Momentous Elections in Moldova
On September 28, the Republic of Moldova held regular parliamentary elections, the results of which will be crucial in strengthening its sovereignty and independence and further developing its European integration course. Since Moldova is a parliamentary republic, these elections are of the utmost importance and even fateful. The leader of the ruling Action and Solidarity (PAS) party, Igor Grosu, who is the Speaker of the Parliament, believes that the September 28 parliamentary elections put the citizens before a choice between war and peace. According to him, the outcome of these elections will determine the future of the country not only for the next four years, but also for many years to come. Given the almost parity of democratic and pro-Russian political forces in Moldova on the eve of the elections, the situation remained completely unpredictable until the final preliminary results were announced by the Central Election Commission (CEC) in the middle of the day on September 28.
According to the CEC, as of September 29, the election results are as follows: after counting 100 protocols of polling stations, the PAS party of the current President Maia Sandu won 50.2 votes (approximately 55 seats); the Patriotic Bloc under the leadership of former pro-Russian President Igor Dodon received 24.17 votes (26 seats), the Alternative bloc – 7.96 (8 seats); Our Party – 6.2 (6 seats) and the Democracy at Home party – 5.62 (6 seats). Thus, PAS has retained its position as the ruling party and may announce the creation of a mono-majority in Parliament, or head a coalition with other parties, except for the Patriotic Bloc, which, due to fundamental ideological differences between supporters of European integration and supporters of Russification, is likely to become a tough and uncompromising opposition.
For those of our readers who are interested, we will continue to discuss the dramatic situation in Moldova on the eve of the parliamentary elections, the ratio between pro-European and pro-Russian political forces, and Russia’s interference in the electoral process, the results of the elections in the pro-Russian autonomous entities of Transnistria and Gagauzia, as well as among the Moldovan diaspora in many countries around the world, the impact of the situation in Moldova on the situation in Ukraine and vice versa, and other nuances related to these life-defining parliamentary elections in Moldova.
Pro-European Political Forces in Moldova
The CEC published the final list of candidates a week and a half late due to court cases over the denial of registration to a number of pro-Russian political forces. Twenty-three participants were admitted to the elections – four electoral blocs, 15 parties, and four independent candidates. However, according to most opinion polls, only four political forces were supposed to enter the Parliament, and in fact, 5 of them did.
The main, if not the only, fully-fledged pro-European party in Moldova is the ruling center-right, liberal Action and Solidarity Party (Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate, PAS), formed on May 15, 2016, by the former Minister of Education and current President, the Honorable Maia Sandu. PAS adheres to the doctrines of social liberalism and democratic values, and advocates Moldova’s accession to the European Union, which should guarantee reliable social, economic and political development and consolidation of Moldovan society. In the early parliamentary elections on July 11, 2021, the Action and Solidarity party won 52.8 votes (63 seats out of 101), which guarantees it a majority of seats in Parliament and allows it to form a government on its own.
On the eve of the 2024 presidential election, the “Together” (“Împreună”) bloc was formed, consisting of four parties: The Dignity and Truth Platform (DA), the Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB), the League of Cities and Communities (LOC), and the Party of Change, which announced at the time that they were uniting to “guarantee Moldova’s European course”. If the bloc were to overcome the 7 percent threshold in this year’s parliamentary elections, they would certainly have a chance to enter a coalition with PAS.
Before the election, experts made different predictions about PAS’ chances to win. For example, Valeriu Pasha, executive director of the WatchDog expert association, pointed out that PAS still had a chance to win a majority in Parliament, even if it received only 40 votes. In his opinion, much would depend on the results of this party’s competitors. According to Director of the Chisinau-based Institute of Effective Policy, Vitalie Andrievschi, PAS’ chances of retaining a majority in Parliament “were slightly lower than 50-50, although, in his opinion, it should have taken first place”. The political analyst believed that if PAS went into opposition, the country could be plunged into a deep political crisis, as President Maia Sandu would never approve the pro-Russian Prime Minister proposed by the pro-Russian majority of the future Parliament, and new parliamentary elections would have to be announced.
