Al-Qaeda: A Forgotten but Latent ^[1] Threat

Over the past few years, Al-Qaeda [2] has largely disappeared from the center of Western public debate. Media coverage is now dominated by the Russia-Ukraine war, the rivalry between the USA  and China, the situation in the Middle East, and cyber threats. Compared to the first decade of the 21st  century, when the organization posed a defining threat to global security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, its presence in public discourse is now negligible. However, as recent reports from international organizations and expert assessments show, a lack of media coverage does not automatically mean a loss of operational significance.

A UN report dated February 4, 2026, pointed out that the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates remains constant, albeit fragmented and highly regionalized. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups retain operational capabilities in several areas of activity, and the nature of the threat varies by region.

This means that today’s Al-Qaeda is no longer a monolith capable of a single spectacular operation with global impact, but rather a network of affiliated organizations exploiting local conflicts, state weaknesses, and long-term ideological mobilization.

Organizational Architecture

In an analysis published late last year by the “South Asia Times”,  Al-Qaeda was described as a “dune-like” organization – diffuse, flexible, and one that avoids a rigid, single-tier hierarchy. Its operational model is based on the formula of “centralized strategic leadership and decentralized execution”.  In reality, this means that the main organization provides the ideological foundation, general priorities, and “brand”, while the implementation of tactical tasks is left to regional branches, which operate with due regard to local political, social, and military conditions.

This characteristic aligns with the conclusions presented in an analysis by the American research organization the Soufan Center. According to its data, the current strength of Al-Qaeda lies not in a central command or a unified organizational structure, but in the resilience and adaptability of its affiliates, such as those in Somalia, the Sahel [3], or the Arabian Peninsula, which are capable of integrating into local conflicts and building their own social base.

This fragmentation has several key consequences. First, it complicates classic counterterrorism strategies based on “decapitation”.  Between 2001 and 2011, fighting Al-Qaeda was largely focused on eliminating central leaders and command structures. However, as experience following Osama bin Laden’s death has shown, the removal of the leadership did not lead to the collapse of the entire network, precisely because the affiliates had already developed operational autonomy by that time.

Second, a decentralized architecture provides significant ideological flexibility. Affiliates maintain general loyalty to the global jihadist narrative but adapt their messages to the local context. In West Africa, the narrative may focus on elite corruption and ethnic disputes; in Somalia, on clan rivalries and the presence of foreign troops; in Yemen, on the civil war and regional conflict. This adaptability enhances the resilience of these structures, as it allows them to integrate into existing social tensions rather than impose a homogeneous, “imported” structure.

Third, this model allows for the transmission of strategic direction without the need for the physical movement of personnel. Even if a specific affiliate, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) [4], articulates specific threats, their execution can potentially occur through other nodes in the network that are geographically closer to potential targets. This means that the network functions more as a system of interconnected modules than as a classic organization with a linear chain of command.

This model was particularly important after 2014, when Al-Qaeda faced competition from the Islamic State (IS). Instead of competing with IS for spectacular and rapid territorial gains, Al-Qaeda, as expert analyses show, adopted a long-term strategy of “coexisting with the conflict.” This meant abandoning the immediate establishment of quasi-state structures in favor of patiently integrating into local power structures and building relationships with tribes, militias, and insurgent groups.

In this sense, decentralization was not only a result of external pressure but also a deliberate adaptation to the security environment after 2011. Intensive counterterrorism operations, the development of Western countries’ intelligence capabilities, and competition from other armed groups made the centralized model more vulnerable to disruption. The network structure, on the other hand, allowed Al-Qaeda to survive the period of greatest pressure, preserve ideological continuity, and maintain affiliates in different  regions of the world.

Thus, Al-Qaeda’s current organizational architecture, based on a strong ideological “brand” and decentralized operational activities, is one of the key factors in its resilience. It is precisely this capacity for local adaptation, tactical autonomy, and modular operations that ensures the organization, despite the loss of its central media visibility, remains a viable element of the global threat landscape.

Africa As an Attraction Centre: The Sahel and Somalia

Africa remains the most important area of activity for Al-Qaeda-linked organizations. Research confirms that the level of violence in regions such as the Sahel remains high. According to ACLED data [5], in the Benin-Niger-Nigeria border triangle, between 2024 and 2025, the number of incidents involving jihadist violence increased by 86%, and the number of fatalities – by 262%.

Meanwhile, in Somalia, the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab [6] retains the ability to carry out attacks, control rural areas, and influence local authorities and the government. According to an analysis by the Soufan Center, these regional entities are currently the most dynamic component of the Al-Qaeda network. In reality, this means that the organization functions as a catalyst for protracted low-intensity conflicts, weakening state institutions and perpetuating chronic instability.

From a Local Insurgent to an Organization Seeking a Global Role

The activities of AQAP, long considered one of the most operationally capable branches of the al-Qaeda network, have recently drawn special attention. Historically, this group has focused primarily on the Yemeni theater of operations, exploiting the chaos of the civil war, the rivalry between the government in Aden and the Houthi movement, and the fragmentation of state structures. However, as shown by studies conducted at the turn of 2025 and 2026, AQAP is signaling its desire to move beyond the role of a purely local insurgent group.

