An Energy Truce with Russia. Is It Possible?
Meeting Ukraine’s energy needs during the autumn and winter months is becoming a key challenge. Russia is openly threatening to destroy Ukraine’s energy sector in order to force Ukraine to capitulate. We managed to hold out during the severe cold spell at the start of this year. We will continue to hold out. After all, we already have the means to respond to the aggressor, and our capacity to counter it will only grow. Russia, meanwhile, will continue to do its best to achieve its aims. It will have no further options, as the crisis in the Russian economy will prevent it from continuing the war. However, the threat that Ukraine will leave Russia and its capital without electricity and heating, as well as destroy Russian oil refining facilities, may force Putin to agree to an energy truce.
On 16 September this year, US President D. Trump announced the conclusion of an energy truce between Ukraine and Russia, which sparked lively debate on the issue in media and political circles. This is entirely understandable, as this issue is of critical importance to Ukraine and Russia, and also affects the interests of the USA and other countries due to global oil prices. Therefore, this issue should be examined more closely.
As has just been noted, Russia is openly declaring its intention to destroy Ukraine’s energy system in order to force it to capitulate. Besides, it is highly likely that it plans to destroy other vital infrastructure in our country, including the water supply and sewerage systems in Kyiv and other major cities. Not to mention that strikes will also be directed at warehouses storing food and consumer goods, industrial facilities, shopping centres, railway and road transport, and residential buildings. In this regard, Russia is banking on the fact that it possesses a greater number of strike weapon systems than Ukraine, namely the “Iskander-M” tactical ballistic missiles and the “ground-to-ground” version of the S-400 air defence system, as well as sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, jet-powered UAVs such as the “Geran”, and “Banderol” missile drones. Also taken into account is the critical shortage in Ukraine and among its Western partners of missiles for the Patriot air defence systems, which are used to successfully intercept ballistic missiles. Added to this is Ukraine’s lack of interceptor drones capable of countering jet-powered UAVs.
However, this situation is rapidly changing in Ukraine’s favour. Production of “Flamingo” cruise missiles, with a range of up to 3,000 km, is now getting under way. Russia may be able to shoot them down, but their massed deployment makes it possible to breach its air defence system. FP-7 ballistic missiles (BM), with a range of 200–300 km, are being introduced into service. They are capable of covering the entire territory of the Russian regions bordering Ukraine. Field tests of the FP-9 BM, with a range of 850 km, are beginning. It is not possible to carry out test launches against targets at firing ranges in Ukraine. Therefore, this will be achieved by carrying out strikes against Russia.
The Ukrainian Defence Forces already have in their arsenal the “Peklo” strike jet UAVs, with a range of 700 km, and the “Palianytsia”, with a range of up to 650 km. These are currently being modernized to increase their range, speed and payload. New jet-powered drones with significantly improved performance are also being developed.
As for intercepting jet-powered UAVs, it should be noted that Ukraine made a mistake here and failed to prepare for this in good time. However, this mistake is being rectified. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are already testing four types of interceptor drones on the front line, capable of countering such unmanned aerial vehicles. Around ten other manufacturers are also testing their own designs.
Measures are being taken to address Ukraine’s shortage of missiles for the Patriot air defence systems. For example, Ukraine is already receiving such missiles from its partners, notably Germany and Poland, which have certain stocks, albeit modest ones and, for the most part, not of the latest models. The possibility of such missiles being transferred to Ukraine by Japan and South Korea is also being considered. Besides, the USA has promised to supply us with such missiles and is ramping up production. Germany and Japan, which hold the relevant licences, are also increasing their output. Furthermore, in May this year, Poland received authorization from the US Department of State to produce interceptor missiles for the Patriot systems. New air defence systems with missile defence capabilities, jointly produced by Ukraine and European countries, will soon begin to enter service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Consequently, Ukraine will have a significantly greater capability to strike both neighbouring Russian regions and strategic targets deep within Russian territory. Our country’s air and missile defences will be strengthened accordingly.
