Russia “Igniting” a New Cold War in the Arctic Region

The Arctic, once a zone of low tension and pragmatic cooperation, has become one of the key theaters of strategic competition between NATO and Russia since 2022. This year’s reports from Norway’s military intelligence, Police Security Service (PST [1]), and National Security Directorate (NSM [2]) clearly indicate that Moscow has moved to a hybrid offensive. The use of civilian vessels for espionage, pressure on Svalbard, and the threat of sabotage against critical infrastructure are all elements of a new reality in which Norway is becoming the main target of Russian influence on the Alliance’s northern flank.

At the beginning of the 21st  century, the Arctic was still perceived in international debates as a peripheral region, relatively stable and based on pragmatic cooperation between Arctic states. The functioning of mechanisms such as the Arctic Council [3], joint research projects, and coordination of rescue operations contributed to the narrative of so-called Arctic exceptionalism, according to which, even in conditions of global tension, this region was to remain a zone of low conflict risk. However, as analysts at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI) [4] point out, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 led to the final collapse of this paradigm.

The suspension of cooperation with Russia within the Arctic Council and restrictions on military dialogue have led to the region being included in the broader logic of Russia’s strategic confrontation with the West. In this sense, it is no longer a separate theater of war, but an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security system. These conclusions are confirmed by the events of recent years. Experts have repeatedly emphasized that after 2022, the Arctic has become one of the key areas of NATO-Russia rivalry, and the security dynamics in the region increasingly resembles other “gray zones” dominated by activities below the threshold of open conflict.

The Importance of the Arctic for Russia

From Moscow’s point of view, the Arctic is of fundamental and multifaceted importance. As noted in the Norwegian military intelligence report “Focus 2026: Assessment of Current Security Challenges”,  this region is one of the pillars of Russia’s military doctrine. A significant part of Russia’s nuclear deterrent potential is concentrated on the Kola Peninsula and in its immediate vicinity, including the Northern Fleet’s strategic submarines, command infrastructure, early warning systems, and elements of air and missile defense.

At the same time, the Arctic is economically and strategically important to Russia. Melting ice and climate change are increasing the region’s accessibility and extending the shipping season, which is contributing to the development of the Northern Sea Route. Moscow sees this route as a potential tool for strengthening its economic and geopolitical position, especially in the context of sanctions and limited access to Western markets. Although these ambitions are limited in practice by technological and financial challenges, this does not diminish Russia’s strategic determination in the region.

Norway As a Key target of the RF’s Intelligence Interest

Norway plays a special role in this security architecture. According to this year’s National Threat Assessment prepared by the PST, Norway is the focus of Russian intelligence. Oslo expects a significant increase in Russia’s activity on Norwegian territory this year, with the northern regions and the Svalbard archipelago predicted to be particularly vulnerable.

According to the PST, this increase is directly linked to the increased presence of NATO allies in the region [5], an increase in military exercises [6], and the expansion of critical defense infrastructure on Norwegian territory. The PST emphasizes that all these factors increase Russia’s interest in obtaining both military and civilian intelligence data. The RF  considers Norway to be a particularly important country for three main reasons:

1. This is determined by Norway’s geographical location in the Arctic, in close proximity to key Russian military facilities on the Kola Peninsula and areas of activity of the Northern Fleet.
2. Norway plays a central role as the main exporter of natural gas to Europe, which has become particularly important after the reduction of energy supplies from Russia and has strengthened its position in the European energy security system.
3. Norway serves as a logistics and operational base for NATO, allowing it to deploy forces, conduct training, and maintain an allied presence on the Alliance’s northern flank.

PST analysts emphasize that this combination of military, energy, and logistical factors puts Norway “in the crosshairs” of Russian intelligence activities. This activity is not limited to classic espionage, it also includes cyber operations, attempts to recruit agents, and influence operations aimed at weakening Norway’s ability to support Ukraine and undermining public confidence in state institutions. These conclusions are consistent with assessments by leading think tanks, which indicate that the pressure exerted on Norway should be viewed in the broader context of Russia’s strategy to influence key European countries that actively support Ukraine. From this perspective, Norway is not an end in itself, but rather part of a broader strategic puzzle in which Moscow seeks to weaken Western unity, increase the cost of supporting Kyiv, and test the resilience of NATO member states to sustained pressure below the threshold of open armed conflict.

Spitsbergen – an Area of Special Strategic Sensitivity

The Spitsbergen archipelago occupies a special place in the assessments of the Norwegian security services. Growing tensions between Russia and NATO have given the archipelago new strategic significance. According to the Norwegian authorities,  its formally demilitarized status and special legal regime under the Svalbard Treaty [7] make it vulnerable to intelligence activities and influence operations.

