Russia retains control while China benefits from supporting a stable, predictable regime.
Ultimately, contrary to some narratives about a “Chinese alternative” to Russia, reality shows that Beijing has no intention of pulling Belarus out of Moscow’s orbit or creating a parallel center of influence. China is pursuing its economic and geopolitical goals in this direction, but it is doing so in a way that does not undermine Russia’s dominance. Despite the growing number of joint projects, exercises, and declarations of “strategic partnership”, Belarus remains in a system where Russia dominates, while China observes and benefits.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
Notes:
[1] The “Great Game” – the geopolitical confrontation between the Russian and British empires in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Central Asia, the Himalayas, Persia, and Afghanistan. Traveler Nikolai Przhevalsky and future President of Finland Carl Gustaf Mannerheim took part in Russian reconnaissance expeditions to map the area of future military operations between the empires. The term “Great Game” was first used in Rudyard Kipling’s novel “Kim” (1901). The independence of the four former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1991 led to a new revival of the “Great Game”. After September 11, 2001, it became customary to talk about the “new Great Game”, as the ideology of the new confrontation became the fight against the terrorist threat, which often masks the struggle for spheres of influence and raw materials in Central Asia. The United States and China are active participants in the “new Great Game”. During the first quarter of the century, Russia intensified integration processes with the Central Asian republics under its leadership. In 2001, the CSTO military-political bloc was created, and since 2015, the Eurasian Economic Union has existed. Russia and China have partially joined forces within the SCO (2001) and BRICS (2009). China is expanding economically into the region as part of the “New Silk Road” project. After the emergence of independent Turkic states in Central Asia, Türkiye intensified its foreign policy concept of Pan-Turkism, creating the Turkic Council in 2009, which was transformed into the Organization of Turkic States in 2021.
[2] A special economic zone being created in Smolevichi district of Minsk region near Minsk Airport. Construction began in 2015.
[3] “The New Silk Road” (Eurasian Land Bridge) is a transport route for the movement of rail freight and passengers by land from China’s industrial centers to Europe. On December 13, 2015, the first train on this route arrived in Georgia from China.
[4] The joint development of the “Polonez” MLRS is being carried out within the framework of agreements signed in 2013 between the governments of China and Belarus.
