Influence Agents “for the Future”: How the Kremlin Builds Networks Loyal to It in the West
In the modern landscape of hybrid threats, the evolution of the methods employed by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) of the Russian Federation occupies a special place. There is a clear strategic shift from classic espionage, focused on immediate access to state secrets, to a long-term strategy of “selection” and recruitment of promising young Westerners. Russia is systemically investing in the future political, media, and intellectual capital of Western countries, building extensive “sleeper” networks of loyalty.
The main thesis of this analysis is that Moscow has shifted its focus to working with individuals who are just beginning to enter the elite circles of their respective countries. Through a multi-tiered infrastructure – ranging from mass festivals to individualized academic mentoring under the guise of legitimate residenturas [1] – the Kremlin is building a talent pool of influence. The end result of this activity is not simply a foreign agent in the classical sense, but an entire class of loyal administrators whose loyalty has been shaped by years of covert support and ideological indoctrination.
A New Paradigm of Russian Espionage: Investing “for the Future”
Traditional understanding of intelligence activities typically focuses on the theft of classified documents or recruitment of current high-ranking officials who already have access to state secrets. However, Moscow’s current strategy demonstrates a much deeper and, in the long term, more dangerous approach – the accumulation of “capital of influence” [2]. This represents a paradigm shift from seeking quick results to strategic patience. Instead of trying to break the resistance of an experienced bureaucrat, Russian intelligence prefers a full recruitment cycle, which begins with the stages of so-called “scouting” [3] and assessment of targets who do not have access to secrets yet but demonstrate the potential to gain it over time.
The psychological aspect of this strategy is extremely sophisticated. Students, interns, and young analysts are ideal targets for the initial stages of development. At ages 20–25, young people are typically open to expanding their networks and lack the life experience to recognize covert manipulation or recruitment tactics. For a young, ambitious professional, contact with a “cultural attaché”, a representative of an international foundation, or the organizer of an academic conference is not perceived as a threat or an attempt at recruitment. On the contrary, it is interpreted as recognition of talent, assistance with education, or a unique opportunity to launch a career.
The Kremlin exploits this openness to thoroughly analyze the target’s psychological profile and gradually draw them into its sphere of influence through “soft power” mechanisms. In this model, an intelligence officer operating under a legal cover acts as a mentor or benefactor, which allows for the establishment of a strong emotional bond and a sense of gratitude. This approach lays the foundation for asymmetric institutional influence, where loyalty to the aggressor becomes an integral part of the future leader’s worldview. Theoretical models of such recruitment are best illustrated by specific examples of Russian intelligence operations, such as a recent case in Hungary.
Diplomatic Cover and Operational Calculation
The incident that occurred in early 2025 in Budapest is a textbook example of operational support for a recruitment candidate in the early stages of his career. The case of a young Hungarian student who applied for a job at a government agency shed light on the inner workings of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s (SVR) legal residentura in NATO and EU countries. This case demonstrates how Russia attempts to infiltrate its agents into government agencies through “youth quotas” and career advancement programs.
According to investigative journalists, the key figure in this operation was Third Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Budapest Aleksandr Verkhnev. Based on information available to Hungarian counterintelligence, this “diplomat” is “directly” a career officer of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). His activities were a classic example of a recruitment operation. Verkhnev’s methods of working with the student included:
personal mentoring – the “diplomat” assisted with the preparation of academic papers, effectively becoming an unofficial academic advisor, which allowed him to establish intellectual control over the target;
career counseling – the Russian deliberately steered the student toward applying for positions in government agencies, counting on his long-term infiltration into the power structures;
training in the principles of secrecy – as the student neared the stage of employment, the “diplomat” instructed him on how to conceal the fact of their contacts during the mandatory security screening.
An important detail is that the student was part of a 20-person delegation that attended the World Youth Festival in Sochi in March 2024. It was there that the so-called “spotting” [4] took place, during which Verkhnev personally met with the participants. A key role in this chain was played by Roland B., a Hungarian national residing in Russia who acts as an intermediary between young people and intelligence officers.
At the same time, the case of another Third Secretary at the Russian Embassy, Artur Sushkov, illustrates the instrumentalization of the intellectual community. Sushkov focused his attention on Hungarian think tanks and academic circles close to Viktor Orbán’s government. His task was to build long-term relationships with young professionals who, as their careers progressed, would be integrated into the processes of developing and adopting government decisions. These examples are just the tip of the iceberg, concealing a multi-level “selection ladder” system.