The situation for Moldovan pro-European political forces was further complicated by the fact that a significant part of the Moldovan population, even those with a pro-European orientation, not to mention Moscow’s fans, are dissatisfied with the current government. According to IMF data for 2025, Moldova ranks among the last countries in Europe in terms of GDP per capita. Maia Sandu and her government have failed to fulfill their promises to reform the legal system, eradicate corruption, and improve living standards. Significant increases in the cost of utilities, healthcare, and education did not help to foster sympathy for the current government either. These sentiments were already evident on October 20, 2024, during the first round of the presidential election and the referendum on Moldova’s membership in the European Union, given the not-so-convincing victory of pro-European political forces.
Pro-Russian Political Forces
According to many political analysts, Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor (also Șor – Transl.) has been the main conduit of the Kremlin’s influence in Moldova for the past 15 years. His name has long been on the sanctions lists of the United States, the EU, and Switzerland. Ilan Shor was born in 1987 in Tel Aviv to a Jewish family of a Moldovan immigrant businessman, Myron Shor. In the 1990s, the Shor family returned to Moldova. In 2005, after his father’s death, I. Shor, then 18 years old, inherited a number of companies that were part of ShorHolding. A few years later, I. Shor decided to get involved in politics in independent Moldova. In 2015-2019, he served as mayor of the city of Orhei.
Thanks to various social projects, I. Shor gained some popularity among some segments of the Moldovan population. In 2013, I. Shor was a participant in a fraudulent scheme that stole $1 billion from Moldovan banks, which at the time amounted to about 12 % of the country’s GDP. Following a trial in 2023, he was sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison. In 2019, I. Shor left Moldova for Israel, then moved to Moscow. One of the key figures in this “scam of the century” is also a former member of the Moldovan Parliament, the “grey cardinal” of Moldovan politics until 2019 and one of the richest people in the country, Vladimir Plakhotniuk. At the end of September, he was extradited by the Greek authorities to Chisinau, where he was arrested for 30 days on the basis of four previously issued court warrants.
Although Ilan Shor is in Moscow, this does not prevent him from controlling the online situation in Moldova. Through the branch of the Russian Promsvyazbank (currently PJSC Bank PSB) in the TMR, I. Shor has established funding for pro-Russian parties and hundreds of thousands of ordinary pro-Russian voters in Moldova. On April 21, 2024, at a congress of Moldovan pro-Russian politicians in Moscow, I. Shor announced the creation of the “Victory” political bloc, consisting of the pro-Russian parties “Chance”, “Victoria”, “Revival”, “Alternative Forces for the Salvation of Moldova”, and other parties, with the aim of electing a pro-Russian president in the autumn of 2024 and “preventing Moldova from joining the EU”. However, on July 19, the Moldovan CEC refused to register the pro-Russian “Victory” bloc for the parliamentary elections, which can be considered a major victory for Moldova’s pro-European political forces.
Below is information about other most active pro-Russian political parties in Moldova, which are, in one way or another, in the sphere of influence of I. Shor and the Kremlin:
The left-wing “Patriotic Electoral Bloc” (Blocul Electoral Patriotic – BEP) took part in the parliamentary elections. The leader of this bloc was the Party of Socialists (PSRM), which in 2011-2016 was headed by former President of Moldova Igor Dodon, and after 2016, the new head of the PSRM was former Prime Minister of Moldova and Speaker of the Parliament of Moldova Zinaida Greceanîi. The bloc also includes the left-wing conservative party “Heart of Moldova” led by Irina Vlah, the party “Future of Moldova” led by Vasile Tarlev, who is associated with I. Shor, and the Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM), which has been led by former President Vladimir Voronin since its foundation in 1993. In 2001 – 2009, the PCRM was in power in the country, with a majority of seats in the parliament. The PCRM is the only communist party in the territory of the former Soviet Union that had been in power for a long time. “The Patriotic Bloc” became the third officially registered association in the parliamentary elections after PAS and “Democracy at Home”. Irina Vlah harshly criticized the current government and said that in the future Parliament, the bloc members would not enter into a coalition with PAS. And so it happened: On September 26, the Central Election Commission (CEC) excluded the “Heart of Moldova” party from the election race after the Central Court of Appeal ruled to restrict the party’s activities for 12 months.
