The European Union Has Been Establishing Its Own Intelligence Service. For Almost 30 Years…
Lately, the topic of creating the European Union’s own supranational intelligence service has been actively discussed in European security debates. The European Commission (EC) is currently working on a proposal for a new intelligence unit that will operate under the direct supervision of EC President Ursula von der Leyen. This initiative immediately raised the painful question of the distribution of sovereignty between member states and Brussels in such a sensitive area as national security, especially given that EU treaties assign it to national competence.
The roots of the debate on this topic date back to the 1990s, when the wars in the former Yugoslavia revealed the extent of European states’ dependence on American intelligence. At that time, European capitals became convinced that without its own analytical capabilities, the EU would not be able to pursue an independent security policy. This realization led to the creation in 1999 of the Situation Center (SITCEN), initiated by the then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Javier Solana, after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. SITCEN quickly established itself as the first European strategic analysis center, using both information from the scene and data from EU missions.
Over the following years, SITCEN evolved. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it was strengthened in terms of personnel and structure, and then merged with the EU Military Staff to form the Single Intelligence and Analysis Center (SIAC [2]). With the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS [3]), SITCEN was incorporated into it in 2011. A year later, it was reorganized into the EU Intelligence and Situation Center (EU-IntCEN), which retained its character as a synthesized unit. It does not conduct intelligence operations, does not have access to national signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) systems, and the quality of its analysis depends entirely on voluntary contributions from member states.
The limitations of these structures in 1999 – voluntary information sharing, no operational activities, and differences in strategic culture – have repeatedly led to renewed discussions about the need for deeper intelligence integration.
The last decade has shown that this problem has not disappeared but has deepened. The war in Ukraine, the increase in hybrid operations, sabotage of energy infrastructure, and uncertainty about the future of intelligence cooperation with the USA have clearly demonstrated that the existing EU system cannot keep up with the scale and pace of modern threats. The EU currently needs the tools to analyze data in real time or to integrate disparate reports from 27 member states into a single, coherent picture.
One of the most powerful impetuses aimed at rectifying the situation was former President of Finland Sauli Niinistö’s recommendation on October 30, 2024, prepared at the request of the European Commission. He called for creation of a full-fledged EU intelligence service capable not only of conducting strategic analysis, but also of countering sabotage and espionage in Europe, as well as influence operations in EU institutions [4]. Although the project was not implemented, it became a benchmark for subsequent attempts to reorganize the architecture of European intelligence.
Hope for Success or “Going Around in Circles”?
In this context, the EC’s return to the concept of own intelligence agency is not an institutional experiment, but a continuation of a long-standing, unfinished evolution. The problems identified during the Yugoslav wars – the lack of a common analytical system, complete dependence on national data, and chronic mistrust between states – remain unresolved.
What is officially described as a “small unit” has the potential to profoundly transform relations between EU institutions. According to foreign media reports, the EC is preparing a concept for an intelligence structure embedded in its General Secretariat and reporting directly to Ursula von der Leyen. The new unit has not yet been officially presented to all member states, but the Commission is working intensively to define its tasks, recruit staff, and regulate relations with existing EU bodies.
The EC President plans to create a unit which would collect and process information from national intelligence services and other EU sources in order to make better use of available data and strengthen the EC’s position in the decision-making process. This unit would complement the activities of the EEAS and prepare materials for the Security College, which consists of Commissioners and the EC President, significantly expanding the EC’s mandate in the security sphere.
The EC Press Service has emphasized that neither the name, staffing, nor the start date of the structure have been determined yet. Its main task will be to coordinate and synthesize information, rather than conduct independent intelligence operations in the field.
The War in Ukraine, Hybrid Threats, and the American Factor
Ursula von der Leyen is using these arguments in a much more tense geopolitical situation than two decades ago. Russia’s protracted war against Ukraine has sped up the debate on defense integration and demonstrated the importance of the ability to quickly process and jointly interpret intelligence data. The new unit is designed to respond to a changing geopolitical and geo-economic environment, where hybrid threats, cyberattacks, sabotage of infrastructure, and information interference by third countries are on the rise.
The transatlantic factor exacerbates these fears. The risk that Donald Trump’s administration will limit the scope of military and intelligence guarantees for Europe is a key topic of discussion. Ursula von der Leyen’s decision to insist on creating the EC’s own intelligence structure is interpreted as an attempt to reduce dependence on the USA and build greater strategic autonomy for the EU against the potential “whims” of future administrations in Washington.
Institutional Competition: the EC Versus the EEAS and the Role of Kaja Kallas
The EC’s plans are sparking debate not only about the sovereignty of member states, but also about the institutional balance within the EU itself. The new unit, reporting to the EC’s General Secretariat, would compete directly with the existing EEAS unit, EU-IntCEN, which reports to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. This can be interpreted as an attempt to further centralize influence in the hands of the EC President at the expense of the EEAS.
