Putin’s “Crusade” Against the Patriarchate of Constantinople
On January 12, 2026, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) published a statement in which Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was called “the antichrist in a cassock”, “the devil incarnate”, and “a false prophet”. According to experts, the form and language of this official statement was not typical for a state body, but rather resembled an information operation. It contained biblical quotations, apocalyptic images, and direct accusations of the hierarch’s cooperation with British secret services. This moment is crucial, as the change of the main actor means a change in the nature of the conflict. The dispute, which until then had taken place mainly in the sphere of canonical and ecclesiastical diplomacy, was taken over by the state apparatus and transferred to the security sphere.
The origins of the current escalation date back to 2018, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Since then, Constantinople has been the target of countless attacks from Russian church and political circles. Moscow saw this decision as undermining its historical role and encroaching on Russia’s sphere of religious influence. The result was clear: the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) lost its jurisdictional monopoly in Ukraine, and the Kremlin lost one of its key instruments of political influence. From that moment on, the dispute ceased to be exclusively theological and began to take on a strategic dimension.
The ROC’s Relationship with the State Apparatus
After 2018, there was a clear shift in the role of the ROC, which included its systematic integration into the ideological apparatus of the state. It became one of the pillars of the “Russian World” narrative, and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow began to play the role of the central legitimizer of the Kremlin’s policies, the aggression against Ukraine included [2]. After the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church openly blessed the so-called “special military operation”, presenting it as a defense of “Russian civilization” and “traditional values”, which clearly integrated the church institution into the state’s propaganda efforts.
This process is structural, not just personal. According to the conclusions of the American think tank Atlantic Council, the ROC is an integral part of the Russian Federation’s “ecosystem of influence”, where religious, cultural, and informational tools are coordinated with the activities of security agencies, including the FSB, GRU, and SVR. Analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations share this view, pointing out that the ROC serves as a conduit for soft power, an infrastructure of influence in diasporas, and a cover for information operations, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
The Kremlin constantly uses religious language to sacralize state goals, and the speeches of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow increasingly coincide with the key lines of official propaganda. Russian authorities view the ROC as a strategic partner in shaping public attitudes to the war and the West. Since 2022, the ROC’s messages have been almost completely synchronized with the state narrative, which portrays the conflict as an existential struggle rather than a political dispute [3].
Security researchers also point out that the ROC serves as a conduit for military ideology and an element of social mobilization, supporting the state’s efforts in the information sphere. Besides, the ROC is used by the Kremlin as an instrument of influence in the countries of the former USSR and diasporas, which coincides with the interests of Russia’s special services.
This has led to a qualitative change: religion has ceased to be an autonomous sphere of public life but has become an element of state infrastructure, integrated into the mechanism of projecting power, influence, and legitimization. This means that actions against the Ecumenical Patriarchate are no longer simply ecclesiastical polemics, but should be interpreted as the protection of an instrument of influence. When Constantinople weakens Moscow’s position with its decision on autocephaly and support for the independence of local churches, the reaction concerns not only doctrine or canons, but also targets an element of the state system.
In this logic, as Western experts point out, the attack on Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is not an emotional or accidental reaction, but stems from the perception of Constantinople as an actor that truly undermines Russia’s architecture of influence. That is why the FSB was involved in the conflict – when an ideological tool is under threat, the state resorts to security instruments.
Real Erosion of Influence: Ukraine, the Baltics, the Balkans
Recent years have brought further losses for Russia. Since 2022, dozens of clergymen of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) have been detained on charges of collaborating with Russian special services. The case of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (in particular, its abbot Pavlo Lebid [4]) demonstrated the use of church structures for pro-Russian and information activities.
At the same time, in 2025, Estonia passed a law limiting the influence of foreign structures on churches. Moscow perceived these actions as a threat to its infrastructure of influence in the Baltic region. In the Balkans, Russian networks of influence, relying on church circles in Serbia and Montenegro [5], are also increasingly suffering defeats. The consequences of this are systemic. The space in which Russia could use Orthodoxy as a political and operational tool has begun to shrink significantly.
Special Services Intervene in the Conflict
It is in this context that the above-mentioned statement by the FSB should be read. It accused Patriarch Bartholomew of “dismembering Orthodox Ukraine”, planning to “expel Russian Orthodoxy from the Baltic states”, cooperating with “British secret services”, and intending to grant autocephaly to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church [6] in order to “deal a blow to the particularly recalcitrant Serbian Orthodox Church”. This is an unprecedented example of an intelligence service taking on the role of an actor in a religious dispute, formally transferring the conflict into the realm of information operations and state security.
The language used by the FSB press office also deserves special attention. Here, there is a “theologization” of the intelligence services, i.e., the deliberate use of religious vocabulary for political purposes. This tactic serves several functions at once. It mobilizes domestic public opinion, polarizes the international community, and delegitimizes the opponent.