In an analysis published in February 2026, War on the Rocks [7] draws attention to a clear escalation of anti-Chinese rhetoric in statements by the current emir of AQAP, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki. According to him, the PRC is a “pagan, infidel regime,” and Beijing’s policy toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang is presented as justification for potential retaliatory actions.

Given this, one can conclude that China is no longer a peripheral actor in the AKAP narrative and is being integrated into the list of its main ideological opponents. However, experts clearly distinguish between rhetoric and actual capabilities. They emphasize that direct AKP attacks on Chinese territory remain unlikely due to the organization’s limited capacity in this regard and the extensive apparatus of Chinese security agencies. The real risk is more closely tied to Beijing’s overseas interests – infrastructure, investment projects, and diplomatic and business personnel in unstable regions where AQAP or its affiliated organizations may exert indirect influence.

Any potential operation against China would not necessarily take the form of direct expansion from Yemen but could occur through other nodes of Al-Qaeda’s global network. In this context, one can cite Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) [8], groups linked to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan [9], and the presence of militants in Afghanistan.

The decisive factor here is Al-Qaeda’s network architecture, which allows for the transmission of strategic momentum without the need to directly move militants from one theater of operations to another. In reality, this means that an ideological message formulated by the AQAP leadership can be utilized by other affiliates or sympathizers located closer to potential targets – both geographically and logistically. This model aligns with the principle of “centralized leadership and decentralized execution” described above.

It is worth noting that the shift in Houthi rhetoric is part of a broader trend toward the internationalization of its message. Historically, the group has focused on the so-called “near enemy” (the local government in Yemen) and the “far enemy,” embodied by the United States. Current narratives indicate an attempt to adapt to shifts in the balance of power within the international system, where China’s growing presence in regions with unstable security situations is creating new arenas for potential symbolic and operational confrontation.

At the same time, an analysis of AQAP’s activities in 2025 and 2026 does not indicate that it has regained the capacity to conduct operations on a scale comparable to its most notorious attempted attacks of 2009–2010 [10]. Instead, it is more a matter of attempting to restore its “authority” by expanding its list of opponents and fitting into the global narrative of “defending Muslims” in different regions of the world.

Thus, AQAP is currently in a phase of strategic positioning: on the one hand, it remains an actor rooted in the realities of the civil war in Yemen, and on the other hand, it seeks to be an entity that contributes to the global narrative of the Al-Qaeda network and signals its ability to operate beyond its own region. It is precisely this ambition, even if largely rhetorical, that ensures AQAP remains a key element of the broader Al-Qaeda threat architecture.

Afghanistan As a Centre for Transferring Capabilities

The aforementioned UN report points out  that the situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s seizure of power remains ambiguous. The document does not mention the restoration of a centralized global command structure for Al-Qaeda, similar to the one that existed in the 1990s, but emphasizes the preservation of ties and personal contacts between various jihadist groups operating in the region.

According to UN experts, Afghanistan remains a territory where elements linked to Al-Qaeda are present, and relations between the Taliban and this network are complex and historically rooted. This does not imply formal integration or open patronage, as was the case prior to 2001, but rather an environment conducive to maintaining contacts, training militants, and exchanging expertise. The UN emphasizes that the threat is of an evolutionary nature and depends on regional conditions.

In other expert analyses, Afghanistan is described as a “capacity transfer laboratory”. It is a territory where various elements of the global Al-Qaeda network, even if they operate autonomously, can benefit from the same operational environment. In practice, this means the ability to:

• exchange know-how on training militants;
• adapt tactics for conducting irregular warfare;
• test models of cooperation between regional groups;
• maintain logistical and ideological contacts.

It is important to note that this is not about restoring a centralized global jihadist command structure, but rather about creating an environment conducive to the network’s operations. Afghanistan serves as a transit zone: it is not a formal operational center, but rather a geographical and symbolic hub where the interests and activities of various groups intersect.

Of key importance for international security is the fact that such an environment can facilitate the transfer of capabilities between zones of operation. If a particular branch, for example in South Asia or the Middle East, develops a new strategic line, Afghanistan can become a space where other groups can adapt it. This does not necessarily imply formal agreements or joint operations; a shared environment, communication channels, and ideological support are sufficient.

The UN report also stresses that the threat landscape in Afghanistan is competitive in nature and involves various jihadist organizations. This further complicates the assessment of the situation: the environment is heterogeneous, dynamic, and multifaceted. However, it is precisely this complexity that makes Afghanistan a crucial reference point in analyzing future trends – not as an impressive command center, but as a hub where experience, narratives, and operational capabilities can be transmitted between different elements of the global network.

The Narrative of Global Chaos

An article published in early March by the investigative outlet The Insider,  analyzes one of the most intriguing aspects of Al-Qaeda’s current communications strategy: its attempt to embed its own agenda within a broader narrative of global chaos and growing rivalry among major powers. Materials disseminated by Al-Qaeda-affiliated entities portray the world as a system entering a phase of profound destabilization.