“Selection Ladder”: A Multidimensional Infrastructure for Building a Network of Influencers
The Russian system for selecting and cultivating loyal personnel is a comprehensive industry in which each level performs a specific function – from mass outreach to targeted support.
Level 1: Mass Spotting. The foundation of the pyramid consists of large-scale events such as the World Youth Festival in Sochi (2024) and the festival in Yekaterinburg (2026) [5]. These events serve as an ideal platform for the mass collection of primary data. Organizers (under the auspices of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs) collect detailed questionnaires from thousands of participants, including their ambitions, language proficiency, social connections, and psychographic profiles [6]. Of special interest are young leaders in the fields of digital technology, media, and science. The goal is to create a database of “sympathetic” individuals, from which the most promising candidates will later be selected for further cultivation.
Level 2: Targeted support. At this stage, “Rossotrudnichestvo” [7] becomes involved through the “Russian Houses” network and the “New Generation” program [8]. The goal is to lull people into a false sense of security. Young politicians and journalists are invited on short-term trips to the RF, where they are immersed in a “friendly Russia” environment. This creates a network that maintains ties with Russian institutions. At this level, random individuals are weeded out, and those who are willing to accept Russian narratives as an alternative to Western ones are identified.
Level 3: Academic Scouting. This is a level of deep professional infiltration. The key tools here are:
The “Open Doors” International Olympiad [9] – the search for technical and scientific talents in strategic fields (AI, physics, energy);
the “InteRussia” [10] programs of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – direct engagement of foreign analysts under the supervision of Russian experts (often SVR officers with scientific degrees);
The Gorchakov Fund [11] and the “Valdai-New Generation” project [12] – the development of a shared conceptual framework and loyalty to the concept of a “multipolar world”. This is where “asymmetric influence” takes shape: individuals return to their home countries with a set of pre-formulated Russian talking points that are integrated into their professional activities.
Level 4: Operational Phase. Transition to covert personal contact. A target who has passed the previous levels receives career support (financial, informational, or reputational). This is the stage at which “gratitude” for assistance with training transforms into a willingness to carry out specific tasks – ranging from lobbying to the transfer of non-public data.
This multi-stage system trains personnel for various niches, but special attention is paid to the media space, where a surrogate alternative to reality is created.
Niche Specialization: Cultivating Surrogate Opinion Leaders (Using the Media as an Example)
As part of its “active measures”, the Kremlin has focused on cultivating local journalists as an alternative to direct propaganda (RT/Sputnik). Official channels are often viewed with suspicion in the West, so it is more effective to use “local voices” that have the trust of their audience.
A striking example is the journalism school in Bamako (Mali), whose activities were covered in detail by Le Monde. Russia trains local correspondents there, providing them with resources and a platform. These journalists subsequently disseminate Kremlin narratives without any obvious Russian branding. Similar methods are also used in the West through internships with “SputnikPro” [13] and “RT Academy” [14].
The goal is to create a pool of media professionals who will act as independent bloggers or correspondents, while systematically spreading disinformation that benefits Moscow. This allows the Kremlin to circumvent blocks and manipulate public opinion from within national media spaces. Traditional in-person training at such schools is now closely intertwined with the use of digital platforms to disguise recruitment operations.
Recruitment Space 2.0: Shifting Operations to the Digital Realm
The mass expulsion of Russian intelligence officers from Europe after 2022 forced the SVR and GRU to seek new methods of accessing their target audience. This led to the formation of Recruitment Space 2.0, where the main stages of scouting and assessment have been shifted to the digital realm.
The UK’s National Protective Security Authority [15], as part of its “Think Before You Link” campaign, has documented a sharp increase in the activity of hostile intelligence services on professional networks such as LinkedIn. The enemy’s algorithm in the digital environment operates as a “hybrid funnel”:
creating a fictitious persona – using profiles disguised as recruiters for international companies, researchers, or consultants at think tanks;
initial “hook” – an offer of paid analytical work or an invitation to a prestigious online conference;
assessment of access and loyalty – an analysis of what information the candidate is willing to share under the guise of “consultations”;
moving into the “gray zone” – a quick transition from LinkedIn to private, encrypted messaging apps (Signal, Telegram);
in-person meeting – offline contact, often disguised as participation in events such as festivals in Sochi or “InteRussia” internships.