Senior EEAS officials are concerned that the new unit would duplicate the work of EU-IntCEN and SIAC, weakening the mandate of existing structures and fragmenting analytical channels. Such duplication could threaten the future of EU-IntCEN, leading to an outflow of experts delegated there and creation of an alternative, overly politicized channel for processing information within the EC. The lack of a single central data processing center could lead to different institutions receiving different assessments of the same crisis – conflicting reports would disrupt the decision-making process more than the lack of data itself.
The dispute also has a personal dimension: Kaja Kallas and Ursula von der Leyen clearly have different visions of the role of the EEAS and the Commission in security policy. The creation of a new unit could be interpreted as a weakening of the EEAS’s mandate and the EC’s takeover of some of its strategic functions.
The Critics’ Position: “Brussels CIA”, Superpower, and Lack of Legitimacy
Institutional rivalry is accompanied by sharp political criticism. Some politicians describe the project as another step towards an “EU superstate” or as an expansion of “bureaucratic oversight and power” that does not lead to any real improvement in citizens’ security. Others speak of a “shadow structure devoid of democratic legitimacy” and even use the term “Brussels CIA”, which has become a vivid symbol of concern among some members of the public. Some factions in the European Parliament emphasize that the creation of a new unit could deepen the democratic deficit, as the EC is not subject to the same oversight mechanisms as national intelligence services.
The Perspective of Member States: Sovereignty, Mistrust, and Voluntariness
Against the background of institutional disputes, the concerns of member states are crucial. Experts point out that national security remains the exclusive competence of states, and the exchange of intelligence has always been one of the most sensitive areas of cooperation. Many states are not inclined to delegate additional powers to the EC. Larger states (such as France and Germany) have historically preferred bilateral cooperation or cooperation within NATO. Smaller states fear the influence of major players on the interpretation of strategic data.
The project does not formally violate the principle of exclusive competence of states in the field of national security, as the new structure will reportedly not have its own operational powers and will be based on voluntary data sharing. However, the key issue of voluntariness and unwillingness to share the most sensitive information will not disappear simply because a new unit is created.
Existing Architecture: EU-IntCEN, SIAC, and Informal Forums
From the point of view of member states, it is also important that the EU already has mechanisms for joint analysis: EU-IntCEN, SIAC, a network of informal forums (the Bern Club [5], the Counter-Terrorism Group), cooperation with NATO, and bilateral cooperation. EU-IntCEN and SIAC provide analytical data, in particular for Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI [6]. Despite the transformations that have taken place since the Lisbon Treaty, EU-IntCEN still relies exclusively on voluntarily provided information and does not have access to national SIGINT and HUMINT systems.
Some member states are wondering what the solution to the problem is: creating a new parallel unit within the EC, or strengthening existing structures – EU-IntCEN, SIAC, and cooperation with the Bern Club?
New Technologies and AI As the Missing Pillar of European Intelligence
The future of European intelligence cooperation will depend on the use of AI, automation, and consolidation of disparate data. Europol already uses AI to analyze criminal behavior, identify patterns, and predict the activities of organized criminal groups. The same technologies can be adapted to analyze geopolitical threats: cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and the financing of hostile states.
Only the widespread use of AI can enable the creation of a European early warning system that operates at the pace of modern hybrid operations. The EC sees AI as a tool to overcome the two biggest weaknesses of the current system: data fragmentation and delays resulting from the voluntary rather than formalized nature of cooperation.
Comparison with Other Models: Five Eyes, NATO, and the Bern Club
Plans for the potential creation of an EU intelligence structure should also be compared with existing models of intelligence cooperation. An example of this is the Five Eyes alliance (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), which relies on deep integration based on a shared culture, language, and trust – a model that the EU is unable to replicate fully due to the number of states and divergent interests.
NATO structures (JISD, NIFC [7]) are data sharing centers, not operational agencies – the EU could create a civilian-political version of such a system. The most “European” model remains the Bern Club – a voluntary, informal platform of service leaders, important but delicate. The new EC structure, if properly formed, could become a link between the Bern Club and EU institutions.
Possible Scenarios of Development
1. A “small analytical structure” in the EC – the minimal scenario, but the most politically plausible. It involves the creation of a small team of analysts in the EU General Secretariat, without operational capabilities, who coordinate the work of the directors-general and work closely with the EEAS. Some experts suggest that such a structure could be launched relatively quickly if it does not encounter strong resistance from member states.
2. A “European CIA” – a fully-fledged, functioning EU intelligence service. This option would require amendments to treaties, transfer of some sovereignty, creation of HUMINT and SIGINT structures, and a common intelligence policy [8]. Currently, there is no political majority in Europe to adopt such a project.
3. An AI-based “integrated intelligence network” is a technological scenario that does not require radical changes to agreements. The EU could create an integrated analytical system using AI, satellite data, big data, and information provided by existing agencies (Europol, Frontex, EU-IntCEN), while preserving the formal sovereignty of states in the field of intelligence operations. This solution could be a compromise between the need for “analytical autonomy” and real political constraints.
Alternative: Strengthening Europol and Frontex
It should be noted that instead of creating a completely new intelligence structure under the auspices of the EC, the EU could achieve some of its goals more quickly and easily by strengthening the existing agencies – first of all Europol and Frontex [9]. Europol is currently the most technologically advanced analytical platform in the EU, using AI to identify criminal patterns, consolidate data, and predict the behavior of criminal groups. Analysts argue that these same mechanisms can be applied in areas closely related to national security, such as cybercrime, cross-border crime, money laundering, and networks of connections between state and non-state actors.
