Results of the Development of the Global Military-Political Situation in 2025 in the Context of Ukraine’s National Interests
Part I
Introduction
At the end of last year, the Institute for Global Politics made a brief assessment of the results of the development of the military-political situation in the world in 2025. Given the importance of this issue, we consider it appropriate to analyze it in more detail.
Although the events of 2025 are now history, they deserve attention. After all, without understanding them, it is practically impossible to properly assess the current situation. This refers primarily to those aspects which directly concern and affect Ukraine, including the situation on the front lines, the peace process, US and European policy, and Russia’s ability to continue the war.
All of the above mentioned seems to be well known and has been widely covered in the media, both in the form of current information about various events and in the form of assessments. At the same time, in many cases, such information was distorted, and the assessments did not correspond to the real state of affairs. The reasons for this were both journalists’ and experts’ misperceptions of the true nature of what was happening and the deliberate dissemination of disinformation by certain countries and political forces.
As a result, wrong conclusions were formed about Ukraine’s inability to contain Russia’s offensive on the front lines, about the supposedly pro-Russian policy of the United States, about the weakness of the European Union and NATO’s inability to protect Europe, as well as about the Western partners’ intentions to stop supporting our state. Such views are mainly formed by Russia, which is trying to strengthen its position in the confrontation with the West and defeat Ukraine. It is practically impossible to reveal the full picture of events in 2025, as this would require significantly more information and analytical resources than are currently available. However, it is possible to outline the general features of the military-political situation and trends in its development in some detail.
Part I. Russia’s War Against Ukraine
1.1. Strategic and Operational Aspects of Russia’s War Against Ukraine
Throughout 2025, Russia’s war against Ukraine was characterized by fairly intense fighting on the front lines, but without significant changes to the front line itself. Overall, since the beginning of the year, the enemy had managed to capture no more than 1 % of Ukrainian territory.
The Russian Armed Forces outnumbered the Ukrainian Defense Forces in terms of personnel, aircraft, missiles, and a range of other weapons, and continued their strategic offensive operation. In this way, Moscow hoped to force Ukraine to surrender by breaking through the front line and entering operational space, as well as to capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible.
First and foremost, Russia sought to establish control over the entire Donbas region, which had been identified as one of the main objectives of the war at its beginning and was carried out under the pretext of “protecting the Russian-speaking population” of the region. In addition, it sought to expand its zone of control in Zaporizhzhia region, which it included in the Russian Federation’s constitution as “Russian territory”. No active offensive operations were carried out in Kherson region, which Moscow also claimed as its own, due to the impossibility of crossing the Dnipro River with powerful forces. Moscow’s separate goal was to push Ukrainian troops out of Kursk region and establish a so-called “buffer” zone on the border with Sumy and Kharkiv regions of Ukraine.
In accordance with these priorities and the specifics of the operational situation, the main directions of the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive actions were as follows: in the Donbas — Pokrovsk-Myrnograd, Lyman, and Siversk; in Zaporizhzhia region — Huliaipole; in Kharkiv region — Kupiansk and Vovchansk; in Kursk region — Sudzha and further — Sumy. At the same time, local offensive actions by Russian troops continued in other areas of the front, and there were attempts to capture islands on the Dnipro River near the city of Kherson.
The Defense Forces of Ukraine conducted a strategic defensive operation with separate counteroffensive actions along the entire front line. Ukraine’s main objectives remained unchanged: to defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to counter the enemy’s offensive in the above-mentioned areas and to maintain control of key positions on the front line, as well as to minimize enemy advances in other areas.
At the same time, both Russia and Ukraine tried to systemically build up missile and drone strikes on each other’s territory with roughly the same goal. Thus, both sides tried to reduce the military capabilities of the opponent and undermine the morale of its citizens by destroying key energy facilities, transport infrastructure, seaports, and military-industrial complex enterprises.
A certain number of Russian strikes were purely terrorist in nature. They targeted residential infrastructure, medical and educational facilities, and civilian logistics. For its part, Ukraine sought to undermine Russia’s ability to export oil. To this end, it targeted Russian oil terminals in the Black and Baltic Seas, as well as tankers belonging to the “shadow fleet”.