Russian authorities increasingly present the conflict with the West in quasi-religious terms, as a struggle against “Satanism”. In this context, labeling Bartholomew as the “Antichrist” is not an emotional ploy, but rather part of a broader narrative strategy. The opponent is presented not as a partner in a dispute, but as an existential threat with whom negotiations are impossible.
Constantinople’s Reaction
The Ecumenical Patriarchate responded promptly to Moscow’s accusations. On January 13, 2026, a brief statement was published expressing “deep sadness” over “fictitious scenarios”, “fake news”, and “insults from propagandists”. The Phanar [7] emphasized that the attack was coming from Russian state authorities, not from the Russian Orthodox Church.
It follows that Constantinople does not want to engage in theological or political polemics, but instead identifies the author and qualifies the action as a state operation. The refusal to engage in symmetrical escalation is a deliberate strategy of de-escalation.
An analysis of a series of events reveals a consistent mechanism of escalation, in which each stage logically follows from the previous one. The 2018 decision by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine led to Russia losing its jurisdictional monopoly in the region, thereby weakening one of the key instruments of Russian influence. In response, the Russian Orthodox Church deepened its integration with the state apparatus, leading to the integration of religion into the Russian governmentэs political strategy as an element of ideological infrastructure.
In the following years, this process deepened against the background of a real erosion of influence – both in Ukraine and in the Baltic and Balkan countries – where governments and church communities began to distance themselves from Moscow. With the reduction of the ROC’s sphere of influence as a political tool, the state apparatus in the form of the FSB was drawn into the conflict, signaling that the dispute had moved into the realm of information operations and state security.
The characteristic use of theological language in the SVR – references to the “antichrist”, “devil”, and “false prophets” – was not accidental, but aimed at simultaneous internal mobilization, extreme polarization of the message, and delegitimization of the opponent. The reaction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which clearly pointed to the state nature of the attack and refused to engage in symmetrical escalation, ended this chain of events, shifting the interpretation of the conflict from the theological level to the level of inter-state relations.
“Orthodox” Putin Against World Orthodoxy
The media often refer to Russia’s confrontation with the civilized world as Putin’s “crusade” against the West. This time, the Kremlin leader, who likes to demonstrate his piety (though only on major church holidays), has opened a “second front” against global Orthodoxy, one of whose key figures is Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. He is the head of many interchurch communities, speaking on behalf of the entire Church not only at political forums but also at interchurch meetings, initiating many processes in global Orthodoxy.
Moscow calls its war against the Euro-Atlantic community, and now against Constantinople, which is the historical and spiritual center of world Orthodoxy, the defense of “traditional values”. In reality, this pseudo-religious obsession is madness that masks the Kremlin’s usurpation, lies, and neo-imperial ambitions.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
Notes:
[1] The Patriarchate of Constantinople considers the territory of the Kyiv Metropolis within the borders of 1686 (i.e., at least Ukraine and Belarus) to be its canonical territory. Its annexation to the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) was carried out without the consent and approval of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, under whose jurisdiction the Kyiv Metropolis was at that time. The Ecumenical Patriarchate twice condemned this subordination as uncanonical by its conciliar decision.
[2] For more details on this topic, see: “The Russian Orthodox Church Has Always Been at the Service of the Empire” // https://bintel.org.ua/analytics/rosijska-pravoslavna-cerkva-zavzhdi-bula-na-sluzhbi-imperiyi/? fbclid=IwY2xjawF8UXVleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHZJiOAAk1qrjeMyB1llwB0YedYjD1J0OxZuMyYJpCcxq_mkxXLCxXnJ9uQ_aem_qZurfckUzhemW7AdqBiNEg
[3] The Kremlin is reviving the theological and political concept of “Moscow – the Third Rome”, according to which Russia is the successor to the Roman and Byzantine empires.
[4] Metropolitan Pavlo is an odious bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, abbot of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (1994-2023), known for scandals, a luxurious lifestyle, and pro-Russian views. Since 2023, he has been under investigation by the Security Service of Ukraine on suspicion of inciting religious hatred and justifying Russian aggression.
[5] The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) is an autocephalous local church of Serbia, also widespread in areas inhabited by Serbs in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the rest of the world. It is traditionally considered a satellite of the Russian Orthodox Church. The SOC does not recognize the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, calling it “unrepentant schismatics”. However, Serbian Patriarch Porfirije does not oppose the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church in principle, but only disagrees with the methods by which it was granted.
[6] The Montenegrin Orthodox Church is one of the non-canonical Orthodox churches, covering some Orthodox parishes in Montenegro and the diaspora. In October 1993, it declared independence from the Serbian Orthodox Church, but its autocephaly is not recognized by any of the canonical Orthodox churches. Since 2024, with the support of the state authorities, it has been trying to obtain a tomos from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
[7] Phanar is a historic district in Istanbul where the residence of the Ecumenical Patriarch is located. This name is sometimes used as a synonym for the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