This combination of online scouting and offline events creates a seamless mechanism for recruiting promising personnel. Digital tools enable mass screening of potential targets, minimizing risks for intelligence recruitment officers.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Kremlin’s long-term investments in “loyalty networks” demonstrate an exceptionally high return on investment. Russia is willing to spend enormous resources on festivals, scholarships, and academic programs because even a low success rate fully justifies the costs. If, out of a thousand festival participants or scholarship recipients, even one goes on to hold a position as an advisor, analyst, or department head in a NATO member state’s ministry five to ten years later, Moscow gains a strategic advantage that cannot be offset by traditional espionage methods.
The end result of such activities is the formation of a network of loyal administrators and experts whose allegiance is not always based on financial gain but is rooted in long-standing professional and personal ties with Russian mentors, established as far back as their student years.
Western Trek: The Threat of Direct Infiltration and Verification Gaps
For Western countries (the EU, NATO, and the United Kingdom), the threat remains immediate and semi-legal in nature due to the active operation of Russia’s humanitarian infrastructure abroad.
Key Conclusions for Western Countries
Current vetting procedures for candidates for civil service or the defense sector have a systemic flaw. They are designed to identify direct, documented contacts with intelligence agencies (transfer of documents, financial transactions), but they completely ignore latent “soft loyalty”, which has been built up over the years through participation in student exchanges, academic grants, or innocent professional interactions with Russian “diplomats”.
Russian entities (“Russian Houses,” “Rossotrudnichestvo” offices) in many Western countries continue to operate under the guise of cultural and educational centers, creating a safe space for initial scouting.
Recommendations for Western Partners
The intelligence agencies of Western countries must include mandatory questions in standard security questionnaires regarding participation in events organized under the auspices of “Rosmolodezh,” “Rossotrudnichestvo”, World Youth Festivals, as well as specific programs of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) (in particular, the “Open Doors” Olympiad and “InteRussia” internships), treating such participation as a serious risk factor.
Conducting information campaigns for students and young researchers. Young professionals must clearly understand: if a Russian diplomat provides unofficial assistance (for example, by helping with a research paper or funding a trip) and insistently asks to conceal this connection during security screenings – this is direct evidence of the diplomat’s affiliation with hostile intelligence services.
The Ukrainian Trek: Hybrid Engagement in the Absence of Contacts
For over a decade, Ukrainian citizens have had no official contacts with Russian government or cultural institutions within their own country. However, this does not mean that Ukraine’s human resources have fallen off the radar of Russian intelligence agencies. In conditions of complete isolation, the threat to Ukraine has shifted to the hybrid domain and is carried out through three main channels.
Key Conclusions for Ukraine
Thousands of young Ukrainians (students, graduate students, and young researchers) are currently studying or completing internships at universities and think tanks in European countries. It is there that they find themselves in a shared academic environment with Russian foundations, “diplomats”, and lobbyists, where they may be approached for recruitment at a stage when they have not yet assumed security obligations to their own state.
Russian secret services are actively masquerading as European recruitment firms, private scientific societies, or international consulting agencies online (operating under a “false flag”). Offers of high-paying remote analytical work (such as preparing reports on public sentiment in Ukraine, the state of critical infrastructure, or logistics) are a classic digital “bait” used to lure Ukrainian professionals into “blind” collaboration.
Russian intelligence services recruit young Western analysts “for the future” counting on the fact that these individuals will later be sent to Ukraine as employees of international humanitarian, military or diplomatic missions, or advisory bodies attached to Ukrainian government agencies.
Recommendations for Ukraine’s Security Sector
Preventive protection for Ukrainian students abroad is essential. Clear safety guidelines should be developed and disseminated through diplomatic missions and networks of Ukrainian student organizations in the EU. Ukrainian youth abroad must be informed about recruitment methods disguised as “academic solidarity” and international scientific platforms.
Counterintelligence agencies should develop recommendations for young IT specialists, translators, and analysts on how to vet clients for remote work. Any proposal to gather analytical information on the internal situation in Ukraine from newly established Western “startups” or private clients on social media (LinkedIn, Telegram) must be subject to verification.
When engaging foreign consultants, experts, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations to work in Ukraine’s public sector or defense industry, security agencies must thoroughly vet their “academic background” for past participation in Russian youth festivals or forums in Sochi or Yekaterinburg, or for having received grants from “Rossotrudnichestvo” foundations.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
Notes:
[1] In intelligence terminology, a “legal residentura” is the intelligence representation of one state on the territory of another, operating under the cover of legitimate diplomatic institutions. This term is contrasted with “illegal residentura”, where intelligence men (career officers or agents) live in the country using entirely fabricated documents (a “legend” or a “cover story”), do not officially maintain contact with the embassy, and are subject to criminal prosecution if arrested.