Although Russia maintained the initiative on the front lines, it failed to achieve its strategic goals. The Russian Armed Forces regained control of Kursk region and occupied parts of Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Vovchansk, and Huliaipole, capturing Siversk and a number of border and frontline villages in the Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy regions. At the same time, its troops were bogged down in urban and positional battles and were unable to build on their success.
For their part, the Ukrainian Defense Forces drove Russian troops out of Kupiansk and regained part of the lost territories in Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk regions. At the same time, Ukraine essentially took the initiative in the Black Sea region. The Russian Black Sea Fleet was blocked in Novorossiysk, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued to inflict losses on it. The air defense of the Crimean Peninsula was also breached, which made it possible to intensify strikes on Russian military facilities on its territory. Finally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces significantly complicated the export of Russian oil from Black Sea ports.
That is, Russia’s successes were only tactical, which did not lead to strategic changes in the situation on the front. At this, these achievements were made possible by the Russian Armed Forces’ superiority in manpower and the use of operational reserves in the second half of the year, which allowed them to carry out frontal or so-called “meat grinder” assaults. However, due to significant losses, the Russians were forced to switch to a tactic of “infiltrating” small groups through the combat formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with their subsequent consolidation and accumulation in the near rear. Such actions were effective but slowed down the pace of the offensive.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine used the advantages of defense, including in dense urban areas. Ukrainian troops mainly used their prepared lines of engineering fortifications, which enabled them to hold back the enemy’s advance and inflict significantly greater losses on it than they themselves suffered. Unfortunately, the enemy’s advantages in manpower and certain shortcomings in the organization of the defense forced the Ukrainian Armed Forces to retreat from some of their positions.
UAVs were widely used on the battlefield. As a result, several dozen kilometers deep so-called “kill zones” formed around the line of contact between the sides, which significantly complicated access to combat positions and logistics for frontline units. Armored vehicles were used sporadically because they were vulnerable to UAVs. The role of artillery declined, and Russia actually lost its advantage over Ukraine in this regard. Instead, aviation remained important, with guided bombs being used without aircraft entering the enemy’s air defense zone.
The large number of strike UAVs on the battlefield effectively deprived Russia of the opportunity to redeploy its troops to the operational space, even in cases where they managed to break through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defenses. An example of this was the elimination of the Russian breakthrough near Pokrovsk in the direction of Dobropillia in the autumn of 2025.
A significant problem for Russia was the shortage of personnel to man its troops, which was the result of heavy losses and a decline in the number of people willing to sign contracts for military service to participate in the war. In the third quarter of 2025, three times fewer such contracts were signed than in previous years. As a result, troop strength on the front lines fell to an average of 60 %. And of the 14 new divisions that the Russians planned to form, only seven were deployed. At this, some of them had only one regiment.
In this situation, the RF’s leadership intensified its covert mobilization measures. A new procedure for conscripting citizens into military service was introduced, allowing for conscription throughout the year, rather than only in the spring and winter as was previously the case. In addition, a law was passed allowing reservists to be sent to special training sessions for the protection of important facilities. This mainly concerns countering unmanned aerial vehicles.
In general, the fourth year of the war confirmed that it is impossible to resolve the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on the battlefield. The Russian Armed Forces retained their ability to gradually advance, but high casualties without adequate replenishment began to wear them down. According to experts, the fighting on the front lines began to reach a dead end, with the prospect of a final turning into a positional form as early as next year.
1.2. Political Situation Around the Military Confrontation Between Russia and Ukraine
In 2025, the political situation around Russia’s war against Ukraine began to become more complex in nature compared to previous years. First of all, this was due to changes in Washington’s policy after Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency at the beginning of the year. The changes were mainly related to the difference between his and the previous administration’s views on the strategic goals of the USA and the methods of achieving them. In addition, D. Trump’s policies were influenced by his personal interests and political processes in the USA.