According to the PST, both Russia and China are showing growing interest in scientific, economic, and infrastructure activities on Svalbard. These activities could be used as a cover for obtaining strategic information. This is consistent with the conclusions of the “Focus-2026 Report”, which identifies Svalbard as an area of particular sensitivity, where the absence of a military presence facilitates operations below the threshold of war. Norwegian military intelligence emphasizes that Russia views Svalbard not only as an object of operational interest, but also as a tool for testing Norway’s ability to enforce administrative sovereignty and relevant regulations. In this context, the Norwegian government has tightened control over the sale of real estate and land in the archipelago, fearing that such acquisitions could have far-reaching consequences for national security.

Maritime Espionage and the Use of  “Civilian” Cover

One of the most characteristic elements of Russia’s current Arctic activities, which is very difficult to counteract, is its systematic use of civilian resources for intelligence activities. This allows Moscow to operate below the threshold of open confrontation and avoid direct state responsibility. According to PST analysts, Russian citizens working as crew members on merchant, fishing, and support vessels pose a significant and growing counterintelligence threat to Norway.

According to estimates by Norwegian intelligence services, this mechanism combines intelligence activities with normal maritime traffic, which makes it much more difficult to detect and document. Russian sailors, technicians, and communications officers [8] can conduct surveillance and collect intelligence  during normal voyages without the need for specialized military or research units. Such activities include monitoring NATO ship movements, observing port infrastructure, documenting security procedures, and identifying vulnerabilities in the protection of energy and logistics facilities.

Russian crews are not limited to ships flying the Russian flag. They are increasingly working on ships registered in third countries, including countries offering so-called “flags of convenience” [9], and in some cases also on ships serving Norwegian or international shipowners. This pattern of behavior makes it even more difficult to identify the affiliation of these “sailors” and makes it difficult for government agencies to assess whether a particular activity is purely commercial in nature or serves intelligence purposes.

From the perspective of the Norwegian special services, the presence of Russian crews on civilian vessels allows for the systematic reconnaissance of critical infrastructure, including gas terminals, offshore installations, submarine telecommunications cables, and power lines. This data, as stated in this year’s “National Threat Assessment”, can have dual applications: on the one hand, it can be used in ongoing intelligence operations, and on the other, it can serve as a preparatory basis for potential acts of sabotage or hybrid pressure in case  of a crisis escalation.

The PST report also points out  that the use of civilian vessels allows Russia to test the response of Norwegian institutions responsible for sea, port, and energy security. Even legal port calls or scheduled maintenance work can provide an opportunity to observe crisis response procedures, response times, and the degree of coordination between civilian and military structures. According to analysts, such activities in peacetime constitute de facto reconnaissance of facilities, carried out in a manner that is difficult to challenge under international law.

In the aforementioned National Threat Assessment, Russian crews of civilian vessels registered in third countries are clearly identified as one of the key challenges to Norway’s maritime security in 2026. The document emphasizes that this is part of a broader Russian strategy of combining economic, logistical, and research activities with intelligence objectives. This strategy allows for long-term intelligence operations without the political risk associated with the use of overt military means. Therefore, Norwegian intelligence agencies view Russia’s civilian maritime activities not as a random phenomenon, but as a permanent and systemic component of strategic competition in the Arctic, requiring enhanced counterintelligence surveillance, better civil-military coordination, and increased awareness of threats from actors operating in the maritime and energy sectors.

Sabotage, Cyberspace, and Below-the-Threshold -of -War  Operations

Russian activities in the Arctic are increasingly taking the form of open demonstrations of force and increasingly following the logic of “below–the–threshold–of–war” operations. Norwegian intelligence services are analyzing scenarios that include cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, disruption of communication systems, and disinformation campaigns. The NSM’s “Risks–2026”  report adds to the threat assessment presented in other intelligence reports by focusing not so much on the intentions of state actors as on the structural vulnerabilities of the Norwegian security system. NSM points out that the key problem is not only the scale of potential hostile actions, but also the high level of interdependence between energy, digital, transport, and logistics infrastructure, which increases the state’s vulnerability to local disruptions.

From the NSM perspective, the modern state functions as a system of systems, in which a disruption to one element – even a limited one – can lead to cascading effects that impact subsequent sectors of the economy and governance. The report says that Norway’s critical infrastructure, including energy systems, telecommunications networks, and digital solutions used in public administration and logistics, is becoming increasingly integrated, which increases efficiency but also increases systemic risk.

The NSM emphasizes that in such an environment, sabotage or cyberattacks do not necessarily have to be large-scale to have strategic consequences. Interference with selected nodes, such as control systems, data centers, or transmission infrastructure, may be sufficient to disrupt energy supplies, communications, or decision-making processes. Such scenarios are particularly relevant in the context of hybrid threats, which remain below the threshold of armed conflict but can exert significant political and economic pressure.