[2] It should be pointed out that the Russian Federation’s special services have returned to a practice once employed by the Soviet Union’s KGB in its recruitment activities, recognizing the long-term benefits of investing in young personnel. The main instrument of this strategy was the Patrice Lumumba University of Friendship of Peoples (founded in 1960), as well as other prestigious Soviet universities (such as Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv or Leningrad State University). The KGB of the USSR also actively used the Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad to chose and recruit potential agents.
[3] Scouting is the process of seeking, selecting, and recruiting promising talents, specialists, or ideas for a specific field of activity. The term is borrowed from the principles of reconnaissance (from the English word “scout”), where the main goal is to find a valuable resource before competitors do.
[4] Spotting (from the English “spotting” – tracking down or noticing) refers to the careful observation, hunting, or collecting of specific objects, people, or phenomena in real life. This term originated from aviation spotting (photographing airplanes), but is now used in many other fields.
[5] The 2026 International Youth Festival was organized by decree of Vladimir Putin as a large-scale propaganda forum aimed at attracting young people from different countries. Initially, Russia’s authorities planned to hold part of the event or a similar one in Crimea, but due to security risks, it was ultimately moved to the Urals.
[6] A psychographic profile is a detailed characterization of a person or group of people based on their internal psychological traits, values, interests, and lifestyle. Unlike a demographic profile (which describes who the customer is – gender, age, income), psychographic analysis explains why a person behaves in a certain way and what their inner motivation is.
[7] “Rossotrudnichestvo” – the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation. In April 2018, the SBU exposed “Rossotrudnichestvo” and a Russian diplomat for engaging in anti-Ukrainian activities. Specifically, under the guise of implementing the so-called “RF’s Humanitarian and Social Programs” and with the coordination of Russian intelligence, Ukrainian citizens – first of all members of pro-Russian civic associations and movements – were recruited into anti-Ukrainian activities to forge documents, seals, stamps, and letterheads. Ilya Ponomarev, a former deputy of the Russian State Duma, said of “Rossotrudnichestvo’s” activities: “Throughout the world, this organization performs functions that are more propaganda-oriented. It works with Russian speakers, explaining how great Putin is, how correct Russia’s policies are, and, accordingly, recruiting them to its side. In the context of Ukraine, this is a subversive organization in its purest form.”
[8] “New Generation” is a state program offering short-term familiarization trips to Russia for young foreign professionals and public figures aged 25 to 35. The organizers cover the cost of airfare, lodging, meals, and the cultural program in the RF.
[9] The “Open Doors” International Olympiad offers foreign citizens and Russians living abroad the opportunity to enroll in leading Russian universities tuition-free and without entrance exams.
[10] “InteRussia” is a government program offering short-term internships for young foreign professionals. The project was launched in 2021 by the A.M. Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Support Foundation. The program is aimed at foreigners aged 21 to 40 (researchers, journalists, medical professionals, and engineers).
[11] The A.M. Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy Support, established in 2010 by order of the President of the Russian Federation to promote Russia’s foreign policy interests and “soft power” abroad.
[12] The “Valdai – New Generation” project is a youth program of the Russian think tank “Valdai Discussion Club”, aimed at creating a global network of loyal or interested young scholars, researchers, and experts in the fields of international politics and the global economy.
[13] “SputnikPro” is an international educational and awareness-raising project created by the Russian state news agency and radio station “Sputnik” (part of the “Russia Today” media group). The project consists of a series of seminars, lectures, and master classes aimed at foreign journalists, bloggers, students in relevant academic programs, and press office staff.
[14] “RT Academy” is an international educational project launched by the Russian state-run propaganda television channel “RT” (former “Russia Today”) in early 2024. The main goal of this platform is to provide free training to foreign journalists, bloggers, and content creators. In reality, the project is used by the Kremlin as a “soft power” tool and to advance its own information agenda (propaganda and disinformation) on the international stage.
[15] The United Kingdom’s National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) is a division of the counterintelligence agency MI-5 and serves as the country’s main technical body in the field of physical and personnel security. The agency was established in March 2023 on the basis of the former National Infrastructure Protection Center. The reform was carried out to expand the agency’s authority: it now protects not only critical infrastructure but also the economy, the scientific sector, and the business community from modern threats.