We will analyze the strategic aspects of US policy in the world a little later. For now, let us focus only on the part that concerned Russia’s war against Ukraine. This issue is the most important because Trump’s interests in this area determined his attitudes to Ukraine and Russia, as well as the war itself and the USA’s actions towards them. Unfortunately, they were not always positive for our country. In a number of cases, Trump’s misunderstanding of the reasons and nature of the war led him to make inappropriate decisions that directly harmed Ukraine. Eventually, he did come to understand what was happening and took a more balanced position.
One of the main themes of D. Trump’s 2024 election campaign was harsh criticism of then-US President Joe Biden for providing assistance to Ukraine and severing relations with Russia. According to Trump, this approach led to excessive US financial expenditures and an escalation of confrontation with the Russian Federation, instead of mutually beneficial cooperation with it in global security, politics, and economics, as well as on the issue of prolonging the war.
At the same time, D. Trump’s real goals were to undermine Biden’s pre-election position, boost his own electoral rating, and create opportunities to promote his business interests in Russia. At the same time, Trump sought to fulfill his personal ambitions and achieve revenge for his defeat by Biden in the previous election in 2021, which he called “a victory stolen from him”. Although, as the future US President, D. Trump certainly thought about America’s interests, but only as he understood them.
In line with this approach, D. Trump and his Republican Party effectively blocked the process of allocating funds to Ukraine in early 2024, which led to delays in the supply of weapons to the country. As a result, Ukraine’s military capabilities to counter Russia were weakened. Russia managed to achieve success on the front lines. However, D. Trump was not concerned about any of those consequences. At that time, he probably really hoped that his personal relationship with Putin and Ukraine’s dependence on American aid would help him quickly end the war and then engage in joint economic projects with Russia. He began preparations for this immediately after his victory in the presidential election in November 2024, even before his arrival at the White House. A series of consultations were held between D. Trump and representatives of Russian President Putin, who managed to impose on him the Russian view of the reasons for the war and ways to end it. In return, he was promised favorable preferences for economic activity in Russia. According to some assumptions, the USA was to be given access to Russian natural resources, including the transfer of Russian companies such as Gazprom, and joint development of the Northern Sea Route was also envisaged. This was fully in line with Trump’s intentions to strengthen America’s position in the global economy and provided additional mechanisms to increase influence over Russia and neutralize it as a military adversary of the USA and a competitor in the global energy market.
Therefore, immediately after taking office in January 2025, Trump initiated the resumption of negotiations to end the Russian-Ukrainian war and undertook to act as a mediator in them. At the initial stage, he actually followed a line of conduct agreed with Russia and forced Ukraine to agree to Russia’s peace terms, which were completely unacceptable and meant Ukraine’s capitulation.
The main ones were: Ukraine’s giving up joining NATO; transfer of the entire territory of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions to Russia and recognition of their Russian status along with Crimea; a radical reduction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their actual disarmament; lifting the ban on pro-Russian parties and churches in Ukraine; and lifting Western sanctions imposed on Russia.
The only fundamental difference between the USA and Russia was Trump’s demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities with subsequent agreement on all other issues, while Moscow insisted on the need to resolve them as a priority as a prerequisite for a truce. By doing so, the Russian leadership hoped to drag out the negotiations in order to seize as much of Ukrainian territory as possible.
From the point of view of logics, Moscow’s position was irrational, since the benefits it could gain from ending the war and starting joint economic activities with the USA were much greater than the results of achieving its goals in Ukraine. But these goals were sacred to Putin. Therefore, he could not give them up, even at the cost of losses that were critical for Russia.
Nevertheless, D. Trump continued his mediation efforts, although they were asymmetrical in nature. In exchange for Ukraine’s agreement to Russia’s demands, D. Trump promised it rather ephemeral security guarantees, as well as the implementation of a joint project to develop Ukrainian deposits of rare earth materials. The US proposals for such a project were mainly beneficial to America, not Ukraine. However, D. Trump insisted on them as a condition for taking Ukrainian interests into consideration in the negotiations. This issue was important to him because it allowed him to demonstrate to Americans the effectiveness of his actions for the US economy. To this end, he tried to pressure Ukraine by blackmailing it with the possibility of stopping arms supplies and the transfer of intelligence information.
During negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, D. Trump relied on his environment, which included quite diverse individuals. In particular, US Vice President Mike Pence, presidential aide and billionaire Elon Musk, and his special envoy Stephen Witkoff were mainly pro-Russian. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Special Representative for Ukraine and Russia Kurt Campbell mostly supported Ukraine.
At the same time, Trump’s attempts to achieve his goals at Ukraine’s expense did not yield the results he expected. Ukraine did not make concessions to Russia and refused to sign an agreement with the USA on mineral resources on unfavorable terms. At the same time, Ukraine continued to demand reliable security guarantees.
As a result, relations between the USA and Ukraine deteriorated sharply. It all started with the well-known diplomatic scandal during the meeting between D. Trump and V. Zelenskyy on February 28, 2025, in Washington. The meeting was supposed to agree on the terms of signing an agreement on mineral resources. However, sharp disagreements arose between the parties regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the meeting was suspended.
D. Trump perceived this situation as a personal challenge and a delay in the implementation of his plans. In view of this, he sharply intensified his anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, repeating all Russian narratives. According to him, it was the Ukrainian leadership that was responsible for starting the war, did not want peace, and did not have the support of the Ukrainian people. In addition, he suspended both arms supplies to Ukraine and the transfer of intelligence information to it.
However, Ukraine did not remain unnoticed. D. Trump’s actions provoked an extremely ambiguous reaction in the USA and outrage in Europe. Many American politicians, mainly from the Democratic Party, regarded them as undermining the USA’s leading position in the world, a rejection of democratic values, a condoning of Russia’s aggressive course, and a betrayal of Ukraine. On this basis, D. Trump’s opponents in the USA launched a massive political and information campaign against him.
Europe, in turn, perceived D. Trump’s policy as a direct threat to its security, as it contributed to Russia’s aggressive policy. This gave Russia the opportunity to defeat Ukraine and then continue its military expansion in Europe. Besides, Europe could not agree to decisions on its security being made without it, which is essentially what the USA and Russia were doing behind its back. Therefore, the leaders of the EU and leading European countries joined forces to oppose D. Trump and provide assistance to Ukraine. They were also joined by the European part of NATO’s leadership.
In March 2025, three meetings were held with the participation of EU leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which made it possible to define and agree on the basic principles of action to defend common interests. These mainly involved switching to ensuring Europe’s security primarily on its own and increasing aid to Ukraine, including in the military-technical sphere. A decision was also made to intensify dialogue with Donald Trump in order to persuade him of the need to involve Europe in all political processes concerning its security, as well as the impossibility of making any decisions about Ukraine without Ukraine.
This forced D. Trump to slightly change the nature of his policy in terms of taking the interests of Europe and Ukraine more fully into account. However, Russia remained his priority. In March–April 2025, the USA developed a more detailed peace plan, which provided for the cessation of hostilities and a freeze on the war along the front line. However, it included most of Russia’s demands, such as the same ephemeral guarantees for Ukraine as before, as well as an American version of an agreement on the joint development of Ukrainian mineral resources. However, it also contained certain concessions in favor of Ukraine, including the return of the occupied territories of Kharkiv region, the Kinburn Spit, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and the Kakhovka Dam.
Ukraine prepared its own peace plan as well. It agreed to freeze the war along the front line, but demanded to retain the right to join NATO and the EU and to have reliable security guarantees. Ukraine also refused to agree to Russia’s territorial claims and to recognize Russian status of the territories it occupied.
Both plans were submitted for consideration to representatives of the USA, the EU, and Ukraine on April 17, 2025, in Paris. The parties did not reach an agreement on it, but agreed to continue working on harmonizing the provisions. These intentions were confirmed by the Presidents of Ukraine and the USA on April 26 of the same year in the Vatican on the day of the funeral of Pope Francis. Despite all the differences between Ukraine and the USA, the meeting was constructive. An important outcome of the negotiations was the final agreement on joint mineral extraction, which was signed by representatives of the two countries on April 30, 2025.