Frontex, for its part, has unique access to data on migration movements, cross-border flows, and the situation at the EU’s external borders. Strengthening its analytical capabilities and integrating it with satellite data and AI tools could transform it into a key element of an early warning system, particularly in the field of hybrid threats and destabilizing activities. Expanding the mandates and budgets of Europol and Frontex would have several advantages: greater political acceptability (as these are already existing structures), no need for amendments to agreements, natural links with member states, and reduced risk of conflicts of competence with the EEAS and EU-IntCEN. In this context, a new EC unit could serve as a coordinator and hub for information sharing from these agencies, rather than as the core of a separate “Brussels service”.
Striving for European Information Autonomy
An analysis of published materials on the possibility of creating a supranational EU intelligence service raises a fundamental question: does the return to this idea stem solely from institutional ambitions or from a growing geopolitical necessity? As analysts point out, the EU is facing for the first time the real challenge of building its own information autonomy in a world where intelligence is no longer the domain of human analysis alone, but rather a system combining data, algorithms, and AI. The war in Ukraine, uncertainty in relations with the USA, and the escalation of hybrid threats have highlighted that the current EU security architecture is too slow, too fragmented, and at the same time dependent on the will of individual states pursuing their own national interests.
The EC’s new intelligence unit – regardless of whether it remains a limited analytical unit or becomes the core of a broader structure – opens a new stage in the transition from Europe as a market and regulator to Europe as an intelligence and strategic actor, but at the same time it is a manifestation of federalist tendencies. This may mean that the EU is moving towards a kind of “superpower”, and attempts to create it should be seen not only as an instrument of technical coordination but also as a catalyst for growing trends of centralization within the EU and the strengthening of the role of its institutions at the expense of national competences. Besides, there is a tendency to attempt to build a security architecture in Europe that is separate from the USA.
For this reason, the final direction of this project will depend on several factors:
• the political will of the member states, which will determine whether they agree to further transfer powers to Brussels;
• the balance between the EC and the EEAS, which will determine whether the project will be a stimulus for integration or a source of institutional disputes;
• the pace of AI technology development in the security sector, which may shift the focus of intelligence analysis to the EU level;
• the willingness to strengthen the existing agencies such as Europol and Frontex, which for many states remain a more acceptable instrument of security integration than the creation of a new, potentially competing intelligence structure.
Depending on how these factors work, the project could be a catalyst for deeper integration or another area of contention over the limits of national sovereignty in the European Union.
Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations
Notes:
[1] A series of armed conflicts that took place between 1991 and 2001 and were a manifestation of disintegration processes in the federal state. They consisted of the desire of the peoples of Yugoslavia to gain their independence and the desire of predominantly Serbian forces to prevent this. The wars ended with the creation of new independent states: Bosnia and Herzegovina; North Macedonia; Serbia; Slovenia; Croatia; Montenegro; Kosovo (with limited diplomatic recognition).
[2] Acronym for Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity.
[3] The service responsible for implementing the EU’s international relations (effectively performing the functions of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs). It reports to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
[4] For more details, see “Is It Realistic to Create a European Intelligence Agency?” // https://bintel.org.ua/analytics/voenni-voprosy/u-yevrosoyuzu-vinikla-potreba-stvoriti-rozviduvalnu-koordinacijnu-agenciyu/
[5] An informal forum created in 1971 for the exchange of intelligence and discussion of current issues of intelligence activities between the special services of EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland. The Bern Club has no secretariat and does not make any decisions that are binding on EU special services. Created after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Counter-Terrorism Group acts as a link between the Bern Club and the EU leadership. Its leadership rotates in the same way as the EU presidency.
[6] The operation began on March 31, 2020, to monitor compliance with the UN arms embargo on Libya in order to help restore stability in the country. The mission has the right to inspect ships at sea off the coast of Libya if there is suspicion that they may be carrying weapons or other goods for such purposes to or from Libya. The mission also collects relevant information on attempts to circumvent the embargo and forwards it to the UN. In addition, data are being collected on illegal exports of oil and petroleum products from Libya, and assistance is being provided to improve the professionalism of the Libyan coast guard and navy in order to counter networks involved in the illegal transportation of migrants to Europe.
[7] Acronyms from English names – Joint Intelligence and Security Division and NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre.
[8] It should be noted that Western experts have long called for the formation of a common European intelligence policy. See, for example, an article by Ole R. Villadsen, published back in 2000. “Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy”. // https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/ propsects-euro-common-policy.pdf At the same time, the author made a disappointing prediction even then: “Although European cooperation in the field of intelligence will improve significantly, it is likely to remain decentralized and predominantly reactive, and is unlikely to pose a serious compatition to NATO in the near future.”
[9] Full name: European Border and Coast Guard Agency. It is responsible for coordinating the activities of national border services and ensuring the security of EU member states’ borders with other countries.