As for the party “Moldova Mare” (“Greater Moldova”), which was created and is led by former prosecutor and ex-presidential candidate Victoria Furtune (Victoria Furtună). In reality, this is a virtual party, i.e., a party that does not exist in real political life. Its leader, Victoria Furtune, is also a person from I. Shor’s environment. The program of V. Furtune’s party contains territorial claims to Ukraine, demanding the annexation of the Ukrainian part of Budzhak, a historical and geographical region in the southwest of Odesa region, in order for Moldova to have access to the sea. According to V. Furtune, “without access to the sea, Moldova is like a lion on a leash”. However, on September 26, the Moldovan CEC suspended the “Moldova Mare” party from participating in the parliamentary elections on suspicion of illegal financing. The CEC stated that “Moldova Mare” had used illegal sources of funding and foreign funds, as reported by the Moldovan police, security services and intelligence. The party’s leader, Victoria Furtune, called the decision of the CEC biased and announced her intention to appeal it.
The populist party “Democraţia Acasă” (“Democracy at Home”), which advocates the unification of Moldova with Romania, also entered the Moldovan Parliament. The main partner of the Moldovan “home democrats” is the Romanian nationalist party AUR and its leader, Gheorghe Simion. (In 2011, the SBU announced a ban on Gheorghe Simion’s entry into Ukraine because he did not recognize Ukrainian borders and spread disinformation about the oppression of the Romanian minority in Ukraine). This party is headed by Moldovan politician Vasile Costiuc, who holds Romanian citizenship. At first glance, this party does not appear to be controlled by the Kremlin, but Romanian investigative journalists have found a lot of evidence of Vasile Costiuc’s cooperation with the Russian FSB. If this is true, the CEC should have removed this party from the election race as well.
The center-left “Our Party”, led by businessman, philanthropist, politician and mayor of Beltsy Renato Usatîi, which garnered 5.9 % of the total number of votes surveyed, and the center-left “Alternative” bloc, which was created in 2025 by the current mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, with the participation of presidential candidate in the 2024 elections Alexandr Stoianoglo, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, and former MP Mark Tkachuk (Mark Tcaciuk). This bloc is counting on 5.5 votes of the total number of respondents. It cannot be ruled out that “Our Party” may enter a coalition with PAS. It is less likely that I. Ceban’s bloc could do so if it overcomes the increased threshold (7) set in Moldova for electoral blocs. According to some experts, on the eve of the vote, if I. Ceban’s bloc does not enter the Parliament, a pro-Russian coalition in the Parliament becomes almost impossible.
Voting in the TMR, Gagauzia and the Moldovan Diaspora
TMR. According to the Moldovan Central Election Commission, approximately 277,000 Moldovan citizens live in the territory of the TMR, but as in previous elections, only about 12,000 voters participated in the September 28 parliamentary elections. After 99 protocols were processed, the Patriotic Bloc took first place with 51 % votes, PAS received 29 % votes, and the “Alternative” bloc –about 9 % votes.
In case pro-Russian political forces came to power, Russian special services were developing a “Georgian scenario” for Moldova, where a pro-Russian parliamentary majority would use fake pro-European rhetoric to block the country’s accession to the EU. A scenario was also being prepared in which men from the Russian Federation as tourists could fly from Moscow to Chisinau via Istanbul and enter Transnistria, where the Russian Task Force, about 1,500 so-called “Russian peacekeepers”, and Soviet arms depots are stationed. If this group were to grow to 10,000 people, these formations could attack Odesa, which is only 100 kilometers from Tiraspol. Please, be reminded, that President Sandu has previously warned that the Kremlin was seeking to use the TMR as a springboard for an attack on Odesa region. She has also repeatedly pointed out that the presence of Russian troops in the TMR is a violation of Moldova’s neutral status and creates risks of destabilizing the situation in the country, especially during the war in Ukraine.
