Moldova as Russia’s Military Springboard. An Alleged Threat or Reality?
Since the 1990s, the political situation in Moldova has resembled a “seesaw”, with pro-European and pro-Russian forces coming to power in turn. However, the country’s foreign policy has not changed fundamentally;
The parliamentary elections in Moldova at the end of September 2025 consolidated the position of pro-European forces, but this does not mean that they have won definitively. After the next elections, the situation may change, as is happening in many European countries;
However, even if pro-Russian parties manage to return to power in Moldova, Moscow will not be able to use them to significantly strengthen its position in the country, let alone turn it into a military springboard;
Under such circumstances, it would be virtually impossible for Moscow to attack Ukraine and Europe from Moldovan territory. At the same time, if conditions become favorable for Russia, it will be able to use Moldova to carry out provocations.
The parliamentary elections in Moldova in September brought to the fore the issue of possible threats to Ukraine and Europe emanating from that country. This was the main topic discussed by experts on the eve of the Moldovan elections.
Among such threats, the strengthening of the positions of pro-Russian forces in Moldova’s Parliament and their gaining a parliamentary majority were considered to be the most important. According to political observers, victory in the elections would have allowed them to appoint their own government and change Moldova’s foreign policy, reorienting it towards Russia. This, in turn, would have given Moscow the opportunity to create a springboard in Moldova to open a “second front” against Ukraine and attack Europe.
At the same time, it was pointed out that Russia was capable of destabilizing the situation in Moldova and provoking another armed conflict on its territory if pro-European forces won. According to experts’ forecasts, this would have been a powerful source of instability for the whole of Europe, weakening its ability to resist Russia.
It is great that nothing like this happened. Despite Russia’s active information campaign and other measures to support its puppets in Moldova, pro-European parties of a national-democratic orientation achieved a confident victory. This can be considered a personal achievement of President of Moldova Maia Sandu, who took tough measures to counter Russian influence. She managed to cope with this problem thanks to the support of the European Union and Ukraine. Moscow’s efforts to implement its plans to establish control over Moldova, or at least to strengthen its influence over it, were prevented by certain actions.
At the same time, parliamentary elections in Moldova are not the last ones and do not guarantee that the situation will never change. Therefore, the above-mentioned threats will remain on the agenda. However, they are somewhat different in nature than most experts tend to believe. Therefore, it makes sense to consider this issue in more detail. After all, Moldova will remain our neighbor, so it is important to understand what is really happening there. To more clearly define the main aspects concerning Moldova, let us break them down into several blocks.
Firstly, since the 1990s, the political situation in Moldova has resembled a “seesaw,” with pro-European and pro-Russian parties alternately coming to power. At the same time, Moldova’s foreign policy has does not undergo any fundamental changes. Only the rhetoric of the country’s leadership changes, and even then not very significantly.
In particular, from 2016 to 2020, the president of Moldova was the leader of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, I. Dodon, with his openly pro-Russian views. However, under him, Moldova did not abandon EU accession, just postponed it. Nor did it enter any integration associations with Russia. He did not take any negative steps towards Ukraine. On the contrary, he maintained normal relations with it. He did not recognize the “Russian” status of Crimea and the “LPR” and “DPR.”
The current president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, is a representative of the pro-European Action and Justice Party. She has intensified her country’s European course, but it still does not match Ukraine’s achievements in this sphere. And there is no question of Moldova joining NATO. Sandu also refrains from sharply criticizing Russia’s actions.
In other words, regardless of who is in power, Moldova’s course remains centrist, with some variation in the rhetoric of the country’s leaders. This is quite understandable and can be explained quite simply. Moldova is critically dependent on the EU, Romania, and Ukraine, which ensure the functioning of its economy, and therefore cannot contradict their interests. Their share in Moldova’s foreign trade is 65 %, while Russia’s is only 2.5 %. In addition, the EU and Romania fully supply Moldova with gas and petroleum products and partially with electricity.
This situation became particularly evident after 2022, when trade between Moldova and Russia through Ukraine completely ceased, and they were unable to establish trade bypassing Ukraine due to the economic inconvenience of such a process. Therefore, Moldovan businesses, including those linked to pro-Russian forces, have largely reoriented themselves towards Europe. This was fairly easy to do, as a significant portion of Moldovan citizens, including the leaders of pro-Russian parties, also have citizenship of Romania, which is a member of the EU.
Given this state of affairs, regardless of who is in power, Moldova will not be able to fully side with Russia in order to start a confrontation with the European Union, Romania, and Ukraine. At the same time, any Moldovan government tries to avoid excessive tension in relations with Russia.