During the same period, the issue of supplying American weapons to Ukraine was resolved. Thus, after temporarily suspending deliveries due to the aforementioned scandal at the end of February 2025, D. Trump resumed them in early March. However, in April of the same year, the funds allocated by the Biden administration ran out. As promised, D. Trump stopped allocating funds for Ukraine’s needs (with the exception of funding for certain relatively insignificant programs), but agreed to sell weapons for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with funds from European countries. In particular, this issue was discussed by D. Trump and V. Zelenskyy during their meeting on June 25, 2025, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in The Hague. Later, this principle was implemented as part of the PURL program.
At the same time, President of Türkiye R. Erdogan joined the negotiation process to end the war. He had his own interests in this matter. The main ones were to increase his authority as a regional leader capable of playing a prominent role in restoring peace in the Black Sea region, as well as to actually contribute to ending the war, which had negative consequences for Türkiye.
On the initiative of R. Erdogan and with the support of D. Trump and EU leaders, peace talks between Ukraine and Russia were resumed in May 2025. As in 2022, they took place in Istanbul with Türkiye acting as mediator. A total of three rounds of negotiations took place, namely on May 16, June 2, and July 23, 2025. However, they were fruitless, except for reaching agreements on the exchange of prisoners.
Russia did not change its demands on Ukraine. It continued to stall for time, without even trying to hide it. For example, V. Putin appointed his adviser Vladimir Medinsky as head of the Russian delegation. Medinsky had no real authority. Instead of addressing the real issues, he tried to prove that there was no historical basis for the existence of the Ukrainian state and that Russia’s victory over Ukraine was inevitable, and demanded concessions that were unacceptable to Ukraine.
In doing so, Moscow was clearly counting on its military superiority over Ukraine and Donald Trump’s support for Russia. However, D. Trump increasingly changed his position and began to shift from a positive perception of V. Putin to putting pressure on him, criticizing his position, and threatening to impose sanctions. The reasons for these changes were the Kremlin’s obvious unwillingness to end the war and its attempts to manipulate Trump, which undermined his authority. Plus, D. Trump was influenced by European leaders who maintained constant dialogue with him.
However, D. Trump was still hesitant to make tough decisions regarding Russia, including imposing sanctions against it. According to his explanation, this could complicate the peace dialogue. Although, most likely, he was first of all concerned about the interests of his future business in Russia. Only harsh criticism from the American media, senators, and congressmen, who accused D. Trump of inaction and showed the consequences of Russian strikes on the civilian population of Ukraine, forced him to take more decisive steps.
D. Trump issued an ultimatum to Putin on July 15 to suspend hostilities along the front line for 50 days. In response, he threatened to impose tough sanctions on both Russia and its partners who did not stop trading with it. And after the third round of talks in Istanbul, which ended without result, D. Trump reduced the term of his ultimatum to two weeks. His move was met with mixed reactions, particularly in Ukraine. Some politicians and experts called it a real act of pressure on Putin. Others considered it another delay, during which Russia could continue its war against Ukraine. Either way, Trump’s ultimatum forced Putin to agree to concessions or, at least, to demonstrate such a possibility.
Putin withdrew his demands for the transfer of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to Russia and limited himself to Donbas. His position on the rest of his demands remained unchanged. Discussions on this issue in Moscow with the participation of US Special Envoy S. Witkoff led to misunderstandings, but the parties agreed on a meeting between D. Trump and Putin to determine a common approach to ending the war. Besides, there were plans to consider the prospects for normalizing relations between the USA and Russia.