This vision encompasses the crisis of the West, the collapse of transatlantic alliances, rising tensions between the Western bloc and China, Russia, and Iran, as well as a growing economic and social crisis. This narrative suggests that the international liberal order is losing its cohesion, and states are focusing on competing with one another rather than on combating non-state actors.

Presented in this way, this worldview serves a mobilizing and strategic purpose. Al-Qaeda does not position itself as a force capable of immediately overthrowing the world order, but rather as an actor capable of capitalizing on a moment of systemic crisis. In this narrative, a potential confrontation between major powers – even if it does not take the form of a classic world war – creates a space in which states weaken their own capacity to project power in peripheral regions. It is precisely in such a security vacuum that the organization can strengthen its influence.

At the same time, The Insider emphasizes that this narrative contains numerous simplifications and manipulative elements. Publications linked to Al-Qaeda present international events selectively, conforming to a biased view of the inevitable collapse of the “infidel world order”.  Complex political processes, such as changes in the foreign policies of individual countries or trade tensions, are reduced to evidence of the West’s systemic decline and moral crisis.

Nevertheless, the very fact of the consistent development of such a narrative has analytical significance. It demonstrates that Al-Qaeda does not limit itself to local conflicts but seeks to interpret and exploit global geopolitical processes. The organization “invests” in a strategic narrative that links local conflicts – in Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia – to a broader narrative of a clash of civilizations [11] and an impending systemic crisis.

The narrative of global chaos serves three functions. First, it legitimizes strategic patience by suggesting that even if the organization is not currently in the spotlight, a “favorable moment” will arise as international crises deepen. Second, it bolsters recruitment by offering potential supporters a sense of participation in a historic turning point. Third, it allows Al-Qaeda to present itself as an actor that anticipates and interprets global trends, rather than merely reacting to local conflicts.

In this sense, the narrative of global chaos is not merely propaganda but an element of a long-term ideological strategy. Even if it relies on simplifications, it demonstrates that Al-Qaeda continues to think globally and seeks to embed its actions within a broader geopolitical context. It is precisely this ambition – maintaining a strategic worldview despite limited resources – that distinguishes it from many other groups of a purely local nature.

Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations

(Image generated by neural network)

Notes:

[1] Latent (from Latin latens – hidden, invisible) – a term describing hidden processes, phenomena, or properties that are not currently manifesting externally, are not noticeable, but exist and may become apparent in the future.
[2] Al-Qaeda (AQ) was founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988 alongside Arabs who were fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union’s occupying forces. The organization’s stated goal was to rid the Islamic world of Western influence, overthrow the “heretical” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by their own interpretation of Sharia law, which would serve as the center of a new international order. In October 1999, the US  Department of State designated Al-Qaeda as a foreign terrorist organization. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the UN designated Al-Qaeda as an international terrorist organization and placed it on a sanctions list, which entails asset freezes, an arms embargo, and travel bans for members of the group.
[3] The Sahel is a tropical savanna in Africa that serves as a transition zone between the Sahara and the southern, more fertile lands known as the Sudanese region of Africa. This region includes countries such as Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.
[4] AQAP – an Al-Qaeda affiliate based primarily in Yemen and operating in Saudi Arabia. It was formed in 2009 through the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branches. It is considered one of the most active and dangerous branches of Al-Qaeda, seeking to overthrow governments in the region and establish an Islamic state. AQAP is designated as a terrorist organization by the UN and many countries.
[5] ACLED – an acronym for Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (data about places and events of armed conflicts). It is a US–based non-governmental organization that specializes in collecting, analyzing, and mapping data on political violence and protest events worldwide in real time.
[6] Al-Shabaab – a radical Islamist group seeking to establish Sharia law in Somalia. The organization is actively involved in the civil war, controls parts of southern and central Somalia, and is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the United Kingdom.
[7] War on the Rocks – an American news commentary website that offers articles and podcasts on national security issues featuring expert anal sts.
[8] AKIS – an affiliate of Al-Qaeda established to spread jihad in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan). The organization seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region.
[9] “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” – a radical Islamist armed group operating primarily in Pakistan. Founded in 2007, it seeks to overthrow the Pakistani government, establish Sharia law, and supports the Afghan Taliban. It is a separate, though ideologically related, entity from the Taliban movement in Afghanistan.
[10] The most notable of these during this period include: an assassination attempt on Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Minister of the Interior, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who sustained only minor injuries; an attempt to blow up a plane over Detroit, but the bomb caused only a small fire, and the attacker was detained by passengers; intelligence agencies intercepted two packages containing explosives that were being shipped by FedEx and UPS cargo planes from Yemen to the United States.
[11] The Clash of Civilizations – a hypothesis by American political scientist and sociologist Samuel Huntington regarding models of conflict in the post-Cold War era. He first presented it in a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute in 1992, and it was later published in the book  “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” in 1996.