These circumstances explain the position and actions of I. Dodon and M. Sandu. In this regard, the parliamentary elections in September 2025 were crucial for Moldova in terms of maintaining favorable conditions for continuing its European course and normal development of relations with Romania and Ukraine. This is quite beneficial for our state.
Similar political “swings” with the same consequences are observed in most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe. However, there are some exceptions. One of them was the parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 2023, during which its pro-European forces lost to pro-Russian ones. As a result, its foreign policy also changed.
Secondly, even if openly pro-Russian forces came to power in Moldova and changed its course, Russia would still not be able to use it as a springboard to open a second front against Ukraine, let alone attack Europe and “march on Berlin and Paris.”
To do this, in addition to such a springboard, Russia would also need troops there, which it does not have. Contrary to reports from many Moscow experts, there are only two Russian battalions in Moldova, specifically in Transnistria. This is all that remains there of the former 14th Army of the Odessa Military District of the USSR Armed Forces, and it is now part of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. One of them guards the warehouses of the former 14th Army, while the other performs peacekeeping functions on the administrative border between Moldova and Transnistria (in the Transnistrian conflict zone).
Incidentally, they are only officially Russian in name. Their personnel consists of local residents who have Russian citizenship. Most of them also have citizenship of Transnistria (so-called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic — PMR), Romania, and Ukraine. In addition, since 2014, they have been completely cut off from Russia by Ukraine. Romania and Moldova do not allow Russian military personnel or supplies to enter Transnistria either.
Therefore, Russian troops in Moldova do not have the necessary numbers, proper weapons, sufficient training, or motivation to wage war, which would make it possible to create a “second front” against Ukraine on their base. This is simply impossible. Not to mention the aforementioned “marches on Berlin and Paris.”
Russia will not be able to do this even if it tries to involve the so-called armed forces of the PMR in such a task. It has been stated that they have four motorized rifle brigades. In reality, they are no more than battalions, and in fact, they are paramilitary formations. Besides, they have a limited amount of heavy and extremely outdated weapons, which they inherited from the former 14th Army. Their main task is to defend the self-proclaimed republic from possible attempts by Moldova to forcibly restore its territorial integrity, as Azerbaijan did with Nagorno-Karabakh. This is what they are intended for, not an attack on Ukraine or Europe.
In the best-case scenario, Russia wouldl be able to form no more than two units in Transnistria, resembling motorized rifle brigades with extremely limited offensive capabilities and no air support. They would also lack the necessary logistics, as the PMR is unable to provide them. As for the depots of the former 14th Army, which are located on the territory of the self-proclaimed republic, they would be immediately destroyed by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. Therefore, such a grouping of Russian-Transnistrian troops would be defeated even by the forces of Ukraine’s territorial defense.
However, this scenario is purely fantasy. Just as fantasy is the possibility of Russia drawing Moldova to its side if pro-Russian forces come to power there. Even if Moldova suddenly becomes like today’s Belarus (which is impossible in its situation), it will not mean that it will enter the war against Ukraine. By the way, Belarus, which is completely dependent on Russia, has not yet dared to do so. Moldova, which is sufficiently dependent on the EU, will not dare either.
Russia is also unable to increase its troop numbers there. Moldova does not share a border with Russia. In fact, it has no access to the sea. Therefore, Russian troops would have to break through to Moldova by landing a marine assault force on the coast of Ukraine or Romania, or by air, again through Ukrainian or Romanian airspace.
It should be noted that Russia was unable to land its marine assault force on the coast of Ukraine’s Odesa region even in 2022, when we had fewer capabilities to repel such an attack. Therefore, it will not be able to do so now. The same can be said about Romania as a NATO member. In addition to its own Armed Forces, Romania hosts the Alliance’s multinational Southeast Corps and one of the divisions of the US Army’s 5th Corps. Russia has neither additional marine forces, nor a sufficient number of landing ships, nor strike assets that could pave the way for a landing.
Russia will not be able to break through to Moldova by air either. All of its aircraft, especially transport aircraft, will be shot down by the Ukrainian Air Force over the Black Sea. Perhaps Romania and its NATO partners will not rush to destroy them with the first shot, but they will not allow regular flights to be established. And Moscow will not dare to take such risky actions.
Therefore, there is no point in continuing to discuss this topic. In fact, the most Russia can do is to organize provocations on the border between Transnistria and Ukraine. But this will be associated with a number of problems that are difficult for Russia to resolve, as discussed below.