As is known, the meeting took place on August 15, 2025, in Alaska. Russian propaganda presented it as a diplomatic victory for Moscow, as Russia was supposedly emerging from international isolation. However, it was noted that D. Trump did not agree with Putin on the issue of the division of the world. Such narratives were typical Russian exaggerations, but the meeting was indeed quite important in nature, albeit ambiguous for Ukraine. Putin confirmed that Moscow would temporarily not claim the territories of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions controlled by Ukraine. However, he made Russia’s acquisition of the entire Donbas a key condition for peace. In addition, he assured D. Trump that a ceasefire would only be possible after all issues of the peace plan had been agreed upon. The US and Russian Presidents also reached an agreement on resuming US-Russian dialogue, which Putin perceived as Trump’s final shift to his side. Nevertheless, the results of the negotiations indicated the possibility of reaching compromises on the principles of ending the war. Therefore, work on the peace plan continued at all levels. In particular, within the framework of closed working groups. The preliminary results of the agreements on the principles of future peace in the USA-Ukraine format were discussed during the meeting between D. Trump and V. Zelenskyy on September 23, 2025, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. In general, the parties reached agreement on the issues raised.
Discussions on the peace plan in the USA-Russia format were planned during the meeting of the leaders of the two countries in Budapest in October 2025. Moscow also accompanied it with an active propaganda campaign, presenting it as a summit of the leaders of the two leading powers. At the same time, it was particularly emphasized that the USA and Russia would decide the fate of Europe and Ukraine without them. However, this did not happen. Moscow, represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RF Lavrov, again began to demand Ukraine’s complete surrender and refused to cease fire. In response, D. Trump canceled his meeting with Putin in Budapest on October 22, 2025, and imposed sanctions on Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil. At the same time, he suggested that he might transfer Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. His tough response to Russia’s attempts to disrupt the peace process demonstrated the true nature of his policy, which was by no means pro-Russian but used a “carrot and stick” approach. Moscow finally understood this, although it still sought to act from a position of strength. Thus, it sharply intensified its bellicose rhetoric toward the West, resorting in particular to nuclear blackmail. At the same time, it mobilized its strategic reserves and intensified its offensive actions on the front lines. In this way, it sought to intimidate the USA and Europe, to assure them of the “inevitability” of its victory over Ukraine, and that providing assistance to Ukraine was “futile”.
At the same time, Russia’s further economic decline, which began to plunge into crisis, became a powerful deterrent. Moreover, the Russian leadership had no way of dealing with this situation without ending the war and therefore tried to do so, but on its own terms. Thus, Moscow returned to a peace plan in which it claimed only the entire territory of the Donbas. Claims to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions were removed from the plan, but all other demands unacceptable to Ukraine remained.
Unfortunately, V. Putin managed to persuade D. Trump that such a plan was most consistent with the current state of affairs. The key role in this matter was again played by US President’s Special Envoy S. Witkoff. At this, D. Trump did not properly understand the content of the plan and its consequences and again began to put pressure on Ukraine. He believed that the possibility of a rapid restoration of peace and the realization of common economic interests in Russia and Ukraine significantly outweighed the issue of Donbas’s affiliation.
However, Europe and its supporters in the USA again sided with Ukraine. Through the joint efforts of Ukraine, EU leaders, leading European countries, and American political forces that defended true Western values, D. Trump was brought back to a constructive position. Ukraine and Europe jointly prepared a new peace plan that took into account Ukraine’s interests based on compromises with Russia.
The peace plan is being coordinated in the same format as before, namely along the lines of Ukraine, Europe-USA, and USA-Russia. The meeting between V. Zelenskyy and D. Trump on December 28, 2025, in the USA was of key importance in this regard. Before and after it, D. Trump also held telephone talks with Putin. According to Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy, the measures taken made it possible to agree on 90 % of the future peace treaty.
The main thing for Ukraine was the USA’s agreeing to provide reliable security guarantees based on the principles of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on NATO collective defense. At the same time, Russia’s demands to transfer the entire territory of the Donbas to it remained a significant problem. As already noted, this is fundamental for Moscow, as it is trying to demonstrate to the Russian population at least some achievements in the war against Ukraine, which began under the pretext of “protecting the Russian-speaking population of the Donbas from Ukrainian nationalists”. Therefore, Putin is directing all his resources to capture the Donbas, despite military losses and the rapid slide of the Russian economy into crisis. For him, achieving at least these goals outweighs all the negative consequences of the war. And he hopes to deal with the problems that have arisen in Russia as a result of the war “somehow later”.