Gagauzia. As in the previous national elections, 82.1% voters in Gagauzia voted for the “Patriotic Bloc”, 11.5 % – for the “Alternative” bloc, and only 3.2 % – for the PAS party in the September 28 parliamentary elections. The turnout in Gagauzia was about 58,000 voters out of 129,000. Like the pro-Russian separatist region of TMR, Gagauzia is also de jure an autonomy within Moldova, but de facto an independent state entity. In December 1994, the Moldovan Parliament passed a law on the autonomy of Gagauzia within Moldova. The Gagauzes are Turkic people who practice Orthodoxy and are provided with Türkiye’s comprehensive assistance. In 2023, during the elections of the bashkan (head of the autonomy), the residents of Gagauzia elected an unknown Evghenia Guțul (Gutsul) from I. Shor’s party. She repeatedly visited Moscow, where she met with I. Shor and Putin. At the end of March 2025, E. Gutsul was accused of importing cash into Moldova from the Russian Federation to finance the forbidden “Shor” party and sentenced to seven years in prison. The court also deprived her of the right to hold the position of bashkan of the Gagauz autonomy, which is currently temporarily held by her first deputy, Ilya Uzun.
To understand how and for whom the population of Gagauzia voted in the previous elections and how they voted in the September 28 elections, it is enough to walk down the central Lenin Street in the autonomy’s capital, Comrat (Komrat), and see his bronze monument near the building of the local Parliament, the National Assembly. According to some reports, a significant number of elderly Gagauz still miss the Soviet era and all of them are very fond of Russia and Putin, who promises everyone to restore the USSR. Accordingly, Eurosceptic sentiments are widespread among most Gagauzes. Although the Gagauzes live on the border with Romania, an EU country, the geographically distant Russia is “spiritually closer” to them.
Diaspora. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova, the number of Moldovan citizens living abroad ranges from 1.11 to 1.25 million, which is almost half of the population of Moldova without the PMR. On September 28, the Moldovan diaspora was given the opportunity to vote by mail, which includes Moldovan citizens in 10 countries. Over the past ten years, the number of Moldovan voters from the diaspora has increased almost fivefold. In the September 28 parliamentary elections, more than 300 polling stations were set up for them in 45 countries. Most of them – 75 – were in Italy, 36 – in Germany, 26 – in France, 24 – in the United Kingdom, 23 – in Romania, 22 – in the United States, 15 – in Spain, and 12 – in Ireland. In Ukraine, two polling stations were opened in Odesa and Kyiv, and none in Chernivtsi. Two polling stations were also opened in Russia, both in Moscow. Four days before the elections, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Moldova’s Ambassador Lilian Darii and protested the Moldovan authorities’refusal to accredit Russian observers in the OSCE/ODIHR monitoring mission, as well as the opening of only two polling stations for the Moldovan diaspora in Russia. Unfortunately, only a fifth of the more than 1 million voters in the Moldovan diaspora abroad voted, 200,000, but their votes were likely to be decisive, just as in the presidential election and referendum in 2024.
Sabotage by Russian Secret Services
Russia’s attempts to influence the outcome of this year’s parliamentary elections in Moldova have become unprecedented in recent years. According to President M. Sandu, “the Kremlin is investing hundreds of millions of euros to buy hundreds of thousands of votes on both banks of the River Dniester and abroad to provoke unrest, violence, and spread fear”. In mid-August, Ilan Shor openly offered three thousand euros a month to anyone who wanted to protest against the pro-European government. On the eve of the parliamentary elections in Moldova, police conducted large-scale searches as part of a criminal case on the preparation of mass unrest and destabilization of the situation in the country, coordinated from Russia. According to the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, on September 22, 74 people were detained for three days, suspected of having been trained in Serbia under the guidance of Russian special services to provoke mass unrest and violence in case of pro-Russian political forces’ losing the parliamentary elections. If proven guilty, they all will face 4 to 8 years in prison.