The “Risks–2026” report also points out that cyberattacks, sabotage, and information manipulation can reinforce each other, increasing the effects of destabilization. Technical failures can lead to social uncertainty, undermine trust in state institutions, and hinder crisis management, which in turn increases the country’s vulnerability to further pressure.

This form of influence is attractive to Russia because it allows it to influence NATO countries without having to take measures that would clearly trigger collective defense mechanisms. Pressure exerted through sabotage, cyber operations, or infrastructure disruptions allows Russia to test the resilience of Western states, forcing them to incur additional economic and political costs and influencing public debate, while maintaining a high level of uncertainty about the perpetrator.

Therefore, as noted in the NSM report, the key challenge for Norway and its allies is not only to protect individual critical infrastructure assets, but also to strengthen the resilience of the entire system, including the ability to quickly detect disruptions, effectively coordinate actions between sectors, and maintain the continuity of state functioning under prolonged hybrid pressure.

NATO’s Response and the Importance of the Arctic Theater of Operations

Growing threats do not go unanswered. In early 2026, NATO began planning for an enhanced presence and new security mechanisms in the Arctic, including increased monitoring, enhanced cooperation between intelligence agencies, and the development of capabilities to respond to hybrid threats. However, experts cited by BISI emphasize that limited military dialogue and reduced transparency in the region increase the risk of misunderstandings and uncontrolled escalation. In this sense, the Arctic is becoming a laboratory for a new type of strategic competition, the consequences of which may also be felt in other regions of Europe, including NATO’s eastern flank.

Although these processes are concentrated in the Far North, their consequences extend far beyond the Arctic. The Russian model of operations in the region, combining espionage, economic pressure, sabotage, and influence operations, can also be applied in other parts of Europe. The integrated findings of the “Focus–2026”, National Threat Assessment, and “Risks–2026” studies, supplemented by BISI analysis, lead to a clear conclusion: the threat posed by Russia in the Arctic is long-term, systemic, and growing.

Espionage, sabotage, cyber operations, and hybrid warfare have become fundamental tools of rivalry, and Norway, together with the Svalbard archipelago, now finds itself in one of the most sensitive areas of this confrontation. Thus, the Arctic is no longer a “remote region”,  but rather a central element of the European and Euro-Atlantic security system, whose stability directly affects the security of NATO as a whole.

Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations

Notes:

[1] PST is an acronym for Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste. A special service subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Functions: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, combating organized crime, ensuring internal security, protecting the royal family and senior officials.

[2] NSM — acronym for Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet. A special service subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Functions: protection of classified information, ensuring the security of digital infrastructure, development of cryptographic systems and products for information protection.

[3] The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum  that  deals with issues concerning the Arctic countries and their indigenous peoples. The Council brings together eight countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. It also includes a number of countries and international organizations with observer status. In August 2024, the Arctic Council resumed cooperation with Russia, which had been frozen in March 2022 due to the RF’s war against Ukraine.

[4] BISI is an acronym for Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute. An independent think tank founded by a group of graduate students from University College London as a platform for discussing and addressing the most pressing security issues in the world. Bloomsbury is a district of London that is home to numerous cultural, intellectual, and educational institutions.

[5] In early February 2026, British Defense Secretary John Healey named Russia as the main threat in the Arctic and announced that London would be stepping up its defense efforts in the region. In particular, there are plans to increase the number of British troops in Norway from 1,000 to 2,000 over the next three years.

[6] In March 2026, Norway, Finland, and Sweden will host NATO’s large-scale “Cold Response” military exercise, which will enhance the allies’ ability to defend strategically important facilities in the fjords and mountains. The UK will send 1,500 special forces marines to Norway. In September 2026, “Lion Protector” exercise will be held, during which hundreds of British-led Joint Expeditionary Force troops will be deployed to Iceland, the Danish Straits, and Norway to train in protecting critical infrastructure from attacks and sabotage and to strengthen joint command capabilities.

[7] A document signed on February 9, 1920, which defined the international legal status of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) archipelago. Under the treaty, Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago, which was previously considered no man’s land, was established, and the states party to the treaty were granted equal rights to exploit the natural resources of the archipelago and its territorial waters. Norway undertook not to build or allow the creation of naval bases or fortifications on the archipelago and not to use it for military purposes. The USSR acceded to the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1935. In 1947, the Norwegian Parliament recognized that the USSR was a state that, along with Norway, had special economic interests in Svalbard. Since 1991, these rights have been transferred to Russia.

[8] According to Vice Admiral Rune Andersen, Chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Staff, weekly communication with the Russian military in the Arctic continues, as this is a matter of security. The Russian military group in the Arctic includes the 14th  Army Corps, the 80th  Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the Arctic Trifolium base.

[9] “Flag of Convenience” (or “Cheap Flag”) is an economic and legal term used to describe the set of conditions provided by a country’s government to non-residents – owners of foreign ships who are willing to sail under the flag of the country providing these conditions.