Thirdly, Transnistria, which is Russia’s main stronghold in Moldova, is in a completely different situation than Abkhazia or South Ossetia, which are also self-proclaimed republics in Georgia. All of them are supported by Russia and survive at its expense. But Abkhazia and South Ossetia share borders with Russia and are integrated into the Russian economy. This does not apply to Transnistria. Strange as it might seem, despite the PMR’s apparent independence, it is integrated into the economy of Moldova, not Russia. This is because Transnistria is located between Moldova and Ukraine, so it can only have economic ties with them and access foreign markets through them. In this situation, Chisinau allows Transnistrian businesses to operate in Moldova and transit their goods through its territory, but only on condition that Transnistrian firms and companies are registered in Moldova. Most of them have to pay (and do pay) taxes to Moldova. The PMR is unable to resolve this issue through Ukraine, as our state is on Moldova’s side. And there are joint Ukrainian-Moldovan customs posts on the border between Transnistria and Ukraine. In addition, for the same reason as in Moldova, the PMR’s main trading partners are the EU and Ukraine, not Russia.
Furthermore, the PMR is supplied with gas directly through Romania and Moldova. It is Russian gas, but since the beginning of this year, the Russians have refused to supply it to Transnistria free of charge, as they did before. Now Moldova pays for it, and in fact, the EU pays for it.
Therefore, the PMR would not dare to carry out any large-scale provocations against Ukraine, as this would, at a minimum, lead to the loss of the Ukrainian market for Transnistrian businesses. And our state, together with Moldova, would be able to destroy the self-proclaimed republic economically. Therefore, the Transnistrian leadership did not dare to engage in any provocations.
Fourthly, Russia will obviously not be able to provoke increased internal tensions in Moldova, including anti-government protests. It will not be able to overthrow the Moldovan government or organize an armed conflict in this way, as it did in 1992 in Transnistria. This would require, at a minimum, armed groups that could oppose the government on the side of the opposition, rebels, or separatists. Without such forces, government security structures in most cases suppress such actions. For example, in 1992, separatist forces in Transnistria were supported by the command of the 14th Army, which was stationed in the region and subordinate to Russia, since Ukraine had refused such subordination.
That is why the Moldovan leadership, which at that time had no armed forces at all, failed to maintain control over Transnistria, where Russia had created the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. Incidentally, Russia used the same method to provoke armed conflicts and organize self-proclaimed republics in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and in the East of Ukraine. Russian troops were stationed in all those areas or were openly or covertly brought in across shared borders.
As already mentioned, there are currently no Russian troops in Moldova that could support the separatists. And it is practically impossible to infiltrate a sufficient number of militants, especially armed ones, through Ukraine or Romania. This did not happen. The leaders of pro-Russian forces in Moldova were unable to organize any protests in the country, despite their promises to do it immediately after the elections.
Indeed, in some cases, the country’s government can be overthrown without its opponents having armed formations, as happened in Ukraine during the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014. But then the national-democratic forces of Ukraine were massively supported by the Ukrainian population. In Moldova, pro-Russian forces do not have such support, as demonstrated by the parliamentary elections in the country in September.
Fifthly, Moldova’s geographical position between Romania and Ukraine necessitates close neighborly cooperation. Romania has been historically, and especially in recent decades, consistently integrating Moldova into its political, economic, and cultural space. Ukraine, on the other hand, is interested in stability on its western borders, especially during the war with Russia. Russia, in its desire to revive something similar to the USSR, is trying to create additional problems for this, primarily for Ukraine. This includes using Moldova. But in general, the situation in Moldova cannot particularly influence the situation in Europe, let alone destabilize it.
Thus, the results of the parliamentary elections in Moldova have strengthened its European course and become another failure for Russia in the post-Soviet space. This is precisely where their fateful significance lies.
At the same time, under any circumstances, even if pro-Russian forces come to power in Moldova, Russia will not be able to use it to open a “second front” against Ukraine or attack Europe. Russia does not have significant military forces in Moldova, and it will not be able to concentrate them there.
As a last resort, Russia could only organize political provocations against Ukraine through the pro-Russian authorities in Moldova, as Hungary and Slovakia are doing now. In addition, the threat of provocations on Ukraine’s border with Moldova and Transnistria could increase. This would create additional problems for Ukraine, but would not have any critical consequences.
The disturbing media response to the elections in Moldova was mainly created by Russian propaganda to weaken the position of pro-European forces in the Moldovan political space and spread negative expectations in Ukrainian society.
However, this does not mean that there is no need to adequately respond to threats to Ukraine that may arise from Moldova and Transnistria. In any case, they will arise. Therefore, there is a need to concentrate troops on the Moldovan direction and strengthen the border security regime, as well as to implement appropriate intelligence and counterintelligence measures.
Yurii Ilchenko,
Institute for Global Politics