This will enable us to swiftly destroy Russian oil refineries, which will deal a fatal blow to the Russian economy. At the same time, key facilities within the aggressor’s military-industrial complex will be destroyed. And should Russia attempt to destroy our energy infrastructure, as it did last winter, it will face the same response. Moreover, it will not only be power stations and heating plants, as well as the electricity and heating networks, in Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk that will be destroyed, but also those in Moscow itself and Moscow Region. As a result, the war will reach Russia itself, posing a direct threat to Putin’s regime.
In other words, in the very near future, a rough balance of power will emerge between Ukraine and Russia, with both sides capable of inflicting equal damage on one another. Essentially, the situation is reaching an impasse, from which the only way out is through compromises between Kyiv and Moscow.
It could all begin with an energy truce – specifically, a mutual agreement between Ukraine and Russia to refrain from attacking facilities that supply their needs for electricity, heating, liquid fuel and other forms of fuel. The next step could be the conclusion of a new grain agreement, which would enable Ukraine and Russia to resume grain exports from the Black Sea region.
Ukraine recognizes this and is prepared to make mutual concessions. However, this must be on a fair basis, not on terms amounting to de facto capitulation, as demanded by the Russians. Nevertheless, Russia is still seeking to force Ukraine to surrender all its positions in its favour. As for the RF leadership’s claims regarding its readiness to resume negotiations with the USA and Ukraine on ending the war, these are merely an attempt to justify its policies and avoid the imposition of new US sanctions against Russia, as well as to establish a channel of influence over Kyiv via Washington. Such intentions are evidenced by statements from Putin and his representatives regarding the unchanging objectives of the so-called “special military operation”.
Under such circumstances, only external powers – namely the USA and China – can influence the situation. Washington has a direct interest in this, whilst Beijing may support it as a “gesture of goodwill” with the aim of creating more favourable conditions for Chinese business operations in America. Indeed, achieving an energy truce between Ukraine and Russia through the USA’s mediation – as the first tangible step towards ending the Russian-Ukrainian war – would help boost the approval ratings of D. Trump and the Republican Party in the run-up to the congressional elections. Moreover, the US President hopes that if Russia resumes supplying diesel fuel to the global market, this could bring down its price somewhat, including in the USA. That is why Donald Trump has stepped up his mediation efforts to launch a new round of dialogue between Ukraine and Russia. And the main focus of this should be the energy sector. D. Trump’s ability to resolve such an issue is bolstered by the prospect of the US Congress passing the “Lindsey O. Graham Act on Sanctions against Russia and Iran 2026”.
Sadly, D. Trump’s policy on the energy dimension of the Russian-Ukrainian war is also inconsistent. Instead of applying firm pressure on Russia to force it into an energy truce, he has begun accusing Ukraine of causing a global shortage of diesel fuel and driving up its prices as a result of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strikes on Russian oil refineries. Even though Ukraine’s actions are nothing more than a response to the war unleashed by Russia. It is therefore it depends on Russia whether Ukraine will carry out strikes against Russian oil refining facilities. This, in turn, will determine diesel fuel prices.
However, Russia’s suspension of diesel fuel exports due to damage caused by Defence Forces of Ukraine to its refineries does not have a critical impact on the situation in the global energy market. It is not Ukraine’s actions that are destabilizing the market, but the USA’s war against Iran, which has significantly hampered – and in some cases even halted – the passage of tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. In September this year, this was compounded by the actions of Iran’s allies – the Yemeni Houthis – who took control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, the global movement of oil tankers has been severely paralyzed. Therefore, it is D. Trump who is to blame for the rise in global prices for oil and petroleum products, having launched a war against Iran without proper preparation or analysis of its consequences. That is why it has dragged on, leading to the problems mentioned above. It is now one of the main factors undermining the credibility of D. Trump and the Republican Party. And he, as President, is trying to shift the blame onto Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow may also be influencing D. Trump on this issue through his inner circle. In this way, it is attempting to halt Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, which are having extremely negative consequences for Russia.