Russian special services are constantly conducting information and psychological operations in Moldova to discredit the current state leadership and democratic political forces in the country. In particular, the “Info Leader” course and the Russian disinformation network “Matryoshka” offered young people up to 250 euros per month for creating and distributing videos on social media that discredit Moldova’s pro-European forces. The fake videos and texts were disguised as brands of well-known media outlets, including DW, BBC, Euronews, and distributed through one and a half hundred anonymous websites and accounts that are part of the Pravda network.
The websites and portals of Moldovan government agencies are constantly subject to cyberattacks by Russian hackers. According to the Prime Minister of Moldova, Dorin Recean, on September 27 and 28, the electoral computer systems of the CEC of Moldova suffered several cyberattacks, which disrupted the work of almost 4,000 websites. At the same time, the cyberattacks were carried out with the aim of overloading the STISC network, which serves the CEC and other electoral infrastructure. However, according to D. Recean, all cyberattacks were neutralized in real time, without affecting the electoral process.
According to Reuters, Russia financed Moldovan Orthodox priests’ trips to Moscow, where it provided them with debit cards with thousands of dollars to create Telegram channels to influence the elections in Moldova and promote traditional “ruzzki values”. In 2024, several dozens of Moldovan Orthodox priests visited Moscow to listen to lectures by theologians and historians who emphasized the “common cultural and religious traditions” of Russia and Moldova and called for “standing together against the morally corrupt West”. An analysis of social media content by Reuters experts showed that over the past year, almost 90 new Telegram channels of parish communities have appeared in Moldova, publishing daily content against the “godless West”.
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Moldova, Ukraine and Europe have won. Moldova has put a final end to the Muscovites’ plans to create a third front in Ukraine’s rear by turning Transnistria into a powerful springboard for an offensive on the Odesa-Mykolaiv direction to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea. The Georgian scenario did not work and will not work anymore. Muscovites can buy individual corrupt officials in Moldova and Ukraine, but they cannot buy the people of these countries. The Russian Federation and Moldovan pro-Russian mercenaries have lost, but they can start another civil confrontation in Moldova. Therefore, Chisinau and Kyiv, with the support of the European Union, must be ready to give a decisive rebuff to the Muscovites who may try to destabilize the situation in Moldova and Odesa region in one way or another, involving their agents, mercenaries and henchmen.
The victory of the democratic forces in the parliamentary elections in Moldova on September 28, 2025 was a historic event, made possible by many factors, and the most important of them, in my opinion, is the factor that is obvious to all reasonable people that the Russian Empire is the day before yesterday, not only in Europe but throughout the world. And this was manifested first of all in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which showed the political, economic and military weakness and moral degradation of Muscovy, its isolation from the civilized democratic world. Today, the vast majority of European countries strongly support Ukraine and Moldova, because they are located in the geographical center of Europe and are paving their difficult path to joining the European Union in friendly tandem.
After today’s victory of Moldova and Ukraine’s future victory over Rashistan, Ukrainians and Moldovans will become even closer and more united. And after both countries join the European Union, they will become even stronger. In my opinion, in this context, it may make sense for Ukraine’s state leadership to consider facilitating better access for Moldovan rail and road transport to the Giurgiulești International Free Port, located on a 430-meter-long stretch of the Ukrainian Danube coastline that Ukraine transferred to Moldova in 2006 in exchange for the territory with a road near the village of Palanca in Moldova’s Ştefan Vodă district, which is owned by Ukraine. I think that this gesture of goodwill, as seen by Kyiv, would have made relations between Moldova and Ukraine even stronger.
Oleksii Volovych,
Candidate of Historical Sciences
(Image generated by neural network)