Ukraine proposes to resolve this issue through a referendum. In principle, Russia is not opposed to this proposal, but continues to pressure Ukraine, trying to force it to make greater concessions. In addition, it is trying to influence the USA’s position on Ukraine, in particular, to prevent Washington from transferring long-range weapons to it. And in doing so, it resorts to various provocations. For example, it accused Ukraine of attacking Putin’s residence in Valdai on New Year’s Eve using more than 90 UAVs. However, the USA’s attitude to Ukraine remained unchanged.
As noted, the inconsistency of D. Trump’s policy was offset by Europe’s firm stance in supporting Ukraine and containing Russia. In addition to participating in determining the terms of a peace plan that took Ukrainian interests into account, Europe provided military-technical and other assistance to Ukraine and continued to put pressure on Russia by consistently tightening sanctions. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany remained Ukraine’s most reliable supporters in Europe. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe, North-Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states also maintained their staunch pro-Ukrainian positions. They are also directly threatened by an attack from Russia, so they see Ukraine as one of the main forces in deterring such aggression.
On the other hand, Hungary and Slovakia opposed Ukraine. Those countries’ policies are anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian. Certain negative elements regarding Ukraine were observed in Czechia’s policy at the end of the year. However, none of this had a significant impact on EU policy.
Since the USA effectively refused to provide financial assistance to Ukraine, the European Union took on most of it. Thus, the EU leadership connected Ukraine to the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) fund, created in June 2025 to ensure adequate financing for measures to accelerate the development of the European economy. In addition, as part of the European Defense Industry Program, a EUR 300 million so-called Ukraine Support Instrument was introduced.
Ukraine’s defense needs were also financed through the European Peace Fund. The Fund’s resources were mainly used to purchase ammunition for Ukraine and to train Ukrainian military personnel under the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM) program. Its mandate has been extended for another two years, until November 15, 2026, with a budget allocation of EUR 409 million. Since the mission was established in November 2022, 85,000 Ukrainian military personnel have received appropriate training.
Resistance from a number of EU members and pressure from Moscow prevented the European Union leadership from resolving the issue of using Russian Central Bank funds frozen in Europe for the benefit of Ukraine. Only a small percentage of those funds were used. They were used to compensate for the G7 countries’ expenditures on aid to Ukraine. In December 2025, the European Union had to decide to freeze Russian accounts in European banks indefinitely and to give Ukraine a EUR 90 billion loan from its own funds. Ukraine is to cover the loan with Russian reparations, and if Moscow refuses to pay them, the funds will be withdrawn from its frozen assets.
The European Union has expressed its readiness to participate in ensuring Ukraine’s security in the post-war period. This mainly involves the continued provision of military-technical assistance to Ukraine and the implementation of other programs to support it. One of the important guarantees of Ukraine’s security will be its connection to the European and Euro-Atlantic security system.
At the same time, the Coalition of the Willing, which brought together the most steadfast supporters of Ukraine, continued to work actively. The number of its members increased to 30 countries in 2025. It includes the United Kingdom and France as leaders of the alliance, as well as other EU and NATO countries, including Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Turkey, Finland, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and others.
The countries participating in the Coalition provided Ukraine with military-technical, financial, and logistical assistance. Some of them have announced their readiness to send their troops to Ukraine after the end of the war as a guarantee of its security. Currently, such a proposal is of key importance and could become a significant addition to the security guarantees provided to Ukraine by the USA.
A separate area of EU activity is strengthening of sanctions against Russia. In 2025, the European Union introduced four new packages of sanctions, which mainly affected Russia’s financial sector, military industry, energy sector, and “shadow fleet”. At the end of the year, preparations began for the next, 20th package.
Despite all the well-known problems, the overall development of the political situation around Russia’s war against Ukraine demonstrates a gradual convergence of positions among all parties involved, even if this has sometimes been forced. This has opened up prospects for reaching certain compromises on the terms for ending the war, although these will not fully satisfy either Ukraine or Russia. Nevertheless, it is possible that peace could be restored as early as 2026.
Yurii Mykhailenko,
Institute for Global Politics
(Image generated by neural network)