At the same time, in any case, D. Trump will still be forced to put pressure on Russia to encourage it to agree to an energy truce, as pandering to it will further damage his pre-election image. First and foremost, this will involve compelling India to abandon the purchase of Russian oil. Otherwise, this would risk a significant increase in tariffs on imports of Indian goods into the USA. D. Trump can now do this by invoking the Lindsey Graham Act. Although he took similar steps last autumn and succeeded in getting India to stop importing Russian hydrocarbons.
Forcing China to stop buying oil from Russia will be much more difficult, as Washington raising tariffs on Chinese goods would have negative consequences for the USA itself due to the disruption of the USA-China trade balance. In this regard, the USA is likely to try and involve China in exerting pressure on Russia through negotiations. This issue may be discussed during D. Trump’s meeting with President of the PRC Xi Jinping on 24 September this year in the USA. That is, of course, provided the meeting is not cancelled.
The positions of Ukraine and the USA on an energy and maritime truce may be agreed in advance by V. Zelenskyy and D. Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York on 21–23 September this year.
Pressure from D. Trump, in the form of new sanctions against Russia, may force Putin to negotiate an energy truce with Ukraine. All the more so if this is backed up by pressure from China. At the same time, the Kremlin will still drag its feet on this, hoping to achieve its aims regarding Ukraine by continuing to strike at its energy infrastructure. In fact, this is already happening in practice. According to a statement by the Russian dictator’s press secretary, D. Peskov, Russia is willing to agree to an energy truce with Ukraine. However, he stated that this would be conditional on ensuring the free movement of tankers carrying Russian oil, as well as the lifting of sanctions on Russia’s oil exports.
Besides, even in the best-case scenario, a number of issues will arise that will require complex negotiations. First and foremost, this concerns the definition of the list of targets off-limits to strikes, particularly if that list is extended beyond the strictly energy sector, as Ukraine is proposing. For instance, Moscow may demand that Ukraine cease attacking its oil refineries, but may not agree to recognise as ‘critical’ those targets identified by Ukraine. In particular, this could apply to railways, water supply, sewerage systems, warehouses and shopping centres.
There will also be a need to establish a system to monitor compliance with the energy ceasefire and to ensure accountability for any breaches. Without this, the ceasefire process is highly likely to be derailed. This is evidenced by events in the Donbas between 2015 and 2021, when Russia and the “DPR” and “LPR” repeatedly violated the terms of the ceasefire set out in the Minsk Agreements. Nevertheless, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (in the Donbas) and the permanent mechanism for monitoring and verifying the ceasefire under US supervision, which was proposed by the Coalition of the Willing in January 2026, could serve as models for a system to monitor compliance with the terms of the energy ceasefire.
Ultimately, only Ukraine’s own actions will be able to deter Russia and compel it to honour the energy truce and other types of ceasefire. As mentioned above, Ukraine will acquire such capabilities once it possesses long-range ballistic missiles.
Consequently, in the near future, Ukraine will come very close to matching Russia in terms of air strike capabilities and air and missile defence capabilities.
This will not only make it more difficult for Moscow to carry out its plans to force Kyiv to capitulate by destroying Ukraine’s energy system, but will also put Russia’s energy sector at risk of major attacks. This state of affairs is forcing Moscow to complicate the energy truce with Ukraine. The USA and China could ultimately put pressure on the Russians, although D. Trump continues to pursue an ambiguous and inconsistent policy. As a result, Russia will drag out negotiations on this issue, seeking to avoid new sanctions from the USA and to buy time to achieve its objectives regarding Ukraine.
Besides, additional problems will arise from the need to resolve a number of complex issues, including agreeing on a list of targets off-limits to strikes, as well as establishing a system to monitor compliance with the terms of the energy truce and accountability for breaches thereof.
Nevertheless, Ukraine may have a chance of getting through the winter without catastrophic consequences, which would enable it to continue putting up fierce resistance to Russia.
Yurii Mykhailenko,
Institute for Global Politics
